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This thesis is an examination of the diplomatic career of Arthur Wellesley, 1st Duke 
of Wellington between 1814-30. The Duke’s significant contributions to foreign 
policy-making have been an area neglected by historians. Occupying a central position 
in British politics during this time, this neglect has distorted both assessments of his 
career and of the wider domestic and foreign contexts.  There is nothing in the extant 
literature that offers a thorough analysis of Wellington’s diplomatic experiences and 
his role in the framing and executing of British foreign policy. This work fills that 
lacuna. It takes a wide look at Wellington’s involvement in the conduct of British 
diplomacy and highlights the crucial formative experiences during his time on the 
Continent 1814-18 and the impact these had for his future policies.  By looking at the 
full scope of Wellington’s foreign policy for the first time, this thesis enables scholars 
to have a more comprehensive view of the conduct of politics during the tumultuous 
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Few figures have received the attention that Arthur Wellesley, 1st Duke of Wellington, 
has been accorded. Remembered as one of Britain’s greatest military leaders, the Duke 
has been the subject of numerous biographies.1 But most of these, and most of the 
wider literature on him, have focused almost solely on the relatively few years of his 
service in the field, especially in the Peninsula and at Waterloo. One biography devotes 
a mere 36 pages to the entire period from his return to Britain in 1818 until his death 
in 1852.2 For a man who would go on to serve in Cabinet for the best part of seventeen 
years, in four different stints, including time as Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, 
this is a notable omission. Indeed, his political career took up much more of his life 
than his military one.3 
Wellington was, furthermore, deeply involved in many of the principal 
political questions of his day. From the trial of Queen Caroline, through Catholic 
Emancipation, Reform and the Repeal of the Corn Laws, the Duke played an 
important, and often pivotal, part in each. The politics of Britain between the end of 
the Napoleonic Wars and the start of the Crimean War simply cannot be understood 
without reference to Wellington and his political views. Though neglected for a long 
time, this aspect of his career has had more light cast upon it in recent years, beginning 
with Neville Thompson’s biography that focuses solely on the years after 1815 and 
culminating in Rory Muir’s magisterial two volume biography. This was spurred by 
                                                 
1 The best, and most recent, are the two volumes by Rory Muir: R. Muir, Wellington: The Path 
to Victory 1769-1814 (Yale and London, 2013) [hereafter referred to as Muir, Wellington, vol. I]; R. 
Muir, Wellington: Waterloo and the Fortunes of Peace, 1814-1852 (Yale and London, 2015) [hereafter 
referred to as Muir, Wellington, vol. II]. Others include, P. Guedalla, The Duke (Kingswood, 1931); E. 
Longford, Wellington: The Years of the Sword (London, 1970); E. Longford, Wellington: Pillar of State 
(London, 1972); N. Thompson, Wellington After Waterloo (London, 1986); C. Hibbert, Wellington: A 
Personal History (London, 1998); R. Holmes, Wellington: The Iron Duke (London, 2003).  
2 Holmes, Wellington, pp. 257-293. 
3 Wellington is not alone in the neglect he has received. The 14th Earl of Derby, the longest 
serving Conservative leader and three-time Prime Minister, had no biography prior to the recent 
volumes by Angus Hawkins. A. Hawkins, The Forgotten Prime Minister: The 14th Earl of Derby 
Volume I: Ascent, 1799-1851 (Oxford, 2009) & The Forgotten Prime Minister: The 14th Earl of Derby: 
Volume II: Achievement, 1851-1869 (Oxford, 2011). 
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Wellington’s papers entering public ownership under the national heritage legislation. 
Since then, it has been possible to take a much wider view of his career, further 
encouraged by the regular Wellington Congresses, and the ensuing publications, 
Wellington Studies.4 The contributions in these volumes have vastly expanded the 
horizons of scholars working on the Duke and enriched our understanding of the age 
in which he lived.  
Historians looking at the career of the Duke of Wellington also have access to 
a veritable goldmine of published primary material – over 40 volumes of his 
correspondence have been released over the years. Two sets in particular form an 
important component of this thesis. Both edited by Arthur, 2nd Duke of Wellington, 
the Supplementary Despatches (WSD) and its continuation, informally known as the 
Wellington New Despatches (WND), a convention followed here, they include almost 
all the correspondence, both domestic and foreign, of the Duke on diplomatic 
questions over the years this thesis covers.5 They make up an invaluable resource for 
the historian interested in Wellington’s career and are supplemented by numerous 
other published sources, most notably, the diaries of Harriett Arbuthnot, Wellington’s 
close friend and the wife of Charles Arbuthnot.6 
Despite the amount of material available, and the advances in scholarship made 
in recent years, there remains one notable lacuna in the historiography surrounding 
the Duke of Wellington: foreign policy. This is an odd omission given the very 
                                                 
4 Wellington Studies I, ed. C.M. Woolgar (Southampton, 1996); Wellington Studies II, ed. C.M. 
Woolgar (Southampton, 1998); Wellington Studies III, ed. C.M. Woolgar (Southampton, 1999); 
Wellington Studies IV, ed. C.M. Woolgar (Southampton, 2008); Wellington Studies V, ed. C.M. 
Woolgar (Southampton, 2013). An earlier volume also arose out of the transfer of the papers to 
Southampton: Wellington: Studies in the Military and Political Career of the First Duke of Wellington, 
ed. N. Gash (Manchester, 1990). 
5 Supplementary Despatches, Correspondence and Memoranda of Field Marshal Arthur, Duke 
of Wellington, K.G., ed. the 2nd Duke of Wellington, 15 vols. (London, 1858-72) [WSD]; Despatches, 
Correspondence, and Memoranda of Field Marshal Arthur, Duke of Wellington, K.G., ed. the 2nd Duke 
of Wellington ‘in continuation of the former series’, 8 vols. (London, 1857-80) [WND]. The printed 
correspondence was compared with the archival copies for 1814 from the Wellington Papers at the 
University of Southampton and for 1828 from the Aberdeen Mss. at the British Library. There were 
very few differences between the contents and no substantive correspondence was left out. For the years 
1819-30, the WND have largely formed the primary basis of the research into the Duke’s 
correspondence on matters of foreign policy. However, the quoted material below has come directly 
from the Wellington Papers, using the excellent Wellington Papers Database, available at 
www.archives.soton.ac.uk/wellington/. Any significant differences between the published and the 
archival material have been noted, and the reference to both has been given in the footnotes.  
6 The Journal of Mrs Arbuthnot, 1820-1832, eds. F. Bamford & the Duke of Wellington, 2 
vols. (London, 1950). 
7 
 
prominent role that he played in its formation, and the important place he occupied in 
the diplomatic discourse of Europe. Yet this aspect of his career has received scant 
attention. Out of the 53 chapters in the five volumes of Wellington Studies, only two 
deal explicitly with this subject.7 Even the more political biographies of him devote 
almost no space to foreign policy. Thompson, for example, writes two pages on 
Wellington’s mission to St Petersburg in 1826 and then nothing else on the question 
of Greek independence, the Treaty of London, the Russo-Turkish War or the Treaty 
of Adrianople.8 These were issues to which the Duke devoted a substantial portion of 
his time and correspondence. Foreign policy was undoubtedly the area of policy where 
Wellington most consistently directed his attention over these years and not to 
examine it in the detail it deserves leaves the historical picture of him limited in the 
richness of its colour palette.  
This issue, however, is not one that is solely limited to the writing around 
Wellington. Foreign policy is always an area that is very closely related to domestic 
politics, but the historiography of each often inhabit completely different worlds, with 
limited contact between them.9 This distorts both, and leaves us with an incomplete 
understanding of the role, aims and policies figures that straddle them, such as the 
Duke. Paul Schroeder’s Transformation of European Politics is one of the most 
important works when examining European diplomacy in this period, yet Schroeder 
simply says ‘[c]ontingent factors made some difference’ to the choices Wellington’s 
Government made during the Russo-Turkish War.10 As will be explored below, this is 
                                                 
7 M. Chamberlain, ‘The soldier and the classicist: Wellington, Aberdeen and the Eastern 
Question, 1828-30’ Wellington Studies III, pp. 136-51; P. Jupp, ‘The foreign policy of Wellington’s 
government, 1828-30’ Wellington Studies III, pp. 152-83. 
8 Thompson, Wellington after Waterloo, pp. 52-3. Rory Muir does go into far more detail than 
any other biographer on diplomatic matters, but the sheer scale and ambition of his work means that 
foreign policy is but one minor aspect in the rich and varied life that Wellington led. Muir, Wellington, 
vols. I & II, passim. 
9 On this issue, see T.G. Otte, ‘“Avenge England's Dishonour”: By-Elections, Parliament and 
the Politics of Foreign Policy in 1898’, in English Historical Review, vol. 121, issue 491 (2006), pp. 
385-428 & ibid., ‘“Chief of all Office”: High Politics, Finance and Foreign Policy, 1865-1914’, in The 
Primacy of Foreign Policy, 1660-2000: How Strategic Concerns Shaped Modern Britain, eds. B. 
Simms & W. Mulligan (Basingstoke and New York, 2010), pp. 232-248. 
10 P. Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics 1763-1848 (Oxford, 1994), p. 661. 
See J. Black and H. Kleinschmidt, ‘Schroeder Reconsidered or the Limitations of the Systems 
Approach’, Diplomacy & Statecraft, ii (2000), pp. 257-70 for an in-depth examination of some of the 
drawbacks of Schroeder’s approach. T.G. Otte, ‘‘A Janus- like Power: Great Britain and the European 
Concert, 1814- 1853’, in Das europäische Mächtekonzert: Fridens- und Sicherheitspolitik vom Weiner 
Kongrβ 1815 bis zum Krimkrieg 1853, ed. W. Pyta (Köln: Bölau Verlag, 2009) deals specifically with 
how Britain cannot simply be placed within a systemic view of European diplomacy in these years. For 
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a wildly inadequate phrase to describe the domestic factors that affected the decision 
making of the Duke and his ministers. Likewise, the direction of foreign policy needs 
to form a part of our understanding of how domestic politics developed: the 
deterioration of the relationship between Wellington and Canning over diplomatic 
questions was central to the shifting party political sands of the 1820s.  
While there have been various attempts in recent years to bridge the gap 
between domestic politics and foreign policy in the mid-nineteenth century, these have 
thus far not particularly extended into the first third of the century.11 This is a problem 
both on the general level of needing further literature to understand each aspect of 
policy, and a problem relating specifically to Wellington. This is because, while his 
biographers have devoted very little space to his foreign policy, he frequently appears 
in more specialised literature on diplomatic questions. The Duke forms a central 
antagonist in Harold Temperley’s work on George Canning, figures prominently in 
Bruce Collins’ book on British expansion in the Napoleonic epoch and is a major 
figure in Edward Ingram’s examination of the Great Game.12 Though works such as 
this go some way to address the deficiencies of Wellington’s biographers, they have 
served to create a piecemeal picture. The absence of an overarching analysis of the 
Duke’s experiences of foreign policy, the influences on his thought and the influence 
he exerted on British and European diplomacy has significantly limited our 
understanding of these years.  
This thesis seeks to provide that analysis. From 1814 through to 1830, 
Wellington was central to the formation and execution of British foreign policy. Only 
between April 1827 and January 1828 was the Duke neither in Cabinet nor some other 
important diplomatic position. He served first as Ambassador to France, then replaced 
Lord Castlereagh as British plenipotentiary to the Congress of Vienna. After the 
interlude caused by Napoleon’s escape from Elba, he spent the next three years as 
Commander-in-Chief of the Army of Occupation in France – a role that straddled both 
                                                 
a slightly earlier period, see T. Goldsmith, ‘Ignorant and Indifferent? British Diplomatic Attitudes 
towards Europe, 1801-4’, The International History Review, vol. 38, issue 4 (2016), pp. 657-74.  
11 For example, D. Brown, Palmerston and the Politics of Foreign Policy 1846-55 
(Manchester, 2002); D. Brown, Palmerston: A Biography (New Haven, 2010); G. Hicks, Peace, War 
and Party Politics: The Conservatives and Europe, 1846-1859 (Manchester, 2007). One exception is J. 
Bew, Castlereagh, Enlightenment, War and Tyranny (London, 2011). 
12 H. Temperley, The Foreign Policy of Canning 1822-1827: England, The Neo-Holy Alliance, 
and The New World (London, 1925); B. Collins, War and Empire: The Expansion of Britain 1790-
1830 (Harlow, 2010); E. Ingram, The Beginning of the Great Game in Asia 1828-1834 (Oxford, 1979). 
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military and diplomatic responsibilities. From Wellington’s return to Britain in 
January 1819 following the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, through to Canning’s 
ascension to power in 1827, the Duke sat in Cabinet as Master-General of the 
Ordnance, though his responsibilities went far beyond the formal duties of his position. 
During that time, he was also plenipotentiary at the Congress of Verona and for a 
special mission to St Petersburg in 1826. He then served as Prime Minister between 
January 1828 and November 1830.  
Though Wellington continued to have a prominent role in British politics, 
including as caretaker Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary during Peel’s Hundred 
Days, the period after 1830 marks a distinct period from what came before. This is 
because of two factors, one related to the Duke personally and one to the wider 
European diplomatic situation. His fall from power in 1830, and even more his failure 
to form an administration in 1832, marked an important shift in Wellington’s domestic 
position. In both cases the conduct of his closest political ally, Sir Robert Peel, was 
crucial, and the Duke’s realisation of his indispensability led him to thrust the 
leadership of the Conservative Party and the Premiership upon Peel in 1834. As never 
before in his career, including between 1828 and 1830, Wellington was now explicitly 
a party political figure, and the clear leader of the Tory peers in the House of Lords, 
as Peel led the party in the House of Commons.13 Wellington’s acknowledgement of 
his colleague’s leadership, as well as retreat from his earlier, stated, position of being 
above politics, fundamentally altered his role in the formation of foreign policy. This 
was especially the case because, as Richard Gaunt notes, ‘[t]he largest area of 
disagreement between them, perhaps unsurprisingly, arose in matters of foreign and 
defence policy’.14 Added to the fact that he was out of office for much of the time from 
1830 until his death, Wellington clearly no longer held the influential place he had in 
the period this thesis covers. The realities of party political opposition to foreign policy 
were very different from the leading role he had earlier held in the making of it, and 
require their own study. 
The other factor that altered Wellington’s place in British foreign policy 
formation, and divided the period covered from that which follows, is the dramatic 
                                                 
13 See R.A. Gaunt, ‘Wellington, Peel and the Conservative Party’, in Wellington Studies V, pp. 
262-85. 
14 Ibid., p. 275.  
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alteration in the European diplomatic situation. This was caused by the French 
Revolution of July 1830, which was followed swiftly by another in Belgium. Added 
to the Great Reform Act in Britain, the rising power of the press and the more 
confrontational and ideological portrayal of foreign policy by Palmerston, the result 
was that the diplomatic landscape was very different to the one he had operated in 
previously. Indeed, Wellington admitted that much himself. When he took over the 
Foreign Office in 1834, he wrote to Sir Herbert Taylor, telling him ‘I am hard at work 
to make myself master of our foreign policy, which is certainly strangely altered in 
four years’. In the circumstances, he told Taylor that he was ‘convinced that it is not 
possible to do more at present than to ascertain and observe the working of the existing 
system, and to see where it is necessary and possible to alter it gradually and to 
preserve the general peace’. In Wellington’s opinion, ‘if any [change] should be 
attempted it ought to be very gradual, and […] none ought to be attempted that a sense 
of justice does not dictate and require, till we shall be quite certain that we have a 
Government at home’.15 Stable domestic circumstances would not come until after he 
had left the Foreign Office, however, and Wellington would never fully master the 
changed circumstances after 1830. 
If 1814-30 then forms a coherent period in Wellington’s relationship with 
foreign policy, it nevertheless contained four distinct phases within it. The first was 
from the conclusion of the Peninsular War in 1814, through to the Duke’s attendance 
at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818 that ended his time as Commander-in-
Chief of the Army of Occupation. These years were spent, almost without break, on 
the Continent, and marked the high point of Wellington’s influence over European 
affairs. As Commander-in-Chief, the Duke was in charge of the very first multilateral 
peace keeping force that had been seen and he exercised considerable sway over the 
Ambassadorial Conference in Paris, that was meant to oversee him and served as a 
clearing ground for any major problems in France. Furthermore, Wellington himself 
formed almost a part of the international system. He was the problem solver of last 
resort for difficult issues that could not be settled otherwise, and in this role was in the 
service of Europe as a whole, rather than simply a British figure. It would be 
                                                 
15 Wellington to Taylor, 27 Dec. 1834, Wellington II: Political Correspondence November 




Wellington to whom the Great Powers turned to decide the matter of a reduction of 
soldiers in France and its form, for him to deal with the question of the amount of 
reparations that France owed after the wars, and the related matter of a loan to the 
French Government. He would also be asked to arbitrate in the ongoing conflict 
between Spain and her American colonies, a task that the Duke declined due to the 
sheer complexity and fluid nature of what was going on.  
The second phase lasted from Wellington’s return in 1818 to the death of Lord 
Castlereagh in 1822. During this time, the habits of familiarity, personal diplomacy 
and frank communication that the two had formed during their times together on the 
Continent, and through their correspondence when separated, left the Duke as the 
Foreign Secretary’s chief lieutenant. Time and time again they had proved themselves 
to be a close and effective team in earlier years and they continued in this vein once 
Wellington had joined the Cabinet. They shared an understanding of the way the 
European system operated that was almost unique to them amongst their colleagues. 
Without Wellington’s considerable prestige, Castlereagh might well have had much 
more difficulty in following his preferred course. The nature of their cooperation 
meant that they acted together, rather than duplicate each other’s efforts. Wellington 
would often use personal means through the substantial network of contacts he had 
established in Europe, and would often deploy more legalistic and military arguments 
to support Castlereagh’s broader ones. As will be explored below, this would be most 
notably the case in 1820 over the question of revolution in Spain and the role of the 
European alliance.  
The Congress of Verona of late 1822 formed an interlude between 
Castlereagh’s suicide and the third phase that would revolve around Wellington’s 
relationship with George Canning. It is, however, notable in one significant way: the 
deterioration of the Duke’s relationship with Metternich, the Austrian Chancellor and 
leading figure in European diplomacy. Prior to Verona, it seems that Wellington and 
Metternich had a reasonably friendly, professional relationship. There seems to be no 
evidence for any particular closeness between them, but nor do there appear any causes 
for complaint.16 The Congress, however, changed matters. Though they began by 
                                                 
16 Webster notes that Metternich, along with Tsar Alexander, ‘in the last resort […] looked to 
him as much as to their own Ambassadors’ to solve diplomatic problems while Commander-in-Chief. 
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cooperating to control Tsar Alexander, their relationship soon soured and Wellington 
would complain of Metternich’s narrow-minded focus on Austrian interests.17 By the 
end of the Congress, Wellington felt deserted and betrayed by the Austrian Chancellor 
and his faith in him and Austria never recovered, to his own detriment when he came 
to deal with the Eastern Question as Prime Minister.18 
When the Duke returned to Britain, he found a drastically altered situation. 
Although George Canning largely pursued the same objectives as his predecessor, his 
methods were very different. If Wellington and Castlereagh’s formative experiences 
as diplomats had been based on their experiences of personal diplomacy on the 
Continent, Canning had no such background. A great orator, he was far more 
concerned with the Parliamentary situation and his tactics were geared towards it.19 
Wellington’s instinct was not to cultivate Parliamentary majorities, or appeal to public 
opinion, but instead to reach out to the Continental powers and settle matters amicably, 
without drawing public attention to any differences between them. Furthermore, he 
was aware of the weaknesses of Britain’s position within Europe. While Canning 
viewed her detached maritime position as an element of strength, Wellington believed 
it could also compromise her. There always remained the prospect that the other 
powers would come together to Britain’s detriment. This had almost happened in the 
closing stages of the Napoleonic Wars and the fear of a repeat was never too far from 
Wellington’s mind. Only after 1830 would it seem that the divisions between the July 
Monarchy in France and the Eastern Powers of Russia, Prussia and Austria were so 
insurmountable that Palmerston could pursue the more boisterous policy. In the 
meantime, the differences between Canning and Wellington would lead to an 
incredibly fractious relationship, that saw a bitter and drawn out battle between them 
in Cabinet over the direction of policy, and eventually for the Premiership itself. 
Canning’s eventual succession to the premiership instead of Wellington, only 
to be followed swiftly by his death, inaugurated the final phase of this period, during 
which the Duke’s formal influence over foreign policy reached its zenith after he 
                                                 
C.K. Webster The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh 1815-1822: Britain and the European 
Alliance (London, 1947), p. 75. 
17 Wellington to Canning, 5 Nov. 1822, Wellington Mss., WP1/738/4 (also in WND, vol. I, pp. 
492-507). 
18 Wellington to Canning, 22 Nov. 1822, Wellington Mss., WP1/739/3 (also in WND, vol. I, 
pp. 562-9). 
19 Temperley, Foreign Policy of Canning, passim.  
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became Prime Minister in January 1828. However, in many ways, his actual influence 
was less than it had been even while Canning had held the seals of the Foreign Office. 
Wellington found himself constrained by the legacies of Canning’s and Goderich’s 
short governments; by colleagues who often disagreed with his suggestions; by 
financial constraints; and by an international situation that was fractious and not 
amenable to easy solutions. Though Schroeder has commended Wellington and his 
Foreign Secretary, Lord Aberdeen, as the ‘implausible contenders for the prize of 
having done most to keep Europe peaceful and on the rails in 1828-30’, their actions 
do not justify such praise.20 While the constraints on him were certainly considerable, 
Wellington nevertheless failed to ever get a grip on the situation. There was a distinct 
lack of strategic clarity, and the result was a policy of drift which left Britain facing 
the worst of all worlds as she had to confront Russian and French expansionism on her 
own. To describe them as understanding and practising ‘the art of damage control, the 
use of pacts of restraint, and the wisdom of accepting the inevitable and muddling 
through’, is to ignore the bitterness, anger and sense of frustration that ran through 
Wellington’s correspondence in these years.21 Many of the developments during his 
three years in office happened against his wishes and best attempts to prevent them, 
from the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish War, through the dispatch of French troops to 
the Morea, to the unsatisfactory Treaty of Adrianople and the French expedition to 
Algiers.  
Despite the foreign policy failures of his Government, Wellington emerges 
from this analysis of the period from 1814-30 as a much more substantial and rounded 
diplomatic figure than has previously been appreciated. He was certainly not an 
‘Ultra’, as he has recently been described, or a reactionary, irrespective of his 
correspondence with people who might more appropriately fit that term.22 Indeed, on 
certain issues he would be a proactive campaigner, as when he negotiated with the 
French Government to try and secure the abolition of the Slave Trade.23 He was also 
a pragmatist. Seeing the threat of a bitter reaction following the return of Ferdinand 
VII to Spain in 1814, the Duke sought to use his influence to encourage a ‘moderate’ 
                                                 
20 Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, p. 663. 
21 Ibid., p. 664. 
22 J. Mori, ‘How Women Make Diplomacy: The British Embassy in Paris, 1815-1841’, Journal 
of Women’s History, vol. 27 (Winter 2015), p. 140. 
23 See below and P. M. Kielstra, The Politics of Slave Trade Suppression in Britain and 
France, 1814-48: Diplomacy, Morality and Economics (Basingstoke, 2000). 
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and ‘practicable’ constitutional settlement.24 His advice was not followed, and when 
Spain erupted in revolution in 1820, once again Wellington wrote that no matter what 
his feelings towards the Constitution of 1812, which the revolutionaries sought to 
impose, he much preferred that to the capitulation of the King.25 In 1826, seeing the 
intractable struggle then being waged in Greece, he was of the opinion that there could 
be no return to direct Ottoman rule. Some other arrangement would need to be 
reached.26 
Wellington tried to hold himself above the political disputes that swirled 
around him, and indeed held the idea of political principles in disdain. In 1828, he 
would complain that he would hear a ‘great deal of Whig principles and Tory 
principles and liberal principles and Mr. Canning's principles, but I confess that I have 
never seen a definition of any of them and cannot make to myself a clear idea of what 
any of them mean’.27 This kind of attitude would be both a strength and a weakness 
for Wellington. While his lofty detachment had enabled him to assume an international 
role within the European system and then an initial position somewhat above party 
politics in Britain, it would go on to damage him as time went on. His reluctance to 
accept that he had come to play a new part as a politician was to ignore reality. As 
Rory Muir has argued, the Duke’s rejection of the Foreign Office in 1822 and his 
advocacy of Canning was the moment that marked ‘Wellington’s great refusal – the 
failure to accept that his active career as a soldier was over, and to embrace his position 
as a leading politician and Cabinet minister.’ The Duke’s reluctance was genuine and 
to ‘justify this indulgence to himself, he argued that whoever was foreign secretary 
would inevitably see the world much as he and Londonderry saw it, and would pursue 
similar policies. He was deluding himself’.28 From then on, Wellington’s failure to 
embrace the concept of ‘principles’, as opposed to a more pragmatic and legalistic 
approach, would undermine his position as he was unable to establish a broader basis 
of support among his colleagues in Cabinet, in Parliament and amongst the wider 
                                                 
24 Wellington to Liverpool, 9 May 1814, Wellington Mss., WP1/417. 
25 Wellington to Alava, 21 Feb. 1820, Wellington Mss., WP1/640/21 (also in WND, vol. I, pp. 
98-101). 
26 Wellington to Bathurst, Berlin, 17 Feb. 1826, in WND, vol. III, pp. 113-6. 
27 Draft memorandum on the retirement of Huskisson and Palmerston from Office, Wellington, 
post-25 May 1828, Wellington Mss., WP1/980/29 (also in WND, vol. IV, pp. 451-5). 
28 Muir, Wellington, vol. I, p. 187. Castlereagh became Lord Londonderry after his father’s 
death in 1821. This thesis will follow the usual convention of continuing to refer to him as Castlereagh 
even after the inheritance of the Londonderry title. 
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public. It has further damaged his posthumous reputation as a diplomat, as evidenced 
by the previous lack of a full study of Wellington and foreign policy.  
Nevertheless, it is possible to give a more precise definition of what 
Wellington was as well as what he was not. In his temperament, the Duke was a High 
Tory. He fits within Boyd Hilton’s definition of someone who ‘tended to work ad hoc 
through influential contacts and officials’.29 While Hilton refers to the economic 
sphere rather than the diplomatic, the definition nevertheless encapsulates 
Wellington’s broad approach to foreign policy. Ideologically though, it is perhaps 
more appropriate to describe the Duke as a pragmatic international legitimist. If a 
rather cumbersome phrase, it identifies the key strands in Wellington’s thoughts and 
actions through this time, in order of decreasing importance. While not a reactionary, 
the Duke did believe clearly that legitimate institutions were the best means of 
preserving peace, and monarchies on a broad foundation the surest guarantee of social 
cohesion. More important than domestic institutions were the norms and modes of 
behaviour in the international system. Wellington viewed those High Tory 
connections with the international elite as the primary means of preserving peace. 
Policy should be conducted and framed in a way that provided the smoothest path for 
all international partners and that avoided conflict and public breaks between the Great 
Powers. But, above all else, Wellington was a pragmatist. If Peel has been seen as the 
‘embodiment of pragmatism’ domestically, the Duke was that in the international 
arena.30 This was in a truer sense than Peel, in that he adopted new positions ‘while 
continuing deep down to believe in the merits of the old one’.31 He disdained and 
disliked revolutions and constitutions, but realised that the former should not be 
opposed in France in 1830, and the latter should be adopted in Spain if it helped 
preserve the monarchy. Likewise, despite his earlier habits of cooperation with 
Metternich at Vienna and Aix-la-Chapelle, Verona demonstrated to him the folly of 
Congresses and he would oppose resorting to them just as much as Canning would. 
Thus Wellington embodied a peculiar pragmatic internationalist legitimism and rather 
demonstrated Richard Gaunt’s warnings that the various streams of British foreign 
                                                 
29 B. Hilton, A Mad, Bad, and Dangerous People? England 1783-1846 (Oxford, 2006), p. 316. 
See also, B. Hilton, Corn, Cash, Commerce: The Economic Policies of the Tory Governments 1815-
1830 (Oxford, 1977), p. 313.  
30 Hilton, A Mad, Bad, and Dangerous People?, p. 324.  
31 Ibid, p. 392. 
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policy traditions would converge ‘in the same personalities at different periods 
according to contingencies and political manoeuvre’.32  
The Duke was concerned foremost with the preservation of peace, and was 
willing to adopt the broadest range of positions at his disposal to help ensure that. 
However, this pragmatism was nested within his beliefs that legitimate institutions 
were the best means of providing this, and within his internationalist tendencies. Just 
as Richard Gaunt has argued that ‘the reflective association between Ultra-Toryism 
and legitimism, in foreign affairs, should be seriously revised’ so it is necessary to 
review what we understand of the Duke of Wellington and his foreign policy.33 This 
thesis seeks to do that.  
                                                 
32 R.A. Gaunt, ‘From Country Party to Conservative Party: The Ultra-Tories and Foreign 
Policy’, in The Tory World: Deep History and the Tory Theme in British Foreign Policy, 1679-2014, 
ed. J. Black (Farnham, 2015), p. 152. 
33 Ibid, p. 162. 
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From Soldier to 
Statesman 1814-18 
 
For Wellington, and Europe, the spring of 1814 marked a new epoch and a new 
challenge. With the war finally over, the time had arrived at last to make active 
preparations for peace. For as difficult as the conduct of the war had been for all 
involved, over time it had taken on a grim familiarity. The Duke and his colleagues in 
government were part of a generation that had reached political maturity during the 
course of the war. None had any significant experience of peacetime politics. In the 
cabinet, a large number had served their first terms there during the short 
administration of Henry Addington (by now 1st Viscount Sidmouth and Home 
Secretary). This had spanned the Peace of Amiens with both the Prime Minister, 
Robert Banks Jenkinson, 2nd Earl of Liverpool, and the Foreign Secretary, Robert 
Stewart, Lord Castlereagh, in its ranks. However, the peace had been short-lived. Most 
of it had been spent in diplomatic manoeuvring in anticipation of the outbreak of war 
once more. It had not served as much of an apprenticeship for the challenges those in 
office would face after 1814. War had offered familiarity; peace was now full of 
unknowns. 
This was as true of both the peace-making process and the domestic situation. 
A number of different treaties had been signed and settlements reached over the course 
of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, including that of Amiens for which 
Liverpool had been responsible as Foreign Secretary. However, there had not been 
any all-encompassing arrangement of the kind that the chancelleries of Europe set out 
to create following the defeat of France by the Grand Coalition. The resulting peace 
treaties, of Paris and Vienna, had never been certain outcomes. At various times over 
the previous year, it had seemed that one or more of the continental Powers could have 
made separate arrangements with Napoleon, thus securing their own objectives at the 
expense of Britain’s. Fears of this nature had prompted Lord Castlereagh to take the 
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unprecedented step of joining the European sovereigns at the Allied headquarters to 
take personal charge of the conduct of British diplomacy. 
This experience of an intimate style of personal diplomacy would be an 
important factor in the course of events over the following year, and influence  
Wellington’s actions over the rest of his career. The habits of familiarity engendered 
by their close proximity informed the decisions of the rulers of Europe and facilitated 
the successful conclusion of the large number of difficult questions under discussion. 
These did not always go smoothly and war almost broke out during the negotiations 
at Vienna. Concerns remained about France. Though the Bourbons were trusted, there 
was a continuing fear that revolution could reappear and threaten the post-war order. 
Just as worrying for many, Russia struck a menacing pose in the East of Europe. But 
peace was preserved, a remarkable achievement for all involved in the Vienna 
negotiations.  
Yet it was preserved between the allies only to be shattered by the return of 
Napoleon from Elba in the spring of 1815. Everything that had been built in Vienna 
now looked like it could be torn down again as the French army rallied to its Emperor. 
His defeat at the hands of Wellington’s polyglot army, however, brought a quick end 
to his gamble. With Wellington at the head of the victorious army marching into Paris, 
the Bourbons were restored once more and a second Peace of Paris was negotiated, 
one that would ensure the maintenance of peace with an allied army to occupy France 
as a security measure until the barrier fortresses in the Netherlands were completed.  
Throughout the four years from Napoleon’s first defeat to the withdrawal of 
the Army of Occupation in late 1818, the Duke of Wellington played an important 
diplomatic role for both Britain and Europe more generally. Along with Castlereagh, 
the Duke was the only British statesman on the first rank who had any experience of 
this new personal style of diplomacy. Yet his position was always an ambiguous one. 
This period followed on from success in the Peninsular War, during which he had 
already come to adopt a peculiar place as a British, Spanish, and Portuguese peer and 
commander, and he continued to play a number of roles. After a Parisian intermezzo 
once his pressing military duties were concluded, he embarked on a mission to Spain 
in his capacity as Spanish Commander-in-Chief following Ferdinand VII’s return to 
the throne. A brief sojourn to England followed before the Duke took up his role as 
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the first peacetime ambassador to France, though not before he had made an inspection 
of the defences of the Low Countries. Throughout he remained with military 
responsibilities as British troops were removed from France and claims and other 
issues from the war were tied up. During the autumn he was briefly considered for the 
command of British troops in America, but was instead chosen to replace Castlereagh 
as the chief British plenipotentiary in Vienna. His spell in the Habsburg capital was 
ultimately interrupted by Napoleon’s return, following which the Duke departed to 
take command of the multi-national force gathered in the Low Countries before 
eventually taking over as Commander-in-Chief of the Army of Occupation from 1815-
18. He finally attended the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818, not as a British 
representative, but for all of Europe. He was there as the Commander-in-Chief, his 
final active role as a solider, but also as a statesman, and one clearly in the first rank 
of Europe. 
This chapter will examine this important period both in the life of the Duke of 
Wellington and of Europe generally. In many respects, his experiences during these 
years were defining ones in his transformation from military commander to European 
statesman, and someone able to hold his own with the monarchs and heads of state of 
the Great Powers. As a new international system emerged out of the ashes of 
Napoleonic Europe, so Wellington’s attitudes towards diplomacy and the conduct of 
foreign policy took shape. His experiences in Paris and Vienna would be the 
foundation of his conceptualisation of British foreign policy over the following two 
decades. Furthermore, some of the problems he faced, and the prejudices that were 
evident in dealing with them, would, in turn, provide the basis for some of his later 
difficulties with the cabinet.  
 
Wellington and the Politics of Foreign Policy 1814-18 
Before examining the course of affairs during this period it is worthwhile to consider 
first Wellington’s role in foreign policy making and the nature of his relationship with 
the cabinet. At this time the Duke had never held office at cabinet level, his highest 
position within domestic politics having been Chief Secretary of Ireland. This was far 
from a true indication of his experience though. He had been Governor of 
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Seringapatam in India during his brother’s time as Governor-General; a difficult 
posting in a newly conquered province. On his return from the subcontinent in 1805, 
he established close links with the government and despite his comparatively junior 
rank was regularly consulted by them on military questions.1 Liverpool’s and 
Castlereagh’s confidence in his abilities and their trust in his judgement led to his 
appointment in the Peninsula, and enabled him to resume command after the 
controversial Convention of Cintra that could have crippled his career.  
Over the following years, he conducted a frank correspondence with Lords 
Liverpool, Castlereagh and Bathurst, the three most important cabinet ministers 
concerning the conduct of foreign policy. He was also given far greater latitude in the 
conduct of his operations than most British generals.2 With the arrival of peace in the 
spring of 1814, it was this relationship and trust between Wellington and the leading 
members of the government that was the main assurance of his continued relevance 
beyond the end of hostilities. His personal prestige and domestic popularity, of which 
more will be discussed later, were also important factors and helped to buttress 
decisions of the cabinet. 
Wellington was not, however, merely a prestigious adviser. Instead, he was 
one of the chief formulators of foreign policy. The direction of diplomacy was firmly 
in the hands of Castlereagh, whose opinions overrode all other factors, but the Duke 
was a unique case.3 The Foreign Secretary corresponded with Wellington on terms of 
equals in policy making. While Castlereagh remained ‘the dominating mind’, as 
befitted the responsible minister, as Charles Webster has pointed out, ‘only 
Wellington, whose services as a diplomatist were invaluable to him, had in any way a 
policy of his own’.4 The two worked in tandem and their views on policy were well 
aligned. ‘I believe that your view & mine are precisely the same’, he wrote to 
Castlereagh in August 1814. But, as he went on to explain, he also knew his place and 
did not seek to take a larger role or gain more control of policy if he thought 
Castlereagh was better placed to take the lead: ‘[H]owever well [Sir Charles] Stuart or 
                                                 
1 For example, he was consulted by Windham and Grenville in 1806 over the idea to use sepoys 
to help garrison the Cape and about a potential attack on Mexico, Muir, Wellington, vol. I, p. 185. 
2 British Diplomacy 1813-1815: Select Documents Dealing with the Reconstruction of Europe, 
ed. C.K. Webster (London, 1921) [hereafter BD], p. xxxi.  
3 BD, p. xxxiii.  
4 BD, p. xxxvi.  
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I may understand you I am convinced that neither of us will explain so satisfactorily 
as yourself [to the French Foreign Minister, Prince de Talleyrand] the necessity of 
your previous interview with the ministers of the Allies & the nature of your Concert 
& mediation & it is desirable on this ground that you should come to Paris’.5  
Castlereagh, in turn, valued Wellington’s input. On the crucial question of the 
Low Countries, he refused to give an opinion on even the principle of a proposal before 
having heard from the Duke and from London.6 No other diplomat was accorded such 
a role. Wellington additionally served as an important sounding board for Castlereagh, 
especially for more controversial subjects. The Duke’s intimacy with the Foreign 
Secretary’s diplomacy and his military knowledge meant that the latter used 
Wellington to establish the basis of the case for ejecting, by force if necessary, King 
Joachim Murat, from the throne of Naples. This was even before the Prime Minister 
had been consulted.7 Following Waterloo, these trends intensified. His military 
prestige was so great the cabinet had to agree with him, and as the allies got to the task 
of settling a new peace with France, it was very clearly the Duke and Castlereagh who 
set the tone for Britain.8 
Wellington occupied this position of confidence as he increasingly shared the 
same experiences and viewpoints on international questions as Castlereagh. The 
events of this entire period served to emphasise and strengthen this trend. No other 
British statesman, apart from the Duke and Castlereagh, was engaged in regular 
discussion with sovereigns and leading European ministers. The two came to share the 
same attitude as to what exactly the European system should be.9 Castlereagh 
complained to him in late October 1814: ‘Our misfortune is, that the Powers all look 
to points instead of the general system of Europe, which makes an endless 
complication. You know that Prussia may be brought forward’.10 This similarity of 
views was a factor in the decision to replace Castlereagh with Wellington at the 
Congress in Vienna. As the former wrote to the Duke, ‘There is no person in whom 
the government, the public, or myself could feel the same confidence; and as we have 
                                                 
5 Wellington to Castlereagh, Copy, 18 Aug. 1814, Wellington Mss., WP1/425.  
6 Castlereagh to Wellington, 2 Oct. 1814, in WSD, vol. IX, p. 301. 
7 Wellington to Castlereagh, Copy, 12 Sept. 1814, Wellington Mss., WP1/428. 
8 C.J. Bartlett, Castlereagh (London, 1966), p. 155; Muir, Wellington, vol. II, p.92. 
9 Bartlett, Castlereagh, p. 159. 
10 Castlereagh to Wellington, Private, 20 Oct. 1814, Wellington Mss., WP1/431 (also in WSD, 
vol. IX, p. 357). Emphasis in original.  
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hitherto been, in a great measure, conducting the negotiation together, the business 
would be more familiar to you than to any other person’.11 
The Duke’s personal prestige and popularity were also important factors 
behind this decision. Given the wide-ranging powers accorded to Castlereagh in 
Vienna, which the Duke would also receive, Liverpool argued that ‘such a discretion 
the Prince Regent and his government would not like to entrust to any individual out 
of the Cabinet, except to the Duke of Wellington’. He continued: 
In addition to this consideration, he is the only person after yourself who could 
be expected to have any personal authority over the Allied Sovereigns or their 
ministers, and his name would reconcile the people of this country to 
arrangements which might be viewed with considerable jealousy and distrust 
if concluded by any one who did not possess a large share of public 
confidence.12  
 
The Prime Minister wrote in a similar vein to the Duke himself, noting how 
‘no circumstance will […] give so much confidence at home and abroad as your 
having been selected to succeed him’. On the trust reposed in Castlereagh in Vienna, 
he added that ‘I speak the sentiments of all my colleagues when I say that we should 
have the same confidence in you as we have had in him’.13  
While he remained officially in a subordinate position, this did not reflect his 
true influence. His opinions could not be rejected lightly, and Wellington was able to 
ignore the repeated entreaties of the Prime Minister to get out of Paris when his safety 
seemed in danger in late 1814.14 Though Liverpool stopped short of giving him ‘an 
official order for this purpose’ he did stress that whilst there were advantages in him 
remaining in Paris, ‘we cannot allow ourselves on Public grounds to place them even 
for a moment in comparison with the dangers to which you are exposed’.15 The Duke, 
although ‘entertain[ing] a strong opinion that I must not be lost’, was also aware of the 
importance of him staying. He wrote to Liverpool arguing, ‘to tell you the truth I think 
that under existing Circumstances you cannot at this moment allow me to quit Europe’. 
                                                 
11 Castlereagh to Wellington, n.d. Dec. 1814, in WSD, vol. IX, p. 459. 
12 Liverpool to Castlereagh, 1 Dec. 1814, in WSD, vol. IX, p. 462. 
13 Liverpool to Wellington, 31 Dec. 1814, in WSD, vol. IX, p. 518. 
14 Liverpool to Wellington, Most Secret and Confidential, 4 Nov. 1814, Copy, Liverpool Mss., 
Loan MS 72, vol. 22, ff. 61-68; Liverpool to Wellington, 18 Nov. 1814, Wellington Mss., WP1/434. 
15 Liverpool to Wellington, Copy, Most Secret and Confidential, 13 Nov. 1814, Liverpool 
Mss., Loan MS 72, vol. 22, f. 69 (also published in WSD, vol. IX, pp. 430-1). 
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He went on, ‘I would likewise observe that I flatter myself I am daily becoming of 
more use to Lord Castlereagh here, & I am acquiring more real influence over the 
Gov[ernmen]t & it would not answer all at once to deprive him of this advantage’.16 
In light of this, the Prime Minister could only reply that ‘the Gov[ernmen]t can have 
no idea of urging you to do any thing [sic] which is contrary to your feelings, and 
repugnant to what you consider as due to your Character […] Though we can not 
refrain from looking at your personal Situation with the greatest anxiety We shall be 
perfectly ready to approve & support your Determination whatever it may be’.17 The 
Duke remained until he replaced Castlereagh in Vienna the following year.18 
Wellington, then, was not just a diplomat. He was more a part of the decision-
making group on foreign affairs questions than many of the cabinet, sharing attitudes 
on diplomacy and the European system with Castlereagh. The Foreign Secretary came 
to rely on him for advice and input on broad aspects of policy as well as specific 
territorial and military questions. He was a figure in whom the government and the 
wider public could place their trust, and his prestige not only helped the government 
in the one-to-one diplomatic dealings in which he was involved, but also in helping 
secure wider domestic support for some of the contentious questions that they had to 
grapple with.19  
The Spanish Mission 
Within weeks of the end of the war in 1814, Wellington’s new role as a diplomat as 
well as a soldier found an outlet. The cessation of hostilities, along with the return of 
Ferdinand VII to Spain from his imprisonment in France, served to highlight the 
Duke’s European position. With the King back in Madrid, various groups looked to 
the Duke to offer support to their causes. The Irish-born Spanish general, Joseph 
O’Lawlor, who had served under Wellington during the war, wrote to him in late April 
to apprise him that a number of Spanish generals were plotting to ‘put the King on the 
throne without any limited power’. He informed the Duke that ‘they depend on your 
                                                 
16 Wellington to Liverpool, Private & Confidential, 7 Nov. 1814, Wellington Mss., WP1/435 
(also in WSD, vol. IX, pp. 422-3). 
17 Liverpool to Wellington, Most Secret & Confidential, 21 Nov. 1814, Wellington Mss., 
WP1/434. 
18 Muir, Wellington, vol. II, pp. 19-20. 
19 Wellington’s prestige had long been crucial in supporting the government – without his 
victories in the Peninsula, they would have been in a very difficult situation. J.E. Cookson, Lord 
Liverpool’s Administration: The Crucial Years 1815-1822 (Edinburgh & London, 1975), pp. 2-3. 
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Lordship’s countenancing this plan, and everything else they may undertake’.20 
Similar calls were being made to Henry Wellesley, who rightly argued that ‘it was 
impossible for me to take any active part in support of the measures which I understood 
His Majesty to have in contemplation’. But neither could his brother Wellington, 
‘holding as he did the chief command of the Spanish armies merely with a view to 
offensive operations against the enemy, make any offers of support of the nature 
suggested by the Duke of San Carlos’.21 
Despite this, Wellington decided in May, with the agreement of Castlereagh, 
to set out to Spain to see if he could ‘prevail upon all Parties to be more moderate; & 
to adopt a constitution more likely to be practicable & to [contribute?] to the peace & 
happiness of the [Nation?]’.22 This episode is a further example that Wellington was 
not a dyed-in-the-wool reactionary. As always, the tests for him were utility and 
practicality. Castlereagh supported the Duke’s mission. His ‘visit will be very 
opportune’ given the ‘Critical State’ of matters in Spain. He thought that ‘calling a 
new Cortes to revise the Constitution upon certain liberal and Moderate Principles […] 
may be the best Mode of curing the present Evil’.23 Wellington told his brother that 
Castlereagh had urged him to hasten to Madrid so ‘that I may be in time to prevent 
mischief’.24 
The Duke also thought he would be able to have a decisive say in the outcome 
of the Spanish constitutional question. Although elements in the Spanish army were 
beginning to take different sides in the argument, Wellington reported to Castlereagh 
from Toulouse that he thought he ‘can keep them both quiet’.25 However, by that time, 
Ferdinand VII had already abolished the constitution and imprisoned the leading 
liberals.26 After his arrival in Madrid, the Duke noted that the King’s actions, while 
‘unnecessary’ and ‘highly impolitick’ were still ‘liked by the people at large’. He 
received assurances that Ferdinand would fulfil his promise of granting a constitution 
to which Wellington urged that it was a measure ‘very essential to H.M.’s Credit 
                                                 
20 General O’Lawlor to Wellington, Valencia, 22 April 1814, in WSD, vol. IX, p. 26. 
21 Henry Wellesley to Castlereagh, Valencia, 24 April 1814, in WSD, vol. IX, p. 31. 
22 Wellington to Liverpool, Copy, Paris, 9 May 1814, Wellington Mss., WP1/417. 
23 Castlereagh to Wellington, 9 May 1814, Wellington Mss., WP1/414 (also in WSD, vol. IX, 
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25 Wellington to Castlereagh, Copy, Toulouse, 15 May 1814, Wellington Mss., WP1/417. 
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abroad’.27 In the end, however, the Duke’s influence was less than either he or 
Castlereagh had previously thought, and less, indeed, than during the years of war: ‘I 
have been very well received by the King & his Ministers, but I fear that I have done 
but little good’.28  
This episode would be the first of many such examples in the Duke’s career. 
Despite his unique position in Europe and the fact that he had the ear of monarchs 
across the continent, he would find numerous times that that did not always translate 
into results. Yet this brief episode does display the Duke’s pragmatic side, and that he 
was far from a reactionary. His support for moderation and the granting of a 
constitution show his wish to see all sides reconciled, and a knowledge that any 
extreme response from the Crown or the liberales could only end sooner or later in 
civil war, as was later to be proved true.29 
 
The Paris Embassy I: Wellington and the Slave Trade 
After his Spanish mission, Wellington returned to England for the first time in six 
years. He was not there long though before he embarked for the continent to take up 
his ambassadorship in Paris, via a tour of the Franco-Belgian frontier intended as an 
‘affirmation of British support for the Netherlands’.30 One of the most important 
matters of business that Wellington had to address as ambassador in Paris was the 
issue of the abolition of the slave trade. Despite his later acceptance of Catholic 
Emancipation and his role in marshalling the Corn Law Repeal through the House of 
Lords, the Duke has been more associated by historians with the regressive forces in 
British politics, not the great progressive causes of the age. While he certainly did not 
back reform for its own sake, both of these instances demonstrate a certain brand of 
pragmatism that marked his attitude to politics in general. Though the Wellington 
scholarship remains dominated by his military career, his role in Catholic 
Emancipation and repeal has received some attention.31 In contrast, the Duke’s role in 
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one of the other great causes of the period, the campaign for the abolition of the slave 
trade, has received very little attention. Even in the extant literature on the subject, the 
period of Wellington’s embassy has not been examined in much depth, with the 
notable exception of Paul Michael Kielstra.32 This lack of scholarly attention means 
that Wellington’s role in what was one of the most important political causes of the 
time has been unduly neglected. 
While the war with France had continued, Britain had been able to extend the 
1807 abolition into all the colonies captured from other Powers. But with the return of 
peace in the spring of 1814, it became necessary to replace direct British control with 
a new legal framework of abolition. While this was a straightforward process with 
some states, others posed more difficult challenges, especially Portugal and Spain. 
France though was the key power, for without her adherence to even a limited 
abolition, other Powers would be free to shelter behind her flag and carry on the trade. 
Furthermore, the cooperation of the Iberian Powers and France would be capable of 
blocking British progress on the issue.33 Wellington was a crucial figure in this process 
in France, balancing the calls for abolition from campaigners such as William 
Wilberforce, his ‘Saints’, and Thomas Clarkson with the practical needs of diplomacy. 
After years of absence in the Peninsula without break, it was some surprise to 
Wellington how the issue of abolition was viewed at home when he returned briefly 
in the summer of 1814. Earlier in the spring, a meeting of some of the leading 
abolitionists, and opposition members, had decided to concentrate on the issue of 
international abolition and suspend their agitation to refine the British abolition laws.34 
The failure of the first peace to secure immediate abolition had stirred the emotions of 
the country. Parliament was bombarded with over a quarter of a million signatures on 
petitions relating to the issue.35 During his flying visit, Wellington wrote to his brother 
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Henry Wellesley, the British minister to Spain, about the atmosphere in the country. 
He was ‘unable to describe to you the degree of frenzy existing here about the Slave 
trade’. He noted that ‘People in general appear to think it would suit the Policy of the 
Nation to go to War to put an End to that abominable Traffick, & many wish that we 
should take the field on this new crusade’. The public viewed Spain in very low esteem 
thanks to them giving the most protection to the slave trade and despite the two nations 
being been close allies in the war until a few months previously. Indeed, when 
Wellington intended to drink to the King of Spain’s health at a dinner at the Guildhall, 
the Lord Mayor had to tell him that ‘if the Toast were not positively refused, it would 
at least be received with so much disgust as to render it very disagreeable to me & to 
every well wisher to the Spanish Gov[ernmen]t’. Wellington was also aware of the 
impact that this pressure would have on the Government’s ability to act as it wished. 
He had found it impossible to secure the subsidy due to the King of Spain on the 
condition of just banning the trade north of the equator. Instead, the stipulation that it 
should be banned completely at the end of five years was required.36 
This encapsulated the problem which Wellington and the government faced 
when dealing with the calls for abolition. A vehement public at home restricted their 
ability to reach an accommodation and influence the decisions of foreign states over 
the slave trade. It was also an indication of the limits of British power and influence. 
Even Spain and Portugal, two states to some extent owing their independent existence 
to British troops and money, were resistant to attempts to force them to outlaw the 
trade. Short of the military action that some advocated, but fewer would have actually 
supported on grounds of expense, Britain had little ability to enforce her will on her 
allies. Diplomacy was the only realistic option. 
Wellington had to face these problems head on in Paris after taking up his 
appointment at the end of August 1814. The leading campaigner, Thomas Clarkson, 
reported to the Duke of Gloucester, president of the abolitionist organisation the 
African Institution, that the new ambassador had quickly mastered the literature on the 
topic. ‘He wants little or no aid from me, as far as a knowledge of the subject is 
concerned’, he wrote to the Duke.37 This mastery was definitely needed as 
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Castlereagh’s preliminary instructions had emphasised the importance of reaching an 
accommodation with France on this issue. ‘The voice of the nation’ obliged him to 
instruct Wellington to make another effort in favour of immediate abolition.38 
However, this ‘voice’ was not content to rest and let Wellington do the talking. Instead, 
campaigners such as Clarkson were eager to take up the cause in France itself and 
engaged themselves in discussions at the highest levels. For the cabinet, the presence 
of British politicians of all colours in Paris, combined with the Saints’ somewhat 
ambiguous political position, raised the possibility of a potentially worrying 
combination of opponents. 
This situation rapidly came to a head when news of the conversations of a 
leading Whig peer, Lord Holland, with the French foreign minister, Prince Talleyrand, 
reached London via Clarkson. In these conversations, Holland formed the impression 
that France would be willing to agree to the immediate abolition of the slave trade in 
return for the cession of a British colony in the West Indies. This was a view that 
neither King Louis XVIII nor Talleyrand himself had ever expressed to Wellington or 
Castlereagh in their confidential discussions. 39  Lord Liverpool, in his reply, was 
likewise ‘strongly inclined to believe it to be erroneous’. But the fact that this rumour 
came to the government’s attention through the abolitionists from a prominent 
member of the opposition made it impossible to write it off. While the ‘Saints’ broadly 
supported the administration, this was conditional on their happiness that the cabinet 
was doing all it could to get the slave trade abolished. Not to pursue this apparent 
willingness to reach an agreement on immediate abolition would open the government 
to attack and threaten their majority even though they knew it was likely to come to 
nothing. As Liverpool wrote to Wellington, ‘The question of the abolition of the slave 
trade is become so embarrassing that it would be expedient to purchase it by some 
sacrifice, and perhaps even prudent to be enabled to say we have offered the sacrifice, 
though it should be refused’.40  
To do even this would open up a potential diplomatic can of worms for the 
government. Liverpool swiftly realised that Wilberforce’s and the Saints’ opinion that 
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abolition would be ‘worth anything and everything’ could easily be used by the French 
‘to make us pay, not what we were ready to give, but what they were ready to ask; and 
we should be exposed to considerable difficulties in the refusal’.41 Jealousy and 
suspicion of the Great Powers combined with domestic pressure, however, in 
reconciling the government to make the offer: ‘I have the less difficulty in acceding to 
this proposition,’ the Prime Minister wrote to Castlereagh, ‘in consequence of our 
intention of retaining Demerara, Essequibo, and Berbice. Important as the retention of 
these colonies may be to us, it is impossible the Continental Powers should not look 
to it with some jealousy and distrust. With such a mass of colonial strength and power, 
we can afford some sacrifice’.42  
The expected happened: France refused the offer of an island.  Much the same 
situation existed as had been the case when the First Peace of Paris was being 
negotiated a few months before. Pride and mistrust meant that France would prefer 
war rather than immediate abolition.43 Fortunately, the desire of Talleyrand to work 
with Britain at the forthcoming congress in Vienna, and the sympathy for abolition of 
Louis XVIII and his foreign minister, ensured that France did not exploit the offer as 
Liverpool had feared. However, this was not the end of the matter as it was not just an 
exercise in diplomacy; it was necessary also to placate the domestic audience. 
Wellington was issued with instructions to this effect: ‘unless the attempt is made in 
some shape in which it can be shown that it has been made and rejected, I am 
apprehensive we shall not stand well with many of our friends’.44 In the end this caused 
minor problems of its own as the acting French foreign minister thought a new 
proposal was being put forward and thought it best to refer the matter to Talleyrand in 
Vienna where the offer of an island was refused once more.45 
The failure of what was, in fact, a generous offer of compensation for a non-
existent French slave trade industry shows the limited ability of Britain to direct the 
policies of other states even on issues on which she placed a high priority, and which 
she had the power to enforce given the strength of the Royal Navy. However, the 
section of British political and public opinion sympathetic to abolition did not realise 
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that it was not within the government’s power to dictate to Europe. Indeed, some 
explicitly thought it was. Lord Grenville, a leading member of the opposition, the 
former Prime Minister who had passed abolition and who had previously been Pitt’s 
Foreign Secretary, instead lamented to Parliament after the signing of peace that ‘We 
were masters of the negociation [sic] ... In this cause the example of Great Britain was 
all-powerful, her sentence decisive, her determination final.46 As Kielstra has argued, 
‘the ministry faced a combination of misinformation, unrealistic hypernationialism 
and moral absolutism’.47  
Wellington found himself caught between rampant abolitionists at home and 
indifference on the subject in France. As soon as he arrived in Paris he was aware of 
the need to cultivate opinion in favour of abolition. In a meeting with Clarkson he set 
out what works needed to be translated and the Duke then took up the responsibility 
for distributing them. But this remained an elite form of public opinion. His proposed 
methods were ‘by publishing proper books and dispersing them among the known 
literary men [in Paris], whose voice was always heard, and would, he hoped, be heard 
successfully in the present case’. It was, in Clarkson’s phrase, the ‘literati’ of the 
French capital that the Duke sought to appeal to, not any wider conception of the 
public. 48   
Wellington stressed this in late September to the abolitionist John Charles 
Villiers (later 3rd Earl of Clarendon). Having circulated plenty of material already, he 
got the liberally minded Madame de Staël to translate one of Wilberforce’s pamphlets. 
His broader strategy was clear in his mind: ‘If we can get those who read on our side, 
who are very few in number, we shall do a great deal of good’. 49 To Wilberforce 
himself, he detailed exactly how he believed the fervour in Britain impacted the 
opinion of France towards abolition. For the Duke, it was precisely because ‘England 
takes an Interest in the question it is impossible to convey [information on the trade] 
through the only channel which would be at all effectual viz the Daily Press’. It was 
‘impossible’ to get information inserted into the papers, and whatever was printed 
from the English press in Paris was ‘with a view either to turn our principles and 
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conduct into ridicule, or to exasperate against us still more the people of this Country’. 
50 
Wellington had a clear view of what the problem was in this case and how it 
needed to be addressed:  
the daily Press in England do us a good deal of harm in this as well as in other 
Questions- we are sure of the King & his Gov[ernmen]t if [we] could rely upon 
the opinion of his people. But as long as our Press teems with writings drawn 
with a view to irritate persons here, we shall never be able to exercise the 
Influence which we ought to here upon this question, & which we really 
possess.51 
In a later letter to Wilberforce, he was more explicit: ‘we must keep the subject 
out of discussion & publication in England if we propose to do any real good’. The 
government could not ‘be more jealous’ than they were concerning abolition and 
‘deserve confidence, & ought to be trusted’. In these circumstances he was ‘quite 
convinced that the publications & discussions on the subject do more harm than good.’ 
While the government had achieved French agreement to abolish the trade entirely 
within five years, they were aware abolitionist opinion would not allow them to rest 
on their laurels. But for Wellington, ‘it is really necessary to leave this Interest like 
others in the hands of those whose duty it is to take care of it’.52  
In these letters, the Duke articulated his views on what he considered the place 
of the press in international relations. In his mind diplomacy was the preserve of the 
elite and not a sphere for wider participation. A vociferous domestic press, instead of 
strengthening the hand of British diplomats abroad, would in fact hamper them and 
restrict their ability to manoeuvre. For him, once the press had convinced the domestic 
audience, only after people had calmed down could liberal causes actually be advanced 
and British influence be wielded to best effect. 
Wilberforce, in turn, responded to Wellington’s suggestions on this matter and 
he sought to restrain the British papers. He thanked the Duke, with a ‘deep feeling of 
kindness’, ‘for the hint you have given me concerning the tone of our English papers’ 
and he promised to ‘turn it to account’.53 Appreciating the efforts and sincerity of 
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Wellington and Castlereagh, Wilberforce and the Saints developed a deeper working 
connection than ever before with the Duke and cabinet, of which this is just the most 
extreme example.54  
On this contentious and domestically important issue, Wellington was at the 
nexus of the varying demands of politics at home; public opinion, morality, liberalism 
and diplomacy. Restricted by the need to conduct his diplomacy with the domestic 
audience in mind, he nevertheless succeeded in meeting their minimum demands of 
the French government. He further helped facilitate the development of a positive 
working relationship between the government and the leading abolitionists. As this 
case demonstrates, he was by no means as reactionary as his general image might 
indicate. Indeed, during his time in Paris he managed to secure the implementation of 
the measures of abolition to which France had agreed but to which French public 
opinion remained deeply opposed. He also went some way towards influencing the 
latter in favour of the measure. At all times, though, his conduct remained pragmatic 
and tempered by the needs of diplomacy, a continuous thread through his career. The 
tension between the practical needs of foreign policy and diplomacy, and some of the 
more transient political pressures of parliamentary politics and public opinion would 
remain a consistent factor in Wellington’s role in foreign policy making for the 
following months, years and decades. 
The Paris Embassy II: Wellington and the Settlement of Europe 
Despite the passion which the issue of abolition aroused in Britain, it was but one 
question in the diplomacy of this period, and a comparatively minor one in the minds 
of the European statesmen about to convene in Vienna. Before them lay the task of 
piecing back together a continent shattered by a generation of warfare. The First Peace 
of Paris had merely settled the territorial limits of France. What was to happen to the 
lands that she had evacuated, and her old client states such as the Grand Duchy of 
Warsaw, remained to be decided. Lord Castlereagh was the driving force behind 
British diplomacy in these negotiations, but throughout the Duke of Wellington played 
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an important role, both as a confidential advisor to the Foreign Secretary, and then as 
his replacement at Vienna in early 1815. 
The Vienna Congress remained overshadowed by the pre-existing concern 
about France if she returned to a revolutionary or Napoleonic system, and a newer fear 
about the position of Russia. In the minds of the British policy makers it was not 
France herself that was a threat but France in either imperial or revolutionary hands. 
Only the continuance of the Bourbons on the throne seemed to offer a guarantee of 
stability in western Europe to them. The concern about Russia, though more novel, 
had its antecedents in the worries over Russian expansion in the 1780s and early 1790s 
and then later, following the 1807 Treaty of Tilsit. Nevertheless, at various times 
during the course of the war, Britain had been willing to acquiesce in the growth of 
Russian power, including in the Mediterranean. With the coming of peace, the older 
concerns about the implications of this growth returned. In January 1815 Bathurst 
urged Wellington to ‘not give any encouragement for Russia to have any army or navy 
in the Mediterranean. Depend upon it we shall never get them out of that quarter of 
the world again’.55 The extension of Russian influence additionally took on a more 
menacing aspect with the power vacuum that then existed in central Europe, which the 
Tsar looked poised to fill.  
Throughout this time, France, of course, remained high on the list of concerns 
and fears harboured by the makers of British foreign policy. While Schroeder argues 
that the Francophobia of the time was no more than a latent prejudice, and certainly 
not an element of policy, the fear of France amongst British statesmen was an 
important policy consideration.56 The victory of 1814 was not as definitive in the 
minds of contemporaries as it would appear much later, though this was largely 
associated with the threat of revolution and Napoleon rather than a geostrategic threat 
from France. Occasionally a more fundamental divergence of interests was 
acknowledged. Castlereagh wrote to Wellington shortly after arriving in Vienna 
concerning the ‘systematic views of France to possess herself of the Low Countries 
and the territories on the left bank of the Rhine – a plan which, however 
discountenanced by the present French Government, will infallibly revive, whenever 
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circumstances favour its execution’.57 Nevertheless, a large part of the discourse 
concerning France was dominated by a perceived revolutionary menace and 
discussion about the security entailed in the Bourbon restoration.58 
A letter from Liverpool to Castlereagh in late September 1814 demonstrates 
the mixing of the fears about France and the pretensions of Russia. The Prime Minister 
communicated his concerns that the negotiations, if they continued on their current 
course, ‘might unintentionally lead us further than we had any idea of going, and 
eventually produce a renewal of the war in Europe’. It was the pretensions of Russia 
that were behind this and Liverpool agreed that ‘it may be quite true that if the Emperor 
of Russia does not relax in his present demands, the peace of Europe may not be of 
long continuance’ but it remained crucial to do the utmost to preserve peace. For the 
Prime Minister: 
In the course of two or three years it may reasonably be expected that the power 
of Louis XVIII in France will be consolidated, and that the revolutionary spirit 
which still exists to such an alarming degree in that country will in a great 
measure have evaporated. The people will have returned to peaceful habits, 
and the landed and moneyed interests will feel their fate connected with that 
of the restored government. […] But if war should be renewed at present, I fear 
that we should lose all we have gained, that the revolutionary spirit would 
break forth again in full force, and that the Continent would be plunged in all 
the evils under which it has groaned for the last twenty years. A war now, 
therefore, may be a revolutionary war. A war some time hence, though an evil, 
need not be different in its character and its effects from any of those wars 
which occurred in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, before the 
commencement of the French Revolution.59 
If Liverpool displayed a lack of understanding of the far-reaching effects of 
the revolution on the society of Europe, it was nevertheless a view held by others. The 
need for repose was a prominent feature of the discourse between the leading British 
statesmen, and something Liverpool was apt to stress given his domestic concerns. 
Wellington himself would make the point to Blacas, minister of the Royal Household 
and leading minister of the Conseil du Roi, when he ‘suggested to him the dangers of 
War to the Bourbon family’. However, his reply was one that would be common in 
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later years: ‘if we were not against them there was no danger; & that in some cases to 
remain at Peace was more dangerous even than the most unsuccessful War’. 
This dangerous dynamic in France ‘may drive [the King] to War’, and it meant 
that Britain had to walk a careful tightrope in dealing with that country.60 With the 
French government ‘notoriously weak, disunited, and unpopular’, the military 
unhappy, unemployment high and Republicans subverting the government, one 
recently returned visitor to France reported to Liverpool that ‘this state of things moves 
in its natural progress towards an explosion’.61 Wellington reported back to the Prime 
Minister in a similar vein: ‘it is impossible […] to conceive the distress in which 
individuals of all descriptions are’. Though he was ‘quite certain that the population 
of the Country & even of Paris is favourable to the Bourbons’, he still could not ‘see 
what means the King has of resisting a brisk attack of a few hundred officers 
determined to risk everything’. More worryingly, he believed that ‘the only remedy is 
the revival of Bonaparte’s System of War & plunder; and it is evident that that remedy 
cannot be adopted during the reign of the Bourbons’.62  
It was necessary to concede to France her place at the highest table of 
diplomacy to avoid inflaming sentiments within the country and alienating moderates, 
not to mention providing a balance to Russia. However, this was a delicate proposition, 
given that Britain could not afford to distance herself from the wartime allies and leave 
herself isolated diplomatically. From the start Wellington and Castlereagh were alive 
to the need to meet France at least part of the way. The Foreign Secretary asked the 
Duke ‘how far my passing a day or two at Paris […] is likely to be well taken. It may 
possibly be desired to remove any impression of Councils, to the exclusion of 
France’.63 On the French side, Talleyrand was eager to establish an entente with 
Britain so as to be able to influence the Vienna talks. Wellington wrote to Castlereagh 
about the prospect in mid-August, as he was inspecting the Belgian frontier: 
The situation of affairs in the world will naturally constitute England & France 
as [arbitrators] at the Congress if those Powers understand Each other, & such 
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an understanding may preserve the general Peace. But I think your object 
would be defeated & England would lose her high Character & Station if the 
line of Monsieur Talleyrand is adopted which appears to me to be tantamount 
to the declaration by the two Powers that they will be arbitrators of all the 
Differences which may arise. [?] must not forget that only a few months ago it 
was wished to exclude the interference & influence of France from the 
Congress entirely. 
Despite fearing that the Allies ‘may be jealous of your Intimacy with 
Talleyrand’, Wellington nevertheless believed that ‘these Considerations are nothing 
when ballanced [sic] with the great object of your establishing a perfect understanding 
with Talleyrand on your measures & on the mode in which you will carry them into 
execution’.64  
The French Foreign Minister himself had earlier spoken of similar sentiments 
to the interim British minister in Paris, Sir Charles Stuart. It was ‘materially necessary 
that the two Courts should thoroughly understand each other upon this Subject, & thus 
enable their Ministers cordially to cooperate in defeating a System so obviously 
inexpedient’, that was Russia’s encroachments on Poland.65 Indeed, suspicion of 
Russian policies seemed to be universal. Bathurst wrote to Wellington concerning 
rumours of royal marriages that were circulating around Europe, which he attributed 
to ‘the jealousy which exists every where [sic] of the increasing influence of Russia’. 
In his view though, the marriage of a Russian Grand Duchess ‘will certainly connect 
France with Russia, whatever Talleyrand may profess to Lord Castlereagh’.66 
The British government held the Tsar in low esteem.67 Liverpool was 
convinced that Alexander would be ‘quite deaf to every appeal to justice, moderation, 
or the engagements which he contracted with Prussia and Austria in the course of the 
last campaign’.68 Edward Cooke, Castlereagh’s private secretary in Vienna, had an 
even lower view of Alexander: ‘if any person gives him credit for a sincere good 
design, they do him ample injustice’. The Tsar’s aim was ‘not to give constitutions, 
but to gain power and territory’. Cooke noted that ‘when Prince Hardenberg yields to 
him from deference to his master, he states the Emperor to be the most perfidious, 
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treacherous, usurping character, and infinitely more dangerous than Buonaparte’.69 
Reports of Russian intrigues to stir up jealousy in the Netherlands and Britain against 
France mingled with rumours of a ‘secret understanding between Austria’ and 
Russia.70 These served to reinforce suspicions of Russian motives rather than poison 
Franco-British relations. Wellington assured Bathurst from Paris that he ‘may depend 
upon it there is no intention in this government to disturb the general tranquillity in 
any manner’.71  
However, a close relationship with France was still not without its own dangers 
and, with a war appearing a distinct possibility in late 1814, they became a very real 
concern. Once again the problem was combined with that of Russia. Blacas argued 
that ‘though the King would not go to war for Poland, the country was not disinclined 
to make an exertion to save Saxony’. He also threw out suggestions about increasing 
the size of the French army, in an attempt to fathom Britain’s attitude.72 In late 
November Blacas followed through with the idea. Orders were sent out that the 
semestriers, the soldiers absent on unlimited leave, should join their units ‘by which 
the effective army will be very considerably augmented’. Wellington was unsure 
whether this was caused by high rates of desertion or ‘the desire of being able to 
assume and to support the assumption of a higher tone in the Congress’. Either way, 
he believed that ‘it is certain that it has given occasion to the expectation of the renewal 
of hostilities’.73 
Castlereagh summed up the problems at Vienna. He saw ‘no real spirit of 
accommodation’ among the Powers, and lamented that ‘perhaps it is too much to 
expect that this Congress should differ so much from its predecessors’. The heart of 
the difficulties was the sheer scale of the task before them: ‘It unfortunately happens 
that never at any former period was so much spoil thrown loose for the world to 
scramble for’. But it was Russia who prevented an equitable settlement: ‘If Russia 
had, in the abundance of her territory, been more disinterested, her influence, united 
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with that of Great Britain and France, would have made the settlement comparatively 
easy’. Without that unity the result was that ‘there is an absence of that controlling 
authority which is requisite to force a decision upon the ordinary details of business’.74 
The preponderance of Russian power that blocked agreement meant that a balance had 
to be restored. 
The pretensions of Russia and the lack of balance made some kind of 
agreement with France necessary. Liverpool was aware of the risks, yet saw little 
alternative. As he argued to Bathurst, ‘the objection to thus cooperating with France 
is, that we thereby establish her influence in Germany and Italy. But if we dread the 
increase of her influence by engaging her on our side, what will she become by uniting 
with the Northern Allies [Prussia and Russia]?’ In this nightmare scenario, France 
might regain the Rhine boundary. Liverpool thought that ‘to this the Emperor 
Alexander would not object, and in his present temper cheerfully concur in it as the 
means of humbling us’. With Austria ‘exposed and threatened’, Britain would be left 
without means to oppose this combination. Indeed, ‘[a]ll Europe, from Sicily to 
Sweden, would acquiesce, some secretly, others openly, wishing France success’. 
Hanoverian troops would have to be withdrawn to protect their homeland, and Holland 
would make a deal ‘rather than continue a hopeless contest’. As French opinion tilted 
in favour of war with Britain, there was only ‘the influence of some personal and some 
national feelings, which at present operate in our favour’. Louis XVIII’s leaning 
towards Britain, ‘where he had been so recently protected, and to whose influence he 
more immediately owes his restoration’, his dislike of the Tsar, and the French hatred 
of Prussia combined with the desire to preserve Saxony, were the only factors 
militating against the war impulse. Yet, the Prime Minister feared that ‘these 
estrangements and motives for forbearance will soon lose their influence. Lord 
Wellington could make the union by personal conferences now; but when France 
becomes more prepared to act (and it is evident she has the will as well as the 
opportunity of doing so), it may no longer be in our power to give to her actions the 
right direction’.75  
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The Chancellor of the Exchequer, Nicholas Vansittart, also emphasised this 
point: ‘After all, we can have no security against some treacherous compromise 
between France and Russia; and there is even a great probability that in resentment of 
our interference, the Emperor of Russia may be disposed to listen to some suggestion 
for bringing forward questions of maritime law at the Congress’.76 If Tilsit had 
awakened fears of a Franco-Russian combination, these certainly had not died with 
the death of that union in the snows of 1812. Indeed, throughout Wellington’s 
diplomatic career, it would be a regular theme, even if the fears were not always as 
pressing as they appeared to Liverpool in 1814. 
The Prime Minister stressed that it was of the ‘utmost importance […] to 
anticipate the Emperor of Russia, who, having carried his objects in the East of Europe, 
may be disposed to purchase the concurrence of France by an acquiescence in her 
views in other quarters’. It was necessary to rely on the honour of Louis XVIII. He 
would not enter engagements against Britain, ‘provided we treat him and his 
government with that consideration and confidence which they regard not unjustly as 
due to them, and which may induce them to look to a cordial understanding with Great 
Britain as the best prospect of recovering their fair portion of influence in Europe’.77 
Liverpool was ‘convinced’ that ‘the King of France is (among the great Powers) the 
only Sovereign in whom we can have any real Confidence’. Tsar Alexander was 
profligate, the King of Prussia well meaning, but ‘the dupe of the Emp[eror] of 
Russia’. The Austrian Emperor was honest, but in Metternich he had ‘a Minister in 
whom no one can trust, who considers all Policy as consisting in finesse and Trick, & 
who has got his Gov[ernmen]t and himself [in] more difficulties by his Devices than 
c[oul]d have occurred from a plain course of Dealing’. He rightly pointed out to the 
Duke that they should not ‘conceal from ourselves […] that an avowed Union between 
G[rea]t Britain & France w[oul]d be likely to be unpopular in both Countries’. In light 
of this he recommended that they should ‘establish a complete confidential intercourse 
with the French Gov[ernmen]t w[hi]ch will give to neither Party any Pretence to enter 
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into Engagements to the Prejudice of the other or indeed into any Engagements at all 
under present circumstances w[hi]ch it is not willing to communicate to the other’.78 
Wellington played a crucial role in bringing about his ‘confidential 
intercourse’, more especially as Castlereagh had to deal with the wily Talleyrand at 
Vienna: 
the difference in principle between M. Talleyrand and me is chiefly that I wish 
to direct my main efforts to secure an equilibrium in Europe; to which objects, 
as far as principle will permit, I wish to make all local points subordinate. M. 
Talleyrand appears to me, on the contrary, more intent upon particular points 
of influence than upon the general balance to be established[.] 
Talleyrand thus complicated the settlement of the crucial Polish question by raising 
the specific issues of Saxony and Naples, where France had dynastic and strategic 
concerns, but ‘without essentially serving either of those interests upon which he is 
most intent’. The ‘tone and conduct of Russia […] disappointed [the] hope’ for 
avoiding hostile combinations. Despite Castlereagh’s reservations that ‘however pure 
the intentions of the King of France were, and however friendly, we ought not to risk 
so much upon French connexion’, the Foreign Secretary’s course was to look to the 
general balance by conciliating France on the one hand and basing the system on 
uniting ‘Germany for its own preservation against Russia’ on the other. But for this 
policy to be a success France had to be working alongside Castlereagh’s policy, not 
against it. To ensure that she would was Wellington’s task: 
I have troubled you with this outline of the policy upon which I have been 
acting here, that you may use your own discretion, as occasions arise, of 
preparing and reconciling the mind of the French Government to a concert 
between the two limitrophe Powers against Russian encroachment and 
dictation. You will find their minds (at least Prince Talleyrand's is) very averse 
to Russia, and impatient of the notion of any union between Austria and 
Prussia; yet, while they most inconsistently object to such a union, they admit 
that it is the only mode in which Russia can be kept within due bounds.  
Castlereagh acknowledged that France might not look on a German alliance with 
favour but, given that the union of the German Powers would be ‘in its nature 
inoffensive’, it was ‘unreasonable’ for her to ‘impede the sole means that remain to 
Germany of preserving its independence’.79 Liverpool had earlier stressed this same 
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point, that ‘it is quite essential […] to any balance of power that these two monarchies 
[Austria and Prussia] should be made respectable’ to be able to balance Russia (and 
France).80 Wellington had to reconcile the French government to this course of action.  
On 5th November 1814, Wellington took the matter up with Blacas. The French 
minister was convinced that Russia’s intransigence would force Britain and France to 
withdraw their representatives from Vienna and that ‘they could not acknowledge 
these arrangements, and that Europe would remain in a feverish state, which sooner or 
later must end in war’. Wellington, in turn, ‘again urged him in the strongest manner 
to have instructions sent to Monsieur de Talleyrand to lay aside all considerations upon 
small points, and to unite cordially with [Castlereagh] in a great effort to produce the 
union of all the Powers in Europe against the projected aggrandizement of Russia’. 
Blacas believed that Castlereagh was not acting on the key questions as expected and 
requested that the British Foreign Secretary be furnished with further instructions. This 
Wellington firmly countered. Blacas ‘was quite mistaken’ and Castlereagh’s 
‘language could not be stronger […] both verbally and in writing’ to the Tsar on the 
Polish question. Talleyrand was at fault, not Castlereagh, for ‘running after these small 
objects, instead of looking to that principal one’ of Poland. After making a bid for an 
alliance of Britain, France, Spain and Holland, which Wellington argued would only 
create jealousy and separate Britain from her other allies, Blacas at last agreed with 
the British position and promised to influence Louis XVIII in that sense.81 Orders were 
to go to Talleyrand to ‘cooperate with [Castlereagh] in every way to produce an 
effectual Opposition to the Emperor’s Polish Schemes’ which were ‘the foundation of 
all the Evil which was likely to result from the Congress’. He further noted, ‘[t]hey 
are quite convinced, not only that M. de Talleyrand has acted foolishly himself, but 
that he has led them into error by encouraging representation of your conduct and 
views’.82 
Following Wellington’s interposition at Paris, Castlereagh’s position at Vienna 
was tangibly improved: 
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I cannot sufficiently express to you my thanks for your most useful and 
seasonable co-operation. You have succeeded in rendering the French 
influence here much more accommodating; and, if I have not been able to bring 
the Prince de Talleyrand to the point of common exertion, his Highness has 
been to me personally most obliging and conciliatory, and has ceased to thwart 
me as he did, possibly unintentionally, at first.83 
Over the coming weeks this breakthrough would lead to ‘common exertion’ between 
the two diplomats, eventually resulting in the treaty of 3rd January 1815 between 
France, Britain and Austria to counter Prussian pretensions over Saxony, even though 
by then Poland had been lost to Russia. A little over a month later, Liverpool stressed 
that he has ‘no scruple in avowing that the keystone of all my external policy is the 
preserving [of] the Bourbons on the throne of France’. He was convinced that ‘this 
alone can prevent the recurrence of the costs which we have suffered for the last twenty 
years, and all other dangers may be regarded as contemptible when compared with 
those which could arise out of another revolution in France’.84 Yet, only six days later, 
Napoleon escaped his exile in Elba, so calling into question everything that had been 
achieved over the previous year. 
Vienna to Waterloo 
After being selected to replace Lord Castlereagh at the Congress, as has been seen 
above, Wellington arrived in Vienna in early February. For the following few weeks 
the Duke and the Foreign Secretary worked alongside each other while the former was 
brought up to speed, though little business of the Congress was done thanks to the 
illness of Wessenberg, Metternich’s deputy.85 After Castlereagh’s departure in the 
middle of the month to return to Westminster to lead a boisterous House of Commons, 
Wellington took on the full responsibilities for representing Britain. With the foreign 
minister having settled all issues of direct importance to Britain, the Duke took on the 
role of a mediator in the remaining questions ‘urging the virtues and sweet-
reasonableness with the philosophy that comes from detachment’.86 The most trying 
of his tasks was to join Metternich and Talleyrand in a visit to the King of Saxony to 
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gain his assent to the treaties that divided his kingdom – a far from pleasant experience, 
even if he was losing far less land than had looked likely at one stage.  
By the time of this trip, however, the Congress had already been overshadowed 
by Napoleon’s escape from Elba. News had reached Vienna on 7 March, and while it 
remained unclear what Napoleon’s immediate intentions were (he could have made 
for Italy to join with Murat rather than head to France), it was obvious it did not bode 
well.87 Wellington, as one of the Europe’s leading generals, was in the right place at 
the right time to have a significant impact on the course of affairs. Furthermore, he 
was significantly backed from the government in London and was given a large degree 
of latitude to decide on the spot his course. Castlereagh wrote to him instructing that: 
Your Grace will be enabled at Vienna to watch the progress of this attempt by 
Buonaparte to overturn the existing order of things in France, and consequently 
in Europe; and you can judge, with reference to the state of affairs at Vienna, 
where your personal presence is likely to be most use to the public service. The 
Prince Regent, relying entirely on your Grace's zeal and judgment, leaves it to 
you, without further orders, either to remain at Vienna or to put yourself at the 
head of the army in Flanders. 
Taking cognisance of the fact that officially Wellington remained ambassador 
to France, the foreign minister’s only reservation was that ‘your Grace is not to expose 
yourself by returning to the interior of France, unless in the command of troops’.88 As 
far as the prickly question of Murat went, Castlereagh told him that the matter ‘is in 
your hands, and you alone judge what is best to be done’.89  
Highlighting how close their views were, both sought to base the new alliance 
against Napoleon on the Treaty of Chaumont. Castlereagh wrote to the Duke to draw 
the allied ministers’ attention to that treaty ‘as the only safe basis upon which their 
conduct can now be founded’. With Napoleon’s return ‘there is no safety for Europe 
but in a close and indissoluble union of the Four Great Powers, supported by all the 
other States, who will rally round their standard’.90 Wellington had already been 
thinking along these lines and, despite some difficulties that had delayed agreement, 
he eventually secured the acquiescence of the other powers to a reaffirmation of the 
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treaty.91 On receiving word of this, Castlereagh immediately sought to ratify it. The 
only additional thing he sought to add was a declaration emphasising that ‘the object 
of the alliance and concert is to destroy Buonaparte's authority, and not to impose on 
France any particular Sovereign or form of government’.92 
Swiftly, the Duke’s military nature overtook his diplomatic role. There was 
still significant overlap, however. Wellington’s prestige by this stage was of great 
importance in securing specific objectives. On this head, Sir Charles Stuart wrote to 
Bathurst from The Hague informing him: 
To say the truth, unless the Duke of Wellington shows himself and uses strong 
arguments to compel them to fortify the frontier, I see plainly that we shall 
have to combat difficulties at every turn. The want of money will be a 
justification for delays which proper energy might easily get over; and I know 
not where it is to be sought unless in his counsels.93 
The Duke’s influence was not just limited to matters concerning the small powers, 
however. Tsar Alexander had floated the idea of becoming ‘Generalissimo’ of the 
allied armies, which was ‘brusquely refused’ by the Duke in favour of the model of 
command used during the final months of the war the previous year.94 The Tsar had 
indicated a wish for the Duke to join as part of Supreme Command to which 
Wellington responded he ‘would prefer to carry a musquet [sic]’ and he was instead 
designated command of the allied army of British, Dutch and Hanoverian troops 
already in Belgium, as well as the addition of a Prussian corps of soldiers.95 Wellington 
remained at Vienna until 29th March before departing for the Low Countries and his 
eventual meeting with Napoleon on the field of Waterloo on 18th June 1815. 
Wellington and the Second Bourbon Restoration 
Wellington’s victory over the Emperor sealed for good that Napoleon would no longer 
rule France, but, beyond that, the future remained unclear. A second Bourbon 
restoration was not a matter of certainty and other options existed. One was a regency 
for Napoleon’s young son, then safely under the protection of his grandfather, the 
Emperor Francis, in Vienna. After he realised there was no possibility of remaining 
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on the throne himself, this was Napoleon’s own wish and he abdicated in his son’s 
favour on 22 June. Another option was a monarchy under the Duc d’Orléans, head of 
the cadet branch of Bourbons and more liberally minded. The Tsar wavered between 
these choices before deciding his preference was for the latter.96 
However, it was not for Napoleon or Alexander to decide the future of France; 
Napoleon’s ability to choose even his own fate had perished in a muddy field in 
Belgium along with the lives of so many while Alexander had had his moment of 
victory in 1814. In the summer of 1815 it was Wellington who had the initiative and 
the ability to dictate the cause of events. Though there was a clear preference in the 
British government for the return of Louis XVIII, this necessarily depended on events 
on the continent and beyond the removal of Napoleon Wellington had no specific 
instructions. Had there been a clear preference within France, they would have been 
open to alternative arrangements, especially as an overtly pro-Bourbon stance would 
have caused domestic complications in Parliament.97 Much depended on the 
circumstances on the ground and in this Wellington was the crucial figure. After 
fleeing the Tuileries on Napoleon’s return, Louis XVIII had chosen to take refuge in 
Ghent, only a little over forty miles from the field of Waterloo. Following that battle, 
rather than take the advice of Metternich and Castlereagh to proceed to the south of 
France to re-establish his government, the king followed Wellington’s suggestion to 
proceed with his army on its march towards Paris.98 
The Duke followed this up with discussions with Joseph Fouché, Napoleon’s 
erstwhile Minister of Police, who had now abandoned him and Napoleon II to act 
instead as the midwife for whatever the new regime would be. Elected President of 
the Executive Commission by the French Chambers, he had already been sending 
feelers to various parties even before the Battle of Waterloo. Wellington met with 
Commissioners from the provisional government on 29th June. The Duke stressed to 
them that before he could order a halt to his military operations it was necessary that 
he ‘must see some steps taken to re-establish a government in France which should 
afford the Allies some chance of peace’. After being asked what would satisfy the 
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Allies on that head, Wellington told them that though he ‘had no authority to talk upon 
the subject, even from my own Government, much less from the Allies; and that all I 
could do was to give them my private opinion’, but that for him, he ‘conceived the 
best security for Europe was the restoration of the King, and that the establishment of 
any other government than the King’s in France must inevitably lead to new and 
endless wars’. He urged that any restoration should be without conditions and that they 
‘should recall the King without loss of time, as it would not then appear that the 
measure had been forced upon them by the Allies’. In the course of Wellington’s 
conversation with the commissioners he informed them that while it would be out of 
the question to suspend hostilities with a regency for Napoleon II, he could not 
comment if some other royal prince, referring to the Duc d’Orléans, were called to the 
throne instead of Louis XVIII: ‘I said that it was impossible for me to answer such 
loose questions; that, as an individual, I had made them acquainted with my opinion 
of what it was best for them to do, and it rested with them either to follow this opinion 
or not’. Seeing them again the next day he told them, once again as an individual, that 
‘in my opinion, Europe had no hope of peace if any person excepting the King were 
called to the throne of France; that any person so called must be considered an usurper, 
whatever his rank and quality’ the result of which would be that he would look to war 
and conquest to divert from this fact.99  
Though in his communications he had repeatedly stressed that he was voicing 
his own personal opinions rather than those of the British government or the Allied 
powers generally, the simple fact that he was the commander of the army rapidly 
approaching Paris lent additional weight to his views. This fact, married with the 
failure of the people of Paris to unite behind a single alternative to the Bourbons, meant 
that Wellington’s view prevailed and Louis XVIII returned to Paris to a warm 
reception on 8th July, the day after the allied armies had entered the French capital.100 
However, just the return of the legitimate King was not enough to secure the future 
peace. The events of the previous hundred days had starkly revealed the deep divisions 
that remained in French society and the King would need to follow a moderate policy 
of reconciliation to prevent another disaster. There were serious fears on this head as 
Louis had fallen under the influence of the ultras led by his brother, and heir, the 
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Comte d’Artois. A proclamation followed that held out the prospect of retribution to 
those who had betrayed the Bourbons. Wellington once again intervened. As in the 
previous year when he had urged moderation and inclusivity on Ferdinand VII in 
Spain, he once again argued the case of conciliating liberal opinion. This time it met 
with rather more success, no doubt thanks to the thousands of soldiers under his 
command then occupying Paris. At the Duke’s instigation Louis XVIII dismissed his 
favourite Blacas, and appointed a new ministry with Talleyrand at its head and 
including the regicide Fouché to the horror of the ultras.101  
Though the success of the royalists in the elections for the Chambers a few 
months later saw the resignation of both Fouché and Talleyrand, this is nevertheless 
an important episode in the Duke’s diplomatic career. It indicates clearly his 
preference for legitimacy pressing for the return of Louis XVIII, but it also 
demonstrates his pragmatic and conciliatory stance on sensitive diplomatic issues. 
Wellington was keenly aware of the need to construct the French state on the broadest 
basis possible. Legitimacy meant nothing if government excluded dangerous sections 
of the population that might seek to change the regime once again. Wellington would 
hold true to this maxim throughout his diplomatic career.  
 
Paris and the Making of Peace 
With Paris occupied and Louis XVIII installed once more in the Tuileries, the attention 
now turned once again to peace making. The circumstances were not particularly 
propitious for the task. As allied statesmen and monarchs of the great powers, not to 
mention many of those of the smaller powers, began to arrive in the French capital 
they were faced by a still dangerous and fluid situation. The Prussian army was bent 
on revenge, their civilian ministers in no position to restrain them, French royalists 
were determined to exact their own vengeance and spill the blood of traitors to the 
Bourbons, revolutionary Jacobins and sympathisers of Napoleon had nothing left to 
lose and the ordinary populace was ready and willing to form mobs and pick fights 
with allied soldiers at the slightest provocation. A ‘White Terror’ gripped some of the 
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provinces of France.102 Though Fouché gradually re-established control, it was 
nevertheless a constant reminder of the importance of the task at hand for the 
peacemakers.  
This was no simple process, however. The first obstacle to be surmounted was 
whether there was even a need for a peace treaty. Louis XVIII had been an ally of the 
other powers, and their declarations had made it explicit that their actions were 
directed against the usurper Napoleon, rather than the French nation. Given those 
circumstances, surely peace had already been restored by his abdication and the 
restoration of the rightful king? This was the argument Talleyrand tried to make to the 
other powers but to very little avail. The mood was very clearly running in a different 
direction, and to not impose some kind of peace would have been politically 
unacceptable in every allied country.103 However, it was by no means clear what form 
it should take. The Prussians were determined to crush France once and for all with a 
devastating peace. Their army, contemptuous of the statesmen, were especially 
scornful of Wellington’s role: Gneisenau denounced the ‘threatening magnanimity’ 
that the Duke had shown towards Napoleon, and the press were quick in attacking him 
for his stances.104 Wellington and Castlereagh, who had hastened over to Paris after 
its occupation, intervened to provide additional civilian control over the allied armies. 
The Duke was certain that if the Prussians (and also Bavarians) had their way, the 
result would be an insurrection like the French faced in Spain.105 The desire for 
revenge was by no means restricted to them, however. Even the British government 
was very much inclined towards a harsh peace and they were supported in this by the 
wider British public.106 
Wellington took a very different attitude. In his mind, the primary aim must be 
to promote stability in France, and by extension the wider European system. Count 
Nesselrode, the Russian foreign minister, drew up a memorandum with the aid of 
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Castlereagh and Wellington to submit to the other powers. For them the alliance was 
first directed towards the removal of Napoleon, second, to return France to the 
conditions of the first Peace of Paris, and finally to guarantee to France and all of 
Europe the maintenance of that peace and of the decisions of the Vienna Congress.107 
While the first had been achieved, the latter two aims still hung very much in the 
balance. For the Duke it would be impossible to realise them with a harsh peace. In 
line with the legalist outlook he would take throughout his career, he believed the 
engagements made with Louis XVIII left the allies with ‘no just right to make any 
material inroad on the treaty of Paris’ even though, for him, ‘that treaty leaves France 
too strong in relation to other powers’. However, his reasoning for a moderate peace 
was based on more than just legal grounds. Wellington argued that the object of the 
allies had been to ‘put an end to the French Revolution, to obtain peace for themselves 
and their people, to have the power of reducing their overgrown military 
establishments, and the leisure to attend to the internal concerns of their several 
nations, and to improve the situation of their people’. To demand a large amount of 
territory from France would not achieve any of that. Instead, the allies would have to:  
consider the operations of the war as deferred till France shall find a suitable 
opportunity of endeavouring to regain what she has lost; and, after having 
wasted our resources in the maintenance of overgrown military establishments 
in time of peace, we shall find how little useful the cessions we shall have 
acquired will be against a national effort to regain them. 
Thus, for Wellington, ‘we ought to keep our great object, the genuine peace 
and tranquillity of the world, in our view, and shape our arrangement so as to provide 
for it.’ In his mind, ‘Revolutionary France is more likely to distress the world than 
France, however strong in her frontier, under a regular Government; and that is the 
situation in which we ought to endeavour to place her’. The only solution that could 
provide security to Europe and ensure a stable government in France was a temporary 
army of occupation.108  
On both the aims of the peace and the means of achieving them, Wellington 
and Castlereagh were firmly aligned. Together they formed a key axis in the 
negotiations in Paris, complementing each other’s skills and enabling them to 
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overcome the opposition to moderate terms. Castlereagh told Liverpool shortly after 
his arrival in response to a suggestion of combining with the Duke in the negotiations, 
that ‘[w]e had already made considerable progress in settling the course of business 
here. There can never be a difficulty, I trust, between the Duke and myself; and I hope 
it will not be less amicably arranged with the other Powers’.109 Wellington and the 
Foreign Secretary united with Tsar Alexander to oppose the pretensions of the other 
powers to aggrandise at the expense of France.110 With Lord Liverpool and other 
ministers keen for a harsh peace as well, Wellington also played a key role in ensuring 
they dropped their demands for a punitive settlement: ‘if the victor of Waterloo threw 
his weight behind a moderate peace it would be very hard for anyone in Britain to 
mount an attack on the government over it, while his opinion carried great weight with 
the members of the Cabinet who might not have yielded to Castlereagh’s lone 
judgement’.111 His opinion on military questions was impossible for the cabinet to 
contest and, as Liverpool wrote, they were ‘disposed to place entire confidence in 
whatever may be the ultimate military judgement of the Duke’.112 
With the British government convinced of the need to follow Castlereagh’s 
and Wellington’s policy, and the Prussians isolated amongst the Great Powers in their 
urge for revenge, attention shifted to the alternatives to secure the peace. The chosen 
method was the temporary occupation of part of France. Wellington was firmly in 
favour of this course of action. Not only would they provide security during the time 
they were in France but ‘if carried into execution in the spirit in which they are 
conceived, they are in themselves the bond of peace’. Their presence would give 
security to Louis XVIII, allowing him to reform the army and purge it of its 
Napoleonic elements. Furthermore, the promise of the withdrawal of the force and the 
restoration of the occupied lands to ‘the King, or his legitimate heirs or successors, 
would have the effect of giving additional stability to his throne’. Though Wellington 
still believed that France would still be too powerful relative to the other states of 
Europe even after the occupation, he thought that, ‘if the Allies do not waste their time 
and their means, the state of security of each and of the whole, in relation to France, 
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will, at the end of the period, -be materially improved, and will probably leave but 
little to desire’.113 Yet all of this would be easier said than done. The occupation of 
France, even for a fixed period, would be unpopular within that country and require a 
great deal of skill, and luck, to pull off without severely damaging the relations of 
Europe with France, and those of Louis XVIII with his subjects. It was to the Duke of 
Wellington that the statesmen in Paris turned to attempt this task. Castlereagh was of 
the opinion that ‘it is certain it cannot be well executed in other hands than those of 
the Duke of Wellington’. He further informed Lord Liverpool that ‘[t]his is the view 
of both Emperors: the Emperor of Russia is disposed to even make it a condition sine 
qua non of his leaving a Russian contingent’. With the Duke willing to accept, 
Castlereagh concluded that ‘His Grace having the command will render the plan less 
unpopular in France, and less injurious to the King’.114  
Over the course of August, the preferences of both the cabinet at home and the 
Prussians for a harsher peace were overcome and affairs began to move towards a 
conclusion. A new obstacle was soon found though in the form of Talleyrand. On 20th 
September, the French minister met with the allied plenipotentiaries, with Wellington 
and Castlereagh representing Britain. There was to be no negotiation however, and the 
terms were still significant ones. France’s borders would be rolled back from those 
that the First Peace of Paris had left them, an indemnity would be paid to the allies, as 
well as a contribution to the border forts to be built in the United Netherlands, and, 
most significantly for Wellington, France was to be occupied by a force of 150,000 
allied soldiers.115 When Talleyrand’s pleas that Louis XVIII had been an ally of the 
other powers and that they had no right to demand cessions of territory were rejected 
he attempted to persuade the king to threaten his abdication but, having only just been 
reinstalled, Louis was not willing to take that step. This was too much for his minister. 
‘For my part, it would have been a renunciation of everything I had done at Vienna 
and would have annulled the precautions I had taken to make sure that the alliance that 
had been formed against Bonaparte should not be turned against us’.116 Talleyrand 
handed his resignation in on 23rd September. In his memoirs he lamented the situation 
and the power of the Tsar: ‘There is no government, there is only the will of the 
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Emperor of Russia. I was obliged to take the part of France against him, and I lost. But 
what madness! To take up the cause of France when one has only the Duke of 
Wellington on one’s side, and not even the support of France itself, which understands 
nothing. France is no longer, that is what I should have realised’.117 While Talleyrand 
overestimated the nefarious influence of the Tsar who, as noted, had worked to 
moderate the settlement, the Frenchman does point towards the role Wellington played 
in calling for a lighter treaty. 
The Second Peace of Paris was signed 20th November 1815.118 The final terms 
of the treaty had been slightly modified in the interim by Talleyrand’s successor, 
Armand Émmanuel du Plessis, duc de Richelieu. An émigré, who had served the Tsar 
as Governor-General of New Russia, encompassing the Crimea and Odessa, he had 
initially declined serving in the government shortly after Waterloo, ‘on the grounds 
that he had been away so long that he knew hardly anyone in and very little about 
modern France’.119 Coming into office, Richelieu managed to secure some 
concessions. Nevertheless, they were substantially the same, and on the same day a 
convention for the military occupation of France was signed, with Wellington being 
appointed to the supreme command at the same time, setting him on the next stage of 
his career.120 
Throughout these negotiations the pattern was set for the Wellington’s first 
three years in Cabinet from 1819. The Duke and Castlereagh, working on spot together 
for an extended period for the first time, picked up where they had left off in their 
shorter stints in Vienna earlier in the year and Paris in 1814. They formed an incredibly 
effective partnership, aligned in their outlooks and understanding of the international 
system. Their strengths complemented each other and together found they were able 
to override the Cabinet in London to impose their course and bring truculent 
continental powers to heel. By this time Wellington was a statesman of the first order 
and his personal position in relation to both the British Government and the allies was 
only growing. This trend would intensify over the follow years as Commander-in-
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Chief, bringing his influence to new heights and laying the ground for future problems 
when he returned to domestic politics.   
 
Commander-in-Chief of the Occupation I: International Arbiter?  
The three years that Wellington spent in France as Commander-in-Chief were an 
important stage in his career. In his last active military command, the Duke was in 
charge of ‘history’s first multi-national peacekeeping operation’.121 It was ‘a unique 
advance in the annals of military command, for the allies, in their battles against 
Napoleon, had never fully integrated their forces.’ Each country maintained 
administrative control over their forces in France but their commanders reported to the 
Duke and had to obey his orders on troop dispositions. In this way, ‘[b]y integrating 
allied forces, Wellington had command of all units should he need to employ the 
occupation army’.122 In his unprecedented position, Wellington established a large 
degree of control and influence over the policy of France, and occupied a position in 
the wider European state-system quite unlike any that any other individual has held 
before or since. While T. D. Veve has argued that it was only during the years of 
occupation that Wellington learnt ‘the lessons he needed to enter into the political 
arena’ (a strange assertion given the Duke’s previous political positions in Dublin and 
in Westminster), his tenure as Commander-in-Chief nevertheless did have an 
important role in shaping his long term attitudes towards foreign policy.123 These years 
did not mark a new departure for him. They instead built on his previous experiences, 
especially those of the previous year and a half, and reinforced trends in his attitudes 
such as disdain for the press, a reliance on personal diplomacy and an increase in the 
sense of his own importance. Though his position was a military one, his influence 
extended much beyond that, and touched on his role within the European settlement 
itself. 
Given the precarious domestic political situation within France, the Duke’s 
command took on an additional importance in the early months of the occupation. This 
was revealed when he informed the French authorities in February 1816 of his 
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intention to completely remove the British troops and establishment from Paris. ‘[T]he 
King and the government, particularly the Duc de Richelieu, expressed an anxious 
desire that I should keep the head quarters in Paris.’ Wellington was unwilling to do 
this but on their request that he ‘would stay for some time after the troops had gone, 
and that I would occasionally return to Paris’ he was more agreeable. Writing to 
Bathurst, he told him that, ‘[i]n the mean time I believe my presence is very useful to 
the government and to the King in a variety of ways, and gives confidence to that party 
which brought back the King, although not now in favour’, referring to the liberal 
elements of France which had been ousted by the success of the ultras in the autumn 
of 1815. Wellington was very conscious of the difficult and important position he had: 
‘There is not much confidence in anybody either here or in England, excepting myself. 
But I think a very little caution, and doing no more than what is fair by the French 
government, will soon show them that we are not all so bad as, I must say, they have 
now unfortunately some reason to think us'.124 Wellington was thus acting as the 
personification of British power on the spot in France, and his conduct was to play a 
large role in shaping the opinions of that country towards Britain. This was not just 
the Duke’s ego talking. Webster has surmised that ‘it was undoubtedly [Wellington’s] 
influence, together with that of the Tsar […] that carried the Government through the 
dangerous crisis of the early part of’ 1816.125 
Not only did his broader responsibilities encompass acting as an intermediary 
between nations, but also as one between members of European ruling dynasties. This 
was the case in relation to Wellington’s former aide-de-camp, the Prince of Orange 
and his father, King William of the United Netherlands. Concerned about 
dissatisfaction amongst the Belgian portion of the new Kingdom which he feared his 
father’s actions would make worse, the young Prince wished to establish essentially 
his own court at Brussels. Laying out his case, the Prince wrote, ‘I would request you, 
my dear Duke, if you approve of this measure, to propose it as a measure of policy to 
the King, who, by giving me the command of the troops on the French frontier, might 
by that means render my stay at Bruxelles likewise very palatable to the Dutch; and if 
you could also get your government to propose it, I think the King would agree to 
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it’.126 Wellington was of a different view. Doubting the existence of substantial 
Belgian unrest, let alone the expediency of the idea of a separate court which could 
only serve to separate the Prince from his father, the Duke warned him:  
Nothing would be more unfortunate for your Royal Highness's family than any 
known difference between the King and you; and you may depend upon it you 
will never be upon the terms on which you ought to be, and on which all those 
attached to your family would wish you to be, if you should fix your residence 
at Bruxelles without the King's entire consent. 
Wellington further thought it was impossible for the British government to 
comment on the matter and told the Prince that ‘It is either of a nature purely domestic, 
or relating to interior policy and the King would naturally be offended with his ally if 
the government were to pretend to give him any advice upon it’.127 The Duke referred 
it anyway to Bathurst as Secretary for War, who agreed with the former’s sentiments. 
Revealingly, he told Wellington, that it would be impossible to recommend the Prince 
to take the military command: ‘there is such a habit of jealousy in the different Courts 
of Europe, that many of them would immediately apprehend a secret understanding, 
and be possibly misled into separate engagements to counteract an imaginary one’.128 
The old suspicions were alive and well and still affecting diplomacy during this time. 
Wellington’s primary interactions with the Dutch government during these 
years were not about familial relations but instead about the new ‘barrier fortresses’ to 
be erected along the frontier with France. The Protocol of 21 November 1815 between 
the Allied Powers on the fortifications of the states bordering France placed Britain 
and the United Netherlands conjointly in charge of those of the ‘barrier fortresses’, 
and Wellington was chosen by those two states to supervise their construction.129 In 
this role, the Duke was ultimately responsible for £6.5 million (£2 million each from 
Britain and the United Netherlands and £2.5 million from the payment of French 
indemnities).130 The surveying, design and construction of the fortifications was in the 
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hands both of the British and Dutch engineers and as a result there was a large scope 
for misunderstandings and difficulties to arise. As they both came up with their own 
plans, Wellington had to ensure that relations were not damaged as a result and 
believed that it should be up to the Dutch king to choose whichever plan he believed 
was the best rather than ‘force him to employ’ the British plans against his will. 
Wellington, with his usual disdain for public opinion, and sense of responsibility for 
the government, wrote to Castlereagh:  
It is very easy for any man or set of men to write in the newspapers and 
endeavour to create a sensation in the country upon any point as one of national 
interest or honour; but it is the business of government to counteract these 
attempts, and I am convinced that no reasonable man in England can object to 
the principle above laid down.131 
The barrier fortifications were a central part of the European settlement at the 
end of the Napoleonic Wars, and the Waterloo campaign had emphasised their 
importance. The Army of Occupation was in part designed to act as a substitute until 
the fortresses were ready. In his dual roles as Commander-in-Chief and supervisor of 
the constructions, ‘Wellington was in a better position to evaluate the progress of the 
reconstruction project against the continued presence of the allied army inside France’. 
Given the intimate relationship between the two, ‘[a]s occupation commander-in-chief 
and untitled military advisor to the allied courts, the duke could not recommend a 
removal of the army until a suitable replacement was available.’132 In the end these 
took much longer than anticipated, and the Duke went on annual inspections of the 
fortifications until he became Prime Minister in 1828.133 
Wellington was also involved in a wide number of other questions during his 
time as Commander-in-Chief. As C.K. Webster has pointed out: 
He represented, indeed, more than his own country, for it was an Inter-Allied 
army that he commanded, and in the last resort Alexander and Metternich 
looked to him as much as to their own Ambassadors. Nevertheless, his outlook 
and methods were peculiarly his own and it was the interests of Britain that in 
the long run dictated his policy, however wisely and humanely sought, though 
the Duke was always conscious of the great position which he held in the 
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councils of Europe and was anxious to fulfil his task, a congenial one, in the 
best possible manner.134  
The forum for Wellington to engage in these diplomatic questions was the 
Ambassadorial Conference that sat in Paris. Designed to oversee the Duke’s command 
and for him to be accountable to, he instead dominated it. ‘He was, in fact, far too big 
a personage to be controlled by a Conference of Ambassadors, who were in any case 
generally divided in policy’.135 Writing in 1818, Wellington told Bathurst that ‘it must 
not be supposed that the Allied Ministers here are very cordially united either in their 
objects or councils because they don’t break out. The truth is, that I keep them 
together; but if I were to withdraw from Paris altogether, and particularly if I were to 
do so in a manner which should shake the public respect for me, you would no longer 
see that union of councils and objects which has prevailed here since the Peace’. Such 
was Wellington’s rating of his own importance that he believed that ‘after 
assassination, the greatest public and private calamity which could happen would be 
to obey the order of the Prince Regent’, to leave Paris.136 In 1816 Castlereagh wrote 
to the Duke saying, ‘I have rejoiced to observe the good humour with which you have 
kept the Allied machine together’.137 Webster surmises that ‘By common consent […] 
Wellington was l'homme nécessaire - indispensable not only by virtue of his command 
but by reason of the moral authority which he exerted over the French Government 
and their critics, external and internal. In the long run all the important decisions with 
regard to France during these three years were made by him, however he might try to 
disguise the responsibility’.138 The experiences of this time, of being the trusted 
intermediary of statesmen of various countries, reinforced his preferences for personal 
diplomacy, and went along to give him an exaggerated sense of his own importance 
among the chancelleries of Europe. 
One of the main issues that Wellington would have to deal with over the course 
of his tenure was that of the interlinked problem of French exiles in the United 
Netherlands and a vehement anti-Bourbon press that was in existence there. The 
problem of the exiles was a difficult one, entwined with the various declarations and 
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Ordonnances issued by the French government on its own return after the Hundred 
Days. Given Wellington’s intimacy with the Dutch monarchy, the Ambassadorial 
Conference looked to him to deal with the issue. In April 1816, the Duke was reporting 
from the Hague that the King had already ‘adopted measures to remedy some of the 
inconveniences and evils complained of’ and that he had ‘expressed himself disposed 
to cooperate with the French government in preventing evil-disposed persons from 
plotting in his dominions’.139 Writing a few days later, Wellington told Sir Charles 
Stuart, the British ambassador to Paris, in a letter to be communicated to the 
Conference, that ‘taking the question as a practical one, and not upon the principle, I 
confess that I thought it of little importance whether two or three regicides did or did 
not remain in [the Dutch king’s] dominions, provided they were not immediately upon 
the French frontier’. In this Wellington was acting as a restraint upon the Allied 
ambassadors and the French government. Despite this, ‘if the Allied ministers think it 
an object’, Wellington wrote that ‘I entertain no doubt that I shall be able to prevail 
upon the King to send away the regicides entirely’.140  
This was disingenuous. While Wellington was no doubt convinced that he 
could convince King William I to expel the regicides, he had no intention of following 
the wishes of the Ambassadorial Conference on this question when he did not agree 
with the expediency of the measure. A long correspondence ensued. Wellington told 
Stuart, ‘[o]bserve that I am now reasoning the question as one of right, and I believe 
it will be admitted that there is no right to call upon the King of the Netherlands to 
send the regicides out of his country’. He continued: 
I feel as strongly as others how desirable it is that all the Powers and all the 
people of Europe should show an abhorrence of all those concerned in the 
French Revolution, and particularly the late rebellion; but considering the 
manner in which these regicides were banished, how few of them there are 
remaining in Holland, and what miserable wretches they are, and that to press 
the matter further will be disagreeable to the King, I cannot think it desirable 
to do so. If there is the slightest trace of any one of them being engaged in 
cabals against the French government, I entertain no doubt the King will send 
them all away; but till we can prove that, it appears to me not worth while to 
notice them.141 
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On this question, and the related one of the libellous press in the Netherlands, 
Wellington took a stance that was based on the rights and duties of nations and 
statesmen within the international system. He was not reactionary either in outlook or 
in his actions, but instead was focused on ensuring fairness and realism in his 
suggestions. Writing to Castlereagh, the Duke told him how he ‘found all parties so 
warm, [on the question of the libels] that I thought it best to give in a memorandum to 
the Conference of Ministers, in which I have reviewed all that has passed upon it, and 
recommended one or two practical measures’. He noted how ‘[t]he King and the Duc 
de Richelieu are a good deal softened, and so are the foreign ministers, who wanted to 
erect themselves into a Power’. In this, Wellington was very much in line with British 
interests and placed his actions over this firmly within the wider context of 
Castlereagh’s foreign policy through to his death in 1822. The Duke was still aware 
that while the principles being advanced needed to be opposed, it was still necessary 
to take some practical steps to ‘put a curb upon the neck of rebels and traitors who 
have collected in’ the Netherlands. 142 In all of this Castlereagh was in agreement with 
Wellington. He wrote in reply that he would ‘neglect no means to awaken the 
government of the Netherlands to the danger, I should rather say to the ruin, they will 
sooner or later bring upon themselves, if they do not cease in time to make their press 
and their territory the instruments of general mischief’. Interestingly, highlighting the 
gap that existed between Britain and the continent even in this early stage after the end 
of the war, the Foreign Secretary continued, ‘We may offend by our constitutional 
licence, because we have the sea for our frontier; but such a state as the Netherlands 
will never be tolerated in doing so’. Furthermore, ‘I quite agree with you [...] that 
Prince Metternich’s despatch on this question is very ill considered, and that the Allied 
Ministers must be very cautious of obeying his summons’.143 The battle over these 
issues would rumble on into the next year, until Wellington finally succeeded in 
securing a satisfactory settlement.144 
Another question that was came before Wellington to help settle was that of 
Italian duchies. Formally the Kingdom of Etruria before their annexation by Napoleon, 
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they had been ruled by a branch of the Spanish Bourbons in compensation for their 
earlier loss of the Duchy of Parma. In 1814 they were granted to Marie Louise, the 
Habsburg second wife of Napoleon, by the Treaty of Fontainebleau. This document, 
however, left the issue of her succession wide open and it was possible that Napoleon’s 
son, the King of Rome, could succeed his mother. The Spaniards opposed this and, 
keen to secure the reversion of the duchies back to the Bourbons once more, had 
refused to ratify the Treaty of Vienna as it did not settle this question to their 
satisfaction.  
This remained the state of the question when Wellington was brought in by 
Lord Castlereagh to speak to the Spanish ambassador in August 1816. Wellington 
observed to the Marquis de Labrador that ‘he must be aware that it would be quite 
impossible for the King of Spain either to obtain his objects in Italy, or to place himself 
on the same footing with the Allies in relation to France, till he should have signed 
and ratified the Treaty of Vienna, and should have acceded to the Treaty of Paris’. In 
this, Wellington and Labrador embarked from quite different starting points. Whereas 
the Duke believed that only once the treaties had been signed could the duchies 
become a subject of negotiation, and that ‘till that was done it appeared impossible to 
attain them’, Labrador believed that there needed to be ‘some security for the 
attainment of his objects’ before he could take the step of signing them’.145 The Duke’s 
view was the only one that could be proceeded with and Wellington wrote to 
Castlereagh how Labrador ‘will sign if he gets an assurance from us that he is to have 
[the duchies]; that is, he will believe what we say, but not anybody else’.146 
Castlereagh was clear ‘that we have done our best to settle the point in their favour’ 
but that the British government could not consider itself bound in its support on the 
question and that ‘there is certainly no motive for pledging ourselves blindly to such 
a government as that of Spain on any question, without reference to combinations and 
circumstances which the future may give birth, if the Allies cannot at the present 
moment be brought to agree in closing the question as we have proposed’.147 
In this question, as with so many others, Wellington was to play an important 
mediating role. Indeed, the instructions that Labrador had received from his 
                                                 
145 Memorandum by Wellington, 25 Aug. 1816, in WSD, vol. XI, pp. 461-3. 
146 Wellington to Castlereagh, 26 Aug. 1816, in WSD, vol. XI, p. 463. 
147 Castlereagh to Wellington, 6 Sept. 1816, in WSD, vol. XI, p. 481. 
61 
 
government enabling him to reach an agreement on the issue were such that they 
‘compel him to terminate this question by a direct negotiation with’ Wellington 
personally.148 The affair nevertheless dragged on into the summer of 1817. On 
Wellington’s return to Paris in June, he wrote to Castlereagh that ‘[u]pon my arrival 
here I found the question of the Italian Duchies ripe for discussion: indeed, they had 
all waited for my arrival to open the discussions’. Eventually an agreement was 
reached, based on Wellington’s earlier memorandum on the issue and Spain acceded 
to the Treaty of Vienna and the Second Peace of Paris.149 
These small episodes display the unprecedented position that Wellington 
occupied in the European system. The Duke himself was the closest that Europe came 
during this time to a formal system of arbitration. His prestige and standing amongst 
all parties of all shades allowed him to have a say over affairs that was without parallel. 
These years clearly demonstrate the importance of studying the Duke to have a full 
understanding of diplomacy of Europe following the Napoleonic Wars. They are also 
crucial context to Wellington’s return to domestic politics and the difficulties he would 
later face with both Canning and when Prime Minister. Having had such influence, 
and to have been so successful with a particular style of diplomacy, the transition to a 
more national role and to new styles of business would be a painful one, as will be 
explored below. 
Commander-in-Chief of the Occupation II: Reducing the 
Army 
Of course, for all his influence on diplomatic disputes, throughout these years 
his central role remained as Commander-in-Chief of the Army of Occupation. In this 
capacity the issue of a reduction of the size of the army loomed increasingly large over 
the course of 1816 with Richelieu regularly pressing for it and citing the cost as an 
‘unbearable burden on the French budget’.150 In this question, as in so many others, 
the Great Powers looked to the Duke’s personal judgement to decide the matter.151 By 
October Richelieu was ‘urging in the strongest terms’ the need for it. At this stage, the 
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Duke was still very much against the idea, telling Stuart how he did ‘not think it would 
be expedient to make any reduction’ and certainly the Allies would not be willing ‘till 
they see what is the conduct of the Legislature in the approaching session’. He was 
not completely closed to reducing the numbers should the ambassadors feel that it 
would be ‘expedient’ that Richelieu could ‘announce a diminution of expense’.152 The 
great woman of letters, and friend of Wellington’s, Madame de Staël, also frequently 
harangued the Duke about a reduction of his forces. ‘If at the time of Charles II’, she 
wrote to him in December, ‘the regiments of Louis XIV had camped in Hyde Park 
would there have been one Englishman, whether a follower of Cromwell, the Puritans, 
or the Stuarts who would not have felt despair?’ She urged him to ‘[c]ome to us, then, 
come and become our liberator after having been our conqueror’.153 
Despite at the start of December reaffirming his earlier opposition to a 
reduction, only a few days later Wellington had changed his tack.154 He told 
Castlereagh that his ‘opinion of the reduction as a practical measure is very much 
altered’. While previously he had seen it necessary ‘for the protection of the 
settlement’ and he certainly considered it a success in that regard, circumstances had 
changed. The fact that Richelieu’s government had little ‘real authority and strength’ 
and ‘incapacity or disinclination to give us protection’, when combined with an 
increasing number of scuffles between occupying soldiers made a complicated 
situation. Should it become necessary to ‘proceed to military execution’, something 
Wellington saw as ‘by no means improbable’, then ‘more harm would be done, and 
the cause of the King, and good government, and the world, would be thrown back 
further than can be imagined’. As a result of these factors, Wellington was beginning 
to move away from his earlier opposition to reduction, at this point advising that 
numbers should be brought down ‘only gradually’ due to the significant risks involved 
should they ever need to forcibly obtain supplies.155  
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By the second week of January 1817 he had finished his conversion to the 
necessity of a reduction. Wellington ‘reviewed the issue from a statesman's point of 
view rather than from a commander's’.156 The Army of Occupation had been 
established with a view towards both the internal security of France and Louis XVIII 
and as a ‘temporary security’ of the Allied powers’ territories, peoples and treaties. By 
the time he was writing though, ‘[t]he measure of the occupation of a part of France 
[…] is no longer considered necessary for the interests of France herself, but is 
represented as a disgraceful condition imposed by the conquerors on the conquered, 
unjustifiable in its objects, and the expense of which is as intolerable as the measure 
is disgraceful to the French people’. Thus, it seemed as though ‘the system of 
occupation, however still necessary for all the objects for which it had first been 
adopted, might no longer be one of peace’. The negotiation of a new loan for the 
French government, relieving the necessity of using force to procure succours, was a 
crucial factor in allowing a reduction under these circumstances. Though still acutely 
conscious of the risks of lowering the number of soldiers, given how thinly they were 
spread out over the zone of occupation, Wellington nevertheless conceded the 
reduction of the army by 30,000 men, proportionally from each contingent. 
Furthermore, ‘the French government shall make it known to the public in the manner 
most likely to produce a favourable effect on the public mind’.157 This Richelieu duly 
did in a statement to the Chamber of Deputies on 10 February 1817, thus 
accomplishing ‘a major objective of his government’.158 
As a final point of note on the reduction of the Army of Occupation was the 
principle he chose to apply of a proportional deduction from all, and the minor battle 
he had to fight to achieve it. The challenge was opened by the King of Württemberg, 
but behind it was Russia. The King proposed that he would withdraw his entire 
contingent, and the Russian General Woronzoff informed the Duke that Russia hoped 
to avoid withdrawing any. The idea to remove the contingents of all the smaller nations 
entirely, leaving only those of the Great Powers, received some backing from 
Richelieu who regarded the presence of states such as Württemberg as incompatible 
with France’s status as a major nation. However, Wellington opposed this scheme. As 
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Veve has argued, the Duke ‘recognized that if peace was a goal of all European 
nations, then all nations had to make an investment in security’. Indeed, he ‘perceived 
the important role of all of the allied contingents in the accomplishment of his army's 
mission of achieving tranquillity inside France’. Preventing a permanent presence of 
Russian soldiers in Western Europe was no doubt an added bonus for the Duke, despite 
the fact that to have retained only the troops of Britain, Russia, Austria and Prussia 
would have probably provided a more coherent fighting force should it have been 
required.159 
Once the reduction in troops had been conceded, it began to look increasingly 
like the full force would be withdrawn at the minimum three year period, rather than 
the full five that had been allowed for. Before that could be achieved, however, some 
kind of agreement would have to be reached on the reparations France owed to the 
allies. As so often throughout these years, it was to the Duke they looked to come to 
some kind of equitable settlement for all the parties involved. In October 1817, Tsar 
Alexander wrote to Wellington asking him to take up the gauntlet of looking at the 
problem in its fullest scope.160 In January 1818 this was supported by the Prussian, 
Austrian and Saxon governments.161 
Simultaneously, Wellington also had a significant hand in the negotiations of 
a new loan from Hope and Baring to the French government. The Duke had already 
been a crucial interlocutor in a loan of the previous year. At the time he had shown 
how he was capable of acting in the broader European interest, dismissing the attempts 
of Alexander Baring to try and get a better price out of the French government than 
Wellington thought justified.162 Though the negotiations for the loan and the 
reparations should have been separate, the overlap of personnel meant that they were 
‘intertwined’.163 Despite the continuing wealth of France, in light of the relative dearth 
of the government, the loan was viewed as necessary to be able to pay the debts to the 
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allies.164 These had originally been estimated to be in the region of two hundred 
million francs but their final total ended up an exorbitant 1,600 million francs.165 
In the end the Duke was successful in achieving both the agreement of a loan 
and the settling of the reparations at a reasonable level. The former was the most 
straightforward task. Wellington did find Baring at one point claiming that he was 
‘much less sanguine in his expectations of permanent tranquillity in France, and much 
less eager to engage in French loans’, but this was merely a ploy or a passing 
disquiet.166 By May 1818, Baring and Hope had agreed to contract a loan of 265 
million francs.167  
The arbitration of the reparations would be a more challenging prospect thanks 
to the need to balance both the demands of the allied powers and the ability of France 
to pay. Wellington told Castlereagh that his plan for dealing with this was ‘first to 
ascertain what will really and ought to satisfy each nation’ which he proposed to do 
by getting detailed returns and following them up with discussions with the 
commissioners and ministers of the relevant powers. To follow this up ‘[a]fter having 
ascertained as nearly as I can what will satisfy everybody’, the Duke proposed to 
‘negotiate with the French government to obtain that sum in the mode which will be 
most advantageous to the Allies, and least injurious to the other operations of the 
French government’.168 In this Wellington was remarkably successful. Though the 
Prussians, who had the largest share of the claims, objected, the Duke’s decisions met 
with approval in general.169 The final total of Continental claims Wellington put at 240 
million francs – a fraction of the original estimate of 1,600 million.170 Not that this 
reduction was unopposed by the French government who contested the interest on the 
sums owed. Wellington told Castlereagh how he thought ‘that both the King and his 
Ministers have behaved shabbily in this concern. The Ministers of the Allies have 
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certainly come down as low as they can, or ought, and they all reckoned upon and 
have a right to the back interest’. Despite this the French sought to ‘take advantage of 
the general eagerness to obtain a settlement to refuse any reasonable accommodation 
upon the question’.171 Nevertheless, an accommodation was reached and a convention 
was signed on 25 April 1818 for ‘Final Liquidation of Private Claims upon the French 
Government’.172 With that the prickly issue of the reparations was thus cleared by 
Wellington with minimal complications given the scale of the task that had faced him 
at the outset.  
The final agreement on the question of reparations opened the way for the 
withdrawal of the Army of Occupation at the end of the minimum three year term at 
the end of 1818 that the Treaty of Paris had specified.173 Not only did the French 
government press for this with increasing force, but more generally, the allied powers 
began to see the need for an early withdrawal.174 Wellington was of this opinion, 
seeing that with France increasingly united in opposition to the occupation, to remain 
longer would undermine one of its chief purposes in maintaining domestic stability 
and tranquillity.175 As he had told the cabinet, ‘the continuation of the Occupation 
against the declared wish of the King and every political party in France would 
increase rather than diminish the danger’.176 It was decided that a Congress would be 
called to settle these matters in a final form. Though there was some disagreement on 
what basis to convene it, a reflection of the tenuous and unclear grounds that the 
‘Congress System’ was based on, by May 1818 it was eventually decided to call it on 
the basis of the Treaty of Paris. This thus enabled the Great Powers to exclude the 
lesser states, even those who had participated in the Army of Occupation.177  
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The Congress met from 30 September 1818 in the Prussian spa town of Aix-
la-Chappelle. The final resting place of Charlemagne, the town was conveniently 
located close to Wellington’s headquarters at Cambrai, as well as not capable of 
accommodating all the hangers-on that had flocked to Vienna – a major point in its 
favour, not that it stopped many from attempting to press their claims.178 Many of the 
same faces from Vienna were there at Aix-la-Chappelle. Once again, Metternich took 
pride of place for Austria, assisted ably by Friedrich von Gentz who would reprise his 
role as Secretary to the Congress. Richelieu was the primary figure attending for 
France and Prince Hardenberg, Prussian Prime Minister represented Prussia alongside 
Wilhelm von Humboldt, Prince Wittgenstein and Count Bernstorff. Tsar Alexander 
was accompanied by a range of figures that represented the scope of his varied 
thinking – from the conservative Nesselrode, to the liberally minded Count Ioannis 
Kapodistrias (joint Russian foreign minister and future president of Greece), as well 
as the two ambassadors to London and Paris respectively Count Christopher Lieven 
(a figure of future significance to Wellington along with his wife, Countess Dorothea 
Lieven) and Pozzo di Borgo – the latter having been objected to by Castlereagh and 
Metternich.179 Britain was represented by Castlereagh himself, alongside Lord 
Stewart, Castlereagh’s half-brother and the British ambassador to Austria. Wellington, 
reflecting his European position, attended not as a British representative, but in his 
capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Army of Occupation. This did not, however, 
prevent his close cooperation with Castlereagh and the Duke’s ‘loyalty and common-
sense were to be of great assistance’ to the Foreign Secretary, and their relationship at 
the Congress to be marked once more with ‘a complete harmony of outlook […] and 
never a shadow of jealousy or armour propre’.180  
The Congress revolved around the central question of France. This was made 
up of two parts, the simpler question of the removal of the occupation and the much 
more complex one of France’s future relations with the other Great Powers, and her 
desire to be admitted to the Alliance to remove the stigma and appearance of being a 
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lesser power. This was certainly not a matter without significant dangers. Prior to the 
start of the Congress, the Duke had been endeavouring to find out how France aimed 
to achieve her objective of admittance. The Austrian ambassador to Paris had 
speculated that the Tsar could well be ‘disposed to break up the Quadruple Alliance, 
and to connect himself immediately with France and the other Sovereigns of the House 
of Bourbon’.181 To this end the French government proposed to admit the King of 
Spain to the Congress, who would aid in the reorientation of the Alliance. Wellington 
took exception to this mode of proceeding when informed of it by Richelieu. The 
consequence would be ‘very inconvenient’ and ‘render all the operations of the 
Conference impracticable hereafter’. While the minor states ‘might submit to be led 
by the four Great Powers, who had made the greatest sacrifices during the war, 
together with France’ they would not accept the addition of ‘a Power such as Spain 
introduced into the councils of the Alliance’.182 This blunt statement was a reflection 
on how the fundamental power relationships that underpinned the international system 
had shifted, widening the gap between the greatest of the European states and the lesser 
members of the international system. Over this barrier, concerns such as dynastic 
feelings, as well as diplomatic positioning for self-interest by drawing on them, could 
not prevail.  
The first part of the French question, the removal of the Army of Occupation, 
was dealt with very swiftly. On only the second day of the Congress the allies had 
signed a protocol agreeing to the evacuation and within days the Duke was writing to 
Lord Bathurst noting that given ‘we are so far advanced in our affairs, that I think it 
best to lose no time to write to you about shipping’ the stores, soldiers and horses back 
to Britain.183 The question of France’s relationship to the Alliance was a more difficult 
one. As Nesselrode and Kapodistrias put it in a memorandum to the British delegates, 
the ‘double problème’ was with ‘la France étant évacuée par les troupes étrangères, de 
quelle manière garantir l'Europe de deux grands dangers, du retour des révolutions, et 
du droit du plus fort?’ The Russian ministers proposed that the Congress should come 
to an agreement on what the casus foederis of the alliance would be, as well as 
announcing that the ‘general alliance’, i.e. that of the Vienna Final Act, rather than 
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just the Quadruple Alliance, was based on ‘the solidarity of all legitimate sovereigns 
and guarantee[d] to all states their existing territories and governments’.184  
The disagreements that arose out of this matter were an important turning point 
in the international system and foreshadowed the numerous disputes between Britain 
and the continental powers that would arise over the following years. The fundamental 
difference between the nature of the British state, founded as it was, at least in the 
minds of many of her politicians, with the Glorious Revolution of 1688, and  the 
Russian proposal to guarantee all thrones against revolution necessitated that 
Castlereagh would have to oppose it. It would have been impossible for him to have 
carried the cabinet, let alone the House of Commons, along with him in such a wide 
vision of the role of the Alliance and the Congress System. Indeed, George Canning 
was quite adamant in his opposition within cabinet to even a minor extension of its 
scope. ‘He thinks that system of periodical meetings of the four great Powers, with a 
view to the general concerns of Europe, new, and of very questionable policy; that it 
will necessarily involve us deeply in all the politics of the Continent, whereas our true 
policy has always been not to interfere except in great emergencies, and then with a 
commanding force’.185  
The Duke of Wellington was an important assistant to Castlereagh in this 
dispute. It was together that the two Britons were able to overcome the arguments in 
favour of the wider system. ‘The Russian Ministers were unable to resist an onslaught 
from adversaries so experienced and determined as Castlereagh and Wellington’.186 
Lord Stewart commented on the massive difficulties faced at the congress and that 
‘had it not been for the unwearied labour of my brother and the Duke of Wellington, 
their repeated conferences with the Emperor personally, it is evident that no progress 
would have been made’.187 
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Aside from the disputes over the Alliance, and the more procedural elements 
of the removal of the Army of Occupation, the Duke of Wellington had one other 
question where he played a significant role – the question of the rebelling Spanish 
American colonies. The matter of Spanish America and its fate would form an 
important part of his later career and will be considered elsewhere. In relation to 
discussion of it at the Congress though, the Duke once again found himself at the 
centre of European affairs and representing more than just British interests. The 
rebellious colonies represented an intractable problem for European diplomacy, and 
one that sat at the centre of many strands, from issues of the rights of the alliance and 
non-interventionism to matters of sea power and dynastic politics. Importantly, Spain 
had been a fertile field for Russian intrigues during the course of the previous years 
and Castlereagh had built up a deep reserve of suspicions of Russian intentions at the 
Congress relating to this question. It was thanks to the ‘extraordinary frank speaking 
in which Castlereagh and Wellington were able to indulge’ with the Tsar that these 
fears were dispelled.188 With the air clear, Castlereagh was surprised by Alexander’s 
next move which was to suggest that Wellington should be sent to Spain as the 
representative of the five Great Powers to preside over an ambassadorial conference 
on the matter. Not only was this idea backed by France but it was thought that even 
the United States, a concerning unknown in the question of the colonies, could 
attend.189 For Wellington once more to be proposed by the continental powers for such 
an important task demonstrates the extent his service had transformed him into 
something more than just a British statesman, especially as this would have been a 
task completely unrelated to the military. He was certainly no longer a mere solider. 
In the end the Duke declined the offer. His grounds, that it would be impossible to 
properly represent the rebellious colonists, reflected the pragmatism that guided his 
attitude to diplomatic questions.190 
The period from the end of the fighting in 1814 to the end of Wellington’s 
active military roles in 1818 established some of the patterns for the Duke’s later 
career. Over this time, he made the transition to a British, and European, statesman of 
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the first rank. His official situation understated his influence. While technically 
subordinate to the Paris Ambassadorial Conference, Wellington dominated them while 
in charge of the Army of Occupation. Throughout this time, only Castlereagh had a 
similar influence amongst British politicians in relation to the monarchs and ministers 
of Europe. Domestically, Wellington cemented his influential role in the formulation 
of foreign policy – one that was, in some respects, a broadly liberal policy, as his 
interventions over the constitutional question in Spain and his support for the abolition 
of the slave trade demonstrate. Moreover, it was clearly one in line with the European 
focus of Castlereagh. At all times his style of diplomacy was a pragmatic one. It was 
geared towards broad British and European aims, more of the realm of geopolitics than 
of concern for constitutional systems and models. He was not driven by the British 
domestic press, and thought it more a nuisance than the authentic manifestation of the 
voice of the nation. He was by no means a reactionary, nor did he want to return 
Europe to the days of before the French Revolution but he did not subscribe 
unquestioningly to the zeitgeist of the day. This year also established some of the 
outlines of the foreign politics that Wellington would have to deal with for the next 
two decades. The Duke and Castlereagh had to grapple with a potential threat from 
France, and the revolution more specifically, and a very real threat from Russia. These 
two states would dominate his concerns for a long time to come.  
This period would also establish some of the more personal strengths and 
problems of Wellington’s future career. Not only was the Duke’s foreign policy a 
European one, but he became himself a European institution. He personally formed a 
prop of the Vienna System. Thus the Tsar could insist on him as the sine qua non of 
the Army of Occupation, and thus it was to him personally the Great Powers looked 
to solve difficult problems such as the question of reparations or mediation between 
Spain and her colonies. This very importance, and exalted position he would occupy, 
would in future give rise to issues at home. A personification of the Congress System, 
of the personal methods of diplomacy that prevailed in the immediate post-war years, 
as they began to lessen so would his influence. Formed as a diplomat by habits of 
intimacy and influence at the highest levels, once Castlereagh had died the 
assumptions he held from this time would make him a difficult and quarrelsome 
colleague on foreign policy questions as will be explored below. 
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A Friend and a Rival: 
Wellington, Castlereagh 
and Canning 1819-27 
 
From his entry into the cabinet upon his return from France in 1819 through to 
his resignation from it in 1827, the Duke of Wellington would occupy a central role in 
the formulation of its decisions. This was most clearly evident with regard to British 
foreign policy. His influence on this was exercised in remarkably different ways over 
the course of this period. While Castlereagh was at the Foreign Office, Wellington 
worked in unison with a friend and comrade-in-arms, who shared both similar 
experiences and understandings of the international system and the leaders of the other 
powers. As the previous chapter has shown, they were a formidable partnership and 
Wellington would be a crucial ally to the Foreign Secretary in a cabinet where few 
others shared their view points. In comparison, the Duke’s relationship with George 
Canning could not have been more different. Though he played an important role in 
securing Canning’s appointment as Castlereagh’s replacement in 1822, Wellington 
would have a fractious relationship with the new minister. Indeed, their conflicts 
within the government almost brought it down as resignation threats were bandied 
about at various times. Far from the amicable relationship he had with Castlereagh, 
the Duke would instead act as a break on Canning, and led a substantial portion of the 
cabinet who were mistrustful of the latter’s policies. This chapter will be composed of 
three parts that explore Wellington’s role in British foreign policy over these years. 
The first will look at the Duke from his entry to the cabinet through to Castlereagh’s 
suicide in August 1822. The second will examine Wellington’s diplomatic mission to 
Vienna and the Congress of Verona as Castlereagh’s replacement before the last will 
examine the Duke and Canning’s foreign policy from 1823 to 1827. This will focus in 
particular on the broader rivalry between the two and the interrelated questions of 
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Spain, Portugal and the recognition of Spain’s lost colonies before the next chapter 
will turn to look at the Eastern Question in more depth.  
 
Wellington and Castlereagh 1819-22 
When Wellington finally entered cabinet in 1819 after the end of the occupation of 
France and his return from the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, it was once again as a 
statesman, not as a politician. Of course, as has been seen, Wellington’s influence was 
far more than that of a mere general. Since the end of the war, few major decisions on 
military or diplomatic questions had been taken without his input or advice, and his 
role in the wider European diplomacy had been substantial. Throughout he had 
occupied an ambiguous role, somewhat above the usual norms. This was clearly the 
case when he attended the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle not as a British representative 
but as a European one for the Army of Occupation. Upon joining Lord Liverpool’s 
administration officially, it was also with a similar ambiguity – on the condition that 
he did not have to follow the line of the government:  
I don't doubt that the party of which the present Gov[ernmen]t are the head will 
give me credit for being sincerely attached to them & their Interests; but I hope 
that in case any circumstance should occur to remove them from Power they 
will allow me to consider myself at Liberty to take any Line I may at the time 
think proper. The experience which I have acquired during my long Service 
abroad has convinced me that a factious opposition to the Gov[ernmen]t is 
highly injurious to the Interests of the Country; & think as I do now I could not 
become a party to such an opposition; and I wish that this may be clearly 
understood by the Persons with whom I am now about to engage as a Colleague 
in Gov[ernmen]t. 
Wellington was aware that this might not be a popular stance to take, noting 
that it might ‘render me less eligible as a colleague’, and if that is the case then he 
would happily relinquish the offer with no hard feelings ‘& I can only assure you that 
you will ever find me equally disposed as you have always found me to render you 
every Service & assistance in my Power’.1 The administration desperately needed the 
injection of Wellington’s prestige to support them and Liverpool acquiesced in the 
Duke’s conditions, noting: ‘that there are many special circumstances in y[ou]r 
situation which render it of the utmost importance in the event to w[hi]ch you refer 
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that you sh[oul]d be at full Liberty to adopt that line of Conduct which you may at that 
time judge most proper & advisable with a view to the Country & to yourself’.2 While 
the principle of collective responsibility was still not fully developed at this time, it 
was nevertheless a large degree of latitude that Wellington was given, and it is 
noteworthy the implied extent that he considered himself above party politics.3 This 
has been linked to the prevailing Pittite distrust of party politics, unlike the opinions 
held within the Whigs, but it was still a strongly worded statement of Wellington’s 
unique position within British politics, unlike that required from other figures.4  
Upon entering the cabinet, Wellington did not hold himself aloof from his 
colleagues. Swiftly, the Duke was collaborating with Castlereagh and together they 
formed a clearing house for questions of foreign policy before being brought to the 
whole cabinet.5 As John Bew has pointed out: ‘Castlereagh greatly valued the support 
of Wellington, whose military reputation had never been higher but whose experience 
of Paris as an ambassador was also invaluable to him. Wellington's underrated political 
skills were a theme to which Castlereagh would return many times in later years in 
admiration’.6 The Duke’s time in France was such that he had far more experience 
than any other figure with the politics of that country. Wellington was especially 
qualified to comment on the long-held suspicions of the ambassadorial conference, 
and its determination to extend its remit. Castlereagh asked for his thoughts on the 
ambitions of Russia and Austria for the conference, which, in his mind, ‘is nothing 
more than a project of Pozzo’s for establishing himself as a sort of European director 
at Paris, and it really appears to me to be an inevitable result from blowing up the 
confederacy in the shortest time possible’.7 
Wellington had distinct views on what the roles of the ambassadors in Paris 
should be and on what direction France should take. At a time of turmoil and unrest 
across Europe, including in Britain herself, the allies had to tread a careful line. The 
fall of the Richelieu ministry in Paris, and its replacement by a liberal one under the 
                                                 
2 Liverpool to Wellington, 9 Nov. 1818, Liverpool Mss., Loan Ms. 72, vol. 22, ff. 186-7. 
3 A. Aspinall, The Cabinet Council, 1783-1835, Proceedings of the British Academy (London, 
1952), pp. 214-24. 
4 Muir, Wellington, vol. II, p. 121-2. 
5 Castlereagh to Wellington, 6 Feb. 1819, Wellington Mss., WP1/617/15 (also in WND, vol. I, 
pp. 26-7).  
6 Bew, Castlereagh, p. 408. 
7 Castlereagh to Wellington, 11 Sept. 1819, Wellington Mss., WP1/631/9 (also in WND, vol. 
I, pp. 75-6).  
75 
 
King’s favourite Élie-Louis, Comte Decazes, awoke fears of future French conduct, 
and whether they would even adhere to the line of foreign policy agreed only months 
before at Aix-la-Chapelle. On the future of France, Wellington would play a strong 
supporting role to the diplomacy of Castlereagh. Though the Foreign Secretary 
instructed Sir Charles Stuart of the impolicy of interference in French affairs in March 
1819, much of his time was absorbed by a difficult session in Parliament, and as a 
result he was ‘relying on Wellington’s influence to help him with the French’.8 In this, 
the Duke was perfectly placed to aid him thanks to the connections he had established 
over the previous three years with leading politicians and the foreign ambassadors. 
Already in January he had been writing to the Neapolitan ambassador to France 
cautioning of the danger of the French government looking for popularity in breaking 
with the allies, but that the allied ambassadors should not separate themselves too far 
from them.9 This stance would encapsulate his policy, and British diplomacy, over the 
following months. 
In April Wellington responded to the letters of Decazes warning how the 
conduct of France was necessarily of great interest to the rest of Europe.10 ‘[A]vec la 
même franchise, avec laquelle jadis je vous parlais’, the Duke told Decazes that, ‘[l]a 
triste expérience vous a appris qu’aucune nation du monde ne peut être tranquille si la 
France ne l’est pas’. Furthermore, ‘malgré qu’il soit de notre devoir à tous de tenir un 
silence respectueux sur tout ce qui se passes chez notre voisin, il nous est impérieux 
de bien connaître les choses, et de les juger pour notre propre intérêt’. In addition to 
stressing the concern with which affairs in France would be viewed, Wellington also 
told the French minister that he had warned the allied ambassadors in Paris that they 
had no right to pass judgement on the conduct of the French government. For them to 
do so would just aggravate French feelings towards the allied powers with ill 
consequences.11 Wellington was convinced of the importance of what happened in 
France for the wider world. The following year he wrote to the Austrian ambassador 
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saying that ‘car vraiment la tranquillité du monde, et le sûreté, et la stabilité de l’ordre 
sociale en Europe depend sur ce qui se passe en France beaucoup plus qu’on ne le 
pense dans les salons de Paris’.12 
The Russian ambassador to Paris, Pozzo di Borgo, did not agree with 
Wellington’s advice for how the allies should act. In his mind, what was happening in 
France and the rest of Europe was a struggle for the future of the continent. Pozzo told 
the Duke: ‘qu'il est impossible de rester neutres dans la lutte entre le bien et le mal’. 
At the present time there was a ‘fédération du bien contre celle du mal’. The danger 
would come from timidity and not acting with decision. In Pozzo’s mind ‘[J]e suis 
convaincu que le seul frein des méchants est la crainte de l'intervention étrangère’.13 
This was very different advice to that which Wellington had given Decazes. Though 
the Duke concurred with the Corsican as to the risks of French actions, he had a 
fundamentally different point of view on the role the allies should play. While it was 
true that the French feared foreign intervention, it also meant ‘ces cris résonneraient 
ailleurs, et paralyseraient les efforts de l’alliance; et on trouverait trop tard peut-être 
que le défaut de force morale que donne la justice dans toutes les causes avait faire 
manquer son but à l’intervention Européenne’. For Wellington ‘[j]e ne vois de remède 
à tout ceci que d’abord l’union, et puis la patience et la sagesse’.14 Only through a 
careful marshalling of the moral superiority of the allies could they preserve their 
strength and unity to be able to use it at the decisive moment, when revolution and war 
really did threaten the order of Europe.15  
The role and attitudes Wellington took during the first months of 1819 are 
important indicators of his wider position. The Duke was Castlereagh’s key lieutenant. 
It is to Wellington the Foreign Secretary was looking to help advance his foreign 
policy objectives, even more than many of his diplomats. Wellington’s close intimacy 
with the key ambassadors in Paris, as well as the statesmen of Europe, gave his 
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opinions a great deal of weight and could support British diplomatic initiatives in a 
frank and private way that was unachievable in formal diplomatic correspondence. 
Yet this position hinged on his cooperation with Castlereagh. Without the open and 
frank exchange of views that their relationship was based on, Wellington’s position 
was a potentially troublesome one for the British government, as will be seen below. 
But while Castlereagh still occupied the Foreign Office, this was all in the future. At 
this stage Wellington was happily passing on to the Foreign Secretary his 
correspondence with the continent. For example, he forwarded to Castlereagh a letter 
from Metternich on the status of the Italian fortifications, then under construction, that 
would complement those in the United Netherlands under Wellington’s own 
supervision.16 As Europe’s leading military figure, it was a matter of interest to all the 
allies to ensure that Wellington was informed of such details. 
In this time of turmoil across Europe, it is worth emphasising that Wellington’s 
outlook remained one of careful pragmatism. As before in 1814 when he 
recommended a conciliatory constitutionalism to Ferdinand VII, or in 1815 when he 
helped force Talleyrand and Fouché on Louis XVIII, Wellington remained well aware 
of the need to avoid slipping into a close-minded reaction. While congratulating Baron 
Vincent, Austrian ambassador to Paris, on the efforts of Metternich in Germany, the 
Duke also made the telling statement that ‘soyez sûr qu’en politique il n’y a rien de 
stable que ce qui convient aux intérêts de tout le monde; et qu’il faut regarder un peu 
plus loin que soi-même’.17 Commenting on the events of Spain where a 
constitutionalist revolt was making in-roads against the Crown, Wellington wrote to 
his friend Alava that ‘[c]omme vous le savez, je n’aime pas beaucoup les républiques, 
et surtout pas la Constitucion Espaňola; mais je préférerois [sic] mille fois la réussite 
de la révolte et l’établissement de la Constitucion, à la capitulation du Roi!’18 It was 
necessary to avoid extremes. While always a conservative, concerned with the 
maintenance of the existing aristocratic social order across Europe, Wellington was 
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nonetheless very conscious that a careful and consensual line needed to be followed 
to ensure stability and avoid the bloodshed and horrors of revolution. 
Though Wellington had predicted to Alava that the revolution in Spain would 
end with the soldiers deserting the rebelling officers, this faith proved misplaced. In 
March 1820 the rebels seized control of the government and forced Ferdinand VII to 
make the very concession that Wellington had spoken of: the proclamation of the 
Constitution of 1812. As Schroeder has described it, ‘[t]he revolution thus became an 
attempt by the military to impose a bourgeois constitutional monarchy on an unwilling 
sovereign and a backward country without the benefit of mass support or a viable 
middle class’.19 The events in Spain shocked Europe. Combined with the murder of 
the Duc d’Berri, nephew of Louis XVIII and second in line to the throne, in France 
and the discovery of the Cato Street Conspiracy to murder the cabinet in Britain, a 
dangerous revolutionary wave seemed to be threatening the continent. Even before 
news of the concession of the 1812 constitution had arrived, the Tsar was urging the 
other powers to discuss the question of Spain.20 British interests were of course 
directly affected by what was happening in the Peninsula. Given the area’s immense 
strategic importance, Britain could not look on with disinterest at the prospect of the 
intervention of another Great Power. A French attempt to use their family influence 
with Ferdinand was defeated by the intervention of Sir Charles Stuart in Paris, and Sir 
Henry Wellesley in Madrid.21  
Wellington’s intimate knowledge of Spain from his time there during the war 
once again made him an important international figure. In early March he was writing 
to the Duc de Richelieu, recently returned to office following the assassination of 
Berri. Demonstrating his European loyalties and obligations, Wellington assured the 
French minister of his backing and support.  
Vous pouvez compter sur moi si je peux vous être utile à quelque chose. Non-
seulement je suis attaché sincèrement au Roi et à la famille Royale, et je desire 
très fort que vous puissiez réussir dans tout ce que vous entreprendrez pour les 
bien établir en France, mais je ne prévois que le chaos pour le monde si ce qui 
est établi à presente ne puisse pas se consolider. 
                                                 
19 Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, p. 608.  
20 Jarrett, Congress of Vienna and its Legacy, p. 227.  
21 Ibid., p. 228.  
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Moving onto the vexed question of Spain, the Duke observed how the revolution 
lacked popular support, and was unlikely to gain it, unless pushed to it by foreign 
intervention. Yet he also noted how the King lacked contact with the wider population 
as well, as everything went through military. Nevertheless, he told Richelieu that ‘[e]n 
mon opinion, les Puissances de l’Europe ne peuvent que rester neutres dans cette 
affaire’. To do otherwise would mean ‘[d]’abord le peuple Espagnol se tournera contre 
celui qui appellera les étrangers’. Added to this ‘la voix populaire est partout si forte 
contre le Roi Ferdinand, surtout en France et en Angleterre, que les efforts que les 
gouvernemens [sic] pourraient faire en sa faveur deviendraient à peu pès nuls’.22 Later 
that month, the Duke would write to Richelieu how ‘ce qui est arrivé en Espagne est 
un triomphe pour le parti du désordre’ after news had reached London of the surrender 
of the King.23 
Wellington would have a much larger role to play in shaping the international 
reaction to the revolution in Spain than just proffering advice to Richelieu, however. 
No statesman in any of the Great Powers had anywhere near a comparable knowledge 
of the Peninsula or could speak with anything like the same authority on the subject. 
His belief that not only was intervention a bad idea in principle but also practically 
would be an essential part of the efforts of those trying to prevent it. The Duke laid 
out his objections in a memorandum of 16 April 1820. Ranging from the rights and 
obligations of the powers, to the situation in Spain through to the prospects of a 
military intervention, Wellington demonstrated a firm grasp of all the details. For him, 
the key question was ‘whether it is possible for the powers of Europe to interfere in 
these affairs at the present moment’. Importantly, he noted that ‘these powers must be 
called upon by some authority in the state, to effect some object upon some desired 
principle’ but the ambassadors in Spain had very little idea of what was going on and 
there was no ‘authority existing which could afford him such information’. Given that 
‘[i]t appears then that even if interference on the part of the powers of Europe was 
disireable, [sic] it is at present impossible; but I will go farther and endeavour to 
establish as a principle that no foreign power ought to interfere in this case’. For 
Wellington, ‘[t]here is no country in Europe in the affairs of which foreigners can 
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interfere with so little advantage as in those of Spain’ […] ‘The pride and prejudice of 
the Spaniards, their virtues as well as their faults, are brought into action at every 
moment and in every transaction, and all tend to give them an exagerated [sic] notion 
of their own powers and to depreciate foreigners’. Using a number of examples from 
his own experience, the Duke set out to show how hostile the Spanish people were to 
even the friendly interference of Britain during the course of the wars. Moving on to 
the matter of a hostile intervention, that of France, Wellington wrote how ‘[i]t is true 
that [the] result of the war may in part be attributed to the operations of the allied 
armies in the Peninsula. But these would form a very erroneous notion of the fact who 
should not attribute a fair proportion of it to the effects of the enmity of the peoples of 
Spain.’ Despite the overwhelming superiority of numbers, ‘the French government 
had no authority excepting on the spot on which their troops stood’. The result of this 
was that out of the 600,000 troops Napoleon had sent in, only 100,000 came out in any 
way like an army, and even then they were mostly without cannons or baggage.  
Wellington then moved on to the question of ‘with what force of what nation 
and from what quarter would we carry on our operations supposing such interference 
to be determined upon’. France, in his mind, was an impossibility. ‘The circumstances 
of the late war are still too fresh in the memory of every man in Spain, and there is not 
an arm in that country which would not be raised against a French army’. Though this 
prediction was to be proved false only a few years later, the intervening circumstances 
of rule under the constitution helped highlight how large the gulf really was between 
the people of Spain and the minority supporting it. In the spring of 1820, however, this 
was by no means clear. If not France, then some other power would have to intervene, 
either through France, Portugal or via a landing in the Mediterranean. With Wellington 
convinced that the French government could not allow a German or Russian army to 
pass through it to undertake operations of this kind, it would fall to one of the other 
options and ‘must be by means of a commanding force whether with a view to receive 
the support of the party in the country whose interests it is intended to maintain or to 
put down the adversary’. Yet the thinly populated nature of Spain, and the lack of 
resources on the ground would make it near impossible to collect such a force.  
In short Spain is a country in which military operations must be carried on by 
a large force if it is intended they should be successful; and yet the country is 
so thinly peopled in proportion to its extent and it contains so few large towns 
that is is scarcely possible, and absolutely impossible without incurring an 
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enormous expense to keep such a force assembled, infinitely larger than that 
to be incurred in any other country for a force of the same strength and 
description.24 
While the Duke’s contribution was not of the same sophistication as 
Castlereagh’s famous State Paper of 5th May 1820, it was still of great importance.25 
Drawn up, along with the Foreign Secretary’s, on the instructions of the cabinet, it 
formed a crucial adjunct to the State Paper.26 Wellington’s prestige, built to a large 
degree on service in the Peninsula, and his international standing more broadly, gave 
his voice added weight on this question. Webster has summarised Wellington’s 
contribution as ‘simply […] that of a soldier. It did not discuss the political aspect of 
the problem or its connection with the obligations of the Alliance. This task was 
naturally reserved for Castlereagh himself, and in view of the attitude of his Allies it 
was necessary for him to take a much wider view of the question.’27 To criticise the 
Duke’s input on those terms is to misunderstand not only the Duke’s relationship with 
the Foreign Secretary, but also how Wellington’s influence could be best used to 
further the objectives of British foreign policy. Standing above the maelstrom of party 
politics, or at least cultivating the image of appearing to, and also with the international 
reputation that he had gained from 1814-18, the Duke was well placed to offer 
seemingly apolitical advice. By rooting it in his experiences, Wellington’s 
memorandum was one that could construct a solid practical objection to the case for 
intervention in Spain. It both backed up what Castlereagh was arguing as well as 
offering an alternative basis for analysis should the Foreign Secretary’s not be found 
effective. It was not a strategy that was found wanting. As Jarrett has argued, ‘[r]elying 
on advice offered by Wellington, Metternich contended that foreign arms simply could 
not succeed in suppressing a revolt in Spain. History had demonstrated that “foreign 
action has never either arrested or controlled the effects of a revolution”’.28 
The emphasis Wellington placed on the need to be called in to act rather than 
make that decision externally highlights an important thread in his thinking and that 
of Castlereagh and British foreign policy more generally. By stressing that the Great 
                                                 
24 Memorandum on difficulties of military intervention in Spain, Wellington, 16 Apr. 1820, 
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25 Castlereagh’s State Paper, 5 May 1820, in Foundations of British Foreign Policy From Pitt 
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Powers ‘must be called upon by some authority in the state, to effect some object upon 
some desired principle’ the Duke was reinforcing Castlereagh’s own argument about 
the purpose of the alliance and situating it within broader thoughts on international 
law.29 The Foreign Secretary’s oft-quoted statement that ‘[i]t was however never 
intended as an Union for the Government of the World, or for the Superintendence of 
the Internal Affairs of other States’, while an important comment on the state of power 
relations in Europe, did not mark the withdrawal of Britain from the alliance.30 It 
certainly was not ‘the end of that system of European co-operation which Castlereagh 
had done so much to promote’.31 As John Bew has argued, ‘[o]nce again one must 
avoid the temptation to conclude that Castlereagh was laying down abstract principles 
of conduct; the State Paper was very much conceived of as a response to the prospect 
of an allied intervention in Spain and to clear up any further ambiguities about how 
Britain saw the Continental alliance working in practice’.32 This applied also to 
Wellington, whose own views were dominated by the practical nature of diplomacy. 
The Duke’s emphasis on the need to be explicitly asked to act in Spain was grounded 
in an appreciation not only of Britain’s domestic situation but also the wider role of 
the alliance. As Esterházy reported to Metternich, ‘The British Cabinet wish, as the 
Duke of Wellington has often said to me, that the Alliance sleeps’.33 This stance was 
not a universal rejection of intervention, or a step change in the Duke’s, Castlereagh’s 
or Britain’s views towards cooperation with the other Powers, but instead a practical 
analysis of the situation.  
While foreign affairs would be pushed out of the picture in Britain for much 
of the rest of the year thanks to the crisis around Queen Caroline and her trial, the 
practical nature of Wellington’s and Castlereagh’s views would be reaffirmed in how 
they responded to the revolution in Naples and the proposed Austrian intervention. 
The Duke and the Foreign Secretary were both convinced of the necessity of swift 
action against the revolutionary government by Metternich. Unlike Spain, a nation that 
                                                 
29 Castlereagh ‘made it clear that Britain's guarantee to preserve the peace of Europe did "not 
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30 Castlereagh’s State Paper, 5 May 1820, in Foundations of British Foreign Policy, p. 54. 
31 Foundations of British Foreign Policy, p. 47. 
32 Bew, Castlereagh, p. 483. 
33 Webster, Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, p. 242.   
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did nothing to threaten the wider European system, the revolution in Naples could 
spread throughout the Italian peninsula and potentially undermine Austrian rule in 
Lombardy-Venetia. Crucially, however, there was a firm legal basis for Austrian 
intervention. After the deposition of Murat following the Hundred Days, Austria 
concluded a treaty of alliance with the returning Ferdinand of Sicily that guaranteed 
his throne. In return he promised that he would grant no constitution that did not have 
the prior approval of Austria.34 This provided what was so lacking in the Spanish case, 
and explains the very different attitude that Wellington and Castlereagh took to the 
prospect of intervention. Indeed, the Duke told the Austrian chargé d’affaires 
Neumann in the immediate aftermath of the revolution ‘that in his opinion there was 
not a moment to lose in suppressing the Neapolitan Revolution, and that [Austria] 
could now do with 80,000 men what we could not effect later with 200,000’.35 The 
position of Wellington and Castlereagh was, as Esterházy wrote to Vienna, that ‘[t]he 
question should be treated as special rather than general; as Italian rather than 
European; and in consequence, as falling under the jurisdiction (dominion) of Austria 
rather than the alliance’.36 
Metternich could not act swiftly however, and he also could not view it as just 
a localised matter. Not only did he not have the necessary troops in Austrian Italy, but 
he was acutely aware of the difficulties that could arise in the diplomatic sphere 
through unilateral action. The Austrian foreign minister was ‘loath to commit Austria 
while Russia remained free to interfere in Central Europe and while France might still 
emerge as the champion of the smaller Italian states’.37 Furthermore, the precedent of 
unilateral action by a Great Power, even with clear legal rights, could set a potentially 
disastrous example for those two powers.38 Action was therefore delayed as 
Metternich sought backing for Austrian intervention, the result being the Congresses 
of Troppau and Laibach that Britain attended merely as an observer.  
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While the latter was still sitting, Wellington wrote an interesting letter to the 
Austrian ambassador to London, Prince Esterházy. In a startling demonstration of the 
sense of responsibility the Duke had as an advisor to all of Europe, even on matters 
that conflicted with the foreign policy of Britain, Wellington expounded to the 
ambassador his views on the occupation of France and his advice on what course 
Austria should follow in occupying Naples. The Duke told him:  
Pour ce qui regarde l’occupation, je l’aurais fait durer pendant sept ans. La 
grande faute que nous avons faite en France est d’avoir stipulé l’occupation 
pour seulement cinq ans, en même temps que nous promettions de délibérer 
sur l’évacuation au bout de trois ans. Par l’effet de cette stipulation, et par la 
diminution de la force, ‘occupation ne pouvait durer que trois ans. Elle aurait 
dû durer sept ans. Elle aurait donné le temps pour tout le monde, et surtout 
pour le Roi de France, de s’arranger chez lui; et elle aurait empêché quantité 
du mal qui est arrive depuis qu’elle cessé. 
Austria should not repeat this mistake in Naples. ‘Ainsi je trouve que votre occupation 
de Naples est trop courte. Il aurait fallu qu’elle fût de sept ans. Il aurait été facile de 
l’arrêter au out de trois ou de cinq ans; mais ayant stipule que sa durée ne serait que 
de trois ans, il n’est pas bien facile de la faire continuer pour cinq ou pour sept, si les 
circonstances le rendraient nécessaire.’ Wellington further observed that King 
Ferdinand of Naples should have nothing to do with the command of the army of 
occupation. ‘Il faut observer aussi que cette armée est celle des Puissances qui l’ont 
envoyées à Naples; qu’elle y est pour des objets Européens, et non pour ceux de 
Naples, à moins que ceux-ci consistent avec les premiers’.39 The fact that the Duke 
could talk of the Austrian army in terms of pursuing European objects, when the 
British line was that it was solely a matter of Austrian interest and nothing to do with 
the wider alliance, is a remarkable demonstration of Wellington’s position in 
international politics. As shown earlier over Spain, his advice was one that was 
listened to in the chancelleries of Europe. Continuing from his tenure as Commander-
in-Chief, the Duke retained both sympathy and a residual obligation to the other Great 
Powers and saw it necessary to give his advice when asked, even when this was not 
compatible with the stance of the British government. While Castlereagh remained 
Foreign Secretary, this would not be a problem given the shared experiences and 
attitudes towards matters of foreign policy. As soon as another occupant was to fill 
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that office, however, more substantial issues would arise, and the differences that 
existed within the cabinet on diplomatic questions would become apparent, as will be 
seen below.  
The division between the Duke’s European role and his British and private one 
is revealed by his conversations with his close friend Harriet Arbuthnot the previous 
month on the discussions ongoing in Troppau. Wellington lamented to her that Britain 
‘had not a more efficient representative […] than Lord Stewart, who had given great 
dissatisfaction by going constantly backwards & forwards to Vienna, & who has no 
influence whatever with the Sovereigns & ministers assembled there’.  In marked 
contrast to his letter to Esterházy he told Mrs Arbuthnot how the allies ‘have all sorts 
of wild schemes of establishing a general police all over Europe & sending the troops 
of one country to keep order in another’. For the Duke, ‘any Englishman of good sense 
& conduct w[oul]d have been able to shew them the folly of such schemes’.40 None 
of these thoughts were at all apparent in his letter the following month and hint of the 
dangers of taking Wellington’s attitudes to foreign policy questions at face value 
without a thorough examination of his wider place within the broader British and 
European foreign policy elite. 
Shortly after the revolution in Naples, Portugal became the next country to be 
rocked by upheaval. Liberal dissatisfaction was not the only factor at play in Lisbon 
during the summer of 1820. The events of the Napoleonic Wars were still affecting 
the course of Portuguese politics. Following the French invasion, the Royal Family 
had fled from Lisbon to Rio de Janeiro under British protection. In return for the 
British efforts for them, Britain was granted incredibly favourable trading privileges 
in the Anglo-Brazilian commercial treaty of 1810 that gave Britain lower duties than 
goods even from Portugal herself. Even five years after the conclusion of the war, the 
Portuguese royal court still resided in the Brazilian capital and, furthermore, on 
Talleyrand’s advice had raised Brazil to the status of an independent kingdom in 1815. 
As Jarrett has surmised ‘The Portuguese revolutionaries of 1820 sought not only 
liberal reforms, but also a reduction of British influence and the return of their monarch 
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and his court from Rio de Janeiro to Lisbon. They feared Portugal was becoming 
subservient to her own colony’.41  
The absence of the Anglo-Irish soldier, Marshal William Beresford, 1st 
Viscount Beresford gave them the opportunity. During the Napoleonic Wars, 
Beresford had been a key lieutenant of Wellington’s in the Peninsula after being made 
Commander-in-Chief of the Portuguese army. The Marshal had succeeded in turning 
what had been a dilapidated force into a vital part of Wellington’s war machinery. 
After the war he remained in Portugal not only continuing in command but also with 
further wide powers in the regency. However, his position was continually under threat 
‘amid growing resentment from the ruling element of Portugal’.42 Given this situation 
Beresford determined on going to Rio, as he had previously, to reaffirm his authority 
with the king.43 Wellington attempted to dissuade him from leaving given the 
revolution in Spain and the continuing uncertainty of her future relations with 
Portugal.44 The Duke even warned him that ‘[i]t must not be supposed that you and 
your system have not enemies in the Portuguese army. Even the government have 
encouraged them; and how much more bold and enterprizing [sic] will they become 
in your absence having before their eyes the example of the Spanish army’.  The liberal 
elements in the country would not be ‘unlikely to take advantage of your absence to 
cultivate it to forward their schemes’.45 Beresford did not heed the Duke’s advice 
however, and as the latter feared, the revolution erupted during his absence. Beresford 
was even stopped from landing on his return. After the revolution Wellington 
complained to Mrs Arbuthnot how he ‘almost went upon my Knees to prevail upon 
him not to quit Portugal at present’. In the Duke’s mind, ‘there is no doubt that if ever 
Man lost a Country, he has lost that by this foolish Voyage’.46 
The issues created by the revolution in Portugal would continue to exist as a 
thorn in the side of British foreign policy for over a decade, deeply affecting the 
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foreign policy of Canning as well as of the Duke of Wellington during his time as 
Prime Minister, as will be explored below. In part this was because it remained much 
more of an issue in Britain’s sole preserve than any of the other revolutions of these 
years. ‘The British sphere of influence and the efficacy of British sea power in Portugal 
were so widely recognized that there was never the remotest possibility of intervention 
by any other power’.47 Writing in 1821 the Duke commented on Portugal that: 
Their policy is and must be to throw off this country; because the result of this 
continued connection with this country will be eventually to bring those who 
have revolted to the punishment which they deserve; and this country is I am 
sorry to say it, sufficiently shortsighted to think that its interest lays [on] the 
side of relinquishing the connection with Portugal. There is no road open there 
but a connection with Spain under the auspices of the revolted. 
In Wellington’s mind, it would likely end up that Portugal would form some part of 
Spain. Should the latter remain as a monarchy then Portugal would be absorbed as a 
department. Should it become a republic then Portugal would become ‘one or more 
additional republicks to the league’. He lamented that, ‘[i]n all this I put out of the 
question any resistance on the part of the King or of his family, or his nobility. They 
are geldings, in every sense of the world!’ In a very interesting comment on attitudes 
towards imperial possessions in the early nineteenth century, Wellington wrote that ‘It 
does not appear to me that anything will save [the King] in the independence of 
Portugal. The colonies of both kingdoms are gone; and those who have revolted must 
by this time have discovered that others can revolt as well as themselves; and no 
country in what is called a modern constitutional state can keep a dependency’.48 Quite 
how Wellington explained Britain’s continuing retention of her empire is unclear.  
A few days after this letter, the Duke would write to Castlereagh on the recent 
changes that happened in France. In a damning indictment of the British ambassador 
to Paris, whom Wellington would reappoint to that role during his government, 
Wellington told the Foreign Secretary, ‘[a]s you don’t receive very early or very 
accurate intelligence from Sir Charles Stuart, and you will not see Count Lieven, I 
think it as well to make you acquainted with the purport of a letter which he has 
received from Pozzo, which he has shown to me’. This is additionally an interesting 
reflection of the role Wellington played within British foreign policy at this time, 
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acting somewhat as a second Foreign Secretary and an intermediary between foreign 
diplomats and figures and Castlereagh. Wellington told him that ‘[e]vents at Paris are 
at their crisis’, with the Duc de Richelieu having been forced from office by the 
royalists and replaced by the Duc de Blacas. Given the circumstances that forced the 
change, Wellington could not ‘conceive a more unfortunate event than the formation 
of this administration’. He feared that, ‘[i]n order to acquire a little popularity and a 
national character, they must meddle in foreign politics, and this against the system of 
the Quintuple Alliance’, highlighting the continuing hold that a troublesome France 
had over the Duke’s outlook towards European politics. Given all these circumstances 
he had ‘thought it desirable to draw [Castlereagh’s] attention to this change as soon as 
possible’.49 
In this time of revolution, one final uprising would dominate the last months 
of Castlereagh’s life: the Greek revolt for independence. This would become a foreign 
policy question of such importance that it would be the central issue for British 
diplomacy for much of the following decade. Given Wellington’s key role in its 
development, first as a British plenipotentiary on a mission to St Petersburg and then 
during his tenure as Prime Minister, it will be looked at in some length separately 
below. Nevertheless, Wellington’s first intervention in the question is worth 
considering within the broader context of his professional relationship with 
Castlereagh, and his stance on foreign policy during this time.  Castlereagh had 
originally taken a largely hands-off approach to the revolt. This, however, changed 
when it looked like there would be a strong prospect of Russian intervention. Despite 
the initial Russian condemnation of the revolt, the actions of the Porte had aggravated 
Russia and struck at the heart of her religious and commercial interests through such 
actions as the lynching of the Greek Patriarch of Constantinople, Grigorios V, on 
Easter Sunday, and the detention of Russian ships in the Straits.50 In response, the 
Russian government issued an ultimatum based on four points: the withdrawal of 
Ottoman troops from Moldavia and Wallachia, the need to distinguish between 
‘guilty’ and ‘innocent’ Christians when responding to the revolt, a guarantee for the 
future protection of Christians and that destroyed churches should be rebuilt at the 
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Sultan’s expense.51 The failure of the Porte to respond to these demands in an adequate 
manner in time led to the withdrawal of the Russian ambassador and it appeared 
hostilities would soon follow. 
Into this situation stepped Castlereagh and Metternich in a bid to try and bolster 
the Tsar’s resistance to those calling on him to go to war. The British Foreign Secretary 
made use of an invitation Alexander had made at Aix-la-Chapelle to take the 
uncommon step of writing to the Russian emperor directly. The Ottoman Empire was 
‘a necessary evil’, that any attempt to cure would ‘expose the whole frame of our 
general system to hazard’. Though Russia had been subject to insults, ‘in proportion 
as your Imperial Majesty’s power is undoubted, and, as the events of the late war have 
placed you on exalted ground, your Imperial Majesty can afford to temporize, and to 
suffer the tempest to exhaust itself’. Castlereagh urged on him that while ‘[n]o doubt 
humanity shudders at the scenes which are acting’ throughout European Turkey, and 
that ‘it will require all the commanding authority of your Imperial Majesty’s great 
name and character’, to hold back the tide of Russian opinion in favour of intervention, 
‘[b]ut it is in vain to hope that we can materially alter their lot, or deliver them from 
their sufferings, and preserve the system of Europe as it now stands’.52 Castlereagh’s 
arguments did little to affect the Tsar’s course of action, though fortunately for the 
peace of Europe, his determination to only act with the approval of his allies ensured 
that any decision in favour of intervention was delayed. 
The situation remained in this precarious state when Wellington wrote a 
memorandum to Castlereagh in April 1822. It was nearing the campaigning season so 
there was an added incentive by this time to reach some kind of resolution to prevent 
war. In Wellington’s mind, it was crucial to return negotiations to the original four 
Russian demands, ‘the justice of which is admitted by the allies and even by the Porte’. 
Yet the delay caused by the failure of the Porte to address them had led to an extension 
of the Russian demands, and ‘propositions have recently been brought under the 
consideration of the allied ministers at different courts for the adoption of a plan for 
the amelioration of the condition of the Greeks under the dominion of the Porte’. The 
Ottoman suspicions of such a Russian plan were ‘the real cause of the difficulties’ that 
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had faced the negotiations and the only solution was to move back to the original four 
points. 
So far, so logical. The Duke’s prescription for achieving this was a radical 
departure from his usual advice and one that entailed the risk of war: the removal of 
the British ambassador in Constantinople. To be done only on the condition of the 
Russian demands being limited to the four points, it would be accompanied by 
informing the Porte that ‘His Majesty considered their resistance to these just demands 
so unwarrantable and so likely to lead to the total destruction of the Turkish 
government that he should not leave his ambassador at Constantinople to sanction by 
his presence their conduct and to witness the misfortunes which must be its 
consequence’. While Wellington believed this action ‘will produce its effect and 
secure peace’, if it did not, and war was the result then ‘I can entertain no doubt of the 
result. The Turkish government in Europe will in fact be destroyed, which will 
probably be the smallest misfortune which will be the consequence of this state of 
things’. Despite the extreme nature of Wellington’s advice, it was very much rooted 
in the same kind of analysis of the international situation as that which pervaded 
Castlereagh’s letter to the Tsar. Such a radical step would demonstrate to the Ottomans 
that the British ‘at least were convinced that the Emperor was sincere in confining his 
demands upon them to the four points originally stated; and having admitted their 
justice, they would be more likely to carry them into execution’. If this would secure 
peace then it would be worth the risks. If the Tsar did go to war then Russia’s inevitable 
occupation of the Principalities would ‘give rise to a most important question between 
him and the Emperor of Austria, the difficulty of solving which will be augmented by 
every subsequent step, and that these difficulties can end only by putting the two 
imperial courts in positive opposition to each other, and by the dissolution of the 
quintuple alliance and probably a general war in Europe’. Furthermore, the diversion 
of Austrian and Russian strength to the Balkans would mean that ‘there is nothing 
which can be trusted to check the tide of revolution from the Atlantick to the Austrian 
frontiers’. In short, should war break about between the Porte and Russia, the result in 
Wellington’s mind would be the overthrow of the entire international and social order 
of Europe. As a result, the Duke urged Castlereagh that ‘we should allow no trifling 
consideration nor no speculation upon the advantages of having our ambassador at the 
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Porte at a particular period nor upon the difficulty of getting him back again to prevent 
us from taking a step which may preserve peace and all its existing advantages’.53  
A few days later, after the cabinet had deliberated on the question, Wellington 
told Mrs Arbuthnot how ‘no person more forcibly felt the necessity of, or more 
anxiously wished for, peace than he did’ and though his proposed course entailed the 
risk of complications, ‘it was a measure that w[oul]d bring the Turks to reason, that 
they knew perfectly our power & influence, that they were indebted to the 
representations of our Ambassador for the retreat of the Persian army which had 
invaded their Asiatic provinces, & that the fear of our taking part against them 
w[oul]d have more effect’.54 As will be explored below, such decision and risk taking 
would not be a usual feature of Wellington’s diplomacy towards the Eastern Question. 
However, his advice at this time was in line with his wider analysis of the international 
situation. Coming off the back of two years of turmoil and revolution from the 
westernmost to the easternmost extremities of Europe, the Duke ‘deprecated war from 
the state of Europe’.55 In the situation Britain found herself in, the worst course of 
action would be to do nothing and allow the war he feared to come about. Any positive 
action to prevent a Turko-Russian conflict was a necessary step to prevent a general 
war, and the general revolution that would swiftly follow on its coattails.  
 
The Death of Castlereagh and the Question of his Succession 
Only a few months after these discussions on the Eastern Question, Castlereagh was 
dead by his own hand. Years of strain as pressure as Foreign Secretary and leader of 
the House of Commons were having their impact and come the summer of 1822 the 
statesman had reached breaking point. In June, Princess Lieven wrote of him to 
Metternich that he ‘looks ghastly. He has aged five years in the last week; one can see 
that he is a broken man’. Even Wellington had become the subject of his suspicions. 
The Princess wrote that Castlereagh ‘does not like M. de Lieven to talk business with 
[Wellington], and sometimes has been touchy about it’.  
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The Duke is easier to deal with, more open, more frank, readier to be 
persuaded, because he has no responsibility. Londonderry thinks that he might 
suit us better, or that we think so; and, seeing him so intimate with me, he has 
got it into his head that we might like Wellington in his place: hence my efforts 
to get him admitted to the King’s favour. 
Yet, as Lieven told the Austrian chancellor, Castlereagh’s fear ‘lacks 
foundation’. ‘Politically’, she would just ‘be exchanging one evil for another’ and that 
anyway, ‘[i]n certain things, I place a hundred times more [confidence] in Lord 
Londonderry than in the Duke’.56 That Castlereagh’s suspicions fell on his closest 
colleague was a remarkable demonstration of how his mental condition had 
deteriorated. On 12th August, he took his own life at his Kent home, plunging the 
government into crisis. 
With the King in Scotland, no immediate decision could be taken on what 
should be done about Castlereagh’s now vacant offices. The most obvious solution 
would be for Wellington himself to replace his friend at the Foreign Office. No one 
within the British government knew the details of Castlereagh’s policies as well as the 
Duke did, and none had comparable international experience. That he was in the Lords 
rather than the House of Commons certainly worked against him but it was not an 
insuperable obstacle. But Wellington rejected the idea out of hand. He told Princess 
Lieven that to accept the office: ‘would mean deviating from my position and my 
career. I should be compelled to adopt the opinions of my party and my individual 
opinion would no longer be free. My ideas are more independent as I am now; I would 
rather stick to them’.  In this Wellington was repeating much of the same language 
that he used on entering the cabinet a few years previously. He told the Princess that 
‘I have no ambition; so little that I am ready to take any position, even though it is 
subordinate, if I see that I can be useful’. Lieven argued how the position of Foreign 
Secretary had great weight in the formation of policy attached to it, and that ‘if [the 
incumbent’s] were not absolutely identical with those of the Cabinet, it would be easy 
for him, by a thousand means at his disposition, insensibly to alter the Cabinet’s 
policy’. Yet this did not faze Wellington: ‘Well, that is where I come in. I am in the 
Cabinet and thus I believe I can do far more general good than in any other capacity’.57 
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As will be shown, this proved to be startling naivety on Wellington’s part. In this 
conversation with the Russian ambassadress, he simultaneously underrates his 
political role by placing himself out of the fray that he was very much a participant in, 
while also overrating his degree of influence and control over the policies of his 
colleagues. As Muir has argued, ‘[t]his moment marks Wellington’s great refusal – 
the failure to accept that his active career as a soldier was over, and to embrace his 
position as a leading politician and Cabinet minister […] He was deluding himself’.58 
With Wellington’s refusal to consider the office, there was only one 
alternative: George Canning. Castlereagh’s old rival – the pair had fought a duel in the 
aftermath of the Walcheren Affair in 1809 – would receive the entire inheritance, 
foreign office and leadership of the Commons, and with it a predominating voice in 
the affairs of the government. There was still opposition to overcome, the High Tory 
Lords Eldon and Sidmouth and, more importantly, George IV himself. The King had 
placed a veto on Canning’s accession to cabinet following an acrimonious falling-out 
over the trial of Queen Caroline. But the Duke’s decision to reject the Foreign Office 
for himself left them no way to reject the calls to place Canning back in office. 
Wellington even played an active role in convincing the monarch that it would be an 
honourable step to allow Canning to re-join cabinet despite what had gone before.59 
As Mrs Arbuthnot recorded, ‘the King yielded to that great & powerful mind which 
exercises unbounded influence on all that comes within its sphere’.60  
In taking all of these steps the Duke laid the ground for five years of conflict 
and dispute over the entire course of British foreign policy that Wellington would be 
a central actor in. It marked a distinct break in Wellington’s diplomatic career. From 
1814 through to Castlereagh’s death, Wellington was an effective and influential ally 
and collaborator with the Foreign Secretary. Their partnership had proved itself time 
and time again as a powerful tool in Britain’s diplomatic armoury. From his death 
onwards though Wellington’s career would take on a new direction. Whilst the Duke 
was still influential, partnership with Canning was never on the table. Instead 
antagonism and opposition would be the mark of their relationship. However, before 
this would become clear to Wellington, he would attend one final Congress. 
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Wellington and the Congress of Verona 
Even before a decision had been reached on the position of Foreign Secretary, it was 
decided that Wellington should replace Castlereagh as the British plenipotentiary at 
the forthcoming congress (originally to be held in Florence and preceded by talks in 
Vienna).61 What had made him such a strong candidate for the Foreign Office 
exemplified why he was the only possible choice to attend the Congress. No other 
statesman had the knowledge of, or intimacy with, the leading figures of the continent. 
After a delay caused by illness – it had even appeared his life could be at risk –  
Wellington eventually set off in mid-September and reached Paris on 20 September 
1822.62 The Duke’s instructions were based on those that Castlereagh had drawn up 
for himself. The focus was primarily on the Near East and the continuing Greek Revolt 
and substantial space was devoted to discussing the question and what the British 
response should be. Interestingly, in relation to later British policy towards Greece, it 
including the provision that ‘care must be taken not to commit this country to any 
immediate or eventual concert of this nature that shall go beyond the limits of good 
offices: engagements in the nature of a guarantee are to be considered altogether 
inadmissible’.63 
However, events had moved on since these instructions were originally drafted 
and it was Spain not Greece that dominated allied discussions. The failed attempt of 
the royal guards in Madrid to seize power in July 1822 had brought about the fall of 
the moderate Martínez de la Rosa and seen the revolution there take a radical turn. 
Minds inevitably recalled the recent history of France when considering the events in 
the Peninsula and shaped their expectations and fears of future events.64 Wellington’s 
initial instructions did not cover this in any length, and, indeed, said how ‘there seems 
nothing to add to or vary in the course of policy hitherto pursued’ vis-à-vis Spain. The 
safety of the royal family, protection of Portugal and ‘a rigid abstinence from any 
interference in the internal affairs of that country, must be considered as forming the 
                                                 
61 Princess Lieven to Metternich, 17 Aug. 1822, Private Letters of Princess Lieven to Prince 
Metternich, pp. 195-6. 
62 Muir, Wellington, vol. II, p. 188. 
63 Bathurst to Wellington, 14 Sept. 1822, in WND, vol. I, p. 186. 
64 Jarrett, Congress of Vienna and its Legacy, p. 313. 
95 
 
basis of his Majesty’s policy’. Wellington was instructed to have discussions with the 
French government on his way through Paris on Spain on these bases, ‘the arguments 
in favour of which are too well understood to require insertion in this instruction’. It 
then moved on to the matter of the Spanish South America and the more specific 
British interests of the slave trade, Austrian debt and the recent Russian ukase on their 
possessions in North America.65  
As soon as Wellington got to Paris, it was clear that these instructions did not 
cover the tone that the Congress would take. Instead of the Near East, or even the 
Spanish colonies, the question of intervention in Spain would dominate the 
discussions. This became apparent in Wellington’s discussions with the French chief 
minister, Jean-Baptiste de Villèle. France had collected 100,000 men ‘fully equipped 
for service in the field’, in the Pyrenees, ready to act. And many in the French 
government wanted to act. Though opinion in the cabinet was divided, many believed 
they ‘ought to proceed at once to attack the Spaniards by what M. de Villèle called an 
avanture, or a coup-de-main’. The army would advance in two columns, the largest of 
which would march on Madrid and secure Ferdinand VII. Wellington told Canning 
that ‘[i]t was not difficult to convince M. de Villèle - as, indeed, it was his own opinion 
- that this plan was attended by all the difficulties and risks of any invasion of Spain 
under any circumstances, and that it most probably would produce no result whatever’. 
The Duke raised a number of objections, practical ones for the most part, such as that 
the King would be spirited away from Madrid rather than allowed to fall into French 
hands, and even if he was secured ‘his Catholic Majesty would inspire no confidence’ 
and as a result ‘the cause would become more unpopular in consequence of his having 
being assisted by a foreign, and, above all, a French army’. Wellington believed that: 
M. de Villèle was not insensible of the danger which I represented of the 
continuance of this state of things; and he listened with attention to all that I 
represented to him of the increased probability that the very evils which he 
apprehended would occur in consequence of the irritation occasioned in Spain 
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by the state of preparation in which the French government was upon the 
Spanish frontier, and the constant menace and apprehension of invasion.  
The Duke stressed that their behaviour was not far removed from that of the European 
powers towards the French revolution and ‘liable to be misrepresented’. Yet despite 
this, he lamented that ‘I don't think that what I stated to him induced him entirely to 
alter his plan’. Looking towards the Congress, Villèle wished to know what attitude 
the powers would take, should circumstances force France to intervene. To this 
Wellington upheld the standard British response: ‘I told M. de Villèle that it would be 
quite impossible for us to declare beforehand what would be our conduct upon any 
hypothetical case’. The Duke ‘did not think that any government could adopt such a 
measure, and I was quite certain that ours could not, which was liable to be called to 
account for its conduct at every moment’. Added to this, any statement would need to 
be public ‘to be of any use’, which would only add fuel to the fire and give Spain 
legitimate cause to complain of the Congress. Though his impressions of the talks with 
Villèle, and with Louis XVIII and the Comte de Artois, the heir to the French throne, 
were that the French government was impressed with the dangers and problems arising 
from a potential intervention, Wellington nevertheless requested additional 
instructions in case the French delegation should make any proposition on intervention 
at the Congress.66 
The focus on the events in Spain and a possible French intervention there was 
surprising to the government in London and prompted a shift in strategy. It was 
Liverpool who initiated this rather than Canning. The former wrote to the new Foreign 
Secretary and told him ‘considering this question as one of principle and practicability, 
my mind cannot conceive the case in which it would be expedient to interfere in the 
internal affairs of Spain by force, and I doubt the policy of interfering in any other 
way’. Liverpool instructed Canning that ‘[w]ith these impressions I own I think the 
Duke of Wellington cannot be too explicit in stating the opinion of his government, 
and of himself, as to any hostile operations against Spain. If you think it advisable to 
transmit to him this note, I have no objection’.67 It was the Prime Minister that took 
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the lead in in this matter, rather than Canning. This is a point that has been raised in 
recent historiography and that challenges the traditional version of Canning’s foreign 
policy, first outlined by Harold Temperley, that the Foreign Secretary was determined 
from the outset to destroy the European concert – one of many questionable 
conclusions of his that will be further dealt with below.68 
Canning’s instructions to the Duke on the matter of interference in Spain are 
worthy of quoting in full: 
if, as I confess I see reason to apprehend in the late communications both from 
Paris and Vienna, there is entertained by the Allies a determined project of 
interference by force, or by menace, in the present struggle in Spain, so 
convinced are his Majesty’s government of the uselessness and danger of such 
interference, - so objectionable does it appear to them in principle, and so 
utterly impracticable in execution, - that, if the necessity should arise, or (I 
would rather say) if the opportunity should offer, I am to instruct your Grace 
at once frankly and peremptorily to declare, that to any such interference, come 
what may, his Majesty will not be a party.69 
As Yamada has argued, this was not the opening salvo of Canning’s attack on the 
Concert, but the fruit of Liverpool’s intervention.70 More broadly, the Foreign 
Secretary’s instructions to the Duke were conciliatory to the continental powers, while 
conscious of the difficulties of the British position. This is apparent in his observations 
on the question of retaining Austrian troops within Piedmont, where the Duke was left 
to judge the best attitude for Britain to take on the question.71 
Wellington arrived in Vienna on 29 September 1822, only to find that the allied 
ministers were preparing to imminently depart for Verona themselves. Given that the 
discussions there were meant to solely touch on the affairs of the Italian peninsula, 
which he was to not take part in, the Duke thought it necessary to refuse the invitation 
to join them and to refer the case back to London. He deeply regretted that he had not 
been informed of this change sooner and was concerned about the public impact: ‘I 
cannot but feel that the inconvenience and evil which will result from the absence of 
a British plenipotentiary from Verona, and which under existing circumstances will 
amount, in appearance at least, to a total separation from the Alliance, and will, at all 
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events, tend in a certain degree to shake the influence which we have hitherto had over 
their councils’.72 
His initial conversations with the allies confirmed his belief that Spain would 
dominate the Congress. Furthermore, the wider peace between Russia and the 
Ottomans would be ‘in a great degree dependent’ on the outcome of the Spanish 
discussions. While Wellington found Metternich had ‘an anxious desire that the 
Spaniards may be left to themselves’, Tsar Alexander was in a far more belligerent 
state of mind. He believed that Spain was ‘the head-quarters of revolution and of 
Jacobinism; that the King and Royal Family were in the utmost danger; and that so 
long as the revolution in that country should be allowed to continue, every country in 
Europe, and France in particular, was unsafe’. The Tsar was conscious of the obstacle 
that Britain would be and that she would possibly ‘prevent the good that might be done 
in Spain’. For Wellington ‘it was certainly true that we had insuperable objections to 
interference in the internal concerns of any country’ but these were based on the lack 
of rights, except under immediate danger and also the practical question of interference 
in Spain. These were not merely objections based on Britain’s ‘parliamentary 
constitution’, Wellington told the Tsar, though certainly that spoke against 
interference given that Parliament would exercise ‘the right of discussing all the 
measures adopted in relation to that country which would not be very desirable to 
those concerned’.  
Wellington was acutely aware of the importance of the Spanish question. In 
his mind, it was clear that ‘our deliberations will turn almost entirely upon the affairs 
of Spain’. The most worrying aspect was what Russia and Tsar Alexander would do. 
‘The idea then which is certainly uppermost in his Imperial Majesty’s mind is the 
employment of the Russian army in Spanish concerns, if possible; but at all events its 
employment’. Here Wellington identified the key pivot on which the whole Congress 
would turn. With Russia restless, it would be difficult to restrict the Tsar’s 
interventionist feelings. Given the continuing uncertainty in the Balkans, and with 
clamours amongst the army to go to war with the Ottomans, ‘it is necessary for his 
Imperial Majesty to attend to the progress of the Jacobins and revolutionary parties in 
the west of Europe, and particularly in Spain; who, while the Russian armies should 
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be employed in the east, might destroy all that had been done in the last ten years’. 
The result, of course, was that ‘[t]he Emperor this finds himself in an embarrassing 
position between Spain and Turkey’. In the Duke’s mind ‘[i]t is obvious that the 
contest at Verona will fall principally upon me’ thanks to the Austrians and Prussians 
holding aloof. He did believe that he would be working alongside the French, and that 
they would ‘firmly oppose the passage of foreign troops through France; and that they 
will not press very strongly an attack by France upon Spain, unless the latter should 
insult or attack their frontier’.73 
Though the Duke had identified the importance of the dynamic in Russian 
foreign policy between intervention in either western or eastern Europe, he had 
severely underrated the problems he would face with the French delegation. While he 
had accurately discerned Villèle’s policy preferences, it was Mathieu Jean Felicité de 
Montmorency, duc de Montmorency-Laval who was to represent them at the 
Congress. The latter was the Prime Minister’s rival and viewed affairs in a very 
different light.74 He ‘considered that the only possible decision which would assure at 
one and the same time the security and dignity of France would be that she boldly 
undertake to re-establish order in Spain, even by a military expedition if need be, and 
to obtain the consent and the eventual support of the conservative powers’.75 Once at 
the Congress he decided to go beyond his instructions ‘that he should avoid taking the 
initiative in bringing up the Spanish question’ and instead decided to pre-empt 
discussion by writing a note ‘in which he considered the clear possibility of French 
intervention and asked the powers to indicate clearly their intentions’.76 
This was delivered to the ministers of Britain, Austria, Prussia and Russia on 
20th October 1822.77 Only two days before, Wellington had been quite sanguine on the 
matter, telling Canning that ‘I think I may assure you that nothing will be done here 
in regard to Spain which will be at all inconvenient to you’.78 The divergent allied 
responses to Montmorency’s note would shatter this illusion and prove how isolated 
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Wellington and Britain were on this question.79 The Duke’s initial report of the note 
to Canning did not demonstrate an awareness of this fact. He told him how: 
I imagine that each of the ministers will answer this paper. In my answer I shall 
review our line of conduct since April 1820 and contrast it with theirs, and 
shall very civilly decline to engage ourselves to adopt any measure beforehand 
and till we shall have full knowledge of all the circumstances which have 
occurred between the two countries. I propose, besides, to point out to them 
that, considering the relative position of the two countries, it is not probable 
that Spain will declare against them, if they explain as they ought the meaning 
and object of their corps of observation and make some allowance for the state 
of effervescence of men's minds in Spain, in a state of revolution and civil 
war.80 
By the time of Wellington’s next despatch on the matter, nine days after the 
note was presented, it was clear to the Duke that it was a problem of a different 
magnitude – and one that was still not ‘yet ripe for a discussion’ in conference. The 
Tsar had immediately declared his willingness ‘to consent to all the demands of the 
French ministers, and to conclude a treaty with them, stipulating for the succours 
which he should give’. He additionally informed them of his intention to assemble an 
army of 150,000 men in Piedmont to await the outcome of a French intervention, ready 
to move into France or Spain as needed. While Wellington and Metternich cooperated 
in their talks with Alexander to try and ‘make him feel the danger to which he was 
about to expose the French government and the inconveniences and difficulties in 
which he would involve himself by the adoption of a plan to which all Europe would 
be opposed’ this did not mask the signs of the divergence between Britain and the 
other powers. Austria and Prussia agreed with the Duke that ‘the best and most 
respectable way for France to proceed in order to preserve peace with Spain’, provided 
they actually desired that, was ‘to come to a frank explanation with Spain on her plans 
and objects through the good offices of England alone, if necessary; and that the allies 
should remain quiet and neither say nor do anything till that measure shall have been 
tried’. Despite this, however, ‘they appear to think that if called upon by France and 
Russia to agree to the demands of France in case France should be obliged to cease 
her diplomatik relations with Spain, or is menaced or attacked, they will not be able 
to refuse to enter into such an agreement, taking care, however, to define the case as 
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closely as possible’. Against this Wellington tried to deploy a number of arguments, 
from the dangers of proceeding without the participation of Britain, to how it would 
‘lower the French government in the eyes of the French nation’ if they should act with 
the backing of the continental powers as her allies but in the end he told Canning how 
‘I think they feel the truth of these observations, but they are not willing to resist the 
demand of Russia and France’. With little freedom of action, all Wellington could do 
was to say how ‘I shall object to everything excepting that the allies should call upon 
France to explain herself, and then that they should recommend to her, if peace is her 
object as it must be that of the others, that she should ask for the good offices of one 
of her allies to explain to Spain her desire to remain at peace’. He concluded by 
summing up how: 
In the different meetings of the same kind with this which I have attended, I 
have never yet been witness to so much difficulty and embarrassment as there 
has been in the discussion of this Spanish question. These difficulties are to be 
attributed, first to the false position in which France stands owing to the 
transactions of the French government in Spain since April 1820, of which they 
are now ashamed and therefore deny; secondly, to the false position in which 
the Emperor of Russia stands in this question owing to his embarrassment with 
his army; and thirdly, to the necessity under which the two German 
governments find themselves of managing in some degree the Emperor of 
Russia, and of endeavouring to assist him through his difficulties at home, in 
order that he may not be obliged to carry on a war in the east.81 
Lord Londonderry supported Wellington’s analysis of the difficulties in a 
memorandum a few days later. For him, Britain’s position ‘becomes more difficult at 
the present reunion than it has ever been on any former occasion, not only from the 
mode in which Austria is playing her game, which is evidently directed to keep up her 
assumed power over Russia’ but also that of France, thanks to her ‘having surrendered 
herself entirely to the direction of the Holy Alliance’. The result of this situation was 
that ‘[n]o doubt can now exist that the three powers are at present upon one line with 
France’ and Britain was left in ‘a distressing predicament of an entirely isolated 
nature’. The nature of Montmorency’s approach to the other powers meant that in the 
end there ‘seems to be no possible ground by which the Duke of Wellington can 
                                                 




approach the position of the alliance, preserving those principles which have been 
declared by Great Britain to Europe’.82 
Diplomatically isolated, Wellington had limited means to reconcile the 
fundamental divergence between the attitude of Britain and the continental powers on 
the issue of intervention. Austria was the key power, yet ‘Prince Metternich is as usual 
looking principally to the difficulties which press upon him at the moment’. He had to 
give the Tsar ‘an appearance at least’ of action in western Europe lest Alexander 
should ‘return to his capital in a very bad temper with the alliance; of which the first 
effects will be felt by Austria’.83 This was a central problem with Britain’s alignment 
on the continent and a problem far beyond any issue of Wellington’s diplomacy at 
Verona. Britain looked primarily to Metternich and Austria as the other key status quo 
power on the continent, the one most willing to play a role in both defending against 
any treaty revision by France, and against undue enthusiasm for intervention by 
Russia. Yet they were also two very different powers. Austria, with her exposed 
borders and her polyglot composition, as well as potentially menacing neighbours, was 
subject to the “security dilemma” of being unable to meet the threats it faced as any 
counteraction would merely increase those threats.84 Instead, she relied on external 
support. Out of necessity, this was from Russia. While Austria was aligned with 
Britain on various questions, Britain was not in a position where she was able to aid 
her, either against revolutionary or external threats. Russia could help, and by drawing 
on her support, made her a friend rather than the enemy which she could well be. The 
divergence between Austria and Russia in relation to the Ottoman Empire meant that 
it was in her interests in more ways than one to turn her attention to counter-revolution 
in western Europe. 
Britain’s position was further complicated, and her isolation compounded, by 
the intrusion of the external world into continental affairs. As Otte has argued, ‘[t]he 
widely dispersed range of global interests lent Britain a Janus-like appearance, 
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simultaneously facing Europe and out onto the extra-European world’.85 It was the 
crumbling Spanish Empire in South America that muddied the waters for Britain’s 
policy towards intervention in Spain at Verona. The drawn out battles over recognition 
of the rebellious colonies will be examined further below, but some points from its 
early stages are pertinent for a discussion of Wellington at Verona. The lack of 
established law and power in the New World had created a vacuum where it looked 
like the United States might be the first power to fill it, creating serious strategic 
concerns. The prevalence of piracy had further damaged British trading interests in 
the region, an important area of growth. As a result, the situation in Spanish America 
impacted on three of the areas that Otte identifies as the principal components of 
British power: the capacity of the Navy to project British power, Britain’s financial 
capacity and the ability to mobilize imperial resources in times of war.86 By allowing 
a rival to occupy a stronger position in the New World the strategic elements would 
be damaged and the financial situation was already being eroded due to the continuing 
uncertainty. These factors exerted a negative impact on Wellington’s freedom to 
manoeuvre at Verona. Canning highlighted this to the Duke when discussing the 
possibility of Britain acting as a mediator between France and Spain. Not only were 
the difficulties arising from France, there were further ones ‘from the position in which 
we ourselves stand towards Spain;- a position becoming every day more delicate and 
critical’. He warned Wellington ‘the duties of mediation in our hands will be most 
inconveniently crossed by the causes of complaint which we have against her external 
policy’ where every day word arrived of ‘wrong inflicted on our commerce by vessels 
bearing the flag of Spain and acting under Spanish authorities’.87  
Despite this troublesome issue, Britain was far too out of step with the 
continental powers on just the questions relating to Spain herself for these extra-
European factors to intrude too much, though they would soon enough. In a 
memorandum to be read to Villèle, Wellington wrote how ‘[i]n the course of the 
discussions which have taken place upon this occasion, a marked difference of opinion 
as to the mode of action has appeared between the continental courts on the one hand 
and England on the other’. Wellington looked ‘to the peace and honour of France as 
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the great object in any negociation in Spain and not any counter-revolutionary 
projects’ but the Tsar ‘considers counter-revolution in Spain as the object to be 
attained and war and military operations upon Spain as the only means of attaining it’. 
While Prussia and Austria ‘[i]n principle […] concur in opinion with the English 
minister’ in practice ‘they cannot separate themselves from the Emperor of Russia’. 
In a deleted section of the memorandum that is not in the published version, 
Wellington continued to say that there was a further factor that France must consider 
in pursuing a course of war:  
It is that it necessarily separates England from the alliance. England will not, 
cannot enter upon such a course of conduct; and it will undoubtedly be 
considered that the alliance is broken up. Is France, is Europe yet in such a 
state as that the quintuple alliance can with safety be broken up? Is England of 
no use to the alliance? Has it been considered in what manner her counsels 
operate upon its conduct, and her assistance and influence in forwarding its 
measures? Are not both of use to France in her present position?88 
Though the Duke possibly decided against the inclusion of this paragraph due to how 
clearly it highlighted British isolation, and potentially that it would not necessarily be 
entirely a negative for a French minister to see Britain removed from the alliance, it 
nevertheless shows the desperate nature of the British position at this point.89 
Wellington was conscious of this state of affairs, and when rumours went around about 
the subject of a conversation of his with a Spanish diplomat he believed it showed 
‘how ready my colleagues are to catch at any story which can be construed to our 
disadvantage’.90  
As the Congress moved into its final days, the situation did not really improve 
for Britain or Wellington. The Tsar, in conversations with the Duke, evaded any talk 
on the military side of an intervention in France, the area where Wellington could 
speak with most authority.91 Instead the continental powers moved towards a 
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concerted demonstration by their ambassadors at Madrid.92 This was a road that 
Britain could not follow them down. As Wellington told them, ‘His Majesty's 
government are of opinion that to animadvert upon the internal transactions of an 
independent state, unless such transactions affect the essential interests of His 
Majesty's subjects, is inconsistent with those principles on which His Majesty has 
invariably acted on all questions relating to the internal concerns of other countries’. 
Furthermore, to act in the manner proposed ‘must involve His Majesty in serious 
responsibility if they should produce any effect and must irritate, if they should not, 
and that if addressed as proposed to the Spanish government, are likely to be injurious 
to the best interests of Spain and to produce the worst consequences upon the probable 
discussions between that country and France’. As a result, Wellington informed them 
that Britain could not ‘hold a common language’ with the continental powers. Instead, 
her role would be limited to the good offices at Madrid ‘to allay the ferment which 
these communications must occasion and to do all the good in [the King’s] power’.93  
The unsuccessful conclusion of the Congress, and the isolation Britain faced, 
would have a significant and lasting impact on Wellington and his outlook on foreign 
policy. The role that Metternich played in all of this was of central importance in the 
Duke’s post-mortem to Canning. As soon as the Tsar turned his attention to Spain, the 
Austrian chancellor ‘had felt the utmost anxiety’ about the question and he ‘looked to 
the assistance which he had usually received from the British ministers in these 
conferences as the best mode of getting out of the difficulty without putting himself 
very forward in the discussion’. As a result, Wellington had been urged to raise the 
military aspect of the question with the Tsar, which he duly did. When the Duke failed 
to convince the Tsar against the idea of marching a Russian army to watch Spain and 
France, Metternich had turned to Montmorency, who eventually did prevail. Thus 
‘having got rid of the great danger of all to the Austrian government, and that which 
pressed immediately, the march of a Russian army through Germany into Italy, and 
this upon my failure by the means of the French minister, he then turned short round 
upon the remainder of the question’ and agreed to some kind of treaty on Spain.  
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Nearly up to the last moment he [Metternich] assured me repeatedly that he 
concurred in all my opinions and views, and particularly in that of the 
inconvenience which must result from anything in the shape of a treaty, and 
from the establishment of a conference at Paris which must be in the hands of 
Monsieur Pozo de Borgo [sic]. Yet when it came to the point, finding that the 
Emperor of Russia insisted upon a treaty in some shape or other, and that the 
French ministers would not object to it, he did not  state any objections 
notwithstanding that he knew that a treaty must prevent us from co-operating 
even in the work of peace; and within the last week he discovered that it was 
impossible for the Emperor of Austria not to pronounce his opinion upon the 
Spanish revolution and against what was passing in Spain. 
Wellington admitted that he had somewhat fooled himself that it would be 
possible to come to some kind of accommodation over the matter ‘up to a very late 
period’ and ‘was in hopes that upon this occasion as upon former occasions truth and 
good sense might at last have prevailed’ in the same way he ‘had seen great difficulties 
overcome’ in previous Congresses. Verona was different, though. The after effects of 
the British stance on Naples were still being felt which had left the three Eastern 
powers ‘displeased and irritated’. The fact they had ‘experienced no inconvenience’ 
from the separation with Britain had bolstered their willingness to act separately. 
Despite this though, ‘the great difficulty’ which was lacking previously was ‘alteration 
of the relations between the two imperial courts’. Wellington believed that while 
Kapodistrias was the Tsar’s foreign minister, Austria was ‘obliged to lean towards 
Great Britain […] for support against Russia in its own immediate views as in the 
questions of general interest’. But since Metternich had secured Kapodistrias’s 
removal, the former had become ‘a great degree himself His Imperial Majesty's 
principal adviser’ and ‘in order to maintain the description of influence which he has 
acquired over His Imperial Majesty's councils, he is obliged to bend his own opinions 
and to guide the conduct of the Austrian government in a great degree according to 
the views of Russia’. While Metternich still had confidence in Britain, ‘there is no 
concert nor union of counsel or of action; and indeed I must add that there is an obvious 
restraint in our intercourse particularly before third persons which is not desired as 
being occasioned by the jealousy of the Russians of the intimacy of the Austrian 
government with that of His Majesty’. The necessity to have pressed the chancellor 
on the matter of the Austrian debt to Britain had further served to worsen relations. 
Wellington concluded to Canning how, ‘[u]pon the whole you will see that the scene 
has changed since the assembly of the congress at Aix-la-Chapelle’. With the allies 
‘determined to shut their eyes’ to France’s intrigues in Spain and the risks of 
107 
 
intervention ‘there remained nothing in which I could found any opposition to the plan 
which they had determined to pursue, excepting the general principle on which there 
is a positive and de[c]lared difference of opinion between the three powers and us’.94 
This is an important document that marks a shift not only in Wellington’s 
attitude towards the allied powers, but also a broader change in Britain’s stance 
towards the alliance and Europe. Yamada has shown that Canning did not set out to 
destroy the Concert of Europe by using Spain as a wedge to drive between them, as 
often assumed.95 The Duke’s experience at Verona, and the desertion of Metternich as 
he turned towards Russia, would leave deep marks on him that would later affect his 
own diplomacy as Prime Minister, where he would display a marked disinclination to 
work with Austria, as will be explored in a later chapter.  
Wellington left Verona on 30th November 1822. Canning instructed the Duke 
to remain at Paris if his letter found him in its vicinity: ‘The temper in which M. de 
Villèle professes to be, affords one more chance of preserving peace, if you should be 
at hand to encourage him, during the first conflict of the two parties in the French 
government. Without such aid I fear he may be overborne’.96 In the Foreign 
Secretary’s mind ‘without you neither Villèle nor we have a fair chance of success’ at 
preserving peace.97 Wellington found the French minister still entertaining the same 
hopes for avoiding intervention as when he had passed through previously on his way 
to the Congress.98 Yet, as ever in dealings with France, a deeply held suspicion of 
Britain hampered Wellington’s efforts. The French belief that Britain had supplanted 
France’s preeminent position in Spain made the Duke hesitate in offering Villèle 
British mediation, and in the same conversation the French minister said, in a tone 
‘excessively warm’, how ‘he could assure me that France could not submit to an 
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extension of our advantages and our territory’.99 Canning took a dim view of this 
‘insolence’, but he withheld his ire as ‘all this will keep’ with the priority being to ‘get 
a clear case for ourselves, whatever may be the issue of the present loose and perplexed 
negotiations between Paris, Verona, and Madrid’.100 Much as Wellington expected, 
the French government declined to accept British mediation and instead pressed for 
British adherence to the proceedings of Verona, an impossibility especially as French 
refusal to remove Spanish royalists from the border could not but be considered as 
‘offensive’. Britain, Wellington told them, ‘would not become parties to a defensive 
treaty with a Power who thought proper or found it necessary to adopt such a 
measure’.101  
In the end, Wellington came away from both Paris and Verona without 
securing peace or preventing intervention in Spain. At Calais he wrote to Sir Charles 
Stuart how ‘[t]he fashion and habit of the diplomatick world has been lately to suspect 
us of selfish policy and, in pursuit of objects of this description, to imagine that we 
stick at nothing’. The Duke had found this at the Congress and had found that even in 
Paris the French ministers ‘were not free from these absurd notions’. When the French 
government had to ‘combat these notions’ any time they wished to act in concert with 
Britain, it would always remain difficult to achieve a positive outcome.102  
Wellington’s actions over these months at the Congress of Verona have been 
subject to a great deal of historiographical controversy. This focused around whether 
Wellington had betrayed Canning and consciously worked against his policy, actually 
urging France to move quickly against Spain.103 Launched with full force by Lord 
Acton in 1888, the debate reached its height shortly before the centenary of the 
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Congress.104 J.E.S. Green in two articles roundly criticised the Duke’s conduct.105 In 
his mind, ‘Wellington was a soldier, with all the defects of those qualities that made 
him illustrious. Like most soldiers, he had an exaggerated dread of democracy, and 
was completely baffled by any species of resistance which could not be overcome by 
force’.106 The result was that ‘Wellington fell so much under the influence of 
Metternich as practically to substitute an Austrian policy for a British policy at the 
congress’.107  
The evidence for this was the diary of Baron Charles Edmond de Boislecomte, 
the twenty-six-year-old secretary of the French delegation. The confidant of La 
Ferronnays, Boislecomte did not attend any of the crucial meetings, and was not part 
of the inner circle even amongst the French delegation let alone the wider Congress. 
The weakness of this source material has been the centre of the rebuttal of Green’s 
argument. The evidence of more senior figures, such as the ranking French 
representatives Montmorency and Chauteaubriand, as well as Gentz, who once again 
was the secretary of the Congress, simply do not support Boislecomte’s evidence.108 
Furthermore, as has been seen, the realities of the diplomatic situation were such that 
it was difficult to adopt any kind of line with effect at the congress. As H. M. Lackland 
argued:  
in view of the absolute determination of Alexander, Montmorency, and 
Metternich to intervene in some way in the Peninsula (though they differed as 
to the method), it is difficult to see how even a Castlereagh could have 
prevented them doing so. What Wellington could do he did […] he was 
doomed to defeat from the beginning, but he could, and did, hamper the 
proceedings of his opponents at every stage.109 
Ultimately the evidence against Wellington does not stand up. In Nichols’s 
opinion Green’s ‘interpretation is based on misinformation and myth’. In the most 
comprehensive examination of the course of the Congress, Nichols comes to the 
conclusion that Wellington ‘did not undermine his government’s policy at Verona nor 
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did he betray Canning, though he sometimes was indiscreet in his language. The 
Acton-Green interpretation of British policy at the Congress is untenable’.110  The 
mere existence of this debate highlights the need to examine Wellington’s foreign 
policy in a more comprehensive manner. Looking at isolated incidents in his career 
leads to these misconceptions and perpetuates one dimensional views of the Duke’s 
actions. Only by placing his diplomacy in its wider context can its true thrust and 
objectives be understood. Wellington may well have been indiscreet in his military 
discussions with the French, but Canning had actually pointed to these as an area 
where Wellington could likely have an impact. Furthermore, when placed in the wider 
context of his career, it is clear that Wellington was continuing his older habits of 
frankness with foreign politicians. His career and his command of the Army of 
Occupation had made him more than simply a British statesman. He had wider 
responsibilities to Europe and the Alliance, in his own mind at least. Whether this 
made him a suitable British representative is questionable, but the frank attitudes he 
took and the habits of communicating with European statesmen were precisely the 
same qualities that had set him above any other British diplomats as the only suitable 
choice. They would also set the ground for a long conflict with Canning over the 
course of British diplomacy over the remainder of Liverpool’s government. 
 
Canning, Spain and the New World 1823-25 
After his return from Verona, the next period of Wellington’s career would be one of 
the most trying he would face. He swiftly came to repent his role in ensuring Canning’s 
appointment to the Foreign Office. The habits of communication and cooperation that 
the Duke had built up over many years with Castlereagh never materialised with his 
replacement, and their relationship was instead marked by miscommunication and 
opposition. The nature of Wellington’s role in the formulation of British foreign policy 
also shifted during these years. No longer was he a positive collaborator as previously 
but instead his role was one of blocking and modifying Canning’s initiatives. Though 
the nature of Wellington’s contributions changed, their importance did not necessarily 
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change with them and consequently it is impossible to understand Canning’s foreign 
policy without examination of the Duke’s role. Wellington forms the main antagonist 
to Canning in Harold Temperley’s work on the Foreign Secretary, but Temperley 
never makes any attempt really to understand the former’s attitudes.111 Instead 
Wellington remains a one-dimensional opponent, out of step with the times. This view 
has not changed much in the following ninety years – Jennifer Mori, in a recently 
published article, described Sir Charles Stuart as ‘an “Ultra” who leaned towards the 
reactionary Toryism professed by the Duke of Wellington’.112 Such labels, so clearly 
out of step with the Duke’s actual actions, especially mark this period. 
There was certainly a divergence between the policies of the two statesmen 
and how they understood the international system to operate. This was not simply a 
matter of Wellington not realising times had moved on. Canning’s policy was by no 
means as successful as could be assumed by reading some of the literature on him, and 
had he lived long enough to be forced to deal with the repercussions of his policies in 
the Near East then his reputation might well have been very different, as will be 
explored in the following chapters. Had Wellington’s preferred policies been followed 
in 1823 then some of the embarrassing failures of that year might well have been 
averted. The trend was certainly to move towards Canning’s beliefs in how diplomacy 
should be conducted but this would not be apparent during his lifetime. The pivot 
would come during the Duke’s own administration and it would be Lord Palmerston 
who marked out the new way British foreign policy should be conducted.  
Wellington and Canning agreed on the fundamental aims of British foreign 
policy. Where they diverged was in relation to how it should be conducted. Canning 
was of the mind-set that ‘England's foreign policy could not be successful unless it 
was generally supported by the nation’.113 It was thus pitched much more towards the 
domestic audience and reflected his extensive experience in the House of Commons. 
Wellington instead had taken on board the lessons of the previous twenty years of the 
vulnerability of Britain’s international position. This reflected his experience on the 
ground in Europe, negotiating with leading figures. He knew first-hand the distrust felt 
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towards Britain and that notions of ‘Perfidious Albion’ had not completely 
disappeared. While Wellington knew as well as Canning and, indeed, Castlereagh, that 
there was a divergence between Britain and the continental powers, he always sought 
to minimise that and make as little of it public as possible. On that head he castigated 
Metternich just as much as he did Canning. The Duke was conscious that to be 
separated from the continental Allies could lead to British interests at best being 
overlooked, at worst actually acted against. This had almost happened at the Frankfurt 
negotiations in 1813 and Wellington was determined that no comparable instance 
should happen again. Canning’s preference for calling on the nation to provide the 
backing for his diplomacy directly contrasted with the Duke’s analysis.  Wellington’s 
inclinations towards an ordered system and a preference for a legalist approach to 
problems further butted up against the preference in flexibility that marked out 
Canning’s approach: ‘every nation for itself, and God for us all’.114 This divergence, 
and the long-running battle the two ministers fought because of it, would be the 
defining feature of the foreign policy of British foreign policy from 1823-25. This 
chapter will focus on the first years of this as the government grappled with French 
intervention in Spain, upheaval in Portugal and the particularly difficult issue of 
recognition of the rebellious Spanish colonies in the New World. The Near East, which 
forms an important issue during this decade, will be looked at in a later chapter and 
the latter stages of the Portuguese question will be examined along with the policy of 
Wellington’s government on it. 
* 
The question of intervention in Spain and the related issue of the independence 
of Spanish America would be one of the most important faced during these years. It 
would also serve as the nexus of the competing policies and strategies of Wellington 
and Canning. Despite lingering hopes that Villèle would triumph over the elements in 
France urging intervention, the New Year would prove these ill-founded. As French 
military action loomed ever larger Canning and Wellington, in cooperation, at least to 
begin with, sought some way to make a last ditch attempt at securing peace. This 
would come in the form of a mission by Lord Fitzroy Somerset, Wellington’s secretary 
and former Aide-de-Camp. His visit was coordinated with the Foreign Office but was 
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a private mission with the aim of trying to use Wellington’s personal influence to 
convince the Spanish government to make changes with the hope of avoiding the 
French intervention.115 In Wellington’s mind it was ‘impossible that any reasonable 
Spaniard can doubt that the time is come at which a great effort should be made to 
effect those alterations which the common sense of mankind points out to be 
necessary’ – a course further needed if any agreement was to be reached with her 
rebellious colonies as well.116  
Just as during the Duke’s own mission to Spain in 1814, his advice was by no 
means reactionary. His earnest desire was reform: to preserve what was good of the 
system but to make it workable and to avoid the opprobrium of other powers. As he 
wrote to the Conde de Toreno, an active politician, one of the original framers of the 
Constitution of 1812, and someone who wished to see Wellington’s personal presence 
in Spain, ‘A tous ces maux de’Espagne il y a un remède, le changement d’un système 
de gouvernement don’t tout le monde avoue les défauts, et son inaptitude pour 
gouverner l’Espagne’. Wellington did not agree with the actions of France and the 
other powers towards Spain, something he had tried to prevent, but they should reform 
their constitution now so ‘que le coup, si c'en est un, est donné, que l'Espagne est libre 
à faire ce qu'elle veut, et que les relations de la France avec ces puissances en égard 
de l'Espagne sont pûrement défensives’.117 Toreno was not the only person that urged 
the Duke’s personal presence in these disputes during January 1823. From Paris, 
Frederick Lamb was writing to the Duke privately, telling him that if he presented the 
court of the Tuileries with a concession by the Spaniards and a ‘fear of our taking part’ 
then peace could still be saved. In Lamb’s mind ‘[t]he best mode of doing this would 
be your arrival with a letter from the King. If you are not prepared to take so decided 
a line you must expect war’.118  
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In the end Wellington did not embark on either mission to the continent despite 
Canning also suggesting it. In his own mind ‘he was too great a card to be played 
unless great & good results were to follow; that it w[oul]d only make bad worse if he 
failed, & that he did not think he ought to go unless it was ascertained that he w[oul]d 
be well received by all parties’. Furthermore, highlighting the Duke’s sense of his own 
place in the foreign policy apparatus of Europe, and of his own experience of 
diplomacy, he thought that if he did go ‘it sh[oul]d be upon his own responsibility, not 
as accredited by the Government here; that he w[oul]d go as an individual anxious to 
serve the Spanish nation, & free to do it in the way he judged best & unfettered by any 
orders from home’. Certainly he would never repeat the Verona trip ‘where his hands 
were tied & he was met at every step by orders from home’.119 These conditions were 
sufficient to see that he did not leave for the continent but, nevertheless, he did believe 
that it was through British influence at Paris where the best hope for a peaceful 
resolution lay.120 Mrs Arbuthnot noted in her journal after being shown various papers 
by Wellington how Sir William A’Court (later 1st Baron Heytesbury), the British 
envoy and minister plenipotentiary to Spain, had stated ‘his conviction that the only 
remaining hope of peace rested upon our friendly relations with France & the influence 
we might have in her Councils’. This aligned completely with Wellington’s outlook. 
However, it would not be easy to act upon. Wellington told Mrs Arbuthnot: ‘the 
misfortune is that Mr. Canning has adopted a tone of great harshness & acrimony with 
the French Gov[ernmen]t, which much necessarily lessen our influence’.121  
This influence would shortly take another blow by Canning in his response to 
the speech to the French Chambers by Louis XVIII. That speech seemed to confirm 
that French intervention would happen, and happen on the basis of the principles of 
legitimacy as set out at Troppau and Laibach: ‘Let Ferdinand be free to give to his 
people the institutions they cannot hold but from him’. 122 Canning proposed at once 
to pick up the gauntlet: ‘If there was to be a war, not of armies, but of opinions, then 
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British public opinion was to count’.123 This entire attitude and the line Canning 
proposed to take jutted completely against Wellington’s own preferences and views. 
The Duke simply did not believe in using public opinion to buttress the British 
position, but instead felt that to do so weakened it. Wellington wrote a long 
memorandum to Canning on the topic of his intended speech. For the Duke:  
the question is not whether the allies have behaved well or ill, but whether the 
minister of the crown in the House of Commons can impeach their conduct; 
nay, more whether if that conduct is impeached he can avoid so far to defend 
them as to remind the House of their former services and of the friendly 
relations still existing between this country and them, notwithstanding their 
recent conduct. 
He firmly believed that ‘[i]t must be our policy not to offend these sovereigns’:  
In proportion as we are upon good terms with them, we may hope that we shall 
influence their conduct in the expected contest between France and Spain, and 
that at all events the best mode of alleviating the evil which must be the 
consequence of a successful result of the invasion of Spain by France will be 
to prevail upon the powers of the continent hereafter to join with us to prevent 
France from profiting by that result by obtaining objects of French or family 
ambition.124 
Wellington accompanied this memorandum with a further one on the realities 
of war should Britain actually get involved. He felt it necessary to take these steps 
thanks to a conversation he had had with Canning ‘in which he found him without any 
ideas as to the inevitable result of a rupture with France & really imagining it 
w[oul]d be only necessary to increase the number of our ships’.125 Wellington believed 
this was simply wrong:  
We may rely upon it that the first shot we may fire, whether at sea or on shore, 
will bring upon us declarations of war by the Emperor of Russia and the King 
of Prussia, and even the Emperor of Austria and their allies and dependants. 
This is the natural consequence of what passed at Verona, and we shall deceive 
ourselves if we do not reckon upon this consequence. 
This would mean the end of British influence on the continent. Hanover would fall to 
Prussia, the Netherlands ‘will be obliged either to declare war against us and to join 
what is already called the continental alliance, or to abandon his dominions; and 
Portugal, equally with Spain, will be occupied by a French army’. Wellington 
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predicted that ‘It is the greatest mistake to suppose that if we enter this or any war, we 
can do it by halves, or confine our operations to one branch of our military power and 
resource. We must deploy our whole force, by land, as well as by sea, and after all we 
should scarcely have enough to defend all that we are bound to protect’. All of this 
without taking into ‘consideration of the part the United States would take in this war, 
though I think that not doubtful’.126 Wellington, rooted in his personal experiences of 
war and diplomacy, took a much lower view of the role of public opinion, and of bluff, 
in the conduct of foreign policy. The aims might have been the same – to prevent 
French intervention – but their means fundamentally diverged. Canning did not even 
touch on any of the Duke’s comments or criticisms in his reply.127   
This dispute over Parliamentary language and tactics foreshadowed the more 
general deterioration in the relationship between Canning and the Duke, something 
exacerbated by an increasing frostiness between Wellington and Lord Liverpool. As 
early as January 1823, Wellington had been complaining to Mrs Arbuthnot about the 
behaviour of the Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister and even talked of 
resignation over the issue of the Foreign Enlistment Bill.128 Despite Canning’s 
assurances that he wanted to hear Wellington’s opinions - ‘no suggestion of yours can 
ever be otherwise than most welcome to me’ – his willingness to listen did not 
automatically translate into actually taking the comments on board.129 Mrs Arbuthnot 
noted in February that Canning had been discussing the subject of ‘peace or war in a 
very warlike strain & without the least reference to what the Duke had written to him’ 
and the following month wrote how ‘[t]he Duke seems very much out of sorts with 
Canning & L[or]d Liverpool for their shuffling conduct in foreign policy’.130 This had 
merely served to ensure that ‘we are now completely shut out from continental 
politics’.131 
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Wellington’s low opinion of Canning and his conduct was apparent in an 
interesting correspondence with Richard Trench, Earl of Clancarty, the British 
ambassador to the Netherlands. The Duke had heard reports of the poor relationship 
between Clancarty and the Dutch King and decided to write to the former on the 
subject. Wellington believed that he had been encouraged in a confrontational sense 
by the Foreign Office and drew a comparison between Canning and his predecessor: 
‘In my opinion our late friend would have warned you of the position in which you 
stood in relation to the King’ but instead ‘[a]s it is, and as I think perceived in the 
dispatches which I read yesterday that, instead of being warned, you had been 
encouraged and indeed fresh matters of irritation had been suggested to you on the 
question’. Wellington then referred to a previous conversation, presumably on the 
issue of the succession to Castlereagh, admitting that ‘[f]rom all this you will see that 
I think you were right and I was wrong in the last discussion you and I had together in 
the room in which I am now writing’.132  
Clancarty disabused Wellington of the notion that he had been encouraged by 
the Foreign Office in his behaviour to the King – ‘I am not aware that I have even this 
excuse to plead in mitigation’ – but expanded more on their earlier conversation. He 
remembered it well and everything he believed had been confirmed since.  
Had Your Grace been declared the successor of our late friend and the future 
permanent guide of our foreign relations, your position and influence at Verona 
would, I am convinced, have been very different from what they were, and 
measures, which the world will probably have permanently to deplore might, 
and I think, would have been avoided. 
In Clancarty’s opinion, ‘[p]ersonal confidence with the influence it creates in high 
quarters, can only be attained by long habits of personal communication on similar 
interests, nor perhaps even then, unless on difficult political measures, and in difficult 
times, our late friend enjoyed the confidence and influence in all the leading cabinets 
of Europe.’ 
After him, there was but one great trump card in our pack, and it ought to have 
been played: it was not, and the world is capotted [tricked]. Look yourself to 
the effect of your own influence, or your return through Paris, and from whence 
alone we have since derived the slight hopes of peace which have been 
entertained subsequently to the French proposal at Verona. 
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Farewell, this is a melancholy subject.133 
 
This correspondence highlights a few important aspects of the Duke’s 
relationship with Canning. The suspicion of methods and aims was a significant 
barrier to an effectual partnership of the kind that Wellington had had with Castlereagh 
but it reflected a deeper divergence between them. For Clancarty and Wellington to 
complain of Canning’s lack of influence and personal intimacy with foreign statesmen 
was to forget that it had been for Parliamentary reasons, more than any other, that he 
had been recommended. While the Duke’s experience and preferences pointed 
towards the methods of Castlereagh, the dictates of domestic politics pointed Canning 
in a different direction. Not that this did anything to temper the Duke’s dissatisfaction. 
Later in the year he would complain to Mrs Arbuthnot that Canning ‘knew no more of 
foreign politics than a child & had neither temper nor address to deal with foreigners’ 
that he had so managed as to be completely in the dark about what was going on’. He 
told her once more that he ‘repented having advised his having the Foreign Seals & 
said, if it was to come over again, he w[oul]d cut his hand off rather than recommend 
such a measure’.134 Likewise, the realities of the situation did not soothe Canning’s 
other opponents, the King included. He wrote to Wellington that ‘[m]y feelings are in 
complete union with your own in this most important and vital question’ of Britain’s 
foreign policy. ‘My confidence is in you, and you only, and in placing my friendship 
and affection in you and with you, I feel safe, happy and comfortable’.135 These 
assurances of intimacy would bring with them their own problems and make 
Wellington’s task of opposing Canning actually more difficult, and bring suspicions 
of intrigue and feelings that Wellington’s views would carry ‘more weight if they were 
unencumbered by royal baggage’.136  
As the divisions within the government and beyond about foreign policy began 
to fester, events in Spain reached a head with long-expected French intervention 
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coming in early April 1823.137 Canning wished to declare British conditional neutrality 
in advance of this – to depend on Portugal remaining unmolested, no aid by France in 
regaining Spain’s American colonies and that the French occupation should only be 
temporary.138 Wellington, however, opposed many of Canning’s premises: ‘I have 
since turned the whole subject over in my mind, and I confess that the result is a 
conviction that however good the dispatch is, it is better not to launch it’. An official 
declaration of neutrality would require something solid where the Duke believed 
flexibility would be preferable. ‘In respect to colonies, in my opinion, our time of 
proceeding should vary almost in proportion as France should be successful or 
otherwise, and I can’t see any advantage to be derived in any quarter by publishing 
beforehand what our line will be’. On the issue of the Family Compact between the 
two Bourbon monarchies, which was ruled out by the 1814 Anglo-Spanish treaty, 
Wellington likewise thought that ‘even upon that point it might be inconvenient to 
pledge ourselves beforehand to any particular line of conduct’. From his military 
perspective, he told Canning that ‘[i]n respect to French occupation, we may rely on 
it taking place in some shape or other, if the French should be successful even only in 
the military operation, and the duration of it must depend on circumstances’.139 In the 
end Canning rejected Wellington’s reservations and the French ignored British 
statements resulting in a ‘humiliation for British foreign policy’ – an army of 
occupation remained in France until 1828 despite all of Canning’s opposition and 
bluster.140  
Wellington’s advice would be rejected again over the question of sending aid 
to Portugal. Following the French intervention against the constitutional government 
of Spain, the Portuguese constitutional movement itself collapsed. Palmella, the pro-
British minister appealed to Britain for military aid while the military was 
reorganised.141 There was no doubt in Wellington’s mind of the need to send soldiers 
to Portugal if possible: ‘[I]f we have the troops, I cannot see how we can refuse them, 
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allied as we are to the King of Portugal, unless we make up our minds to give up our 
position in Europe, and to leave France to act the part which has hitherto been ours’.142 
In Liverpool’s mind there simply were not the troops to send and to acquire them 
would involve recourse to Parliament, something he was unwilling to do:  
[t]he question is not, however, about sending them, but about raising a force 
for this purpose. In this case Parliament must be called, nay, I think Parliament 
must be called even if you send a force which was now in existence upon such 
a service. I do not allude to the calling of Parliament as any matter of personal 
inconvenience to ourselves, but before such step was taken, it would be well 
to consider all the evils which might result from the debates in Parliament upon 
a subject of this nature being forced upon them.143  
 
This was the opposite approach to that which Wellington took, and 
furthermore, in his opinion based on a false premise, as he ‘indignantly remarked’ to 
Mrs Arbuthnot.144 The Duke wrote back to Canning pointing out two instances since 
he had been in cabinet where extra troops had been raised without reference to 
Parliament. Wellington was absolutely stunned that there could be any discussion of 
not sending aid: ‘It will be said that it is an interference, but it is in fact none. The 
ancient ally of the country, states an undeniable fact, viz. that his mutinous troops have 
twice overturned the government of the country’ and requested British aid to help 
‘disband his mutinous army and raise another’. The Duke frankly told Canning that ‘I 
confess that it opens a scene of operations for us in our neutral character and affords 
an opportunity which I am astonished that you don’t seize’.145 Mrs Arbuthnot recorded 
it in even plainer terms:  
I have never seen the Duke so much annoyed about anything in my life; he 
says this proposition from the King of Portugal w[oul]d be the most excellent 
opportunity of replacing us in our proper station in Europe, & shewing to the 
world that our Gov[ernmen]t is not a revolutionary one, which Mr. Canning’s 
conduct ever since he came into office must have made them feel it to be; that 
the argument in favour of the measure was an unanswerable one; that our oldest 
& most faithful ally, the King of a country with which we carry on seven 
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times the trade we do with France, applies to us to assist him in settling the 
affairs & gov[ernmen]t of his distracted kingdom.146 
Despite this anger and desire for Britain to act Canning was not moved. He 
merely told Wellington that he and Liverpool were agreed that ‘whatever may be the 
ultimate decision upon the subject of it, it is impossible to come to that decision 
satisfactorily without having had a conversation with you upon it’.147 Or, in the words 
of Mrs Arbuthnot, ‘Mr. Canning has behaved with his usual shabbiness in the whole 
business; for, instead of discussing the subject with the Duke himself, he contents 
himself with sending L[or]d Liverpool’s opinion – what the Duke calls, sets 
L[or]d L[iverpool] & him together by the ears & stands by himself to see the result’.148 
Nevertheless, Liverpool was decided against intervention, both for Parliamentary 
reasons and fears of escalation– ignoring the advice of the Duke, in an arena where he 
was the most qualified person possible, that only 6,000 troops would be needed.149  
Without the troops he wanted, Palmella tried to resort to other expedients to 
protect Portugal from turmoil. In late 1823 he sought a guarantee from Britain. This 
was not a measure that met with the approval of Wellington despite his earlier support 
for the sending of soldiers. He told Beresford that ‘[b]efore we can guarantee anything, 
we must know what it is. We must be sure that it will stand the test of enquiry and 
discussion in the most acute assembly of men in the world’. He continued on that ‘I 
cannot understand the existence of a guarantee of internal government in any country 
by a foreign power and the existence of independence in such country […] In short, 
this internal guarantee is a novelty in politicks, to which I for one can never consent 
that this country should be a party’. The Duke also pointed out to Beresford the 
precedent that a British guarantee of Portugal would set. Should they do that then ‘can 
we object to the guarantee by France, or by any other power, of the internal 
government of Spain?’150 Mrs Arbuthnot a few days later explicitly asked the Duke 
how he squared off the refusal of a guarantee with the desire to send troops. To this he 
told her that ‘the troops were to be granted for a specific purpose (to quell a mutiny of 
the troops) which he had no objection to, but what is now wanted is a guarantee of the 
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form of gov[ernmen]t that may be established generally, which w[oul]d cause our 
Parliament to interfere in every act of the Portugueze [sic] Gov[ernmen]t & is a thing 
he could not sanction’.151 This is an important statement by Wellington. While 
Canning has been praised for his ‘unchangeable principle of non-intervention’, the 
Duke is conspicuously absent from historical debates about this and about the issue of 
guarantees.152 This absence has not only helped to cast Wellington as a reactionary 
where the picture was much more complex, but also to overstate the case of Canning 
being a trailblazer in his diplomacy. While some of his methods might clash with those 
of the Duke, his principles in general did not and were shared more widely by the 
leading figures in the formulation of British foreign policy. 
With neither a British army nor a British guarantee in place instability still 
ruled the day in Portugal. In early 1824 King Joao decided to take the step of 
summoning the ancient Cortes. His autocratic son Dom Miguel responded by 
attempting to stage a coup and Wellington once more proposed intervention to secure 
Portugal. Trying to avoid the question of resorting to Parliament for an increase of the 
army, it was instead the aim to send the King’s Hanoverian soldiers.153 While this plan 
originally appealed to the Foreign Secretary, he pulled back from it when it was used 
as an example of Britain being ‘once more linked up with the European system’ as 
Princess Lieven described to Metternich.154 He secured that France would not 
intervene herself and with that prospect removed was happy to then decline British 
support.155 Wellington was furious. He believed it ridiculous to tell Portugal that ‘We 
were willing to give troops & assistance when we thought that France w[oul]d if we 
did not, but now that we find France will not, we will not & you may get thro’ your 
difficulties as you can’. Mrs Arbuthnot had ‘never seen the Duke so angry’. To 
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Wellington the British were ‘bullied by France & are abandoning our old ally, who is 
to be left at the mercy of a rebellious soldiery’.156  
The Duke was deeply affected by this incident. To Wellington, Canning’s 
removal of support for military aid was just another incident in the ‘tricking & 
shuffling way in which business is now done’ – which was worse than the lack of aid 
itself. Mrs Arbuthnot recorded:  
He says he never knows what ground he stands upon. To use his own 
expressions, it is cut from under his feet. In Ld Londonderry’s time he knew 
that every thing was fairly stated, nothing kept back; but now, nothing is told 
but what cannot be concealed, that papers are sorted even before their faces & 
some shewn & others kept back. 
Wellington thought that Canning’s aim was to end the Continental Alliance and that 
if he succeeded ‘we shall have war directly’.  
It was an alliance contracted solely for the public good, the Powers of Europe 
engaging to consult each other & make common cause together; it has kept 
England in a state of profound peace for nine years, & what the Foreign 
Ministers (Metternich in particular) say is very true. No power gains so much 
by being at peace as England, & why can’t she continue a course of policy that 
produces such beneficial results? The Duke says he is sure that in a few months 
more we shall either have to reconquer Portugal for the King or we shall see it 
occupied by French troops & be thus driven out of our last hold in Europe. 
The Duke took this very personally.  
[H]is whole life has been spent in fighting against the Liberals; that all his 
honours had been gained in fighting for Spain & Portugal; that the Treaties he 
had made had promised a long & prosperous peace, & now the work of his life 
is undone from Mr. Canning’s mere love of undoing, from his dislike to a 
settlement not made by himself, & to gratify his own spleen. For principle he 
has none, he has no fixed project, no plan of action, it is a mere vague desire 
of change.157 
There could be no starker statement of the rift that opened between the two 
statesmen over the conduct of British foreign policy and it stated clearly how little 
they agreed on crucial matters of state. The drawn out battle over the independence of 
Spanish America would be another demonstration of this fact, and one that dominated 
these years more than any other.  
* 
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The issue of the Spanish colonies in the New World was one that had been 
around since the war. As has been mentioned previously, at Aix-la-Chapelle 
Wellington had been invited by the Tsar and France to act as a mediator between Spain 
and her rebellious subjects – an invitation he had declined. It had further been a 
question that Castlereagh had addressed and it had been he who had accorded the 
colonies belligerent rights and had sent out consuls to protect British trade. However, 
it would take on a completely new light under Canning’s leadership at the Foreign 
Office. Once more, Wellington and the Foreign Secretary would be agreed on the 
ultimate ends – that at some stage it would be necessary to recognise the independence 
of Spanish America – but as in so many other questions they differed fundamentally 
on the means. For the Duke, this had to be driven by a focus on Europe and the 
Continental implications of policy choices. Canning, on the other hand, placed much 
more emphasis on the commercial and parliamentary ramifications. As he was wont 
to do, Wellington rested many of his arguments on a legalistic basis. This kind of 
outlook on the one hand lent his views greater authority, but, on the other, endowed 
them with a rigidity that enabled more flexible opponents to outflank him. Ultimately, 
this was what Canning was able to do over Spanish America, despite some setbacks 
along the way.  
The European focus and the legalistic slant are evident in some of Wellington’s 
contributions on the question in 1823. In July, at the height of the arguments over 
intervening in Portugal, the Duke wrote to Canning to emphasise the need to bear in 
mind the protocols of Aix-la-Chapelle. Wellington told him that ‘[w]e are bound […] 
at least to explain ourselves to the signing parties of those protocols upon all our 
measures respecting the possessions of any other power of Europe’. In the Duke’s 
mind he was clear that the explanations of British conduct needed to be completely in 
line with the actual motives behind it. If the latter had shifted, so must the former: ‘if 
we alter the ground of our proceeding, if the danger of that country falling into the 
hands of France, or becoming an ally of America, is the motive for the recognition of 
its government, we ought to explain ourselves to our allies, and ought to draw our 
instructions in such a manner as to be able to communicate them’. He was clear that 
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‘our real motive for making the enquiry and for the new measures should be distinctly 
set forth’.158 
Two months later Wellington returned to the charge on the need to conciliate 
the continental powers. The ‘Modern Revolutionists’, and the party that supported 
them, presumably the Whigs, wished to ‘involve this country in all the expences [sic] 
and consequences of another extended contest’ but the Government should not. He 
urged that ‘surely we must not get into a war of notes, at least with our neighbours, 
peace being our object, only because the editors of newspapers and their Jacobin 
patrons are desirous of enlisting us in the cause of revolution’. Wellington did not 
believe the rumours of French intervention in America but regardless of that, he argued 
that, given the principle of opposing foreign involvement already being laid down, it 
‘would be far more conciliatory and more effectual for every purpose, excepting to 
gratify those who wish to push us to a quarrel, to communicate verbally either with 
Monsieur de Polignac or with the ministers at Paris, and if there be real ground for 
uneasiness, explain it to them and call for an explanation of this conduct’.159 
Canning took quite a different line, and one that demonstrated the chasm 
between their attitudes about how foreign policy should be conducted. He replied to 
the Duke that ‘[t]he alternative, as it appears to me, is between giving fair notice of 
what we intend, in time to prevent a collision, or waiting till we are called upon to 
speak out, with all the allies leagued against us’. European diplomacy for the Foreign 
Secretary was formulated with assumptions of confrontation, of ‘us versus them’, 
rather than the spirit of cooperation and camaraderie that Wellington was used to and 
had worked so hard to foster. Canning continued how ‘[i]t may be very fit that the 
allied sovereigns should govern the old world as they list, but they have no business 
to expect that they shall be suffered to extend their continental rule to the new’. In his 
mind, given those thoughts, ‘we shall do well to take the best chance of avoiding 
collision by speaking plainly to France while she is yet uncommitted’.160 While the 
Duke was at one with Canning on the issue of the need to oppose European 
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involvement in Spanish America, they differed in the method: the former by quiet, 
cautious and private means, the latter by a public statement of the British position. 
Wellington was concerned that the Foreign Secretary’s note would mean that Britain 
‘will be pledged […] to a course of action of the expediency of which it might be as 
well that the government should judge at the time’. Thus the Duke’s prescription was 
that it would be ‘desirable to avoid any farther irritating correspondence with our 
neighbours on an event which appears so improbable’.161 Like the general he had been 
for so long, Wellington did not want to commit himself to defend a position that enemy 
manoeuvres could make untenable. Canning meanwhile wished to force them to 
retreat before they ever got close to threatening his position. Canning prevailed in this 
exchange, with the result being the Polignac Memorandum, but this episode still 
served as a further incidence that nettled Wellington against the Minister.162  
After a short while the dispute was renewed. Canning put to Wellington: ‘[a]re 
we bound by our neutrality to suffer France to pick up spoils of Spain, after the 
conclusion of the war? […] Would you suffer France to acquire Cuba by cession? If 
not why Canaries, or Ceuta, or Minorca?’163 Wellington dismissed these as rumours. 
For him, ‘we should avoid to notice such reports until we shall have some ground to 
stand upon; such ground must be afforded’.164 Taking a familiar stance, he told the 
Foreign Secretary that ‘there is neither dignity nor advantage to be derived from angry 
discussions upon reports of designs which are so vague, as to be entirely unworthy of 
attention’. The Duke concluded by telling Canning:  
In entering upon this question, therefore, I confess I feel very anxious that we 
should know exactly the ground upon which we stand, and that we should place 
ourselves in that which we can certainly maintain, that the justice of our case 
in every part of this transaction should be clearly brought forward, and that 
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although our object should be distinctly stated, our tone should be very 
moderate. We must by all means keep out of this disgraceful contest, or we 
should not satisfy the King or the publick of this country.165 
A few days later Wellington described the situation with Spain over the independence 
of her colonies as ‘the worst scrape we have ever been in’, and once again urged 
Canning that ‘we should proceed in this question with as much moderation as is 
possible’. He was clear eyed about the question and argued that ‘[t]here cannot be a 
greater misfortune for this country than to get into a war with a country which in fact 
it cannot injure. In truth, we cannot injure Spain’ whereas ‘Spain might do us as much 
injury as all the Powers of Europe leagued against us; and we should soon see the 
Adventurers and Revolutionists of the whole world in the service of the Rey Neto 
against us as willingly as they entered the service of the Cortes against France’.166 
Even if that overstated the threat from Spain, Wellington was certainly right in the 
limited capacity of Britain to exert influence on Spain on this question. With no 
colonies to seize from her, the traditional British method of pressure was lost and there 
was no suitable alternative that would not bring on the ire of Europe – something 
Wellington was ever keen to avoid.   
All of these disputes were just a prelude to the main struggle that would take 
place in 1824 over whether to recognise the independence of the Spanish colonies or 
not. This would stretch the relationships of the Cabinet to breaking point and bring 
about underhanded tactics from all side as they attempted to prevail, from the 
withholding of dispatches and information, to the connivance with foreign powers for 
the removal of the Foreign Secretary as well as resignation threats all round.  The first 
rift would be over whether to accept an invitation from Spain to a conference about 
her colonies. As so often with the Duke and Canning, the differences emerged not 
from the substance of the course that Britain’s policy should take – both were 
convinced it would be inadvisable to accept – but instead from ‘the whole tone & 
temper of Mr. Canning’s intended note’ as Mrs Arbuthnot put it.167 The Foreign 
Secretary was typically blunt in his draft despatch, informing the Spanish that Britain 
considered the separation of the colonies ‘as practically and irrevocably decided’, as 
well as that ‘any interference by force or menace on the part of any foreign power in 
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that contest would constitute a case in which Great Britain must act as her own 
essential interests might require’.168 Wellington wished that Canning ‘might find in 
antecedent circumstances and in the nature of the case reasons for declining which will 
give less offence’, in particular the circumstances around the failed discussions of Aix-
la-Chapelle. This he argued without ever diverging from the opinion that the 
Conference was undoubtedly something that Britain should not attend. In his mind, 
Britain was the only power ‘which can have any influence upon this question: that 
influence may be diminished but cannot be increased by using it in consequence of the 
decrees of a conference; and I think it very desireable [sic] for the sake of Spain herself 
that it should not be thrown away’.169 Wellington was not far removed from Canning’s 
basic premises, and was certainly keen to see a conclusion in the independence 
question that was in line  with British interests but how this was to be achieved was 
tempered by his continuing concern about Britain’s perception on the continent. He 
was not a one dimensional reactionary, nor an ardent fan of congresses, but instead 
someone with a developed and honed analysis of the need for Britain to remain close 
to the continental states and not to offend them and risk the exclusion of Britain on 
questions where she did not have the influence she did over New World affairs. In 
contrast, Canning told the Duke ‘[w]ith respect to the form of the answer that is a 
secondary consideration’.170 
Wellington’s opposition to extending formal recognition to the colonies was 
based on a different basis – the mode mattered. He told the Foreign Secretary in 
February how ‘[t]he existence of these countries, their declarations of independence, 
their wars are matters of fact which must be acknowledged by everybody’. Following 
from this ‘[t]he recognition of the existence, de facto, of these governments, and of 
their rights of war, the appointment of consuls and the appointment of political agents 
[…] do not go to the recognition and acknowledgement of the right of these colonies 
to independence, or to question the title of the King of Spain to their dominion’. Thus 
for Wellington the measures taken thus far had ‘acknowledged and recognised the 
existence of facts, the truth of which nobody can dispute […] But none go to the 
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question of right, nor has any power a right to call upon us to pronounce 
acknowledgement of recognition of such right’.171 Such a technical argument was not 
one to win votes in the House of Commons – a major consideration in Canning’s 
calculations – but it was an outlook that mattered especially to prevent isolation.  
Wellington’s preferences in this direction were supported by Metternich. The 
Austrian Chancellor wrote to the Duke stating that ‘[l]e gouvernement Britannique 
semble se vouer à un système d’isolement complet’. Metternich, like the Duke, wanted 
Britain to be a part of the European system and urged him to do what he could to bring 
it about:  
Ce que je me sense en droit de vous demander, c’est d’user de tous vos moyens 
d’influence pour donner de la vie à ce qui en manqué, et pour tuer les chances 
de perdition que je vois augmenter journellement, par suite d’un système (ou 
si vous le préférez) d’une marche, que je regarde comme jugée par le seul fait, 
que la raison ne suffit pas pour l’expliquer, et bien moins encore, pour le 
justifier.172 
Mrs Arbuthnot described this letter as ‘the worst written & the most absurd I really 
ever read’ and records some interesting comments about Metternich from the Duke. 
Wellington told her that ‘Metternich always writes ill & tho[ugh]’ he thinks him 
certainly a sharp, clever man, he considers him greatly over-rated’.173 Nevertheless, 
the Duke did agree with some of Metternich’s points, telling Sir Henry Wellesley that 
‘[w]e are certainly not upon the most confidential terms with the allies’. Wellington 
did not place this solely at the door of Canning, however, despite him believing that 
Britain was ‘radically defective in our diplomatick headquarters here’. The conduct of 
Metternich and the other continental powers was also to blame: ‘[T]hey should know 
that even their best friends think that they treat us very ill, and that they can do nothing 
with us as long as this continues’.174 Wellington expanded on this in his reply to the 
Austrian Chancellor. The first time that the division between Britain and the continent 
became public was at Troppau thanks to the Circular that had been brought forward 
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‘without the knowledge of our plenipotentiary’.  This situation continued at Verona 
where Wellington had ‘ventured to foretell to Your Highness the consequences to the 
alliance in general of the state of “isolement” in which I was left’. He continued on 
that he did not: 
pretend that upon either occasion the allies were bound to abandon their object 
to please the councils of this country; but, I contended then, as I do now, that 
as it was an object to the allies upon both occasions to carry this government 
with them, as far as it could go, it would have been wise to conduct these 
transactions in such manner as that at least it might not be apparent to the world 
that we were separated from the allies, and that the well-meaning people of 
this country might not have been accustomed to consider that separation as a 
benefit instead of an of an evil. 
In Wellington’s view it was ‘neither les choses themselves nor les hommes who have 
transacted them that have occasioned the mischief, but the mode in which the 
transactions which have taken place have been carried on’. In this way the Duke 
extended his criticism of Canning to Austria and the other Allies, highlighting that 
these were based on a broader conception of how international affairs should be 
conducted. 
Moving onto the matter of the independence of Spanish America, once again 
Wellington believed that the continental powers had not given necessary consideration 
to Britain’s position. Britain ‘no doubt posssesses [sic] a preponderating influence’ on 
that matter and a ‘strong interest is likewise felt upon it in the country’ which had 
‘their influence in Parliament and even in the cabinet’. The Duke believed that ‘[u]nder 
these circumstances it would have been desireable [sic] to endeavour to conciliate this 
government towards the councils of allies, and to take care that there should be nothing 
either in the proposition itself or in the mode of making it which should insult us or 
remind us of “isolement”’ – a condition that had not been forthcoming. This was a 
damning volley by someone that Metternich considered a friend of his system, and 
who he had called upon to do his utmost to counter Canning. The Duke’s 
dissatisfaction at the Austrian’s conduct at Verona, which has been explored above, 
would have a long lasting impact on his personal relationship with Metternich and for 
Anglo-Austrian relations. Wellington ended his letter with a defence of the British 
government’s conduct, despite his own criticisms of it: ‘But this I must say, that there 
is no act of this government, there is scarcely a word in any publick document of which 
any power can complain’. He continued to urge Metternich, ‘who in many respects 
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[was] placed in the centre of Europe and at the head of its councils’ to do Britain 
‘justice; and that you will endeavour by your influence and example to prevail upon 
others to consider our real situation and to conduct themselves towards [Britain] in the 
manner which is becoming on account of the station we will and the mode in which 
we have always conducted ourselves, and this for their own sakes as well as for the 
sake of the world at large’.175 The Duke returned to this theme in a later letter. He told 
Metternich how the feelings against cooperation with the continental powers were by 
no means limited to the usual agitators: ‘This sentiment prevails among moderate, 
well-judging men to as great a degree as among political adventurers and fanaticks’. 
Wellington stressed that ‘[t]he allies ought to be aware of these facts and ought to 
shape their measures in such manner as to carry this country with them, which is at 
least as necessary for their interest and welfare as it is for ours’.176 
While Wellington was critical of the conduct of the continental powers towards 
Britain, he had not eased up in his disapproval of some of Canning’s tactics. This was 
apparent in the dispute over the publishing of papers, the Polignac Memorandum the 
most important, in the Commons in March 1824. On this matter Wellington told Lord 
Liverpool that ‘I differ positively with the government on this proceeding’ though he 
was ‘not desirous of giving any farther trouble in a subject on which I believe nobody 
was of the same opinion’. The Duke’s outlook on this fundamentally contrasted with 
the Prime Minister’s and the Foreign Secretary’s. For Wellington, ‘[t]he moment the 
government lay papers before Parliament on any political question, the decision is no 
longer practically in their hands’. With discussions still on-going, the ‘consequence of 
producing these papers at present is that Parliament must form a judgement upon the 
whole subject, which must have its influence hereafter whatever form it may assume 
and however disadvantageous whenever the final decision made’. Furthermore, to 
release papers to Parliament would have an impact on Europe: ‘Foreigners who have 
witnessed and are aware of the caution and reserve with which we are in the habit of 
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communicating papers of this description to Parliament, will see in this act a desire to 
throw it out of our own hands’.177  
In this matter Wellington rather missed the point of Canning’s parliamentary 
tactics – in part because they were aimed against the Duke. Mrs Arbuthnot recorded 
how Wellington believed ‘the system of publishing papers upon subjects still in a 
course of negociation [sic] very bad, & it prevents the Minister being as free & 
unfettered as he otherwise w[oul]d be’.178 This was the appeal of the move as ‘Canning 
resorted to his favourite weapon of publicity’.179 Taking it to the public sphere meant 
that the Foreign Secretary was setting his policy in stone and removing it as a topic of 
discussion by his biggest Cabinet critic – Wellington. Liverpool worded it in a more 
conciliatory manner to the Duke of course:  
I sincerely believe that the production of these papers, so far from embarrassing 
our course in future, will give us a latitude both as to negociation, if Spain 
should resist our good offices, and as to the time and circumstances of 
recognition, of which we should find ourselves wholly deprived by any 
unwillingness, or even backwardness, to explain our past policy and our 
present position as to Spain and the American provinces.180 
Nevertheless, there was a crucial divergence between the tactics and outlook of the 
Duke and his cabinet colleagues. While in 1824 this would be a relatively minor flash 
point, as the 1820s went on Wellington’s position would become increasingly out of 
touch with the needs of British diplomacy and parliamentary politics – bringing them 
into conflict rather than using the latter as a prop to the former.  
One other area where Wellington differed substantially with Canning was on 
Ireland, where they took opposing sides on the issue of Catholic Emancipation, and 
the Duke drew comparison between the question there and that of Spanish America. 
In this Wellington foreshadowed a criticism that was used against Palmerston in his 
pomp over the following decades when he was highlighting the case of supressed 
minorities and groups while ignoring the irony of the situation in Ireland. For the Duke 
‘considering what is passing’ in that country and ‘what all expecting will occur […] 
before long, the bad with hope, the good with apprehension and dread’ he was clear 
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that ‘we must take care not to give additional examples in these times of the 
encouragement of insurrection, and we must not be induced by clamour, by self-
interested views, by stock-jobbing, or by faction, to give the sanction of our 
approbation to what are called the governments of these insurgent provinces’ by means 
of diplomatic recognition. These arguments were tied to the overriding one of the risk 
of war: ‘The preservation of peace must be our object, and if we must have war we 
must not be forced into a continental contest single handed with France having all 
Europe for her well wishers if not for Allies’. Wellington concluded: 
Considering what an interest we have in the preservation of peace; the delicacy 
of our position in Portugal, and the chances, and even probability of a civil war 
in Ireland; and on the other hand, the interest which all European Powers feel 
on this question, and with what anxiety even our best friends view our conduct 
in relation to it; there ought to be a very strong and manifest interest, bordering 
upon, if not amounting to, an absolute necessity, which should induce us to 
take any further step.181 
In this wish the Duke would be completely out of step with the direction of 
policy. In July 1824 the cabinet finally agreed to formally move towards recognition 
in a memorandum to George IV. This divided Spanish America into five parts: Peru, 
Chili, Mexico, Columbia and Buenos Ayres. In the first four areas the situation was 
still too fluid or the knowledge of what was happening uncertain. However, in the case 
of Buenos Ayres ‘there does not appear to be any such circumstances of 
disqualification’. Their separation from Spain, the absence of conflict, ‘the settled state 
of the Government’ and ‘the extent of the commerce of Buenos Ayres with this 
country’ thus ‘satisfied Y[our] M[ajesty]’s servants that they best perform their duty 
in humbly advising Y[our] M[ajesty] that the time is arrived for taking some decisive 
step towards the establishment of relations with Buenos Ayres’. Woodbine Parish, the 
Consul-General there, would therefore be empowered to negotiate a commercial 
treaty.182 This measure was not conceded by Wellington without the usual tussle with 
Liverpool and Canning. The Duke came away very bitter from the experience. Mrs 
Arbuthnot wrote that he believed that the Prime Minister ‘is opposed to every thing he 
wishes & is anxious to make a quarrel with him’. Nevertheless, Wellington was willing 
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to see the negotiation of a commercial treaty which he believed ‘w[oul]d be in fact 
acknowledging them to be independent, & w[oul]d give no offence to Spain as we 
have always contended for the right to do whatever was necessary for the protection 
of our own subjects’.183 
This agreement quieted matters for most of the reminder of 1824 as more 
information was gathered and negotiations pursued but at the end of November the 
fight was renewed. Lord Liverpool and Canning circulated a memorandum that argued 
‘[t]he period is now arrived when it appears necessary to review the state of our 
relations with the provinces of Spanish America, and to consider the language which 
it may be proper to recommend to the King to hold in his speech to Parliament’. After 
recounting the circumstances of the rebellions it then proceeded to ask ‘are there any 
circumstances extrinsic to this internal character which should longer delay the 
recognition of the independence of such of those states as have established their 
independence “de facto” and have constituted governments capable of maintaining 
relations of peace and amity with other powers?’ The memorandum concluded by 
pointing out the threat from the United States of America. Menacingly, it argued that 
‘[s]ooner or later we shall probably have to contend with the combined maritime 
power of France and of the United States’. But Spanish America offered a balance. 
‘The disposition of the new states is at present highly favorable to England. If we take 
advantage of that disposition we may establish through our influence with them a fair 
counterpoise to that combined maritime power. Let us not then throw the present 
golden opportunity away, which once lost may never be recovered’.184 Given all these 
points, the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary were of the opinion that recognition 
needed to be extended to Mexico and Columbia in addition to Buenos Aires.185 
Wellington disagreed fundamentally with this argument. While he admitted 
that at some stage it would be necessary to ‘recognize their existence as independent 
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states’, the Duke was ‘convinced that in a view to our own internal situation, to our 
relations with foreign powers, to our former and to our existing relations with Spain, 
considering the mode in which the contest with these states has been, and to our honour 
and good name, the longer the establishment of such relations is delayed the better’. 
In Wellington’s mind there was nothing in the situation in late 1824 that differed 
enough to make any change to the policy agreed in July to only recognise Buenos 
Aires by commercial treaty. He urged Lord Liverpool to ‘ascertain the real opinions 
of your colleagues and that of the public’ before pledging the government in the King’s 
Speech: ‘Excepting one, I believe the former are either disinclined to stir farther in the 
question, or are indifferent about the matter. All that they wish for is that the peace 
should be uninterrupted’. He was also sceptical about the public’s wish for forward 
moves to be made in the question. Wellington was very critical of the Government’s 
course on this question. He asked the Prime Minister: ‘has it never occurred to you 
that we lost the best fruits of the late war by our connivance at the private wars of the 
King’s subjects in those countries?’ Furthermore, ‘the state in which we find ourselves 
in Europe at present is to be attributed in a great degree to our conduct in this very 
question?’ Wellington was being disingenuous with this line of questioning. While he 
did believe sincerely that the Government was going too far, he had supported earlier 
moves towards recognition and was not so blind to the reality of the situation in 
Spanish America as to believe that what had happened there could have been stopped 
or reversed. Nevertheless, he did view this matter seriously. He said to Liverpool how 
he: 
came into the government to support yourself and the principles in which you 
had been acting, and for which we had struggled in the field for such length of 
time. I should wish to go on as I have done, and nothing makes me so unhappy 
as to differ in opinion with you. But as you know, I am not inclined to carry 
these differences farther that is necessary, and I have and shall invariably 
advise His Majesty to follow the advice of his cabinet. 
But I can easily conceive that it must be equally irksome to you to have 
a colleague whose opinion upon any subject is so decidedly different from 
yours, and I can only assure you that I am ready whenever you wish it to ask 
the King's leave to retire from his service.186 
                                                 
186 Wellington to Liverpool, 7 Dec. 1824, Wellington Mss., WP1/808/5 (also in WND, vol. II, 
pp. 364-6).  
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Despite this threat of resignation, Liverpool did not back down. He assured 
Wellington ‘that nothing could give me more sincere pain, privately or publickly, than 
your separation from any cause from the government’. Nevertheless, he told the Duke 
that ‘I can most truly say that my opinion has not been hastily formed, and that I 
conscientiously convinced that if we allow these new states to consolidate their system 
and their policy with the United States of America, it will, in a very few years, prove 
fatal to our greatness if not endanger our safety’.187 Wellington did not follow through 
with his threat after receiving the letter. Mrs Arbuthnot wrote in her journal that while 
the Duke thought British policy towards Spanish America had ‘been impolitic in the 
extreme from the beginning’ and had been ‘doing all we can to raise up powerful rivals 
[…] Now, however, his anxious desire is that the steps we may be obliged to take 
sh[oul]d be such as not to embroil us with the European powers, & he thinks the 
Commercial Treaty proposed the best course that can be adopted’.188  
Nevertheless, the Duke conceded the point and even facilitated the acceptance 
of the measure by the King.189 The concession of the extension of negotiations for 
commercial treaties in December 1824, for all intents and purposes settled the question 
of Spanish America.190 Backing down on the matter of recognition was eased by a 
minor victory for Wellington on the question of the French occupation in Spain, 
though even this was achieved acrimoniously – Mrs Arbuthnot writing how she had 
‘never seen the Duke so much annoyed upon any subject’ (she seemed to have been 
in a constant state of surprise at Wellington’s anger during these years). Tellingly 
though, and in a description recognisable to any student of former generals in civilian 
life, she wrote how ‘tho[ugh] war is his trade, he is always the advocate of peace & 
says he cannot think without horror of all the miseries of war being inflicted upon 
                                                 
187 Liverpool to Wellington, 8 Dec. 1824, Wellington Mss., WP1/807/6 (also in WND, vol. II, 
p. 366).  
188 16 Dec. 1824, Journal of Mrs Arbuthnot, vol. I, p. 366. 
189 Muir, Wellington, vol. II, p. 219-20. After their meeting the King wrote how he ‘would not 
be able to manage without the Duke to confide in’. George IV to Wellington, 17 Dec. 1824, Wellington 
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Europe again because one man has a bad temper, for there is not a pretence at a national 
interest in the whole business’.191 
The arguments and disputes of these years would leave a bitter mark on all 
involved. Certainly, the conduct of foreign policy in the cabinet seemed more like that 
of enemies than colleagues. Despite some setbacks and delays, often the result of 
Wellington’s opposition, Canning emerged the victor in all the important questions – 
in the process completely changing the style, if not the objectives, of British 
diplomacy. Its tone, much to the Duke’s chagrin, could not have been much more 
different than that of only a few short years previously. At the same time, Wellington 
emerged as a keen critic of the Foreign Secretary and the nexus of an internal 
opposition to him – one that at this stage included the King.  
Shortly before joining the cabinet for the first time in 1819, Wellington had 
been asked by the Tsar to sit in judgement of the question of Spanish America. Then 
at the height of his European influence, with a friend and ally as Foreign Secretary, 
the Duke exerted unprecedented sway over the affairs of the continent. By December 
1824, having faced defeat at the hands of a new Foreign Secretary, Wellington was in 
a very different position. His impact on Britain’s foreign policy was as great as ever, 
but it was not in a constructive manner. Instead he opposed, delayed and complained 
about its conduct. Wed to his own brand of diplomacy, which has been characterised 
above as pragmatic internationalist legitimism, Wellington proved inflexible to the 
more parliamentary slant of Canning’s foreign policy. These tensions would continue 
to haunt both during their remaining time in office together. But as the issues of the 
New World receded, and the Eastern Question instead took over a new prominence, 
these relationships and the Duke’s power in Cabinet would shift and change, 
eventually embarking both Canning and Wellington on their own courses to Downing 
Street and the premiership. 
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138 
 
Wellington and the Near 
East I: 
St. Petersburg to 
Downing Street, 1826 –1828 
 
The myriad of questions in western and central Europe had been the overriding 
issues for the Great Powers during the first ten years after Vienna. Wellington’s career 
up to this point had been intimately linked with the development of British diplomacy 
in these areas. However, over the latter years of the 1820s problems in the Near East 
would come to dominate the foreign policy of Europe, and the Duke would play a 
central role in how they developed. Few diplomatic issues of the nineteenth century 
posed a more dangerous minefield for Britain’s government than the Eastern Question 
at this time. It first erupted in 1821 when the Greeks first rose up in revolt against their 
Ottoman suzerains and it had been a live issue from then onwards. For conservatives 
across Europe this raised difficult questions, none more so than in St Petersburg, as 
the desire to crush revolution in all its forms clashed with religious and cultural 
sympathy for the Christian subjects against their Turkish overlords. This manifested 
itself even in Britain. Lord Aberdeen initially contributed to the appeal of fellow 
classicist Dr John Lemprière for subscriptions to aid the Greek cause. He had to be 
dissuaded by the Colonial Secretary, Lord Bathurst, because of the trouble that it might 
bring for the government, not to mention the atrocities the rebels themselves were 
committing.1 At the same time, Russia remained on the verge of war with the Porte, 
thanks not only to Greece, but also because of simmering resentments and 
complications following the 1812 Treaty of Bucharest. To cloud matters further, 
France was making efforts to regain her previous position in the Levant. This chapter 
will chart Wellington’s involvement in the Eastern Question, from his mission to St 
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Petersburg in 1826 through to his appointment as Prime Minister in early 1828 and the 
concomitant shift of this matter from the private diplomatic sphere to the public 
political one. 
During this period the Eastern Question meant the ramifications of the Greek 
Revolt and the Russo-Turkish War which eventually emerged from it. The term 
‘Greek’ did not denote a specific territory, but instead Greeks tended to associate 
themselves primarily with the Orthodox faith, and were found all over the Ottoman 
Empire, both in Europe and Asia Minor, and played an important role in the 
functioning of the Empire itself.2 Erupting in March 1821, the rebellion actually began 
in the Danubian Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, rather than in what would 
be considered Greece itself, by the crossing of the Pruth by 3,000 men commanded by 
Alexander Ypsilantis. By the summer, his force had been crushed but once the 
rebellion began it sparked a further revolt in the Morea peninsula, the modern 
Peloponnese. Though the Turks reversed some of the rebels’ initial successes, this 
revolt proved much more enduring. The Sultan was unable to crush it, much to the 
disappointment of those such as Metternich who realised the seeds for future trouble 
lay in the dissolution of Ottoman rule in Europe. In 1824, the powerful Pasha of Egypt, 
Mehemet Ali was called in to aid the Sultan and by April 1825 the revolt in Crete had 
been suppressed and Egyptian forces were landing in the Morea.3 
Meanwhile, for a number of years the Powers had attempted to restore peace 
to no avail. Russia was unique amongst the other Great Powers of Europe as the Tsar 
had substantial grievances of his own against the Porte, due to disagreements coming 
out of the Treaty of Bucharest. The Greek Revolt added to these complications. The 
rapid growth of the port of Odessa as an exporter of agricultural produce from the 
South of Russia depended largely on Greek merchants as the carriers, something the 
Porte was eager to end. To counter it, the Sultan exercised his right to seize any goods 
in ships within the Straits to feed Constantinople, a course which angered all the 
Powers, not just Russia. The first conference attempted by Tsar Alexander I to reach 
a concerted policy on Greece proved abortive, and a second, despite lasting more than 
                                                 
2 In 1829 Metternich pointed out the inconvenience of the word ‘Greek’ due to it being used 
indiscriminately and interchangeably for a territory, a race, a language and a religion: C.W. Crawley, 
The Question of Greek Independence: A Study of British Policy in the Near East, 1821-1833 (New 
York, 1930), footnote, p.62. 
3 Jarrett, Congress of Vienna and its Legacy, pp. 285-308. 
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two meetings this time, also came to nothing as Britain held herself aloof. Britain was 
far from uninterested in the affairs of the Near East, however, and kept an anxious eye 
on developments. The death of the Tsar in late 1825 offered the prospect of new 
arrangements and policies on the question of Greece, a prospect Canning was keen to 
seize. He dispatched the Duke of Wellington to St Petersburg to reach an accord with 
the new Tsar Nicholas I, setting in motion a new stage in both European diplomacy 
and the Duke’s career. 
* 
After four years of war, little progress had been made towards a peaceful 
settlement, and there was concern about the potential repercussions. In November 
1825, Wellington informed Mrs Arbuthnot that ‘the Foreign Office are rather alarmed 
at the position of the Russian armies on the frontiers of Turkey, & are rather afraid 
that the Emperor has warlike views in that quarter & is seriously mediating the project 
which has so long been assigned to him of conquering Constantinople.’ Mrs Arbuthnot 
went on to record that,  
The Duke says the great difficulty in the question is the odious nature of the 
Turkish Gov[ernmen]t. No power can wish to support them, while certainly 
they will not accept assistance from any power who will not guarantee their 
existence, while on the other hand Europe cannot sit quietly by & see the 
Emperor Alexander make such an immense addition to his power. The Duke 
advised Mr. Canning to concert all his measures with Austria & France & it 
was quite necessary we sh[oul]d co-operate with our allies on so important a 
point.4 
It was not the threat that Russia provided to India or British imperial 
possessions that concerned Wellington and the Foreign Office at this stage, but the 
threat to Europe.  
George Canning had no intention of concerting with Austria or France, 
however. Instead, he had been laying the groundwork for a closer accord with Russia. 
Alexander had grown frustrated with the policy of cooperation with Austria, which 
had achieved nothing in the Greek question. Indeed, Metternich, during a trip to Paris, 
even boasted of his influence over the Tsar and how he used it to prevent Russia from 
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acting against the Ottoman Empire.5 This was the final straw for Alexander and 
marked the end of the Austro-Russian accord that had had such important 
consequences in Europe over previous years. As Palmer has stated, ‘[t]he Alliance, if 
not dead, was certainly buried’.6 Countess Dorothea Lieven, who had lost nothing of 
her political acuity, used the opportunity of her first visit back to Russia in thirteen 
years to help precipitate a minor diplomatic revolution. Instead of being suspected for 
her well known relationship with Metternich, she instead denounced Austrian policy 
to the Tsar. Furthermore, the Countess reassured him that Canning was not a ‘Jacobin’, 
despite previously describing him as such herself.7  
The effect of her meeting was momentous. Alexander had been struck by her 
statesman-like appreciation of affairs. Meeting Nesselrode shortly after, the Tsar told 
him of his frustration with the current state of relations with Austria and the other 
continental powers: ‘Compare my conduct to theirs.  Everyone has intrigued in 
Greece. I alone have remained pure’. Impressed by Lieven’s representation of Canning 
and the possibility of cooperation with Britain, Alexander went on to tell his foreign 
minister: ‘If they grasp hands [with us] we are sure of controlling events and of 
establishing in the East an order of things conformable to the interest of Europe and 
to the laws of religion and humanity’. Countess Lieven was to be the ‘foundation’ on 
which this policy was to be based, and would act as ‘a living despatch’ for the Tsar. 8 
Given the previous tension between the two powers over Britain’s aloof stance over 
the conferences, Russia could not make the first move. Nevertheless, the Countess was 
to make it clear to Canning that, should he make an advance, it would not be rebuffed.9  
Rumours abounded that Alexander planned war against the Ottomans in the 
spring of 1826, accurately as it turned out. This was an opportunity too good to pass 
up for Canning to gain a measure of influence over Russia.10 But, after setting out to 
                                                 
5 J. Charmley, The Princess and the Politicians: Sex, Intrigue and Diplomacy in Regency 
England (London, 2005), p. 123; see also 15 March 1828, Journal of Mrs Arbuthnot, vol. II, pp. 168-
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6 A. Palmer, Metternich (London, 1972), p. 230. 
7 Charmley, Princess and the Politicians, pp. 126-7. 
8 Temperley, Foreign Policy of Canning, pp. 346-7. 
9 Temperley, Foreign Policy of Canning, pp. 344-51; Charmley, Princess and the Politicians, 
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10 See, for example, Planta to Wellington, 21 Jan 1826, enclosing a report to George Canning 
by Francis D’Arcy Bacon on the preparations of the Russian Army for war against the Ottomans. 
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join his army, the Tsar died on 1st December 1825, news of which reached London 
seventeen days later. Some suspected that he had been assassinated, as his father, Paul, 
had been. Others thought that he was still alive but had been overcome by religious 
fervour and had gone into a monastery. No matter what the truth of the matter was, the 
Tsar’s death ‘echoed through Europe like a thunderclap’.11 In Russia the event was 
followed by a brief, but bloody, uprising of liberal army officers and a succession 
struggle. Eventually, Alexander’s youngest brother, Nicholas, secured himself on the 
throne but the ‘Decembrist’ revolt left a deep impression on the course of his reign.12 
Much still remained uncertain. Nicholas pledged that he would follow the 
policy that his brother had been following. Would that mean that the young Tsar would 
also march into the Ottoman Empire as soon as the weather allowed? With discussions 
having only just begun over a Russo-British accord over Greece, a pledge of following 
Alexander still left a great deal uncertain. This was further exacerbated by an 
indiscretion of the British ambassador to St. Petersburg, Viscount Strangford, that 
brought forth a stinging rebuke from Canning.13 It was in these circumstances that the 
Duke of Wellington was chosen to attend Alexander’s funeral on behalf of the King. 
In reality his mission was to reach an agreement over Greece. It also had the advantage 
of removing the Duke from London, and thus securing Canning at least a temporary 
ascendancy over the cabinet. It was an absence that Wellington’s friends lamented. 
Harriet Arbuthnot wrote in her diary how she could not ‘see him set out on such a 
journey at this bad season without the utmost anxiety & some doubts as to our policy 
in parting with such a jewel. He is so important at home! […] [As] the only person 
that can curb Mr. Canning & Mr. Huskisson in their liberal policy, his loss will be 
most severely felt.’14 Even on Greece, Canning was pleased with what the choice of 
the Duke would mean. Countess Lieven recorded that as the Duke ‘would have to 
make an understanding on the question of Greece, [Canning] would [thus] 
compromise him and dupe him at the same time – a double pleasure’.15 
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As the Duke’s instructions were being drawn up prior to his departure, some 
of the problems that would cause a great deal of difficulty in the future were already 
apparent. One point on which Wellington and Canning agreed was a dislike of the use 
of conferences, preferring instead the direct intervention of Britain at the Porte to settle 
the problem.16 However, the Duke was aware of the difficulties this mode of 
proceeding would cause with France and Austria and expected ‘great jealousy […] of 
our proceedings’ from the former. Indeed, he thought that they would ‘throw every 
difficulty in [Canning’s] way short of hostilities’.17 Another issue with which 
Wellington would have to contend was Russia’s separate quarrels with the Porte that 
threatened war on their own. Arising out of the 1812 Treaty of Bucharest, Russia was 
unhappy at the non-fulfilment of a number of clauses by the Ottomans, conveniently 
skirting their own transgressions in not evacuating areas on the eastern shore of the 
Black Sea. Wellington was nevertheless to deny any right for war between the two 
entirely: ‘The Emperor of Russia must be informed that we don’t think he has any just 
ground of war with the Turks […] and we must understand from him distinctly that 
His Imperial Majesty entertains no intention of commencing a war of conquest upon 
the Turks, in case our efforts to settle the question at Constantinople should fail’. The 
only ground of war that could be admitted was that of the rumoured plan of Ibrahim, 
adopted son of Mehemet Ali and commander of the Egyptian troops in Greece, to 
deport the Greek population to Egypt as slaves and replace them with Egyptians. This 
cause would ‘afford to every Christian power ground for complaint and even for 
measures to prevent the execution of the designs supposed to be entertained’.18 The 
questions of the appropriate role for the other powers in these matters, and that of the 
separate quarrels of Russia would be pregnant with future problems for the Duke and 
for British diplomacy.  
Despite these potential difficulties, the Duke’s instructions were finalised and 
he set out before dawn on 8th February 1826 on his long journey to St Petersburg.19 
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With Tsar Nicholas pledging to ‘look to the employment of his own resources’ if his 
allies do not ‘come effectually to his aid’, Wellington had an important mission before 
him. Canning instructed him that foremost, ‘our object is, if possible, to prevent Russia 
from going to war’. It was understandable that a young monarch with 800,000 men at 
his disposal, with the aftershocks of a mutiny still reverberating, might want to use 
them outside Russia’s borders. However, ‘every effort must […] be made to induce 
the Emperor of Russia to forego, or at least, to suspend an appeal to arms’. Mediation 
between Russia and the Porte, and the Porte and the Greeks, seemed to the Foreign 
Secretary the best method of achieving this. Stratford Canning had already been 
dispatched to Constantinople with instructions on this head, and it was hoped that they 
would hear of his success soon. If not, a joint mediation of Russia and Britain between 
the Porte and the Greeks would be proposed. Neither should allow the Russians any 
right of war against the Ottomans, however. In Canning’s view, there certainly were 
not sufficient grounds to warrant ‘the commencement of a war, which when once 
kindled, must, too probably spread throughout Europe’. The fears and legacies of the 
French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars were alive and well. The Duke was to 
dodge the question of renewing the conferences on the Greek question. Canning told 
him ‘there can perhaps be no more convenient mode of avoiding it than by multiplying 
the conditions which alone would induce us to attend to it’.  
There still remained the prospect of a Russo-Turkish war regardless of the 
absence of just cause. In this circumstance there had to be either a combination with 
Austria and France, though both powers were liable to make a deal with Russia about 
a partition of the spoils leaving Britain alone to defend the Porte, or it would be left to 
Britain’s ‘single admonition to Russia that we would not see the Turkish power 
destroyed’. Either way, Canning doubted the possibility of getting the funds from 
Parliament to support the Ottomans militarily. He drew on the example of the Ochakov 
Affair:  
Is it to be expected that the simple question of balance of power, which was 
insufficient in the year 1791 to induce the Parliament to check the progress of 
Russia towards Turkey, before the name of Greece had been heard in recent 
modern history, would now reconcile Parliament to an active alliance with 




Given this, Canning told Wellington that it would be best to ‘take some active 
measures, which, by restraining the excesses of the existing war between the Ottoman 
Porte and the Greeks’, might thereby bring about conditions which could change ‘the 
warlike counsels of the Emperor of Russia’. This referred to the supposed plans of 
Ibrahim to repopulate Greece. Under these circumstances the Duke should inform 
Russia of the possibility of British intervention and ‘by that confidence, it is possible 
that [he] may purchase a suspension, at least, of the warlike designs of the new 
Emperor against the Porte’ and that intervention ‘may probably save the Porte herself 
from destruction and Europe from a general war’.20 
Under these orders, the Duke made his way to the Russian capital. Stopping at 
Berlin on the way, Wellington wrote to Bathurst in not very sanguine terms. 
‘Excepting in the way of conciliation which is certainly very desirable at the 
commencement of a new reign, I don’t expect to do much good in my mission’. He 
believed that once he got into ‘close quarters with the Russian ministers they must see 
very clearly that I have nearly no means of negotiation in my hands. If they are 
desirous of peace and of keeping things as they are, my instructions may enable me to 
get them and keep them in our hands. But if war is on any account desirable to them I 
don’t think I can prevent it.’ Nevertheless, it was still ‘the most important [question] 
that we have had under our consideration since the year 1815’. Wellington, like many 
of his contemporaries, saw the signs of a great conspiracy in the Greek rebellion. It 
would have happened eventually, but ‘was accelerated by those who occasioned the 
Neapolitan, and particularly the Piedmontese revolutions’ as well as the ‘Decembrists’ 
in Russia. Their motivation for speeding up this process was to break the Holy Alliance 
and bring about war, a war which the Duke had no doubt would turn into a ‘general’ 
one and which ‘sooner or later we shall be forced to enter as principals, if our essential 
interests or our honour do not oblige us to commence it’. By comparison, he thought 
‘the question of Greek and Turk is trifling’. Indeed, they were acting to potentially set 
up a rival naval power in the Mediterranean. 
Aware of the Parliamentary difficulties of the situation, he conceded to 
Bathurst that ‘I don’t think our interference to save the Turkish government from the 
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hostility of the Emperor of Russia would be tolerated’ and nor would the money for 
even a single campaign be forthcoming, ‘even though it was certain that our 
interference must be successful’. Equally it would be impossible to help the Ottomans 
against the Greeks and the Duke did not see interference in favour of the latter as an 
alternative either. With no prospect of victory by one side or the other, the only answer 
was compromise: ‘That to which we must look, then, is an arrangement short of 
independence’. 
Wellington ended this letter with an evaluation of the limits of conference 
diplomacy, and in doing so demonstrated a considerable degree of convergence with 
Canning on the matter. The Duke wrote: ‘I know nothing for which the Conference is 
so little calculated as a mediation, whether to prevent war or to make peace’. He had 
personal experience with this from his time as Commander-in-Chief in France. For 
Wellington:  
The Ministers of the five Powers would go into this Conference, not only not 
with the same or similar views, but with views quite inconsistent with each 
other; and the result must be failure. Even if the British government, the only 
one with any real influence upon any part of the question, could bring the 
others and the contending parties to a reasonable decision, it would be in the 
power of any one of the parties to the Conference to defeat the whole 
arrangement. 
Instead of a conference, ‘in cases in which we alone possess influence’ Britain 
should not stay aloof and not have other powers ‘direct the mode in which that 
influence shall be exercised; and perhaps after all to have the whole arrangement 
defeated’. Ever pragmatic, he acknowledged that a conference could gain time, but to 
participate could endanger Britain’s influence with the Greeks and Ottomans, and ‘at 
all events I would not lose the opportunity which the existing circumstances certainly 
afford of trying seriously what we can do alone to settle this question’.21 
If Wellington was not too hopeful of ultimate success, some did take heart 
from his mission. Henry Wellesley reported to his brother that Prince Metternich has 
such ‘confidence in you, that he is quite prepared to enlist himself under your banners, 
and to leave the interests of Europe in your hands, satisfied that they cannot be placed 
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in better’.22 Bathurst, like Metternich, trusted in Wellington to do the job, but lamented 
the limited options available to him. However, Bathurst, also like Metternich, still 
preferred to proceed in concert with the other European powers. The colonial secretary 
believed that to mediate the Greek conflict unilaterally would provoke the jealousy of 
Austria and France who would seek to block Britain at the Porte.23 It remained to be 
discovered what reception the offer of British mediation would be met with when 
Stratford Canning delivered it. 
Wellington arrived in the Russian capital on 2nd March 1826, and discussions 
began later that day that would eventually culminate in the Protocol of St Petersburg, 
signed on the 4th April.24 Scholarly opinion on the Duke’s mission has been mostly 
critical. Temperley first advanced what has become the stock argument. Wellington 
‘went off on the false trail’, was ‘alarmed and bewildered’ and was ‘induced to sign’ 
the Protocol on Greece.25 For Charmley ‘[t]he Duke and nuance consorted badly 
together, and it was Count Lieven who helped to bring matters to what was, from the 
Russian point of view, a successful conclusion’.26 Cunningham concludes that ‘how 
else does one explain [the Duke’s] signature on a document which took up the subject 
of Greece a mere week after that subject had, according to Wellington, been interred’ 
but that he ‘was the dupe of Nesselrode and Count Lieven’.27 This argument has not 
been challenged thanks in part because of the lack of attention given to this episode 
by Wellington’s biographers. Longford writes of the mission: ‘straightforwardness 
was made to look crude when the Duke had to carry out subtle schemes – a blunt 
instrument’.28 These opinions have been primarily based on the far from neutral source 
of Countess Lieven: 
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He [Canning] relied on us and the vanity of the Duke of Wellington to get the 
Greek question pushed on at St Petersburg, but always within prudent limits. 
My husband, summoned by the Emperor, arrived at St Petersburg a few days 
after the Duke. By us the question was presented to the Duke in a new light. It 
was not the revolution that we patronised; we wished to establish in Greece the 
conservation of order; for it was proved that the Turks were powerless, that we 
desired a regular state of things, a hierarchical discipline, all of which sounded 
well in the ears of the Duke of Wellington. He entered full sail into this order 
of ideas, and on 4th April he signed at St Petersburg with Count de Nesselrode 
and M. de Lieven the first protocol which prepared for the emancipation of 
Greece.29 
Wellington’s mission is certainly not completely free from just censure. He 
was not the subtlest of diplomats, but then he had not risen to the place he had in 
European diplomacy on the back of cunning and litheness in negotiating. He was a 
European figure because of his straightforward and business-like manner in dealing 
with questions. His status as a person somewhat transcending borders does open him 
up to a more specific criticism in his conduct at St Petersburg, however. Having been 
showered with honours from all over Europe, and, indeed, during this trip he had 
Russian and Prussian regiments conferred on him, he saw it as part of his duty to offer 
frank advice to anyone who asked it of him.30 As a result Wellington took it upon 
himself to offer not only detailed comments, but also amendments to the Russian 
ultimatum destined for the Porte.31 Even Lord Bathurst thought this was a questionable 
action: ‘I confess to you that I am not quite sure of the prudence of amending the 
Emperor’s Note, for, after all, it is not the measure which you would have advised, 
even in the amended shape; and, were he to accept your amendments, he will quote 
you as his authority’. He did, however, admit that Wellington would ‘have gained a 
good deal’ if he had stopped the sending of the original draft.32 This episode serves as 
an example of how the Duke was not always the best British representative, and could 
potentially compromise British foreign policy thanks to his transcending of national 
roles. A further criticism can be levelled at the Duke’s being taken in by the Tsar’s 
professions of a lack of interest in the Greek question, and that his sole interest was in 
wanting to stand on his own rights against the Porte. More cynicism on the Duke’s 
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part here would have certainly been of use, but he did not accept the assertions at face 
value, with the same told to the French and Austrians.33 
As for the central charge, that Wellington was ‘duped’ into signing the 
Protocol, allowing himself to go much further than he wished, and securing a Russian 
victory, there are fewer grounds for criticism. This argument has been able to flourish 
because scholars have hardly concerned themselves with the Duke’s foreign policy. 
Although a central figure in all these events, there has been little comment on what his 
thoughts actually were, and he has often been written off as simply a reactionary. 
Wellington had made clear to Bathurst when on the road to St Petersburg, he was 
certainly willing to see changes in Greece: ‘that to which we must look, then, is an 
arrangement short of independence’. This view is based not only on the military 
stalemate in the conflict but also on the notion that a truly independent Greece would 
challenge Britain’s naval situation in the Mediterranean, where ‘we are […] masters 
of its navigation’.34 Given his fear of the wider implications of a Russo-Turkish war, 
which he expected to provoke insurrection in the latter’s European provinces before 
becoming a general war, he sought to follow his instructions and do his best to prevent 
that war in the first place, and if that was not possible, to tie Russia’s hands as far as 
Greece was concerned. 35 The Protocol succeeded in doing this. Article III set out that 
the Protocol would be the basis of any agreement concerning Greece, ‘whether in 
concert or separately’. With a very real prospect of war, and with no word from 
Constantinople about the state of the British mediation attempt there, this was a 
sensible enough addition to secure that any eventual settlement of Greece would be 
conformable to British interests on the question. Russia could not take the opportunity 
of war to erect a puppet state under her influence, thus challenging British naval 
supremacy. It likewise tied Canning’s hands on the question, meaning he could not 
push further than Greek autonomy on this question, and was pledged to secrecy until 
Count Lieven’s return to England.36  
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By thus forcing Russia to follow this agreement in case of war, the Protocol 
went some way to acknowledge officially that Russia had the right to go to war on 
separate issues. But as Wellington argued to Canning on his return to London:  
Our object is to be on friendly terms with the Emperor of Russia, but surely it 
is inconsistent to have such an object in view, and not to do the Emperor justice 
where the case is clearly in his favour. The execution of the Treaty of 
Bucharest, or of any article of that treaty, is quite a distinct question with which 
the negotiations now pending at Constantinople have nothing to do.37 
In an earlier memorandum, the Duke had made clear his thoughts on the matter 
of Russia’s rights in general, and in turn his thoughts on international law and conduct. 
For him, ‘A clear distinction ought to be drawn between rights and pretensions, 
however well founded the latter may be in consequence of the circumstances which 
have occurred. Rights are founded upon prescription, the laws of nations, treaties, 
engagements, etc.; pretensions are created by circumstances.’ Russia had certain rights 
under the Treaty of Bucharest but some of her claims in her ultimatum were mere 
pretensions, such as the demand for plenipotentiaries to meet on the border: ‘The rights 
of any power may be demanded sine qua non, in a discussion between two powers 
standing upon a political quality. A pretention, however justifiable, cannot without the 
semblance at least of an equivalent’.38 For the Duke, rights such as these had to be 
upheld despite the potential implications for British foreign policy. 
Despite the criticisms of Wellington’s role in the Protocol, Temperley in 
particular still proclaimed its importance as a success for Canning’s policy. While 
Wellington was ‘cajoled’ into signing it, ‘without the Protocol it is reasonably certain 
that Russia would have maintained a hostile attitude’ on subjects across Europe and 
the New World. ‘With it Canning was enabled to enjoy a great triumph’.39 Instead of 
spending ‘much time later in trying to explain it away’, Wellington was not displeased 
with the outcome of the negotiation.40 What he took objection to was the interpretation 
Canning put on it, and the latter’s moves to bring France into the arrangement without 
the other Great Powers. Doing so turned it into a tripartite treaty, no longer leaving 
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Britain with the free hand in the eventual case of a Russo-Turkish war that Wellington 
thought so important. 
In part due to pressure from Britain and the other powers, the Sultan abandoned 
his intransigent line, and agreed to send plenipotentiaries to reach a deal with Russia. 
The Convention of Akkerman, signed in October 1826, eased the prospect of an 
immediate war and calmed fears of Russian unilateral action. With the situation in 
Portugal taking increasing precedence as the year went on, affairs in the Near East 
took on a less urgent hue. Negotiations continued in the background to invite the other 
powers to accede to the Protocol. Wellington urged on Canning the importance of 
maintaining the principle of the Protocol ‘which is not to render Greece an independent 
state but to reconcile Turks and Greeks permanently by regulating the form and 
conditions of the dependency of the Greeks upon the Porte’. Should joint mediation 
fail by Russia and Britain then: ‘the two courts should endeavour to prevail upon the 
allied courts to give them a more active support even to the length of threatening to 
withdraw their ambassadors and ministers from the Porte unless the Porte should 
consent to a reasonable settlement’. Only then the ‘threat of […] abandonment of the 
Porte by the powers of Christendom’ should be used to force them into a settlement. 
Recognising Greek independence in the current state of the conflict ‘would be 
ridiculous unless we should go to war to protect the independence which we should 
have [created crossed out] recognized’.41 However, the powers of Christendom 
declined to accede. Austria refused to support a precedent of legitimising the division 
of rebellious subjects from their lawful overlords, and Prussia was unwilling to give 
her support to it while Austria withheld hers. The only power willing to reach an 
agreement was France, on the condition that the Protocol would be made into a formal 
treaty.  
Before this could be achieved – if it could have been given reservations in 
Cabinet, including Wellington’s – Lord Liverpool was taken seriously ill and his 
fragile Tory government crumbled. George Canning succeeded Liverpool to the 
premiership, Wellington, Bathurst, Peel and other leading ‘Protestant’ Tories were 
jettisoned and a number of Whigs joined the government. The result was the most 
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fluid and unstable political combination since the collapse of Pitt’s first administration 
twenty-six years before.42 Canning’s now undisputed primacy over foreign policy in 
Cabinet meant that he could conclude the Treaty of London between Britain, France 
and Russia in July 1827. Its terms were largely the same as the Protocol, but it included 
the important addition that if either the Porte or the Greeks should refuse an armistice, 
the three powers should ‘exert all the means which circumstances may suggest to their 
prudence, for the purpose of obtaining the immediate effects of the Armistice’, to 
which end the allied naval fleets would cooperate to blockade supplies, but all 
‘without, however, taking any part in the hostilities between the Two Contending 
Parties’.43  
The addition of France and the military cooperation between the three allies 
utterly changed the dynamics of the question in the Near East. In line with all previous 
statements by the Ottomans, the Sultan rejected an armistice with the Greek rebels, 
and, inevitably, it proved impossible to impose one while avoiding actual hostilities. 
The consequence was that the combined Anglo-French-Russian squadrons destroyed 
the Egyptian and Turkish fleet at the battle of Navarino on the 20th October 1827. 
Canning did not live to see this event, however, having died in August following a 
short illness. A number of historians have been critical of Wellington and his 
government for having ‘squandered the position regarding the Greek question left 
them by Canning in 1827’.44 M.S. Anderson criticises them as having pursued ‘a 
policy of drift and temporary abdication of the position in the Near East which Britain 
had acquired under Canning’.45 Temperley said that Wellington’s and Aberdeen’s 
policy ‘was temporising and feeble’, that they ‘could not conceive that support of 
Russia might really be a benefit to Turkey’, and that ‘the policy of acting with Russia, 
in order to restrain her from attacking Turkey, was one which none but a great 
statesman could conceive or execute’ with the implication that Canning was a great 
statesman.46 All of these criticisms fail to appreciate that it was not Wellington’s 
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government that actually succeeded Canning’s. Nor do they account for the extent that 
Canning’s Treaty had already surrendered the initiative and control from Britain by 
the introduction of France, or that the complex domestic situation acted as a further 
constraint. 
 When Canning died, it was not Wellington who was summoned by the King 
to form an administration, but Frederick Robinson, 1st Viscount Goderich. The former 
friend and ally of Canning continued his predecessor’s coalition but he lacked any of 
the leadership skills the former had possessed. Immediately, it was plunged into chaos 
over the appointment of John Charles Herries as Chancellor of the Exchequer, and it 
never properly stabilised after that. The Battle of Navarino brought the divisions 
within it into stark view. Mrs Arbuthnot wrote in her diary in early December 1827 
that, 
when the news of Navarino first came, the Whigs thought it was an immense 
triumph; L[or]d Goderich did not know what to think. Now, however, they are 
in the greatest dilemma; they don’t know how to back out of it, sometimes 
meaning to sacrifice Codrington, sometimes willing to go all lengths with 
Russia. He was positive there must be a break up, and that the Duke would be 
sent for to form a Gov[ernmen]t.47 
 
The situation in Lord Goderich’s Cabinet resembled that of the ‘seven parties’ in 
Disraeli's administration during the Great Eastern Crisis fifty years later. Views ranged 
from war at all cost to peace at any price. According to Mrs Arbuthnot’s sources: ‘the 
Whigs and Huskisson were disposed to let Russia occupy Moldavia & Wallachia (for 
which, by the way, they have not the slightest pretence); that Lord Dudley was the 
same, being governed by the Lievens; but that he & Tierney had divided the Cabinet 
against them, tho’ opposed by Lord Lansdowne.’48 Just under two weeks later she 
noted: ‘With regard to politics we have only heard that Lord Goderich, a few days ago, 
declared he w[oul]d resign if we went on with war, and that Mr. Huskisson declared 
he w[oul]d resign if we did not (this is known by every gossip in London); Lord 
Goderich, we are told, as usual gave way, & war we have to have’.49  
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The government’s weakness was further complicated by the advantage King 
George IV took of it. Canning had appointed the Heir Apparent, the Duke of Clarence, 
Lord High Admiral, without a seat in Cabinet. This contrasted with the customary 
practice of having a First Lord of the Admiralty with a seat in the Cabinet. Following 
Navarino, the King and Clarence awarded honours and promotions to the British 
commander at the battle, Sir Edward Codrington, and his sailors without consulting 
the Government. The arch-gossip and diarist Charles Greville recorded in December 
1827 that ‘it has been currently reported that [the Ministers] would willingly have 
censured Codrington, and have thrown the responsibility of the battle from their own 
shoulders upon his, if they had dared, but that they were prevented by the precipitate 
approbation expressed by the King.’ He noted that ‘these things are greatly 
exaggerated, but are not without foundation.’50 
This state of weakness and indecision continued until the government fell in 
early January 1828, two and a half months after Navarino. No decisive action over the 
Greek question had been taken, no steps were made to assert British control and events 
had been allowed to slide further. In November 1827, the Sultan repudiated the 
Convention of Akkerman, and pledged to use the funds meant to compensate Russia 
to oppose the allies. The allied ambassadors had to flee Constantinople for Corfu and 
were forced to use the Dutch minister still in the capital as an intermediary. Temperley 
and others fail to appreciate the extent to which Britain’s ability to influence Russia 
was limited in those circumstances, even if action had been taken immediately, not to 
mention overestimating the extent that British power could have a deciding say.51 
Russia had substantial separate grievances with the Porte that she would not allow 
other states to interfere in, something that often applied to Britain’s dealings with 
Russia over this period.  
* 
Even before the Battle of Navarino, let alone when news of it reached Britain 
on 11 November, Wellington was looking to distance himself from the Treaty of 
London.52 In reply to a letter from the former Russian foreign minister, leading 
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advocate of the Greek cause and the first elected Head of State of Greece, Count 
Ioannis Kapodistrias, Wellington stressed that while the intervention in the affair of 
the Protocol took the form of mediation, that of the Treaty rested on war.53 The Duke 
communicated the contents of both the Count’s and his own letter to Bathurst. The 
latter agreed with the Duke that ‘On reading attentively over the protocol I think it 
quite clear that there is nothing in any of the articles which give it a compulsory 
character. Whether Mr. Canning has succeeded in his dispatches to give it that 
appearance is more than I can say, but I am sure the stipulations are free from it’ and 
that he had further ‘always consider[e]d the protocol more against Russian 
aggrandizement than for Turkish dismemberment.’54 
What is of particular interest is that once news of Navarino had arrived, 
Wellington treated the matter as one of party politics. The longstanding divergence 
with Canning on matters of foreign policy was now forced from the realm of the 
Cabinet to a more public sphere. In his correspondence with Lord Eldon, a fellow 
former ministerial opponent of Canning, Wellington said ‘I quite agree with you 
respecting this melancholy affair of Navarino. As usual the blame is laid upon us and 
principally upon me. But I think we are as far from having any concern in this 
transaction as the moon is from being like a cream cheese!’55 Wellington also 
communicated his correspondence with Kapodistrias to Edward Law, 2nd Baron 
Ellenborough, who noted: ‘The protocol and the treaty seem to have been conceived 
in a very different spirit and to have been calculated to lead to very different 
consequences.’56 The Duke even went as far as to produce a collection of papers for 
the defence of the protocol in comparison to Canning’s Treaty. Bathurst wrote to him 
‘I shall be very glad to see the papers which you mention having collected’, noting 
also his misgiving about ‘the dispatch about this time last year when Mr. Canning first 
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attempted to give your protocol a compulsory character. Have you got that among the 
papers you have collected?’57 A few days later, Bathurst wrote again: 
I have been waiting with much solicitude for the papers which you were good 
enough to promise me respecting your protocol, as I find that this protocol of 
yours is to be the grand point of defence and from the compliance with which 
the supporters of government speak upon the subject I am afraid that Mr. 
Canning has in some of his dispatches, not communicated to his colleagues, 
contriv[e]d to give it an interpretation which it certainly was not intended at 
the time.58 
It is quite clear Bathurst appreciated the importance of the matter as one of 
party, and, in a following letter, he recommended that the former ‘great Greek’, 
George Hamilton-Gordon, 4th Earl of Aberdeen, should ‘be put in possession of the 
case, that he may not state his objections stronger than would be consistent with what 
those with whom I know he is most anxious to act would be able to go.’59 Wellington 
also sent his ‘collection of papers’ to Robert Dundas, 2nd Viscount Melville, the former 
First Lord of the Admiralty from 1812 to 1827, who replied, 
If I did not know that the government through their subordinates industriously 
propagating the notion that their treaty of last July and the battle of Navarin 
[sic] were the natural results of the course of policy adopted by the late cabinet, 
and particularly of your negotiation of St. Petersburgh, [sic] I could not have 
believed it possible, after perusing those papers, that any government could 
have ventured on any proposition so monstrous, or on an assertion so 
completely at variance with the truth. 
He further counselled the Duke that he believed that there was a ‘very general 
feeling of indisposition towards [Lord Goderich’s Government]’ in Parliament. 
Melville thought that ‘if that feeling is properly directed and if possible not allowed to 
fly out in captious opposition and absurd cavilling we shall probably do good to the 
country, and we shall keep our friends together.’ Crucially though, he thought that ‘if 
no such system is adopted, I allude again to the House of Commons, we shall do no 
good and our friends will gradually drop off or will keep aloof.’60 The defence of the 
Duke’s diplomacy in negotiating the initial St. Petersburg Protocol, and the 
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corresponding attack on Canning’s and his successors’ subsequent dealings appears to 
have been the central plank of the proposed parliamentary tactics for the coming 
session. Mrs Arbuthnot even noted in late December that Wellington ‘says L[or]d 
Dudley ought to be, & might be, impeached for this Navarino affair’.61 However, a 
few short weeks later, Dudley was the Duke of Wellington’s own Foreign Secretary 
following the collapse of Goderich’s administration, a circumstance which underlined, 
once more, the complex domestic political situation at that time. 
* 
With the collapse of Goderich’s government, Wellington was called upon to 
form his own. He set out to reconstruct as close an approximation to the Liverpool 
Tory coalition as possible but in the end the problems proved insurmountable. 
Wellington’s chief political lieutenant, Robert Peel, insisted on the inclusion of 
Huskisson and his followers to provide him with speaking talent in the House of 
Commons.62 Lord Bathurst warned that ‘though on many accounts Lord Dudley might 
perhaps be somewhat less disinclined to refuse [office than the Whigs Lord 
Lansdowne and Lord Carlisle], the offer could compromise you possibly on the 
Navarino business too much’.63 Even so, Wellington was nevertheless forced to 
accede to Dudley and the other Canningites retaining their places. To make matters 
worse, the Duke had fewer of his friends in the Cabinet than he would have liked. With 
the Canningites occupying some of the most senior positions, and hostile to the 
inclusion of many Ultras, Wellington was forced to leave out men like Lord Eldon, 
and John Fane, 10th Earl of Westmoreland. He even had to offer only a non-Cabinet 
post to his close friend Charles Arbuthnot, husband of Harriet Arbuthnot, an action 
which almost caused a break between the couple and the Duke.64 In these 
circumstances, Wellington found it difficult to get a firm grasp on the diplomatic 
situation, and instead was forced to confine himself to preventing what he saw as the 
full realisation of the Canningite policy – war with the Ottoman Empire. 
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From the very first Cabinet dinner, held on the day the new Ministers received 
their seals, the tensions between the various factions, and policies, were obvious. 
Ellenborough, the new Lord Privy Seal, wrote in his diary of the occasion that ‘the 
courtesy was that of men who had just fought a duel’. On Huskisson’s opening 
discussions on the King’s Speech, he noted wryly: ‘I see their object is to procure an 
approbation of Mr. Canning’s policy’.65 However, no caveat on the continuance of this 
policy had been included in the conditions of Huskisson entering office; these were 
limited to the financial committee considerations discussed above, and the exclusion 
of Herries as Chancellor of the Exchequer. Despite that, within weeks of the 
Government’s formation, there was a significant public debate over continuity with 
Canning’s policies. In early February 1828, Huskisson gave a speech at Liverpool 
following his re-election after having been appointed to office. In it Huskisson stated 
to the electors: 
As for myself, I have no desire to retain [office], except inasmuch as I may still 
be useful to the public, in the promotion of measures which they have stamped 
with their approbation. I say, then, for the security of these I have a guarantee; 
that there are to be followed as far as possible, in the manner in which Mr. 
Canning would have sanctioned and promoted them. (Hear.) I have obtained 
the best guarantee, I repeat, for these, or I should not appear here as a member 
of the Government. (Applause.)66 
The matter of the supposed ‘guarantee’ swiftly became the major talking point. Mrs 
Arbuthnot recorded in her journal on 15 February that ‘no one has talked for the last 
week but of Mr. Huskisson’s ridiculous speech at Liverpool and the consequence’.67  
That consequence was a debate in the House of Lords at the request of Henry 
George Herbert, 2nd Earl of Carnarvon, on the release of additional papers relating to 
orders given to Codrington, as well as some further contextual documents. His speech 
ranged over the principles upon which British foreign policy was conducted, through 
to the details of the arrangement of the new administration. While noting that ‘the 
broad principle of non-interference should [...] be the foundation of all treaties between 
foreign powers’, he argued that it ‘be relaxed, should imperious circumstances demand 
it.’ For him, ‘the principle of the Holy Alliance had been that of interference; but it 
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had been uniformly exerted, not to put down anarchy, its professed object, but to crush 
all attempts at establishing free and liberal institutions. Was that a species of 
interference that ought to be applauded, while an interference with a contrary object 
was to be Condemned?'68 Drawing on historical examples, from the reign of Elizabeth 
I through to the time of Pitt the Younger, he made the case for intervention as a 
traditional tool in Britain’s foreign policy. More especially, though, Carnarvon, 
justified it in the particular case of Greece with reference to balance of power 
principles. He contended that 
he never would admit that Turkey and Greece formed no part of the balance of 
Europe. There was a time when they did not. Russia also formed a great and 
most important part of the balance of Europe. It was a state neighbouring on 
Turkey, powerful from its extent and position. Now, he would ask whether any 
one could have looked without anxiety at the state of the Turkish empire—
could have seen the distracted condition of that country, and not have felt that 
the balance of power in the east of Europe was in danger of being broken from 
hour to hour. Not only had civil war endured for a long period on land, but it 
had been prosecuted at sea with extraordinary vigour. Could noble lords 
believe that such a state of things was not calculated to affect the interests of 
every nation in Europe? Could any one suppose that such a state of things 
would not give rise to violations of neutrality, and occasion a war, not between 
one or two powers, but the greater part of Europe?69 
Interference was then justified as a means of controlling Russian actions. 
Conversely, if Russian diplomacy was willing to cooperate with Britain, it was 
incumbent upon the latter to accept it.70 
Though Carnarvon was not a foreign affairs spokesman of note, his speech 
nevertheless articulated both the fears of Russia and the government’s difficult 
position in respect to the treaty. Canning’s policy and the Treaty of London were 
meant to control and therefore constrain Russia, thus preventing her unilateral 
intervention and preserving the balance of power. But the end results were that the 
treaty had become an instrument for overturning the balance after Navarino. 
Wellington and the non-Canningites were tied to a treaty that had produced very 
undesirable results, but that was still a valuable tool for controlling Russia. The 
Russian ambassador, Prince Lieven, had already informed London that Russia ‘claims 
the right of settling her affairs with Turkey, without intervention of any other Power, 
                                                 
68 Hansard, HL Deb, 11 Feb 1828, vol. 18, c. 265. 
69 Ibid., cc.265-266. 
70 Ibid., c. 267. 
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and attributes it to her own extreme goodness that she has acted with her allies in this 
case’.71 In such circumstances, would it be wise to abandon the Treaty of London, 
without any adequate replacement? Wellington and his Cabinet decided it was not. 
How to reconcile these contrasting viewpoints was brought up in the House of Lords 
debate of 11 February 1828. 
In referring to the Battle of Navarino in the King’s Speech, the Cabinet settled 
on describing it as follows:  
In the course of the measures adopted with a view to carry into effect the object 
of the Treaty, a collision, wholly unexpected by His Majesty, took place in the 
Port of Navarin [sic] between the Fleets of the Contracting Powers and that of 
the Ottoman Porte. Notwithstanding the valour displayed by the Combined 
Fleet, His Majesty deeply laments that this conflict should have occurred with 
the Naval Force of an ancient Ally; but he still entertains a confident hope that 
this untoward event will not be followed by further hostilities, and will not 
impede that amicable adjustment of the existing differences between the Porte 
and the Greeks, to which it is so manifestly their common interest to accede.72 
To describe it as ‘an untoward event’ was contentious, even before the speech 
was delivered. The King preferred to call it ‘unlooked for’ but was prevailed upon 
after some small changes to the sentence and the fact that Huskisson and the other 
members of the previous Government had approved of it. Nevertheless, Peel, now 
Home Secretary and Leader of the House of Commons, ‘thought the word untoward 
would bring us into a scrape’.73 
So it did, when Lord Carnarvon commented on it in the debate on 11 February. 
He argued that it was ‘not unnatural that [the British people] should entertain an 
anxious desire to have the fullest explanation of a case, in which such a strange 
difference existed between the manner in which it was treated by the government of 
France, and the dull phraseology, the "untoward" language applied to it by the present 
administration of this country.’74 Although Wellington and his ministers were 
sceptical of the Treaty and how matters had progressed under the previous two 
administrations, Carnarvon and others looked to the continuance of the Canningites in 
office as reassurance of continuity in policy. Lord Dudley, Carnarvon stated, ‘had been 
                                                 
71 26 Jan. 1828, Ellenborough Diary, vol. I, p. 10. Lieven had been made a Prince in the 
honours after Nicholas I’s coronation. 
72 Hansard, HL Deb, 29 Jan. 1828, vol. 18, cc. 2-3. 
73 26 Jan. 1828, Ellenborough Diary, vol. I, p. 9. 
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lately advanced in a new character, and one in which the country took a deep interest; 
namely, a guarantee for the fulfilment of the treaty. The noble earl was the residuary 
devisee of his departed friend's political principles; he had maintained, both at home 
and abroad, the liberal policy of Mr. Canning’.  
The insinuation in the speech was that there had been a compromise of 
principles on Wellington’s part and a guarantee given to the Canningites that the 
policies of their departed leader would be maintained. Dudley refuted the accusations: 
‘if, indeed, there was so little honour or confidence amongst [the ministers], that it was 
necessary to stipulate for each other's principles, they would be, in his opinion, most 
unfit to act together. No stipulations, therefore, he repeated, had been entered into 
between them.’ Wellington rejected any suggestion that there would be any half-
hearted execution of the Treaty of London. On the contrary, it would be carried ‘into 
full and ample execution, according to its spirit, and letter’. 
On the question of interference in the affairs of other countries, the Prime 
Minister dismissed Carnarvon’s arguments that such policies were a matter of course:   
He did not admit that it was the right of one country to interfere with the 
internal regulation of another in all cases. No doubt the political position of 
countries, in some instances, might justify such interference; but such was not 
the general rule. Non-interference was the rule: interference the exception. 
That was the only true and safe policy. He did not mean to say that the 
interference in the present case was not necessary. He himself had been the 
means of negotiating the act of interference; but that was an exception to the 
conduct of this country when her interference had been solicited on the 
occasion of insurrections in other nations. 
This is a very revealing statement on his foreign policy views. For Wellington, 
the proper way to formulate policy was not to base it on abstract ideals or certain 
liberal political institutions, as Carnarvon had argued. Diplomacy should rather be 
conducted on a pragmatic, case-by-case basis. As the Government went on, this aspect 
of Wellington’s policy would be increasingly evident, as will be examined in the next 
chapter. As for sacrificing principles, Wellington questioned whether it was to be 
believed that he would abandon his principles for ‘the corrupt purpose (for such it 
would be) - of procuring the support and services’ of the Canningites. Referencing 
Huskisson’s speech in Liverpool, Wellington affirmed that, ‘[n]o guarantee was 
162 
 
required, and none was given on my part’.75 As has already been noted, Wellington 
was indeed correct that no guarantee had been given on foreign affairs, but it was far 
from what Huskisson had said in his speech. 
In the opinion of Mrs Arbuthnot, the Duke ‘completely gave the lie’ to 
Huskisson in his speech in the House of Lords, but she suspected that the Colonial 
Minister would ‘get out of the scrape by saying that the persons who form the new 
Gov[ernmen]t area in themselves guarantees that the principles will not be changed.’76 
Ellenborough in his diary mentions how the Duke had told him how ‘for three years 
he prevented the recognition of the South American States’, quite contrary to 
Huskisson’s use of the ‘false phrase of Canning’s foreign policy and Canning’s liberal 
views as to trade, &c., yet at the same time asserts the Duke of Wellington never 
thwarted the last or objected to the first’.77  
Carnarvon’s motion, and the surrounding debate about Huskisson and the role 
of the Canningites in Government demonstrates how far party politics had intruded 
into the conduct of foreign policy. What Wellington would have regarded as one of 
the most important matters of state had turned into a matter of both Parliamentary 
debate and cabinet disagreements. To steer a steady course in such circumstances 
required tact and personal diplomacy, something for which Wellington was not 
especially noted. A snap-shot of his personality and inclinations on such matters was 
recorded by John Wilson Croker shortly after the Duke took office, ‘There, Wellington 
said to him pointing to a pile of green bags and red boxes, ‘there is the business of the 
country, which I have not time to look at – all my time being employed in assuaging 
what gentlemen call their feelings. In short, the folly and unreasonableness of people 
are inconceivable’.78 Even the formation of the new administration and consideration 
for his new colleagues did not prevent Wellington’s continuing efforts to distance 
himself from the Treaty of London, with correspondence between him and 
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Westmoreland establishing what they had agreed to while members of Liverpool’s 
cabinet.79  
These were not the actions of someone prepared to back the Treaty completely 
as the Duke had argued in his reply to Carnarvon. Instead, he had to walk a tightrope 
of balancing political aspects of policy with what he conceived as Britain’s interests. 
This was a departure from Wellington’s previous experiences. Nothing in the Duke’s 
previous diplomatic career had prepared him for the challenges he would now face as 
politics became front and centre and he could no longer play the quiet, frank and 
pragmatic role of mediator. Forced to be the face of British foreign policy as Prime 
Minister, Wellington no longer had an ally like Castlereagh to work with, or an enemy 
like Canning to blame. His internationalist tendencies would be challenged here, and 
his brand of legalist pragmatism would prove inflexible in the fluid circumstances of 
these years. As will be explored next, this complex situation set the stage for the 
Government’s crucial first four months as it tried to grapple with a rapidly changing 
situation in the Near East, as Russia and the Porte slid towards war. Locked into a 







                                                 
79 Westmoreland to Wellington, 29 Jan. 1828, WND, vol IV, p. 221; Westmoreland to 
Wellington, 3 Feb. 1828, ibid., p. 256. 
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Wellington and the Near 
East II: 
The Great Game or the 
Old Game? 1828 –1829 
 
As Wellington took office in January 1828, a daunting situation faced him. There were 
troubled waters both at home and abroad. With the continuation of the Canningites in 
cabinet on Peel’s insistence, there was a discordant element within the government, 
one which Wellington had been actively preparing to oppose only a few days 
previously. In the Near East, even darker clouds loomed. The Goderich administration 
had failed to arrest the drift that had gripped foreign affairs since Canning’s death, and 
to make it worse, had overseen the destruction of the Egypto-Ottoman fleet at the 
Battle of Navarino. War between Russia and the Porte threatened. The Duke would 
have to tackle both of these problems. As France was tied to Britain and Russia there 
were further complications. Despite early hopes that Wellington’s ascent to office 
would herald a peaceful resolution to the crisis, these were quickly dashed with the 
long-anticipated war breaking out in April. With the mass resignation of the 
Canningites in May 1828, the Duke gained a more complete control of the cabinet, yet 
this did little to bring about a more successful resolution to Near Eastern affairs. 
Britain remained paralysed between the twin problems Russia and France: Britain’s 
two closest allies and two greatest threats. The end result of the Russo-Turkish War 
was the 1829 Treaty of Adrianople. Expected to bring about the end of the Ottoman 
Empire as a European power, Wellington and his Foreign Secretary, Lord Aberdeen, 
reacted strongly to its pretensions. While they failed to overturn the settlement, they 
did succeed in securing minor modifications and, at the very least, the Porte did not 
collapse. The actions of the Duke’s government during this time were an important 
turning point in the history of British diplomacy as they struggled between two fears, 
the older one of France, and the ever more pressing one of Russia. In trying domestic 
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and international circumstances, Wellington never reconciled the two, and the lack of 
strategic clarity let to an erosion of the British position in the Near East. Though often 
concerned primarily with keeping French on the same side of questions to restrain her, 
these years saw the erosion of the primacy of France, and by the end of it, it was Russia 
that appeared the greatest threat to Britain and to Europe more generally. This chapter 
will chart the course of this episode, and the difficulties Wellington and his ministers 
faced in attempting to reach a successful conclusion.  
When Wellington took office, he had to deal with a diplomatic situation that 
was not of his making. As seen in the previous chapter, the Duke had started the 
process in motion through the negotiation of the St. Petersburg Protocol, which 
established an Anglo-Russian agreement for dealing with the Greek Revolt by 
mediation. Yet Canning’s Treaty of London between Britain, France and Russia, 
signed when Wellington was out of government, altered the complexion in the Near 
East by bringing in France. Despite the Duke’s hopes that all the European powers 
would guarantee the Protocol, it was only France that proved willing. Austria refused 
to endorse rebellion and Prussia followed her lead.1 This tripartite arrangement 
fundamentally weakened Britain’s diplomatic position, and reawakened troubling 
memories as well as releasing new spectres from a diplomatic Pandora’s Box.2 
It was under thirty years previously that the British had been fighting to expel 
France from the Eastern Mediterranean at a crucial moment of the late wars. In 1801, 
with a French army in Egypt, Tsar Paul threatening India and the Second League of 
Armed Neutrality threatening Britain’s naval position, the dangers of Franco-Russian 
cooperation were clear to Britain’s leaders. It is worth noting that Wellington himself 
was initially intended to command the invasion of Egypt from India that would take 
place concurrently with the one by Abercrombie, and he proceeded to plan for the job, 
though various circumstances meant that he did not depart with the army. In the late 
1820s, Wellington took on board the lessons of these years, and the ones offered up 
by the 1807 Treaty of Tilsit that had divided the continent between Russia and France 
and pledged each to aid the other in their separate disputes with the Ottomans and the 
British respectively. Though he was not aware of it, there were further echoes of 1807 
                                                 
1 Schroder, Transformation of European Politics, pp. 649-50. 
2 L. Cowles, ‘The Failure to Restrain Russia: Canning, Nesselrode, and the Greek Question, 
1825-1827’, International History Review, vol. 12, No. 4 (1990), pp. 688-720. 
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when France attempted to redraw the borders of Europe in concert with Russia in the 
ill-fated Polignac Project of 1829. The Napoleonic Epoch was over, but it still cast 
long shadows over Europe. 
For Wellington, Canning’s Treaty of London presented similar threats to the 
British position. Its implications were more than an abstract and dangerous policy of 
cooperation in an effort to restrain Russia. After all, that could have been achieved 
bilaterally with the Protocol. In August 1827, Lord Bathurst wrote to the Duke of the 
dangers of a separation of the professional heads of the military from the policy 
makers, when he asked him, ‘Do you think for example that any first Lord of the 
Admiralty having a seat in the cabinet would have consented to a treaty by which we 
have lost our naval sovereignty in the Mediterranean?’3 The system of ambassadorial 
conferences established in London, between the British Foreign Secretary and the 
French and Russian ambassadors, combined with the joint instructions they drew up 
for the allied naval forces in the Mediterranean, had immensely restricted any freedom 
of British independent action, either diplomatically or on the spot, and also raised the 
prospect of being outvoted by France and Russia around the conference table. The 
concerns Wellington had raised to Bathurst about the potential threat of Greece to 
Britain’s naval supremacy in the Eastern Mediterranean had become a reality with the 
loss of operational independence of British forces with their combination in the joint 
fleet thanks to the Treaty of London.4 With the outbreak of war in the Near East, these 
factors would have a significant impact on the Duke’s freedom of manoeuvre on this 
difficult question. 
* 
Before examining the policies of Wellington’s government further, it is 
necessary to consider another legacy of Goderich’s government, which would act as a 
major restraint on his policy. Canning and then Goderich had pledged to create a 
Commons committee to examine the country’s financial affairs. The failure of the 
latter ever to meet Parliament meant that the creation of the committee was still a live 
question when Wellington set out to form an administration after the final collapse of 
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the previous government – over the choice of a chairman for the committee.5 William 
Huskisson, Charles Grant and the Lords Melbourne, Dudley and Palmerston, made it 
a condition of their accession to Wellington’s administration that the Committee go 
ahead, and that the Whig Lord Althorp would sit on it.6 Wellington had to accept it, 
and the Select Committee on Public Income and Expenditure sat during the 1828 
session. Its formation was part of the consistent agitation for retrenchment that marked 
the years following the Napoleonic Wars. Although political reform received a great 
deal of posthumous attention, for much of the 1820s it was a peripheral issue. Indeed, 
the Liverpool and Wellington governments were primarily concerned with appeasing 
calls for financial reform and retrenchment. As Martin Daunton argues, ‘at the end of 
the Napoleonic wars, the scale of the national debt was at the centre of politics.’ In 
consequence, politicians ‘had to recreate trust in the tax system, which entailed much 
more than simply reducing "corruption" and imposing retrenchment. It entailed a long 
and complex process of reforming administrative and accounting practices, and 
creating an ethos of "balance" and fairness through political language and culture.’7  
Indeed, ‘from the start Wellington accepted that the political future of the 
King's government depended on keeping spending down, deflecting radical political 
change by lowering the revenue demands’.8 As soon as the Government was in office, 
as Lord Ellenborough, at that point Lord Privy Seal, recorded, Robert Peel was arguing 
for ‘the absolute necessity of reducing expenditure, as we have no surplus, and cannot 
impose taxes’.9 With all the conviction of someone who did not have to speak in the 
House of Commons or defend the Government’s expenditure, Ellenborough was 
adamantly ‘against all reduction of troops and seamen till we see daylight in the affairs 
of Greece. We should reduce what is not essential to national strength’.10  
                                                 
5 Muir, Wellington, vol. II, p.298. 
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10 Ibid.  
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The Committee was an important element in the tensions and difficulties 
surrounding finance and the conduct of foreign policy. The principles it laid down in 
1828 in its reports highlighted the fiscal constraints imposed on the Government. The 
committee insisted that ‘no Government is justified in taking even the smallest sum of 
money from the People, unless a case can be clearly established to show that it will be 
productive of some essential advantage to them, and of one that cannot be obtained by 
a smaller sacrifice’. It further argued that any surplus should be used to reduce the 
National Debt. These statements illustrate the political climate in which the 
government worked as well as their limited freedom to act as they saw fit.11 Sir 
Frederick Lamb, at this point the British Minister to Portugal, in a letter to the Duke 
in April 1828, examined the British response to events in Portugal. He emphasised the 
importance of finance, and the Select Committee, on the country’s foreign policy. For 
him, the doctrine of non-interference, since its introduction by Castlereagh, ‘has 
subsequently been slackened or tightened according to the temper and circumstances 
of the country, and as we are just now under the high pressure of a finance committee 
it is drawn to the tightest.’ To Lamb’s mind British policy 
both abroad and at home, has for years depended upon the struggle we are 
making to escape from financial embarrassments aggravated, if not brought 
on, by our return to cash payments upon a mistaken principle. From the 
consequent vain endeavour to pay what we never owed, has resulted the 
contradictory attempt to keep up high prices in a currency of augmented value, 
with all the round of expedients ending and to end in disappointment. Hence, 
too, has proceded [sic] the sinking of character which ensues, to nations as well 
as to individuals, from a state of debt - I will not call it poverty - for it is a state 
of debt in the midst of wealth proceeding from the balance between our charges 
and our currency having been forcibly disturbed. It is to these causes that our 
capacity for action abroad and our constant state of turmoil at home are due.12 
 These sentiments affected the conduct of British policy throughout the course 
of the Government. In October 1828, Aberdeen told to Stratford Canning that he ‘need 
not be reminded of the great difficulty from the reduced state of our military 
establishments during peace of furnishing an adequate contingent of troops’ to be able 
to intervene in the Morea.13 In November 1829, for example, with the possibility of 
war breaking out again in the East, Aberdeen was writing to Wellington about the 
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prospect of withdrawing three ships-of-the-line as that would ‘tell very considerably 
upon the estimates.’14 Financial considerations thus counselled against any war that 
could not obviously be said to be necessary and so limited the ability of the Prime 
Minister and the Foreign Secretary to respond as they might have wished.15 Despite 
the pre-eminence of British wealth, throughout this period this remained difficult to 
bring to bear where it mattered. This could be seen following the vote of 80 million 
francs by the French parliament that left the British government conscious of their 
own difficulties in comparison, as will be explored below. 
* 
When the government took their places in January 1828, there was an 
expectation by some that the Duke’s mere presence at the head of the administration 
would help guide affairs in the Near East to a peaceful conclusion. Harriet Arbuthnot 
recorded a conversation with the Austrian ambassador, Prince Paul III Anton 
Esterházy. For him ‘the Duke’s appointment gave the best, perhaps the only, chance 
of preserving peace in Europe; that our change of gov[ernmen]t w[oul]d give to the 
Porte the power of saying that, under such new auspices, they w[oul]d be more ready 
to listen to our councils & advice, and that the negociation might be renewed’.16 
Metternich also expressed a desire that the Duke would be able to take a lead in the 
question, though of course, doing so with all of his usual flattery: ‘C'est à vous à les 
lever ou bien à guider notre conscience dans les voies utiles’.17 
Russia, unsurprisingly, was less willing than Austria to see the Duke gain a 
new influence over the affairs in the Near East, and France seemed willing to back 
her. In late January, the Russian Ambassador, Prince Lieven, delivered a statement to 
the Duke that claimed for Russia ‘the right of settling her affairs with Turkey, without 
intervention of any other Power, and attributes it to her own extreme goodness that 
she has acted with her allies in this case’.18 It went on to propose that the Tsar should 
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occupy the Danubian Principalities and that the allied fleets should bombard the 
Turkish positions in Greece and proceed to blockade the Dardanelles and even 
advance to Constantinople.19 A couple of days later, the Lord Privy Seal, Lord 
Ellenborough, recorded that ‘the French Government recommends to our favourable 
consideration the proposals made by Russia’.20 
The dynamic between the three powers would be crucial over the next two 
years, as it proved impossible to cut the Gordian knot. This could have been achieved 
by ending the Treaty of London but to do so would have run incalculable risks. While 
it would grant Britain a greater degree of diplomatic freedom, as has been seen in the 
previous chapter, it would have caused severe political problems for the Duke at home 
given the presence of the Canningites in Cabinet. Furthermore, even if those could be 
overcome, the financial constrictions on the government made it unlikely that Britain 
could easily make use of her freedom. Leaving the treaty would also give rise to the 
possibility that France could unite with Russia, to the complete exclusion of Britain, 
and a war would be needed to regain any sort of initiative. In these circumstances then, 
it became necessary to walk a tightrope by opposing Russian advances in the Ottoman 
Empire while keeping France onside and aligned with British policy. 
Added to these difficulties were those of personal relations. The indomitable 
Princess Lieven had played a significant part in the formulation of Canning’s policy 
that had been crowned with the close alliance between Russia and Britain. Yet, with 
Canning dead, and Goderich’s administration an abysmal failure, ‘having so identified 
herself with Canning, she had no influence with Wellington’ which served to ‘hurt 
both her self-esteem and her influence’.21 As the administration went on, the Princess 
found herself increasingly in opposition to Wellington. Following the departure of the 
Canningites, her hostility reached a new height – she ‘had effectively declared war on 
the victor of Waterloo’, setting the scene for ‘the remarkable spectacle of a Russian 
ambassadress trying to frustrate the foreign policy of the British government’.22 
Throughout the rest of the government, the strained relationship between the Lievens 
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22 Ibid., p. 163. 
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and Wellington and Lord Aberdeen would create a toxic atmosphere that did nothing 
to help, and a lot to cause, the deteriorating relations between Britain and Russia.23 
When Wellington received a letter in February from the French foreign 
minister, the Comte de la Ferronays, that urged on him the dangers of isolated action, 
the need for strong measures following the Ottoman responses to Navarino and the 
desirability of cooperating with Russia, the Duke replied in a long and important 
letter.24 He believed that, given the scale of allied preparations, it was unsurprising 
that the Porte’s reaction was so strong. It was against belief that the allied ambassadors 
could withdraw from Constantinople after Navarino ‘without occasioning some 
breach on the part of the Porte of those relations of amity which had existed between 
the three powers and the Porte for some time?’ Wellington’s overriding concern was 
to ‘leave the Porte in a state of independence, after these transactions shall have been 
concluded’, and instead of expediting a settlement, an occupation of the principalities 
and a blockade of the Straits would be ineffectual. By even embarking on this course 
the allies would need to continue and the result would be 
neither more nor less than the invasion of the Turkish provinces in Europe by 
a formidable Russian army, while a fleet from the Mediterranean should force 
the defences of the Dardanelles and another from the Black Sea those of the 
Bosphorous, and the two should join under the walls of the Seraglio and with 
the aid of the army dictate the terms of peace. 
To do this would inevitably end in a general war: ‘[A]ll nations will arm for the 
purpose of protecting each its own interests in the expected wreck of the Ottoman 
empire in Europe’ and it would be impossible to return those dominions back to the 
Sultan. 25 
The logic of Temperley’s and Cunningham’s idolising of Canning’s policy and 
their criticisms of his successors was that decisive action by the British fleet could 
have forced the Ottoman Sultan to capitulate to the demands of the allies and thus 
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avoid the start of the Russo-Turkish War.26 This displays a failure to appreciate the 
restrictions and limitations on the exercise of sea-power. In this respect, Wellington 
was more keenly aware of those than most nineteenth-century British statesmen.27 To 
dictate terms under the walls of the Seraglio would, in the first place, require the 
forcing of the Dardanelles. The events of 1807 showed how difficult this was. 
Wellington would have been known well that earlier precedent when his close friend, 
Charles Arbuthnot, had overseen an ultimatum to the Porte that resulted in a British 
fleet forcing the Straits. Despite the forts being undermanned, and even, in one case, 
using an artillery piece cast for the 1453 siege of Constantinople, the fleet sustained 
such heavy damage that they were forced to withdraw from the Sea of Marmora.28 In 
1828 the prospect of even achieving this seemed unlikely.29  
Instead of any grandiose plans of forcing the Straits and dictating terms, 
Wellington sought to stick closely to the terms of the Treaty of London to try and bring 
about a speedy settlement between the Porte and the Greeks. To do this would rely 
upon a tight blockade to force the withdrawal of Ibrahim Pasha’s forces as well as 
Austria ceasing to aid the Egyptian and Ottomans still in Greece, highlighting the 
difficulty of drawing closer to the Austrians to help balance France and Russia.30 As 
ever with the Duke, the legality of proceedings was high in his mind and he was 
conscious of the need to take a firm line on this point. Wellington believed that 
Codrington ‘had mistaken his instructions’:  
He says he feels himself “authorized” in “preventing any blockade from being 
violated by any vessels which shall be established by the Greeks”. The laws of 
nations do not allow us to interfere by force to oblige others to obey them. We 
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may by influence induce the Austrians not to violate the Greek blockades. But 
I should think we cannot by force.31 
This kind of line was not universally supported, even within the cabinet. In a 
discussion on 9 March 1828, Dudley raised the possibility of allowing the Russians to 
occupy the Principalities with a small force under the auspices of the Treaty of 
London, an idea that had the backing of the French. Ellenborough recorded that 
Wellington objected to this with these objections resting ‘on principle’.32 As such, 
‘[w]e desired to effect the objects of the treaty in the least dangerous and most direct 
manner, and to keep within the treaty.’ When the discussion moved on to boundaries 
and indemnities due from Greece, Wellington’s ideas met with opposition and ‘thus 
the Duke was, for the present, overruled’.33 It was therefore without the full backing 
of his cabinet that Wellington had to formulate a response to a fast-moving situation 
in the Near East. 
On 11 March 1828, the Russian declaration of war on the Porte was 
communicated to the British government. While based primarily on Russian matters 
such as the Convention of Akkerman and Ottoman interference in the Persian war, it 
also touched on Greece. This it did in a highhanded way. Should Britain and France 
not support Russia fully, then the Tsar reserved the right to settle the matter in the way 
that ‘accords best with his own interests and convenances’.34 This startling declaration 
was to be a consistent bone of contention to which Wellington would refer back 
repeatedly over the course of the war. With the validity of the Treaty of London now 
in question, it was France which became the crucial factor in the diplomatic situation. 
While Polignac agreed with the Duke that he ‘did not apprehend much mischief if 
France and England would act together’, they did not agree that Russia had given up 
the treaty by her actions.35 Mrs Arbuthnot captured the Duke’s attitudes towards the 
question: ‘We must try to get hold of France to induce her to stand by with us & remain 
neutral. If we can get France to unite cordially & entirely with us, we may yet keep 
out of the war.’36 Wellington believed the British government should take a stance on 
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all the outstanding questions relating to Greece and then ‘endeavour to bring the 
government of France to concur in our views of these questions’. 37 The first priority 
in the Duke’s mind was to secure France. This would serve not only to prevent Russia 
from gaining a potentially troublesome partner to overturn the settlement in the Near 
East but also help to maintain the British naval position in the Mediterranean which 
would have been severely threatened by the Franco-Russian combination to Britain’s 
exclusion. The French connection would be the principal relationship for the Duke.  
Though Austria and Prussia figured in Wellington’s thinking, their intended 
role was to back up the Anglo-French line. He was not interested in concerting policy 
with them – despite Austria’s significant interest in the fate of the Ottoman’s European 
lands.38 In April, the Duke instructed Dudley that it would be ‘desirable to avoid’ 
asking Metternich ‘to do more than give his approbation and assistance to what we are 
doing by way of advice at Constantinople.’ Dudley was to ‘keep clear of anything that 
should have the appearance of seeking the Austrian mediation or at the present 
moment in union with Austria for the purpose of attaining our objects’. Wellington 
was clear on Britain’s priorities: ‘Let us be quite sure of France before we make any 
approach towards any other power’.39 This emphasis on France is a surprising one, 
and quite hard to reconcile with the foreign policy options available. Schroeder’s 
argument that it was because of ‘systemic’ reasons that the Duke was determined to 
work with France and Russia and avoid Austria has some truth to it. Certainly, the 
former two powers were more clearly threats to Britain in a way Austria was not, and 
could never be. Yet, working with Austria did not necessarily mean ‘conforming to its 
rigid brand of conservatism’ and ‘letting the Greek revolt grind on indefinitely or be 
snuffed out by the Turks and Egyptians’.40 A Russian occupation of the Principalities, 
control of the mouth of the Danube and invasion of the European Ottoman lands were 
things that affected Austria more than any other power. In those circumstances, Britain 
would be able to exercise considerable leverage rather than merely fall in line with 
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Metternich’s wishes. Writing the following year to another diplomat, Lord Cowley, 
Wellington’s brother and the British ambassador in Vienna, admitted he could not ‘see 
any just grounds for the doubts and suspicions which seem to be entertained respecting 
the conduct of Austria’.41 To close off all possibilities of this only served to heighten 
the threat of Russia and France, rather than diminishing them, by narrowing Britain’s 
diplomatic options and freedom of manoeuvre at critical junctures over the course of 
the following months.42  
The Russian declaration of war came at a very inconvenient moment for the 
Duke. From the start, the government had consisted of relatively uncomfortable 
bedfellows due to the Canningites’ presence, and the issue of a new Corn Law had 
always been a prominent concern. At the very first cabinet meeting, Huskisson had 
stressed the need for one and ‘was so pledged to the principle of that of last year, that 
he must resign if it was not preserved’ – hardly the best way to inaugurate a new 
ministry.43 That Bill had failed to pass then owing to the Duke’s opposition in the 
House of Lords thus setting up a difficult and uncomfortable situation for all involved, 
and one that would dominate many of the cabinets over the administration’s first 
months.44 When Dudley received Lieven’s declaration in March, it was corn, not war, 
that was at the forefront of the ministers’ minds and on this Wellington found himself 
isolated and outvoted.45 Indeed, Ellenborough even speculated that ‘there seemed 
every prospect of the Government being broken up. The Duke would not yield, though 
all were against him’.46 To further add to his worries, and possibly contributing to his 
inability to keep control of the cabinet, Wellington was ill for a number of days with 
a ‘bilious attack’, thanks to overwork in the opinion of Mrs Arbuthnot.47 These were 
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hardly promising domestic circumstances to construct a coherent and effective foreign 
policy in a rapidly changing situation in the Near East. 
It was not long before there was evidence that the problems of Cabinet and 
foreign policy had combined to create a difficult and messy situation for British 
diplomacy. Mrs Arbuthnot recorded in mid-April a conversation between her and Lord 
Esterházy. The Austrian ambassador told her that the French minister de la Ferronays 
had ‘complained that he could not understand the policy of the English Gov[ernmen]t’ 
and that while one line came from Polignac and the Duke from London, in Paris, 
Granville, instructed by Dudley and Huskisson ‘represented matters in a totally 
different light’. For Esterházy, the ‘mischief this state of affairs’ caused was 
‘inconceivable’. In his opinion it was ‘of the utmost importance to the peace of Europe 
that England and France sh[oul]d act together’, as by doing so Russia ‘w[oul]d be in 
a minority in her interpretation of the Treaty but the reverse w[oul]d be the case if 
France joined Russia against us’. Russia’s ‘power of doing mischief w[oul]d cease if 
France made common cause with us as in that case all the other powers w[oul]d remain 
tranquil’.48 The Duke typically did not believe that ‘it w[oul]d be material for that the 
French knew he was Minister, & that his views w[oul]d be adopted by the English 
Gov[ernmen]t whatever L[or]ds Granville & Dudley might say to the contrary’.49 This 
was an underestimation of the political difficulties the Duke faced, especially given 
the continuing uncertainty over corn and redistribution questions at this time. Indeed, 
these first months of the government were marked by the continuing battle for control 
between the Canningite faction and the Duke, and its overspill into diplomacy added 
to the confusion and uncertainty that prevented a clear line being pressed.  
This rift finally reached its climax in May 1828, when Huskisson voted against 
the government in a division over the disenfranchisement and redistribution of the 
seats of Penryn and East Retford. Following this, the Colonial Minister sent a letter of 
resignation to Wellington.50 Perhaps meant as a ‘token apology’, it presented the Prime 
Minister with an easy way out of his cabinet difficulties, and the Duke was quick to 
embrace it. Huskisson received a curt reply informing him that he had laid the latter’s 
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message before the King.51 Despite efforts from the Canningites to explain away the 
resignation, Wellington knew that any retraction on his part would all but concede 
control of the government to Huskisson. On the 25 May, the Duke saw the King and 
made the resignation final.52  
In a memorandum on the resignations, the Duke wrote:  
Principles have been talked of as if there was any difference of principle in 
these discussions. There is not the idea of a principle in all these papers. 
Principles are brought forward solely to aggravate the consequences of these 
unfortunate difficulties.  
We hear a great deal of Whig principles and Tory principles and liberal 
principles and Mr. Canning's principles, but I confess that I have never seen a 
definition of any of them and cannot make to myself a clear idea of what any 
of them mean.53 
This was a characteristic of Wellington. Yet it was also one of his weaknesses. 
Whatever the reality, or non-reality, of principles, the mere idea of them was a crucial 
part of political life and an essential prerequisite in presenting a unified message and 
narrative about the conduct of business to Parliament and the wider public. By refusing 
to develop an idea of his own principles, and instead focusing on some of the narrow 
realities and legal aspects of questions, Wellington directly contributed to his own 
political difficulties during the course of his government, and so to the scarcity of 
historiographical work on his foreign policy by later generations. The further failure 
to outline clear strategic priorities led to drift in British foreign policy, and the ceding 
of the initiative to Russia and France. 
The resignation of Huskisson signalled the departure of all the Canningites 
from the government, including the ineffectual Foreign Secretary, Lord Dudley.54 
Wellington chose Lord Aberdeen, the chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, to replace 
him. Aberdeen had only limited experience in diplomacy and foreign affairs. As a 
young man he had served as the British ambassador to Vienna for Lord Castlereagh 
during the closing stages of the Napoleonic Wars, but he had declined to continue in 
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that post after its conclusion.55 Since then he had had very little contact with foreign 
matters and was more notable as an accomplished classicist than a diplomat. The Lord 
Privy Seal, Lord Ellenborough, had been eyeing Dudley’s job for himself, and on 
being passed over, was scathing in his diary about Aberdeen, at least until he took over 
as President of the Board of Control in the autumn. He wrote immediately after the 
reshuffle that ‘I cannot think Aberdeen a fitter man than myself. He has been useless 
to the Duke in the Cabinet and he failed as Ambassador to Austria. He cannot speak 
at all’.56 Despite Ellenborough’s reservations about his suitability, Aberdeen would go 
on to serve as Wellington’s Foreign Secretary and trusted lieutenant for the remainder 
of his government before later serving as colonial secretary in Peel’s first government 
and then returning to the Foreign Office again in his second. He would eventually 
become Prime Minister himself in 1852 as leader of the Peelites and would preside 
over Britain’s entry into the Crimean War. His elevation to high office then in May 
1828 was an important moment not only in his career but also for British political and 
diplomatic history. 
While Wellington remained the driving force behind the government’s foreign 
policy for the most part - Aberdeen described him as the ‘sails and rudder’ of the 
administration - the new Foreign Secretary would still play a very important role in 
the development of British diplomacy.57 The removal of the Canningites enabled the 
Duke to impress his own foreign policy more clearly on the government, which 
allowed it to deal with foreign policy matters in relative internal tranquillity. However, 
their departure produced a new factor on the scene. The appointment of William 
Vesey-FitzGerald to replace Charles Grant as President of the Board of Trade 
necessitated a by-election for County Clare. The result of this was Vesey-FitzGerald’s 
defeat and the return of Daniel O’Connell, leader of the Catholic Association. In turn, 
this sparked off the Catholic Emancipation crisis that would overshadow all other 
government business over the next year and almost bring down the ministry.58  
                                                 
55 See Chamberlain, Lord Aberdeen, pp.105-155. Metternich, Aberdeen’s old acquaintance 
from that time, was pleased to see his appointment as Foreign Secretary. See Cowley to Wellington, 13 
June 1828, Wellington Mss., WP1/936/27 (also in WND, vol. IV, p. 486). 
56 28 May 1828, Ellenborough Diary, vol. I, p. 127. 
57 Aberdeen to Wellington, 2 Nov. 1828 in C. R. Middleton, The Administration of British 
Foreign Policy 1782-1846 (Durham, 1977), p. 64. 
58 See Muir, Wellington, vol. II, pp. 322-47 for the most recent overview of Wellington’s 
government and Catholic Emancipation. For an older but more in-depth examination, see G.I.T. 
Machin, The Catholic Question in English Politics: 1820 to 1830 (Oxford, 1964), pp. 109-194. 
179 
 
With this looming crisis at home, and with the continuing worries abroad, 
Aberdeen did not take office at a fortuitous time. In early May, Bathurst wrote to the 
Duke pointing out ‘[w]e have done nothing since the commencement of your 
government […]We shall be reproach[e]d with having done nothing, but the conduct 
of Russia in the first instance and the indecision of France from a disposition to yield 
to Russia in the second, has not left it in our power to do anything’.59 This letter was 
accompanied by an accomplished memorandum by Lord Aberdeen, which may well 
have played a role in convincing the Duke to appoint him foreign minister a few weeks 
later. Aberdeen described in explicit terms the difficulty Britain was placed in by 
Russia’s declaration of war. He questioned whether ‘[h]aving disapproved of the 
advance of the Russian armies and deprecated the consequences of that measure’ as a 
measure of the Treaty of London prior to the declaration of war, ‘are we quite 
consistent in giving our support to the same operation when undertaken under 
circumstances in some respects more alarming?’ For him there was a clear question of 
whether ‘our virtual approbation of the hostile invasions by Russia of the northern 
provinces of the Turkish empire, as evinced by our active co-operation in another 
quarter, be more justifiable than our acquiescence in the measures formerly proposed 
by Russia and which for cogent reasons we then declined.’ With the problems of the 
exercise of rights of belligerents and neutrals in the Mediterranean between the various 
parties, Aberdeen speculated that ‘[t]his situation, it is presumed, is absolutely new in 
the history of the world, and the more it is examined the more calculated it appears to 
lead to complications of the most difficult and embarrassing character’.60 
By May 1828 it was impossible to escape the difficulties of the situation, 
however. The complexities of the relations between the parties in the Eastern 
Mediterranean required swift and decisive action to untangle them. By the time 
Wellington was in a position domestically to act thus, it was too late. The attachment 
of the Canningites in government had helped to force his hand, and by the time they 
resigned it was impossible to backtrack, even if it had been desirable. The campaigning 
season was almost upon them and the Russian army had been massed for its invasion 
of the principalities. Yet even in early May, two months after the Russian declaration 
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had been received, Wellington was still concerning himself with clarifying it and 
lamented that he had ‘not yet heard any answer to my principles, my facts, or my 
reasoning, excepting that it is desireable [sic] to renew the conferences’.61 The lack of 
clarity would come back to haunt the government in the future but for the time being, 
British diplomacy in the Near East had assumed an uncomfortable pattern. For most 
of the next year, Wellington and Aberdeen would do their utmost to keep France 
onside while also seeking to restrain Russia where possible. Well aware that France 
backing the Russian war against the Porte would raise the prospect of fundamental 
changes to the European order, they faced the prospect of playing a high stakes game 
where the French government held the cards. At the same time, the British cabinet had 
to attempt to check Russia, and there was a growing awareness, coming especially out 
of the Board of Control, of the threat that she posed to British interests in India.62 
On 15 June 1828, the tripartite London Conference reopened. Instead of 
solving the question of the Russian status as a belligerent, it glossed over the issue 
with the legal fiction of Russia being a neutral power in the Mediterranean.63 This 
arrangement did nothing to clarify matters and would lead to a number of difficult 
situations over the coming months. Doing this did, however, bind Russia to some 
degree to her allies and give them some control over her actions in relation to Greece. 
France was also kept within the treaty framework allowing Britain some possibility of 
regulating her ambitions in the Mediterranean. However, by simply placing such 
prominence on the role and importance of France, to the exclusion of trying to bring 
the other powers, Austria in particular, into the equation, the British government ceded 
the initiative to Paris. In trying to steer British diplomacy between the twin perils of 
Russia and France, Wellington restricted his leeway and had to push on even in cases 
where he would have preferred a different course of action. 
This became the case only one month after the resumption of the negotiations 
in London. While the Battle of Navarino had ended the possibility of a complete 
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Ottoman victory in the Morea, it nevertheless served as another example of the 
limitations of naval power as it failed to settle the question on the ground itself. 
Ibrahim Pasha still remained in Greece with a substantial army and the rebel forces 
proved unable to evict it by themselves. The stalemate allowed the Tsar scope to 
declare originally that he would settle the matter in a way that ‘accords best with his 
own interests and convenances’.64 There was an urgent need to impose some kind of 
order on the peninsula and it was France who sought to do this by intervening with 
troops. In May 1828, the French Chamber authorised a loan of 80,000,000 francs and 
called up 60,000 men of the 1827 class of soldiers to the alarm of the British 
government.65 Yet despite initial opposition, in July Wellington was forced to back 
down on the issue. By early July 1828, the Duke’s room to manoeuvre ran out. With 
the Russian campaign against the Turks in full swing, yet failing to make the expected 
progress, the risks of a second campaign intensified. This point was being pressed on 
him by the French government. To delay the settlement of Greece would risk an 
increase in Russian demands that could undermine the whole Ottoman Empire. Given 
the lack of military success, if the Greek affair could be settled then the Duke believed 
there was a chance that it would facilitate peace. But this would be impossible unless 
Ibrahim was to be removed.66 While Wellington had long taken the attitude that the 
Treaty of London did not permit the use of actual hostilities in its execution, as he 
admitted, ‘events have, however, materially altered the situation of affairs’. For him 
in ‘the meantime, important events are occurring in other quarters, and it is necessary 
that the allies should be prepared for their probable consequences.’ Given this, 
Wellington was forced to admit the necessity for the British government to consent to 
the French deployment, adding the caveat:  
Trusting to His Most Christian Majesty that this measure will be carried into 
execution in the true principles of the treaty of the 6th July 1827, that the 
operations which will be carried on will be limited by the necessity of the case, 
and that the troops will be withdrawn as soon as Ibrahim Pasha will have 
evacuated the Morea, whether by sea or land.67 
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Sanctioning the French deployment did achieve one British aim in the short 
term: making Paris more amenable. The new British ambassador, Lord Stuart de 
Rothesay, who had replaced Lord Granville after he had resigned with the Canningites, 
reported to Wellington in late July that ‘[t]he French government are greatly pleased 
with the answer which has been received from England respecting the expedition to 
the Morea and appear inclined to follow the same course with ourselves in almost 
every question of foreign policy’.68 This seemed to confirm Wellington’s policy of 
working to bring France onside.  
As it often would throughout the course of his government, this ray of light 
proved chimerical. Very swiftly complications arose about the French deployment. In 
August 1828, news reached London that Ibrahim wished to withdraw his army from 
the Morea despite the orders from Constantinople to the contrary. As Aberdeen noted, 
‘should it speedily be effected, it will give a rather a strange character to the French 
expedition’. The Foreign Secretary drew Wellington’s notice to the fact there was a 
‘very great difference between the language employed in the instructions to General 
Maison and that of Polignac as inserted in the protocol of our conferences’.   For 
Aberdeen, it was ‘another proof how little we can trust to the strict letter of their 
declarations’.69 A few days later, after talking with Polignac, the Foreign Secretary 
wrote to the Duke ‘[o]n the whole, I can hardly suppose that at the present moment 
they have the intention of breaking faith with us. But it is impossible to feel any 
security about the duration of their honesty’: a startling reflection on Britain’s closest 
ally and the linchpin of her foreign policy.70 Wellington remained deeply unhappy at 
having to concede this to the French: 
If our admiral had done his duty (and for not doing it he has been recalled) we 
might have resisted the vélléite of the French to send a military expedition. But 
situated as affairs were when we consented to send the expedition, we could 
not have refused without taking upon ourselves the responsibility of the failure 
to get Ibrahim Pacha out of the Morea. We therefore consented. But it is said 
we may be deceived. The French government cannot be answerable for their 
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actions. That may be true. But we have taken every precaution that it is possible 
to take.71 
He would soon learn that these precautions were not sufficient. 
The continuing clashes over the French intentions in Greece would dominate 
the diplomacy of the summer of 1828. The picture was further clouded by the fate of 
Greek slaves who had been taken into captivity in Egypt. This was an issue that 
mattered to the government politically because of its humanitarian aspect.72 
Wellington wrote to Aberdeen about the case that:  
We cannot prevent the return of Ibrahim to Egypt till they are restored, as we 
shall thereby injure the Morea and defeat our own purpose. We cannot go to 
war with Mahomed Alli [sic] to force him to restore the slaves. The only 
resource is then to buy them if we must have them. Have them we must, or we 
shall have more trouble in Parliament than the slaves are worth, more 
particularly as the French having at their disposal 80 millions of francs are 
ready for everything. But I would recommend great caution and 
circumspection in the whole of this proceeding.73 
The situation on the spot did not lend itself to caution. News reached London 
of a planned deception to achieve the British goals. Codrington, still the British 
admiral in the Mediterranean, though facing imminent recall, cooperated with the 
French to settle the matter of the slaves and Ibrahim’s army. In the Convention of 
Alexandria of 9 August 1828, Mehmet Ali was to send out ships containing the slaves 
to Greece, though ostensibly containing supplies. These would be intercepted by the 
allied naval forces, the captives removed and Ibrahim’s army forced to embark.74 
Though this would provide a very convenient way around the various difficulties that 
the slaves and the Egyptian forces posed, Wellington was less than impressed with 
such subterfuge,  
In war it is said that all is fair and it must be admitted that we are not far from 
a state of war. But I must say that I think we are far enough removed from such 
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a state to avoid everything that savours of war, that is not absolutely necessary 
to attain the purposes of -the treaty and particularly anything in the shape of a 
trick.75 
A few days later, he told the Foreign Secretary that ‘I protest against such tricks. They 
are unworthy of real officers, even in war, but situated as we are in relation to the 
Turks it would be shameful’ and on the 27th August, he even suggested that they should 
remonstrate with the French government concerning it.76 Aberdeen, however, took a 
more pragmatic view that ‘we have done the best thing under the circumstances’ and 
Codrington carried out the plan on the spot.77 
With the evacuation of Ibrahim’s army, the question of the purpose of the 
French army became a pressing matter for Wellington. It was one thing to condone a 
force to secure the peace in the Morea between two hostile sides, but as Wellington 
wrote to Aberdeen, ‘It was never intended that the allies should conquer a Greece for 
the Greeks’.78 Wellington desired that French operations should not extend beyond the 
Isthmus of Corinth but much depended on what the final allocation of borders for 
Greece would be.79 This in turn, relied upon an allied decision. Unfortunately, this was 
no simple matter to achieve. Not only had the conferences in London been restarted 
but there was a further conference of the exiled allied ambassadors to Turkey that was 
sitting in Poros, also discussing the matter of the Greek borders. Unsurprisingly, these 
two bodies would clash over their competing visions for the future of Greece, 
something made even more troublesome due to the poor relationship between Lord 
Aberdeen and the British representative, Sir Stratford Canning.80 
Additionally, the usually underappreciated factor of realities on the ground 
continued to have an important effect.  Communications with Constantinople were 
slow and could take weeks. The facts of geography meant that France received 
information from the Near East before it could reach Britain, news either having to 
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cross the continent by land on poor roads, or by ship around the Iberian Peninsula. 
When dealing with the matter of the French expedition this was of great importance, 
as it enabled the French press to report on things before the British government could 
react and allowed them to put their own spin on events. Wellington had a long-running 
complaint against the Journal des Débats, the organ of Chateaubriand, on this and 
related heads.81  
An outbreak of plague in the Balkans would also do its bit to delay British 
communications with the Russian headquarters. With messengers being detained in 
quarantine for up to forty days on the Austrian borders, it was difficult to know what 
was happening on the spot.82 The new British ambassador to the Tsar, Lord 
Heytesbury, wrote to Lord Aberdeen from a bivouac en route to the Tsar of the ‘many 
difficulties’ he had experienced, even relating the story of the Prince of Hesse-
Homburg ‘who preceded me by a fortnight, [and] was attacked and some of his suite 
killed tho’ under an escort of 300 men’.83 Heytesbury (à Court as he was, see above), 
‘one of the ablest diplomats of his time’, had served in Naples during the revolution 
of 1820 to the approval of Lord Castlereagh and would play an important role in the 
trying circumstances of the prevailing war and crisis of the Near East.84 The first 
ambassador to the Tsar since the departure of Lord Strangford in 1826, Heytesbury’s 
task was made more difficult by the prevailing distrust of Nicholas I and Russian 
policy generally by Wellington, and the British government more generally.  
In their first interview after the ambassador arrived in Odessa, the Tsar asked 
him ‘[w]hat neighbour could suit me so well as the Turk? What could Russia gain by 
the destruction of the Ottoman Throne?’ Nicholas proceeded to comment on the 
difference in attitude towards Russia between Wellington, who ‘has mistaken me’ and 
the King, ‘who has invariably judged me as I deserved to be judged’.85 This despatch 
would mark the start of a divergence between Heytesbury on the spot and Wellington 
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and the government in London. Mrs Arbuthnot records how the Duke was ‘most 
deeply nettled by the Emperor’s remarks upon himself’,86 and Aberdeen lamented to 
Bathurst that he was ‘sorry that [Heytesbury] has been so speedily charmed by the 
irresistible power of the Emperor’.87 Wellington wrote to the ambassador in response 
how ‘[t]he account of your conversation with the Emperor has been perused with much 
concern’. He took great exception to the distinction the Tsar had drawn between the 
British government and the King: ‘In this country we know of no difference between 
the sovereign and his ministers. Whatever may be the private opinions of the 
individuals composing His Majesty's council if they concur in the acts of the 
government they are responsible for them and those acts must be considered as theirs.’ 
Despite the assurances of an experienced diplomat of Nicholas’s attitudes towards the 
Ottoman Empire, the Duke told Heytesbury that ‘great as is the power of the Emperor 
of Russia he is a man like others, and the usual lot of human nature awaits him, and it 
is inconsistent with the prudence and foresight by which the actions of those must be 
governed’.88  
Deep-rooted distrust of Russia shone through when London looked at the 
question of Russian reinforcements for the Mediterranean fleet to blockade the 
Dardanelles. Aberdeen wrote to Wellington that he ‘cannot imagine with what 
plausibility Lieven will attempt to reconcile us to this proceeding’.89 The Prime 
Minister took a strong attitude towards it in his correspondence with Aberdeen: ‘In my 
opinion, we cannot consent to the hostile operations of the Russian fleet. I am ready 
to go to town to attend the conference upon this subject when you please, or rather to 
consider with you the whole of the Russian and Greek case as at present before us, 
before we proceed to the conference’.90 Yet as ever in the matter of the Near East, 
France complicated the government’s response. ‘But what will France say?’ was 
Aberdeen’s query.91 With continuing wrangling over the issue of the French troops in 
Greece, Whitehall faced two problems and was left stranded in the middle, unable to 
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effectively alter the course of either.92 Once again, the failure of Wellington to set out 
clear strategic priorities, and a clear vision of the direction of British foreign policy, 
had left his administration bogged down in continual disputes with both the French 
and Russians that weakened their hand overall. The Duke himself put the blame on 
the Treaty of London and the legacy he had inherited. Mrs Arbuthnot wrote at this 
time that ‘I think he is very sore about these matters, feeling himself so hampered by 
the Treaty […] & disliking the whole proceedings & yet not knowing how to get out 
of it. It makes him very cross’, and the situation was only exacerbated by the 
continuing problems in Ireland.93 
At times, it appears that an all-pervading sense of negativity took hold over 
Aberdeen and Wellington, in particular, something perhaps unsurprising given the 
continuing difficulties and uncertainty of Catholic Emancipation. For the Duke, ‘there 
never was such a humbug as the Greek affair altogether. However, thank God, it has 
never cost us a shilling and never shall’.94 A few days later he complained to Aberdeen 
that ‘[i]t is most curious to see the difficulties in which we are brought daily by the 
bad faith of our allies, and the mischievous disposition, or the stupid blunders, of our 
servants and officers’.95 With the Prime Minister believing that the British ambassador 
to Russia had ‘misunderstood the government’96 and the French general in Greece 
seemingly acting on his own initiative to push forward into previously uncontested 
land, against the reassurances of the government in Paris, the situation in the Near East 
seemed to be one spiralling out of the control of the ministers in London.97 This was 
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all despite a feeling that France was ‘more heartily with us at the present moment than 
they have ever been’.98 
This negativity was compounded by the difficulties that the continuing Russo-
Ottoman War posed. This was very much a double-edged sword. On the one hand, the 
war prevented Britain and France from making progress in settling Greece. Neither 
power seemed willing to enter the war on one side or the other, and the Ottomans 
would ‘have still to incur all the chances of war, and they are right in thinking that 
they may as well leave the Greek question as all the rest to the result of the same 
chances’.99 On the other hand, Greece and the Treaty of London prevented an 
opposition to Russia and their potential gains against the Turks in the Near East. This 
was in many ways a far more important question.100 Though Aberdeen feared the 
continuation of the war could ‘scarcely fail to bring on a general war in Europe’, he 
told Stuart de Rothesay: ‘the truth is, that no Counsel, however judicious, nor any 
remonstrance however strongly urged, can possess its one weight with either party, 
until the Greek question shall have been practically settled; and this it is in vain for us 
to hope to accomplish within any reasonable period, except as the result of an intimate 
concert between France and England’.101 But, as Aberdeen wrote to Bathurst, ‘[t]he 
worst of the French is, that tomorrow may find the wind blowing quite the other way’ 
– not an ideal situation for creating an intimate concert.102 Even with ‘the breach of 
engagement on the part of His Imperial Majesty’, the blockade of the Dardanelles, 
‘that would have justified His Majesty in taking any steps which the interests and 
honor of his Crown might require’, the British government instead sought a peaceful 
                                                 
98 Aberdeen to Wellington, 13 Oct. 1828, Wellington Mss., WP1/960/15 (also in WND, vol. 
V, p. 132); Aberdeen to Wellington, 3 Nov. 1828, Wellington Mss., WP1/965/8 (also in WND, vol. V, 
pp. 206-7). 
99 Wellington to Aberdeen, 31 Oct. 1828, Wellington Mss., WP1/964/37 (also in WND, vol. 
V, p. 190). 
100 Despite some concern in, what would be termed today, the humanitarian problems of the 
Greek question, especially in relation to the question of whether to lift the blockade of Crete, public 
opinion across Europe did not take a great interest in Greece at this time: Aberdeen to Wellington, 15 
Oct. 1828, Wellington Mss., WP1/961/2 (also in WND, vol. V, p. 140); Aberdeen to Wellington, 16 
Oct. 1828 Wellington Mss., WP1/961/4 (also in WND, vol. V, p. 143). 
101 Aberdeen to de Rothesay, 21 Oct. 1828, copy, No. 46, de Rothesay Mss., MS 6234, pp. 
140-3. 
102 Aberdeen to Bathurst, 22 Nov. 1828, Bathurst Mss., Loan MS 57/18. 
189 
 
resolution of the issue.103 This was not a choice that made everyone happy. Wellington 
wrote to Aberdeen that 
[i]n truth, Metternich is as much at a loss as we are to know what to do. He 
was very angry with us for not seizing the apparent opportunity afforded by 
the blockade of the Dardenelles [sic] to declare against Russia, because that 
would have been a commencement of instance which at all events would have 
saved the Turks, and could have enabled him to what he calls 'prendre une 
position', that is to say either to support us or to oppose us, or, what is more 
probable, do nothing but talk. But as I said before, he no more knows what to 
do under existing circumstances than we do. 
To his mind ‘We are bound by the Greek treaty. Upon that the Turks will do nothing 
till the objects of the treaty will be attained. […] Greece, once settled, we may consider 
the question’.104 Wellington saw clearly that the war posed a threat to British interests, 
and to Europe: 
I confess that I cannot see my way to any negociation [sic] for peace. The thing 
to be wished for is that France, England, Austria and Prussia should agree to 
declare to the Emperor of Russia that happen what may they will not consent 
to any aggrandisement of the Russian empire, nor that the Porte shall be 
crushed by demands of money on account of the costs of the war. 
Nothing else can be of any avail. If this was done manfully the Emperor would 
soon continue to make peace.105 
This was a pipe dream. Only a month earlier he had written about the 
impossibility of a Franco-British mediation in the war: ‘The Emperor would not 
consent to it. The offer would produce no good, and would put the Emperor very much 
out of temper with both powers and render him very unmanageable’. For him, as 
before, ‘the great object to be attained is a perfect understanding with France that the 
objects of both countries are at this moment the same’. Despite the problems with the 
French army in the Morea he believed ‘that we have neither of us any cause of 
complaint against the other and that we ought to look steadily at the existing crisis 
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with the determination to act together and in concert with any other powers for the 
purpose of rendering the result as little injurious to the world as possible’.106  
As Wellington’s first year in power neared its conclusion, the solidification of 
the Franco-British alliance remained one of the chief priorities. By late 1828, it was 
clear that the return of the ambassadors to Constantinople was the only way to achieve 
any kind of progress on Greece, and possibly also offer a way towards a resolution of 
the Russo-Turkish war. While it would be impossible for the Russian ambassador to 
return given the conflict, there were hopes that the return of the British and French 
representatives could still be achieved. Polignac was worried that this could show a 
lack of harmony in the alliance but Wellington was more concerned with the practical 
advantages of the move.107 Fearing the consequences of the coming year, the Duke 
wrote to the Foreign Secretary that ‘[i]t is quite clear to me […] that the Turkish power 
in Europe will be annihilated in the next campaign if something cannot be done for 
their relief’.108 Aberdeen was more hopeful as reports of the Russian losses sustained 
during the campaign ‘may possibly help to smooth the way for the return of our 
ambassadors’.109 Either way, their return was a necessity.  
Fortunately, the French government were agreed on this but for them, the need 
to conciliate Russian opinion was also a crucial matter. Though there were sufficient 
grounds already existing for the ambassadors of Britain and France to return, there 
was a need for some new reason from the Porte, ‘with the view of having some reason 
to give the Emperor of Russia for the step we were about to take which made it 
necessary to precede it by some such transaction’.110 Again, Britain was caught 
between France and Russia. While the French king was determined to maintain the 
peace, Polignac reassured Aberdeen that he would not allow ‘the indelible disgrace 
which would be cast upon England and France if, in consequence of delays and 
diplomatick punctilio, we quietly permitted the sack of Constantinople and the 
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destruction of the Turkish empire’.111 Nevertheless, Aberdeen and Wellington 
remained concerned with French sensitivities towards Russia. Wellington believed 
that ‘[w]e must lead the French with a gentle hand as fast as they will march with us’. 
For him  
The truth is that the French have two or three objects in view and they seek to 
attain each in its turn as it appears to suit the opinion of the salons at Paris. But 
the uppermost one in the mind of Monsieur de la Ferronays is to keep upon 
good terms with the Emperor Nicholas and to seek the attainment of other 
objects only as they will be compatible with this one.112 
This was the heart of the concern for the British government. There was still 
the lingering fear and concern about French intentions and plans, yet their alliance was 
the fulcrum of European relations at this time. Wellington believed that ‘[t]he way for 
France and us to keep well together which is an object so desirable to both countries 
is for each to examine well the bearings of every question upon the interests and 
honour of each before we enter too far with them’.113 This was all the more important 
because of the rumours that were circulating during the winter of 1828-29 about the 
difficulties and strains in the Austro-Russian relationship. Polignac looked upon a war 
between the two as ‘highly probable’ thanks largely to the ‘imprudence of Metternich’ 
whose ‘whole language was hostile to Russia’.114 While the Duke thought that war 
was unlikely, and told Aberdeen: ‘I’ll engage for it that the Emperor of Russia is more 
afraid of us who are as quiet as mice than he is of the Austrians, although the Austrians 
have more in their power immediately’, he nevertheless conceded there was a threat 
of a more general war.115 ‘The danger to be avoided […]’, he suggested, ‘is that the 
Emperor Nicholas, in order to extricate himself from the difficulties into which he has 
brought himself, may endeavour to excite a general war in Europe’. The Duke was 
clear that ‘[n]othing can prevent this misfortune or the overthrow of the Turkish 
empire which would be followed by a general war excepting the cordial union of 
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France with us in any measures to be adopted’, as well as Britain’s ‘total separation’ 
from Austria.116 
Fortunately, things did not reach this extreme, and the fears of the conflict 
escalating quickly subsided, but Britain remained caught between France and Russia. 
The early months of 1829 were comparatively quiet on the international scene. One 
problem was finally cleared when, after months of discussion, it was at last agreed in 
March that the French and British ambassadors should return to Constantinople to 
negotiate with the Turks about Greece on behalf of all the allies.117  This tranquillity 
was certainly not the case domestically where the battle for Catholic Emancipation 
was reaching its highest pitch – ‘[n]othing is thought of or talked of but the Catholic 
question’ recorded Greville in February118 – there were still ongoing concerns that it 
proved impossible to shake off. The eventual passage of the Catholic Relief Act, which 
received royal assent in early April 1829, enabled the government to take a step back 
to assess its diplomatic prospects. Wellington wrote to Aberdeen that: 
We must look at our whole position in this Greek affair. The three powers 
declaring that they look to no objects for themselves and France being in 
possession of the Morea and Russia being on the high road to efface the name 
of Turkey from the list of powers of Europe, while we are looking on and 
holding the candle, come to be matters of serious consideration.119 
With the passing of Catholic Emancipation, Peel’s role in the government assumed 
greater prominence, and from this point, he had greater weight in matters of foreign 
affairs. He at once grasped the difficulties of the British situation, noting in an 
important memorandum that ‘our position as a party to the treaty of the 6th July is daily 
becoming more embarrassing’. He took a very dim view of the conduct of the Russians 
in the Mediterranean and with Greece: ‘[i]f Russia and England were the sole parties 
to the treaty I for one would advise immediate dissolution of this treaty and the 
resumption of amicable diplomatic intercourse with the Porte’. Yet unfortunately this 
was not so simple: 
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The introduction of France as a party certainly complicates the question, but if 
we find one of three parties to a treaty making that treaty the instrument of 
effecting its own objects, indefinitely protracting the fulfilment of the objects 
of the treaty, perpetuating by the excitement of fresh troubles the necessity, or 
at least the original cause, of the treaty, no delicacy towards a third power 
ought to prevent us from acting for ourselves and from refusing to be made the 
tool of that power which abused the treaty to serve its own objects. 
Peel recommended that a plan for effecting the objects of the treaty should be made 
and that was it not followed Britain should withdraw. He did note, however, the need 
to discover what the effect of a withdrawal would be on France, in occupation of the 
Morea, and consider Britain’s situation should France and Russia ‘form a new treaty 
between themselves for the pacification of Greece, pretending to found that treaty on 
the principle of the treaty of the 6th July, which we had sanctioned by becoming a 
party to it, but carrying the principle much further and more to their own advantage.’120 
This was the fear that remained hanging over Britain throughout this time, and the one 
that most stifled its freedom of manoeuvre.121  
As the spring of 1829 moved into the summer, events reached crisis point. Now 
under the command of General Hans Karl von Diebitsch, an experienced commander 
during the Napoleonic Wars who had signed the convention of Tauroggen, rather than 
the Tsar, the Russian army in the Balkans won a string of successes that rapidly 
improved her position. By 19th August Adrianople had fallen, leaving Constantinople 
at the mercy of the Russian forces.122 Even before news reached London, Lord 
Aberdeen predicted that ‘[a] new epoch is about to arrive when the whole question 
will assume another character and of course will demand the most serious 
consideration’.123 While no one had expected the Ottomans to prevail in the campaign, 
the speed of their collapse came as a surprise. It finally brought about the crisis in 
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British foreign policy that had been brewing over the last eighteen months. Having 
failed at any point to overcome the difficulties he had inherited in the Treaty of 
London, Wellington and his government now saw the fruit of their own errors in 
sticking to France and failing to take any kind of initiative over the summer. The 
repeated assertions of waiting to see the outcome of the war before Britain would judge 
its effects left her powerless to react when it appeared likely that even Constantinople 
could fall into Russian hands.  
The impending end of the war and the crisis in British foreign policy excited 
comment from those outside of the government. Charles Greville commented that 
‘[s]till more extraordinary does it appear that the Duke, from whom vigour and 
firmness might have been expected, should not have interfered’. For him 
That cursed treaty of the 6th of July, and the subsequent battle of Navarino, 
which were intended to give us a right to arrest the ambition of Russia, have 
been rendered nugatory by the obstinacy of the Turks on the one hand, and the 
perpetual changes of Administration here and in France, which have prevented 
any steady and consistent course of policy from being followed; while the 
Russians, availing themselves of both these circumstances, have pushed on 
with singleness of purpose and great vigour of execution. It is quite impossible 
now to foresee the end of all this, but the elements are abroad of as fine 
disturbances as the most restless can desire.124 
Even at this moment of desperation, when Aberdeen was writing to de Rothesay of 
‘the urgency of the occasion and the magnitude of the crisis’, he was still merely 
seeking the opinion of the French government rather than seeking to impose Britain’s 
own ideas or plans to avoid the potential ‘catastrophe [of] the destruction of the 
Turkish Empire’.125 
At this point, one surprising figure emerged, steering the government towards 
a stronger line against Russia: Robert Peel. In a letter to Aberdeen, he warned that 
‘[w]e might be placed in such a situation that Remonstrances not justifiable on mere 
abstract Policy would become necessary for the maintenance of our honor’. He 
recommended collecting together the assurances of Russian moderation to base 
Britain’s stance on claims of breaches of faith. For him ‘[t]he justice of that claim will 
tell two ways. The stronger the assurances of moderation the more complete may be 
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our defence for having confided in the earlier stages of the proceeding, but then the 
more signed will be the breach of faith, and possibly the more insulting to our honour’. 
He added though ‘While I write this, so far from having any warlike spirit, I deprecate 
with the utmost earnestness the necessity of the particular War of which there is a 
distance murmuring’. Nothing could be achieved against Russia, apart from ‘the 
vindication of Honour’. Though France would be ‘our Natural Ally’, ‘there seems little 
prospect that France will be with us’ while Austria could not be relied upon. To then 
take a firm stance against Russia would possibly leave Britain isolated, and Peel ended 
on a dark note: ‘There then is a prospect of War in which we are pretty nearly single 
handed against Europe, and the “Right of Search” and General Jackson ready to 
embroil us in two months after its commencement with the United States’.126 Though 
not talked of often, there still remained this consciousness of the threat and 
opportunism of the USA should Britain get into a war – another brake on an active 
policy. 
One significant problem facing the government in the crafting of a response 
was the likely target of Russian aggrandisement. After having previously been 
promised that Russia would not annex any Ottoman territory, it emerged that it would 
likely take the strategic locations of Anapa and Poti on the northeastern coast of the 
Black Sea, controlling entry into the Caucasus. Though significant, these points were 
not of interest to any other European power. Austria was particularly concerned with 
the Principalities and the Balkans, and France with the Mediterranean, but only Britain 
was concerned with Asiatic Turkey.127 But it was impossible to do anything to save 
them. As Wellington admitted, they were ‘a trifle in comparison with the risk of 
attending the continuance of the Turkish war’: 
Anapa and Poti are not sufficiently well known, nor, indeed, are they so 
important to our interests, as to induce us to incur the risk of involving 
ourselves and all Europe in war, in order to prevent these places from falling 
into the hands of the Russians. But the Emperor of Russia ought to be told a 
little of our mind upon this subject when the Turks shall be out of the scrape.128 
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Aberdeen was relieved at Wellington’s assessment. For him, the towns ‘may be 
important; but we could never be justified in allowing the Turks, if we could help it, 
to continue the war for these objects. How many people know of the existence of these 
places? and of those who do, how many know their situation and importance?’129 The 
Duke summarised the situation in August: ‘it is quite evident that everything in Greece 
as well as in Turkey is going on as badly as possible for the interests of this country’, 
thanks to the establishment of Russian influence in Greece and the demands for the 
two Black Sea ports, ‘which is known by all Europe to be injurious to the interests of 
Great Britain alone’.130  
By this stage, Wellington and his government had already restricted their own 
freedom of manoeuvre. An overreliance on France left Britain in a difficult position. 
Mrs Arbuthnot’s belief was that Polignac’s ascent to power meant ‘we shall therefore 
have France sincerely in our interest, which is an immense advantage’ and that Britain 
could ‘[n]ow we shall be able to speak decidedly both to the Russians & Greeks & 
carry France with us’. 131 This was a view shared by Wellington and Aberdeen, French 
domestic opinion and even Prince Metternich.132 Yet all were mistaken. Instead of 
leading France, the British government was isolated and liable to be manipulated. 
Wellington told Aberdeen in August how Polignac ‘knows better than others the desire 
of this country to keep upon good terms with France and the sacrifices that we would 
make to secure that object. I would make many sacrifices, indeed any sacrifices, 
excepting our honour’.133 A few days later the Duke complained how ‘[w]e have made 
the greatest sacrifices of opinion, principles, and national pride and prejudice to our 
allies. In return they have not performed their promises […] We can talk of nothing 
excepting in the tone and quality of a power that is degraded’.134 This was a damning 
indictment of his own foreign policy to be in that position after over a year and a half 
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in power. These sacrifices and the reliance on France were even given a ridiculous 
light thanks to the frequent complaints about her actions, her preference for Russia, 
and that factions within France were even eager for war with Britain.135  
The true scale of the folly of close relations with France was not appreciated 
at the time but has become clear in hindsight. With fears that the collapse of the 
Ottoman Empire was imminent, Prince Polignac sought to lay the ground for an 
agreement with Russia to partition the remains and redistribute the borders in Europe 
itself with what has been described as ‘the most pretentious official nineteenth-century 
French plan for solving the Near Eastern question’, the Polignac Project.136 Russia 
would gain the Principalities and land in Asia, Austria would gain Serbia and Bosnia, 
Prussia receiving Holland and Saxony, with the latter getting the Prussian Rhineland 
in compensation, and France would gain the long coveted Southern Netherlands. 
Britain for her part would get the Dutch colonies, a poor compensation for the loss of 
the Low Countries as an independent buffer state, as well as Russian expansion in the 
direction of India.137 Although the project never materialised, this episode 
demonstrates some of the weaknesses of Wellington’s foreign policy in the Near East. 
Twenty months of efforts at concerting with France had not prevented the latter from 
reaching out to create the very alliance that was the most feared by Britain. 
Despite the problems of which the British government were aware, not to 
mention those of which they remained ignorant, they still would not seek to broaden 
their foreign policy by bringing in Austria. In late August the Foreign Secretary 
recorded that: ‘Esterhazy came to me after he had seen you yesterday and was very 
inquisitive about our opinions and intentions under the present crisis. He truly said that 
we might be comparatively at ease, but that it might be a question of life or death to 
them.’ Despite the importance of the issue, Aberdeen’s reply was, ‘[o]f course I said 
nothing to him of consequence and rather declined entering upon the subject at 
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present.’138 The Duke took the same attitude, adding ‘till we shall know the result of 
our reference to the French government we must say nothing to them’.139 This only 
had the effect of leaving British foreign policy at the mercy of others. As Aberdeen 
noted:  
It seems to me that we are in a bad way, principally because we are at the mercy 
of the Emperor. He can insult us if he pleases, and it is for him to judge how 
far he can venture to do so with impunity. Our position, that is the position of 
France and England, is more dependant[sic] upon the conduct of the Emperor, 
because we have in some manner guaranteed his sincerity by accepting his 
promises, and have thus given all Europe reason to believe they might be 
satisfied with his assurances.140 
Though Britain was the most dissatisfied with the conduct of Russia, the fact 
Wellington’s government saw itself in the position as guarantor of her actions 
demonstrates clearly the extent to which they had failed to extricate themselves from 
the mess they had inherited and had merely embedded themselves in it more firmly.  
Even at this stage, however, Wellington still very firmly blamed the 
Government’s difficulties on ‘Canning’s management’:  
He had set us at variance with every Court in Europe; that he had then made 
his famous treaty of July 1827, in which he embarked us with Russia in a cause 
which was opposed to our own interests & admitted France alone into the 
Treaty, which c[oul]d have no other effect than to give additional influence to 
Russia; that we had been struggling with this difficulty ever since & he did not 
see how we were to get out of it.141 
While the Treaty of London had undoubtedly left the Duke’s government with a 
troubled legacy, after this long in office Wellington’s protestations were beginning to 
have the ring of excuses. If anything, they underscored his own lack of diplomatic 
ideas and vision.  
By early September, rumours were circulating about the fall of Constantinople. 
‘A very few days will decide whether the Turkish Empire is to exist or not’, Aberdeen 
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wrote to Bathurst.142 Wellington speculated that if it had been captured, it would be 
the end of all questions of Greece and ‘to the Turkish empire in Europe’. With the fall 
of the capital, ‘[t]he world must then be reconstructed’ and to do this ‘there is no doubt 
that the best ground for satisfactory reconstruction would be a cordial co-operation 
between England and France, that is to say if the French government has a will of its 
own’. It would then be necessary to ‘reconstruct a Greek empire’ possessing the Straits 
as well as the mouth of the Danube.143 In a rare statement of intent, the British naval 
presence in the Mediterranean was reinforced.144 
In large part due to the weaknesses in Diebitsch’s own army, with supply lines 
overstretched and the ranks decimated by disease, Britain’s nightmare never came to 
pass. Nevertheless, on 14 September 1829, the Russian general signed the Treaty of 
Adrianople to bring the war to a conclusion.145 On the whole, it was a moderate peace, 
demanding only small territorial gains, including Anapa and Poti, as well as imposing 
an indemnity and reaffirming rights held by Russia in previous treaties. One notable 
extension of Russian rights was in Article VII which touched on trading rights and the 
passage of the Straits, but this was by no means a revolutionary innovation. 
Nevertheless, the treaty still provoked an outraged response in Whitehall. Following 
the conclusion of the peace, ‘[i]t would be absurd to think of bolstering up the Turkish 
power in Europe. It is gone in fact and the tranquillity of the world, or, what is the 
same thing, the confidence of the world in the permanence of tranquillity along with 
it’, the Duke wrote to Aberdeen.146 
Wellington outlined his views on the Treaty of Adrianople in a long 
memorandum. For him, the independent existence of the Ottoman Empire was under 
threat. At the start of the war, ‘His Majesty's government likewise declared their 
opinion that the most compleat [sic] success in the justest [sic] cause would not entitle 
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the stronger party to demand from the weaker sacrifices which would affect its 
political existence’ or reduce ‘the Ottoman power to a degree of weakness which 
would deprive it of the character of an independent power’. To this, the Russians had 
reassured Britain that there was ‘no intention exists of demanding indemnities which 
could affect the political existence of the Ottoman empire, and it was over again 
declared that the well understood interests of Russia excluded the idea of overthrowing 
the Turkish empire’. Yet the provisions of the Treaty of Adrianople seemed to go 
against these assurances. With the Principalities and Serbia both made independent in 
all but name, Wellington asked ‘[c]an it be believed that the Sultan can exercise an 
independent or any controul over the various people submitted to his government after 
such concessions have been extorted from him?’ On Article VII, the Duke thought that 
no-one would believe ‘that the power upon which it is imposed can be considered 
independent within its own territories’. The occupations of Ottoman territory that the 
treaty provided for until the Porte had paid off its indemnity also drew the ire of the 
Prime Minister. Though occupations in the Caucasus were respectable enough, given 
that they were ‘connected with schemes of ambition in Asia which Russia may 
reasonably entertain’, those in Europe were a different matter and instead ‘just grounds 
of suspicion are afforded that the principalities are kept in order to facilitate ulterior 
views upon the independence of the Porte and the integrity of the Turkish dominions’. 
For Wellington, 
[t]hese views are quite inconsistent with the Emperor's professions and 
promises and with the security of other powers, most particularly of Austria, 
to whom the occupation of the principalties [sic] for eleven years after the 
professions made are not only a serious injury but an insult. This injury and 
insult are aggravated by the prospect afforded by recent transactions and by 
this peace, that the Ottoman power must crumble to pieces, and that them, and 
with Silistria alone, the command of the navigation of the Danube and of the 
Black Sea. 
Surprisingly, the Duke thought that the best course would have been the actual 
occupation of Constantinople and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. In that 
situation, the ‘natural course’ would have been a Congress to settle the division of the 
empire, including the parts Russia had taken for itself. But now ‘it is difficult to have 
such a discussion’. Once again, this was blamed on the stances of other countries: ‘If 
France or Prussia were disposed to take any steps in concert with this country to 
prevent the evils which must be the consequence of this treaty of peace, they would 
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before this time have approached us. France will not move with England, and Austria 
without Prussia, and Prussia will not move without having being certain that the 
movement will be agreeable to the Emperor of Russia’. In light of all that had 
happened, Wellington thought that the aim now should be to get an agreement from 
the Great Powers that if the Ottoman Empire collapsed, ‘the dissolution of the 
dominions hitherto under its government should be concerted and determined upon by 
the five powers in conference’. This should be combined with a remonstrance to the 
Tsar, ‘strong in facts, yet moderate and respectful in language’, yet even this ‘should 
not be produced or ever come to light if we should be able to attain our object, that of 
obtaining a concert upon the future fate of the Turkish dominions’.147 
This memorandum encompasses many of the flaws of Wellington’s foreign 
policy in the Near East since coming into office. While quick to complain about the 
situation, especially to place the blame on the difficulties raised by allies, it was short 
on positive action. The emphasis on the need for concert was very much at odds with 
the Duke’s previous attitudes towards Austria, spurning her advances in preference for 
a policy tied closely to that of France. Even his close friend Mrs Arbuthnot was critical 
of Wellington: 
It vexes me to death for I am certain, when Parliament meets, the enemies of 
the Gov[ernmen]t will say that Russia has outwitted us, and it is true. We have 
got too much into a way of being afraid of a war. We are always tacking to 
what France or Austria will do, never taking the lead ourselves; and I am 
persuaded that, if we let the Emperor of Russia know that we w[oul]d resent 
his occupation of the Turkish territories, he w[oul]d not dare persist. But I am 
afraid we shan’t do it, & we shall be laughed at! I c[oul]d not help writing in 
this strain to the Duke and I dare say he will be angry.148 
Peel wrote to Aberdeen in a similar vein: ‘I think we should do nothing and 
say nothing to provoke Russia, but in the present position of England with relation to 
Russia, and the present temper of the English People in regard to Russian Conquests, 
we should not be too courteous or too confiding’.149 As has already been noted, the 
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financial contingencies placed on the administration by the Finance Committee of the 
previous year, and the wider moves in favour of retrenchment in government spending 
served to place constraints on the ability of Britain to wage war. However, while this 
was certainly a factor, the timidity of Wellington and the government in facing the 
problems that confronted them was also crucial. It points to the lack of a clear foreign 
policy strategy. 
The government were certain that a remonstrance was required.150 This was no 
simple matter, however. Given the peace had been negotiated on the spot by Diebitsch, 
it was by no means certain that the terms would not be altered by the Tsar and his 
government. Heytesbury had already sent word that Nesselrode was ‘so exceedingly 
annoyed personally’ at the General for including the occupation of the Principalities as it 
gave openings ‘to those who are always suspicious of an arrière pensée’. As a result, the 
ambassador had ‘very great hopes of seeing that article altogether new modelled in the 
ratifications’.151 Lord Ellenborough, never trusting entirely in the abilities of Aberdeen as 
a Foreign Secretary, drafted up a dispatch for Heytesbury to deliver to the Tsar as a 
remonstrance.152 But only two days later, Wellington was writing back to him saying that 
‘[w]e are in truth without knowledge of what will be the details of the treaty’. All that they 
knew is ‘that there is peace, but nothing more to a certainty. It is said among other things 
that the Emperor has ordered his army to cross the Balkan and even the Danube, that he 
means to remit a great part of the 10 millions of dollars and not to retain in his hands the 
principalities’. As a result, in the Duke’s mind ‘[i]t may still be necessary to remonstrate 
but it would be ridiculous to remonstrate till we should know for what’.153 Aberdeen 
reinforced this to Ellenborough: ‘We must really see what it is that we are to remonstrate 
about. We cannot remonstrate against his victories over the Turks, or the inevitable effect 
of these victories; although we may take means to protect ourselves, and all Europe, 
against the consequences’. In the Foreign Secretary’s mind ‘Something, no doubt, must 
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still be said; but if ever a knowledge of the tenth was necessary before speaking, I think it 
is now’.154 
Aberdeen was more revealing in a letter to Peel: ‘it has been necessary to suspend 
the remonstrance […] and its tone must be modified’, thanks to word from Heytesbury 
about the intention to reduce the indemnity and the occupations: ‘These were our great 
causes of remonstrance; The greater part of the remaining evils are not capable of remedy’. 
But, he told the home secretary, ‘[s]till, we must I suppose, make some sort of 
expostulation’.155 
This eventually came in the form of a remonstrance that was sent to Lord 
Heytesbury at the very end of October, which in turn was not received until late 
November, well over two months after peace had been concluded. The despatch, which 
was to be read to Nesselrode and a copy given to him if desired, began by stressing how 
the treaty had consequences that could ‘influence so powerfully the future happiness and 
tranquillity of all nations’ that it was necessary to communicate Britain’s sentiments. 
Though the relative situation of the Porte and Russia at the end of the war could have 
justified the imposition of ‘still harder terms’, and while ‘[i]t may not be easy to accuse of 
want of generosity, the conqueror who checks the unresisted [sic] progress of success, and 
who spares the defenceless Capital of his Enemy’, the Treaty of Adrianople did not meet 
the ‘expectations held out by preceding declarations and assurances [and] appears vitally 
to affect the interests, - the strength, - the dignity, - the present safety, - and future 
independence of the Ottoman Empire’. To challenge in such an explicit way the sincerity 
of Russia was quite a major step. The despatch even went on to comment how ‘[t]he 
independence of a State may be overthrown, and its subjection effectually secured, 
without the presence of a hostile force, or the permanent occupation of its soil’. 156  
These were clearly strong words to be saying to an ally in the moment of their victory, 
especially when contrasted with the French response ‘which had congratulated the 
Tsar on his moderation and magnanimity’.157 While Wellington could argue that ‘[t]he 
independance [sic] of the Porte is important to all the powers of Christendom’, the fact 
the remonstrance was a lone one was revealing.158 
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The dispatch indicated the depth of the problems of Britain’s foreign policy in 
the Near East. A lone remonstrance from Britain, unsupported even by the one ally, 
France, who she had courted since the beginning of Wellington’s administration, 
served merely to deepen the rift between Britain and the continent. Even the Foreign 
Secretary was unsure of its ultimate purpose. The remonstrance, he noted, was ‘a very 
delicate matter, and requires much care. If we state our case too strongly, why do we 
only remonstrate? If too courteously, why are we [deceived?]? We must not Forget 
that the two specifick objects of the remonstrance, when first proposed, are both 
already obtained, at least to a certain extent’.159 Instead of taking a lead, British foreign 
policy was left to drift until a conclusion came about that the government was 
convinced left the independence of the Ottoman Empire almost non-existent. This was 
not all Wellington’s doing; the treaty of London had moved Anglo-Russian mediation 
towards Franco-British-Russian intervention, overturning the balance in the 
Mediterranean in the process. Domestic difficulties with the retention of the 
Canningites in Cabinet during the first half of 1828 served to limit the Duke’s 
diplomatic options at the crucial juncture. But since their departure, foreign policy had 
not received a new focus. By prioritising close relations with France, Wellington had 
spurned promising possibilities with Austria to avert the problems that the 
remonstrance complained of. It allowed France the freedom to extort British 
permission for an expedition for the Morea, it gave her the openings to reach out to 
Russia, abortively, for a closer alliance, and the following year it would give her the 
space to make a very worrying intervention in North Africa, as will be explored below.  
The Treaty of Adrianople did, however, clear the way for a resolution of the 
war in Greece. Independence was to all extents settled, and the main question that 
remained was to settle on a monarch for the fledgling state. Even here was an issue on 
which Britain failed to take a clear line. While various candidates were suggested, the 
name of Leopold of Saxe-Coburg was one that was frequently returned to – indeed, he 
made the Tsar’s first list when the suggestion of a hereditary prince came up in 
December 1828.160 Leopold had been married to George IV’s daughter, Charlotte, was 
still in receipt of a generous British pension after his wife’s death and remained 
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resident in England at Claremont House.161 Despite this, however, he was not a 
particularly favoured candidate by the British government. When Laval, in 
conversation with Aberdeen, ‘tried to describe him as a candidate’, the Foreign 
Secretary ‘corrected him, and said that since the rejection of Prince Philip of Hesse we 
had put forward no other candidate than Prince Frederick of Orange’.162 
Instead of advocating him as a unifying candidate, and one that would be the 
option most likely to take a pro-British line in Greek affairs, suspicion was directed 
his way, as was the wont of Wellington’s administration. The Duke thought that ‘as 
the French do not object to his being the sovereign of Greece, there must be something 
in the idea that he is [to] connect himself with the House of Orleans’.163 Even when it 
was clear that Russia would be happy to support his candidature, there was only very 
grudging acknowledgement of Leopold’s advantages by Aberdeen: ‘Perhaps the only 
method as a middle term will be to agree upon Leopold who nobody likes but to whom 
no one objects’.164  
One crucial figure did object: George IV. In December 1829, it emerged that 
he had promised his support for the claim of Charles of Mecklenburg.165 This was 
completely separate from the actions of his ministers, and without consultation, and it 
threatened to bring down the Government. Upon learning of it, Wellington was aware 
of both the domestic implications of the King acting separately from his ministers, and 
the diplomatic effects as well. He wrote to Aberdeen stating that ‘[t]he affair upon 
which this correspondence takes place is not trivial. It is the most important one of the 
day in foreign affairs, and one in which the honor and interests of this country are 
materially involved’. The Duke was of the view that ‘[w]e must then accept Prince 
Charles or we must quarrel with our allies or we must go out. I should prefer the last. 
But I conceive that we shall not be able to make the world feel the difference between 
Prince Charles and Prince Leopold, even if we could state it in publick We should be 
accused then of having resigned in disgust because we could not make Prince Leopold 
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the sovereign of Greece’. The course which Wellington chose was confrontation with 
the King: ‘Rely upon it that the only safe course for us to take is to strike at once at 
what is a gross unconstitutional irregularity which may be followed by national 
inconvenience, injury and dishonour’.166 
This came at an especially inconvenient time as it was increasingly becoming 
clear that Leopold was the only acceptable candidate and Wellington had set himself 
to actually removing the obstacles (such as his naturalisation as a British citizen) to 
his eventual accession. Things were tied up in discussions with the French though – 
another sign that all of the Duke’s good will had yielded scant rewards: 
If we had Polignac here as the French ambassador I think that we should get 
the better of all these difficulties by the adoption of a different form of words 
in the protocole. [sic] Situated as we are with the King opposed to his ministers 
and in communication with the opposition of the government on the one hand 
and the corps diplomatique on the other through his brother, the Duke of 
Cumberland, and this corps diplomatique eager to excite an opposition to the 
government, our position is most difficult and critical. Monsieur de Laval 
aggravates all these difficulties.167 
Nevertheless, by 8th January 1830, Britain, France and Russia had settled at last on 
Prince Leopold as their candidate and George IV remained the only problem ahead of 
them. The King’s objection was founded solely on a dislike of Leopold as opposed to 
any particular desire to use the issue to force the Government out, as had been 
suspected. Leopold wrote to Wellington that the affair ‘might be understood if the 
[King] founded his opposition upon the impossibility of his giving consent to so unfit 
an individual, but he lays himself completely open’ by an insistence on the ending of 
his pension.168 After a series of meetings with Wellington and Aberdeen, the King 
finally surrendered and gave his consent to the nomination. Even this was grudging 
though, complaining how he could not ‘but deeply regret the selection made by France 
and Russia of Prince Leopold’ and that ‘[w]ithout entering into a detail of reasoning 
the King considers Prince Leopold not qualified for this particular station’.169 
                                                 
166 Wellington to Aberdeen, 8 Dec. 1829, Wellington Mss., WP1/1065/18 (also in WND, vol. 
VI, pp. 312-4).  
167 Wellington to Aberdeen, 2 Jan. 1830, Wellington Mss., WP1/1090/7 (also in WND, vol. 
VI, pp. 370-1).  
168 Leopold to Wellington, 13 Jan. 1830, Wellington Mss., WP1/1085/11 (also in WND, vol. 
VI, p. 407).  
169 George IV to Wellington, 19 Jan. 1830, Wellington Mss., WP1/1086/9 (also in WND, vol. 
VI, p. 426). 
207 
 
Early in February 1830, the three powers congratulated themselves on securing 
the nomination and thus entering the final straight.170 This was to prove premature. 
Leopold now began probing into the situation of Greece and enquiring as to what 
situation it would be in relation to Britain, France and Russia, to Europe generally, and 
what his pecuniary situation would be to run the state, especially important, as Leopold 
wrote to Wellington, because ‘the provisional government has till now only existed by 
foreign subsidies, which I am told are from hence to cease’.171 This would mark the 
slow unravelling of the situation, as Leopold imposed conditions on his acceptance. 
He made clear his desire for ‘a large loan, guaranteed by the Powers; allied troops, at 
least until a Greek army could be properly organised; the cession of Crete; and a firm 
indication that the Greeks wanted him as their sovereign’. These terms were all 
accepted by Wellington. Though Chamberlain expresses surprise that Wellington and 
Aberdeen agreed to the soldiers, this was completely consistent with his long-term 
attitudes. 172 The Prime Minister wrote how he ‘never saw any difficulty about the 
troops if they were not the troops of the three powers only’ and that he was happy to 
provide the money for Leopold to hire men from another European sovereign.173 Given 
the Duke’s experience of the role of foreign soldiers providing an important state-
building role as Commander-in-Chief of the Army of Occupation in France and his 
later advocacy on numerous occasions of British soldiers providing an opportunity to 
reform the army in Portugal, this was firmly in line with his worldview.  
Likewise, his desire to ensure that Greece, and Britain, were not tied to France 
and Russia in this case, bears a resemblance to his desire to pursue an equitable troop 
reduction in 1817 to retain the European aspect of the Occupation. By now though, 
Wellington’s views were tinged with a bitterness absent from his earlier diplomatic 
positions. He objected to the joint use of troops with France and Russia, and to a joint 
guarantee of territory as it would be ‘still the triple alliance. We shall still be in the 
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hands and at the disposal of our worst enemies in Europe and all our movements under 
their direction’.174 
Despite Wellington’s acceptance of Leopold’s conditions, and his overriding 
desire to be free of his nominal allies, the question of Greece was not resolved. In May 
1830, Leopold formally declined the nomination, citing that he had still not received 
an unequivocal invitation from the Greeks.175 As far as Wellington was concerned, 
‘[h]is refusal is founded entirely upon reasons ad captandum’, though he was still of 
the view that ‘this does not signify, our case is excellent’.176 The search for a monarch 
would have to begin anew, a task left uncompleted by Wellington thanks to the French 
and Belgian Revolutions that would blow all other diplomatic business out of the 
water, and then the fall of his administration in November.  
This failure to conclude the Greek affair was symptomatic of the foreign policy 
of the Duke’s Government and capped off a roundly disastrous period on the Eastern 
Question. Quite simply, Wellington failed to secure his preferences at any point 
throughout his time in office. Instead, he lumbered from crisis to crisis, blaming 
anyone other than himself – be it Canning’s legacy, the Canningites in Cabinet, 
Britain’s own representatives abroad, the French, the Russians or the Lievens in 
particular – for the failure to properly outline British priorities and draw up a coherent 
plan, or even a vague sense, of how to go about achieving them in a realistic manner. 
Though there were substantial problems facing Wellington’s Government, the fault 
lay solely at the Prime Minister’s door for not being able to chart a way around them. 
Two planks of the Duke’s foreign policy outlook seemed to have been abandoned 
during these years: his pragmatism and his internationalism. It is quite possible that 
his tendency to micromanage the conduct of the Government meant that never saw the 
wood from the trees in the Near East. He became too embedded in the questions and 
was unable to take sensible positions that he would have recommended previously. 
Certainly, his obsession with sticking close to France meant that he never tried to 
broaden his base of support by bringing in Austria. That strong internationalist streak 
that had run through his earlier career seemed to have been lost in this case. The Near 
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East really did mark the arena in which Wellington demonstrated the gulf that had 
developed between his own conceptions of the conduct and course of foreign policy 






Portugal and Algiers: 
Wellington and British 
Foreign Policy, 1826-30 
 
While the Eastern Question increasingly occupied the attention of diplomats 
in the latter half of the decade, Wellington also faced a number of other important 
issues. The first of these was the continuing problem of Portugal, where two branches 
of the ruling Braganza dynasty vied with each other for control following the death of 
John VI in March 1826. This dispute would concern Wellington in this form for the 
rest of the decade. It would later change its character after the abdication of Dom Pedro 
as Emperor of Brazil in 1831 – creating the conditions of the seeming conflict between 
constitutionalism and absolutism that Palmerston intervened so notably in. Apart from 
Portugal, 1830 would be an especially difficult year, with many problems for British 
diplomacy. The first of these was the French intervention in Algeria that would 
eventually lead to a full-blown occupation –against British wishes. A few months later 
and the regime of Charles X was overthrown by a revolution in Paris, his African 
adventure failing to distract his subjects from the internal problems in France. The fall 
of the Bourbons in another revolution seemed a deeply concerning prospect and one 
that could easily have resulted in war. Following swiftly after was a rebellion in 
Brussels that quickly escalated until it was apparent that the southern provinces of the 
United Netherlands were likely to split off. Having overseen the construction of the 
Barrier Fortresses in the rebellious areas, Wellington was keenly aware of their 
strategic importance and the need to reach a satisfactory conclusion to this question.  
In all of these matters, the Duke operated with a calm and pragmatic policy. 
He was not ideological, and certainly not reactionary – as his quick acceptance of the 
fall of Charles X made clear. Instead, given the conditions in front of him, he set out 
to solve problems as best he could. In this, he was remarkably successful, especially 
in contrast with his policy towards Russia and the Near East. In the Belgian Question, 
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in particular, Wellington laid the ground for Palmerston’s own success, though the 
Duke’s contribution has rarely received the credit it deserves.  
 
Portugal 1826-30 
Having seemingly overcome the difficulties of the earlier part of the decade, 
Portugal was once again plunged into crisis following the death of John VI in March 
1826. The Crown fell to his son, Dom Pedro, who since 1822 had ruled an independent 
Brazil. Those earlier problems had demonstrated that it was impossible to rule Portugal 
from Rio de Janeiro or Brazil from Lisbon any more. As a result, Dom Pedro decided 
to abdicate in favour of his eight-year-old daughter, naming her Queen Maria II, with 
his sister, the Infanta Isabella, as her regent. Crucially, he accompanied this move with 
a constitution that he wrote without consulting anyone in Portugal nor having been 
officially acclaimed as King of Portugal by the Cortes. Pedro’s brother, Dom Miguel, 
opposed both moves and claimed that Pedro’s abdication counted for all of his line 
and that he was the rightful King in Maria’s place. Miguel’s supporters began to desert 
the army and flee to absolutist Spain. Their return later in the year would provide the 
spark that triggered British intervention.1  
It was clear in London that the complications resulting from the granting of the 
constitution would have a destabilising effect on the Peninsula. Wellington was deeply 
concerned about the impact it would have on Spain especially given that whatever they 
felt towards the constitution would be ‘ten times aggravated by the taunts and reviling 
of the Spaniards and their government, which we know to be uppermost in the heart 
and mind of every Portuguese’. He believed that an attack on Portugal would be very 
likely. To prevent this, the Duke suggested to Canning that open discussions and 
publications of the legislature there should be suspended, as should the freedom of the 
press for a temporary period. In Wellington’s opinion ‘by these measures [the 
Portuguese] deprive their enemies of all cause of establishing in their country a 
reasonable system of government, and I need not add the advantages, even in Spain, 
which would be the consequences of the tranquil establishment in Portugal of the 
government under the charter’. The main reason for suggesting this course, though, 
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was ‘in order that we avoid being involved in fresh hostilities in Portugal in which we 
must be principals if they are to be successful, or the misfortune of seeing Portugal in 
the possession of an enemy, Spain, which must be the consequence of our omitting to 
interfere’.2 Wellington was above all eager to prevent the outbreak of war and in 
September told Mrs Arbuthnot ‘positively that, if the Cabinet pursued measures with 
regard to Portugal which he thought likely to bring on war, he w[oul]d quit the 
Gov[ernmen]t for that he w[oul]d not be implicated in councils he thought so 
disastrous to the country’.3 
As well as urging a conciliatory policy by the Regency in Portugal, the Duke’s 
policy recommendations included an emphasis on improving the military situation 
there. Lord Liverpool asked Wellington his thoughts on how capable Portugal was of 
defending herself as the Prime Minister had ‘adopted the idea that Portugal single-
handed was, in a defensive war, a complete match for Spain single-handed’.4 This, 
Wellington replied, was certainly the case, but it was of a ‘Portugal with her army and 
her other military establishments and resources, such as militia and landwehr or 
ordenanzas well-organized, compleat, [sic] and well-disciplined and commanded, her 
fortresses garrisoned and supplied with all requisite for their defence, and the material 
and other establishments of an army in the field in a fit state for service’. In those 
circumstances, the Duke believed that Portugal would be ‘more than a match for 
Spain’, and consequently, that was a position in which he had always laboured to see 
her placed. Doing so would mean that ‘we might be ourselves in some degree of 
security that the war would not recommence’. However, in the summer of 1826, 
Portugal was very clearly not in that well-organised state, and the situation was only 
likely to get worse rather than better. As a result, Wellington advised the Prime 
Minister that  
[w]hat we must endeavour to do then is to prevail upon Portugal so to shape 
her course under her new system as not only not to give ground of offence, but 
that the allies and advisers of Spain, who are still desirous of and have an 
interest in the continued preservation of the general peace, may be satisfied 
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that the most effectual measures have been adopted to prevent the new 
institutions in Portugal from giving offence or creating mischief in Spain. 
This is all that we can do a[t] present, and we must hope that in time Portugal 
may not be a burthen to us, if she should not become a useful ally.5 
This concern for the military situation, and his preference to ensure that 
Portugal should be well defended, both for her own sake and Britain’s, led Wellington 
to be involved in the question of Lord Beresford returning to take charge of the 
Portuguese army. George Canning left the matter up to the discretion of the Duke and 
Lord Liverpool.6 In the latter’s opinion, Beresford’s return marked ‘the only chance 
of rendering that army effective, and of checking the insane proceedings of the Spanish 
government’.7 To begin with, Wellington was not of the same view. His initial 
assessment was that the situation, and the army’s regard for Dom Miguel, made it ‘far 
less likely that he[Beresford] will be able to re-establish the discipline and efficiency 
of the army than it would have been some years ago’. He further doubted of the 
wisdom of Canning’s condition that Beresford should not hold a post in the Portuguese 
cabinet, something Wellington considered absolutely necessary.8  
A few days later the Duke wrote to Beresford and expanded on his thinking. 
He told the Marshal that ‘[t]he circumstances of the times are altered, your own 
personal position is not the same that it was, and the army has relations with the Infante 
Don Miguel which you may find inconvenient in the exercise of your authority’. Yet 
despite this, Wellington was not completely despondent. Beresford’s name and 
character still carried weight and he ‘may be able to restore order, regularity and 
discipline to this mass of confusion and mutiny’. The Duke added that ‘if you should 
succeed I don’t hesitate in saying that you will have rendered to this country and to 
Europe the greatest service that it is in the power of any man possibly to render at the 
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present moment’.9 Wellington remained clear that Britain’s interests were served by a 
peaceful Iberian Peninsula, and that hinged on the internal state of Portugal.  
At this stage, the matter was complicated by Wellington’s complaints about  
Canning’s behaviour. Upon reading through the despatches to Portugal and Spain, the 
Duke realised that Frederick Lamb, then the ambassador to Madrid, had been 
instructed to withdraw should the Spanish government not ensure the Portuguese 
deserters gave up their arms. This, Wellington wrote to the Prime Minister, was an act 
which, ‘will be considered as a signal of war throughout Europe and which will 
infallibly mix this country in this Portuguese dispute unless we should alter our course 
from the principle on which this step is taken and will, therefore, involve this country 
in war’. What the Duke found most difficult and offensive, however, was that all these 
instructions had been issued ‘without any one of the ministers being aware of the 
existence even of discussion’.10 Liverpool brushed these objections off, pointing out 
the difficulties of consultation during the Parliamentary recess, and that Canning’s 
actions were taken in concert with Russia and France and had, anyway, been 
successful.11  
Regardless of Canning’s conduct, Wellington remained sceptical of British 
involvement in the Peninsula. He told the Prime Minister to ‘rely upon it that we never 
were in such a scrape in relation to war as we shall be in if we get to war with Spain 
single handed in alliance with Portugal’. With no glory to be had in the operations that 
would take place, the country would turn against it and when they had become 
‘heartily tired of the war, France and the United States will take part in it, and God 
knows the result’. He ended his letter by imploring Liverpool to ‘[s]ave us from this 
disgrace and mischief’.12 Wellington’s analysis of the risks of such a conflict with 
Spain has clear echoes, and lessons, that reverberate throughout the following years 
and centuries of the dangers of Great Power military interventions against, 
theoretically, much weaker states, but without a clear sense of how the conflict is to 
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be won, or the means to be used to achieve those ends. The Duke repeated his concerns 
to Canning and added that ‘[i]t is with this sentiment of what a war with Spain would 
be, that I have so often urged that we should attend to the military establishments and 
state of Portugal’.13 
For Wellington, Lord Beresford would be the means by which this could be 
accomplished. By 14th October, Wellington had spoken to him and reported to 
Liverpool that the Marshal would return to Portugal to assess the situation there and 
accept the position of Commander of the Portuguese army if it should meet his 
approval.14 In passing on Beresford’s conditions to the Prime Minister, Wellington 
wrote about the attitudes of foreign powers. Uncharacteristically, he brusquely 
dismissed them: ‘They will, of course, be jealous of the whole arrangement, but as for 
my part I shall be indifferent in respect to their feelings, if Lord Beresford can only 
put Portugal in a reasonable state of defence and thus render that country an efficient 
ally to, instead of being as she is, a burthen upon the country’.15 This stance reflected 
his own long service in the country, as well as his analysis of the strategic significance 
of the Portuguese alliance, not to mention the risks involved in its dissolution.  
Nevertheless, on arrival in Lisbon, Beresford was inclined to turn down the 
offer of the command. He was unhappy at the situation regarding Dom Miguel and the 
possibility that he could take over the regency the following year. He wrote to the 
Duke, against the latter’s advice to avoid all communication with him and the 
government in Britain,16 that  
There are several other very weighty reasons for declining to take the 
command, but the principal is what I have already stated, the instability of the 
Regent. I can neither feel or give confidence to others and tho[ugh] I know and 
feel I should get greatly better on with the Infanta Regent than it is probable I 
could with Dom Miguel, yet I fear that here, until he is sent, it will never be 
considered as a fixed and stable government. He is held out to them as their 
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final regent or sovereign and for the peace of the kingdom the sooner he can 
be placed in the government the better.17 
A few days later he expanded on this, telling Wellington that the Portuguese 
army was so ‘totally demoralized’, that the force and coercion needed to restore it to 
a reasonable state would ‘drive every delinquent into Spain’. Given the unfriendly 
attitude of that country, and the fact that ‘the Miguelista party are using every effort 
to debauch what remains of the army would, I am convinced, dissolve the army 
altogether’. 18 Beresford believed that if he tried and failed, the effect would be more 
counterproductive to both his position in Portuguese politics and to Britain’s influence 
than if no attempt had been made at all.19   
The Portuguese difficulties were at this point escalated by the incursion of the 
Miguelist deserters from over the border, despite the belief that the Spanish king was 
coming around to disarming them.20 Though Beresford had not yet accepted formal 
command of the army, the plan that his mere presence would have a pacifying effect 
had backfired. As Collins has argued, ‘British support, aimed at stimulating reform, 
had the contrary effect of encouraging political manoeuvring’, thus rendering any 
response to the incursions ineffective.21 Quite what the incursions signified was also 
an important matter and one that required different responses from the British 
government. As Beresford put it to Wellington: 
Will these troops coming in be considered as an invading army? Wherein if 
unassisted by Spaniards it becomes a civil war, or one of party against party; 
and this makes me doubt if we should here interfere, tho[ugh] the allowing 
these troops to muster, and indeed to give them arms and ammunition and, I 
understand, guns, is clearly an act of hostility on the part of Spain, as great I 
think as if their own troops had accompanied them. But that Spain is 
answerable for, and the question still remains, if whilst the war between the 
two nations is Portugueze against Portugueze [sic], England will from the 
above act, if coming from Spain, take part with the defending side? 
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This further affected Beresford’s attitude towards taking up the command, noting that 
should Spain ‘take a decided part and invade this kingdom, then my position might be 
very much changed and it might be right I should lend my assistance to check and 
retard the enemy ‘till assistance could come from England’.22 While it appeared that 
no Spanish troops would actually enter Portugal with the rebels, Beresford wrote to 
the Duke that he could not ‘see what difference that makes as to the conduct of Spain, 
which appears to have been most treacherous, but I cannot pretend to say how far you 
in England will consider the entrance into Portugal of the Portuguese troops a cause 
to induce you to take part against them and their adherents in Portugal, or if you will 
consider them in Portugal as the two parties fighting for superiority’.23 
For Wellington, the matter was clear cut; Britain had to intervene. Mrs 
Arbuthnot recorded in her journal how he had received the news from Canning while 
they dined ‘en trio’ together with her husband Charles Arbuthnot. The Duke told them 
that ‘if by the presence of a body of British soldiers the Portugueze [sic] Government 
are enabled to organize their army & make it efficient, our troops will do good’. This 
was in line with all his reasoning on the question of Portugal. Britain had to ensure she 
could stand on her own two feet to be a useful ally, and Wellington approved of any 
means to achieve that, be it Lord Beresford on his own, or an entire British army. Mrs 
Arbuthnot drew a comparison with Canning, who she thought ‘hopes it will blow up 
a war’. 24 She remarked a few days later that ‘[a]ll the army are charmed with this 
appearance of warlike action, & I dare say the whole nation w[oul]d be delighted if 
we had a war. We certainly are a strange people, & très inconsequent for, 
notwithstanding all our complaints of our debt & our distresses, we shall send out 
these troops without the slightest difficulty & every body will be pleased’.25  
A force of just under 5,000 men was to be gathered for this purpose, and the 
Duke threw himself into the planning for it.26 A memorandum of his would form the 
basis of the eventual instructions for its commander, Sir William Clinton.27 The nature 
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of the intervention and state of the situation on the ground in Portugal necessarily 
meant that these were quite complex. Given that Spain had ‘connived at the invasion 
of Portugal’ by the deserters, Wellington believed that ‘if there should be such a body 
in arms within the country, the British corps is to take the field against it if so required 
by the Portuguese government and the general officer commanding should deem his 
force sufficient’. Should forces from Spain have been beaten by the time that the 
British contingent arrived, however, then ‘it is not intended that our corps should take 
the field or move from Lisbon with a view to protect any part of the country against 
invasion, or to put down insurrection in any part of the country which insurrection is 
not actually supported by a body of troops from Spain’. Wellington realised that 
determining the nature of the rebels faced was a difficult matter and noted that 
‘discretion must […] be exercised on the spot upon this question which is merely 
political’ – pointing out the need to decide in advance whether the commander, the 
British ambassador or Lord Beresford (should he be in command of the Portuguese 
forces), or all three of them would be making the judgements. The only time that the 
British force should intervene without prejudice to the involvement of troops from 
Spain would be in the case of an ‘insurrection in Lisbon itself, which shall endanger 
the lives or safety of the Princess Regent or any part of the royal family’, in which 
case Clinton should ‘make every effort by the employment of the force under his 
command to protect their persons, to provide for their safety and to put down such 
insurrection’.28 As Muir has argued, ‘[t]he impossibility of identifying the personal 
history of every Portuguese rebel was self-evident, as was the inevitability that the 
blame would fall upon Clinton if anything went wrong, but such are the perils of 
attempting to marry the limited, conditional use of force to an ambiguous foreign 
policy’.29 
The Duke expanded on the aims and intentions of the intervention in a letter to 
Beresford. Should Clinton ‘consider himself strong enough’, he was to attack the 
deserters and force them from the country: ‘We cannot blow hot and cold’. Wellington 
was absolutely clear on it: ‘however strongly we may desire and sincerely intend not 
to interfere in the internal concerns of Portugal we cannot allow an hostile corps sent 
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in from Spain to exist in Portugal if we have the means of destroying it or driving it 
out’. In line with his consistent conciliatory stance on matters of this kind, the Duke 
told Beresford that when the British contingent was in place that ‘the government 
should grant a general pardon to all concerned in the late events, who should lay down 
their arms and submit’. He was not surprised that ‘[w]hen princes commit the follies 
which those of the House of Braganza have done in the last few years, it is not unlikely 
that subjects will go wrong, and they may be misled even to the last extremities of 
rebellion and treason. But some allowances must be made for the circumstances which 
have occasioned these misfortunes’. Wellington’s hope was that ‘a general pardon 
offered at the moment in which the government will be in strength to put down the 
rebellion will be submitted to and thankfully adopted, that the misfortunes of a civil 
and possibly a foreign war may be avoided and that the country will be restored to its 
accustomed tranquillity and happiness’.30 Unfortunately for Portugal, many of these 
dreams were unrealised. 
After being called on by Canning, the Duke spoke in the House of Lords to 
give his backing to the intervention. In a short contribution the Duke reiterated his 
moderate line. He told the House that he believed that the ‘perfidious acts of aggression 
on Portugal’ should not be laid at the door of the King of Spain, but instead ‘attributed 
to the servants of the Spanish government, than to that government itself. They ought, 
in his opinion, to be looked upon as the acts of the captains-general of provinces, and 
even of the ministers of the king of Spain, than as ordered or advised by his Catholic 
majesty’. At any rate, ‘he fully concurred in the measures intended to repress them’. 
The invasion of the rebel forces in Wellington’s mind ‘made out a casus fœderis, and 
that would afford a sufficient justification of our interference’ and he hoped that the 
exertions of his majesty, aided by those of his most Christian majesty, would have the 
effect of bringing the king of Spain to that sense of what was due to himself and his 
own dignity, which would prevent him from allowing any aggression on the territories 
of his neighbour, and our near ally’.31 
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At the same time as Wellington was giving his speech, Canning was speaking 
in the House of Commons, giving one of the finest orations of his career. He urged the 
House to ‘fly to the aid of Portugal, by whomsoever attacked, because it is our duty to 
do so’. Britain went ‘not to rule, not to dictate, not to prescribe constitutions, but to 
defend and to preserve the independence of an ally. We go to plant the standard of 
England on the well-known heights of Lisbon. Where that standard is planted, foreign 
dominion shall not come.’32 According to Temperley, as he ‘uttered these words he 
looked upwards. A beam of light streamed through the windows and smote on him, 
and his face seemed as if inspired’.33 While many were fulsome in their praise and 
looked on Canning’s intervention in the light that Temperley later would, in practice 
it was a divisive speech, Greville noted that it was celebrated more by the Opposition 
benches than the Government ones. Furthermore, his colleagues took exception to 
Canning stating that ‘“I called into existence the new world to redress the balance of 
the old.” The I was not relished’.34 
Mrs Arbuthnot did not hold back at all in her commentary of the speech:  
Mr. Canning made the most abominable speeches that ever were heard, I think. 
He said that he had been reproached for not preventing the French occupation 
of Spain; he had done better. He had rendered it of no importance, he had 
looked for revenge to Spanish America &, by declaring the independence of 
her colonies, had left Spain as a millstone round the neck of France & rendered 
her very different from that Spain on whose dominions the sun never set. He 
said, too, that if England made war it w[oul]d be a war of opinion & that all 
the discontented of Europe w[oul]d range themselves under the banner of 
England, & that it behoved Europe to beware how she forced England to wield 
this tremendous engine. This a Minister who professes to be anxious for peace 
& to want the King of France to declare in his speech to the Chambers that he 
will act in conjunction with us! I think it behoves England herself to beware 
how she enters upon a war upon exactly the same principles as those professed 
by the French of 1792. They proffered fraternity & alliance to all the 
discontented of other countries, & dearly have they & all Europe paid for the 
offer & the acceptance. It behoves her, too, to beware how she upholds a 
Minister who dares, publicly in his place, to avow such sentiments & to hold 
out such dark threats to Europe. Mr. Canning was most loudly & vehemently 
cheered by the Opposition, those on his own side were deadly silent.35 
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This icy reception to what was in theory a Government triumph, and one that 
Wellington supported, demonstrated the gulf that had developed with the Tory party 
by this stage. What was a victory for Canning was received as a blow by sections of 
the Government and its supporters – a situation that foreshadowed the demarche of 
the following year between the Foreign Secretary and Wellington over the succession 
to Lord Liverpool. Wellington himself made some muted criticism of the speech in a 
letter to Bathurst. He told him that ‘I judge from the report of the conversation with 
Monsieur de Damas that the King of France would not inform the legislative body that 
he had been acting in concert with His Majesty because we pass in Europe for a 
Jacobin Club!’ Fortunately, in his mind, ‘as yet we have only boasted that we are such 
a body. Our acts do not yet prove it’. In a cynical observation in the postscript, 
Wellington added: ‘I see in the dispatches to Vienna and Paris that we are now 
explaining away the meaning of our speeches’.36 
The British force began embarking for the Portugal on 17th December and was 
due to arrive by Christmas Eve.37 News of Parliament’s approval of the expedition 
reached Lisbon on 18th December and the news had an immediate impact. Beresford 
wrote to Wellington: ‘[b]y this the state of things here becomes entirely changed, 
tho[ugh] such has not been unexpected’. The arrival of British soldiers would affect 
Beresford’s own role and ‘places me, independently of former considerations, in a new 
situation’. He told the Duke that there was no reason to delay now ‘to take a part here, 
if by this government it should still be desired and that they will accede to such 
conditions as I have all along thought necessary, and the which I have had no reason 
to suppose would be denied, in case they may still think my services useful or that 
they wish them’.38 Despite this, delay was what happened and eleven days later he was 
still unsure of whether his offer of command would be accepted. He had begun to form 
doubts about the wisdom of accepting it anyway as ‘if they wanted me for the present 
crisis, it would in all probability prevent my continuing in command after the bussiness 
[sic] was concluded, or it would infallibly make me be considered as a party man and 
deprive me afterwards of that character of impartiallity [sic], so necessary to guard to 
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be useful after such unhappy conflicts as those now passing here’. Furthermore, he 
was of the opinion that his service might not even be needed, telling the Duke that 
‘[t]he truth is that so soon as the news came here of the decision in England, the moral 
effect was such to turn the scale most decidedly, and in this town in one hour, 
everything was changed from the strongest depression and melancholy on one side, to 
confidence and exultation and the reverse on the other side’.39 Two days later though, 
and despite the rejection of some of his demands, Beresford wrote to Wellington that 
he had accepted the temporary command of the Portuguese army. He had ‘infinite less 
authority’ than when he had previously been in command, but in a situation where 
‘disorder and confusion prevails everywhere’ he could not leave ‘two armies without 
a general head or point of union’ especially when ‘my own government feels such 
interest in seeing a stop put to this state of affairs’.40 
Wellington was disappointed at the command Beresford had been given. He 
told Canning that it was ‘very different from that which I held during the war, from 
that which he held himself since the war, and from that which I considered he would 
have held when I proposed that the British troops should be placed under his command 
in case there should be any conjoint operation’. Previously, both he and Beresford had 
been directly under the Portuguese King but the new command was under the Minister 
at War. The result of that would be that Beresford was not acting under his own 
discretion but instead ‘under the orders of, and responsible to, a revolutionary 
Minister’. In these circumstances, Wellington believed that ‘[i]n the way of forming 
the Portuguese army he will certainly do no good and that, in my opinion, is the main 
object of Lord Beresford’s remaining in Portugal’.41 It further opened up difficulties 
about the command of the British troops which were to be placed under him. To 
Liverpool, the Duke stressed that ‘[t]here can be no trifling in middle term upon this 
subject’.42 The Prime Minister was of the same view, telling Wellington that ‘I have 
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always considered it as necessarily incident to the powers of a commander in chief 
[…] that whatever his previous general instructions may be, he must have a complete 
discretion as to the details and to the application of them’. Given that, he believed that 
if there was ‘the least doubt upon this point, there ought to be no delay in setting it 
right, for everyone must see that it would be nearly as unsafe to trust the command of 
the British army to Lord Beresford as it would be to trust it to any other Portugueze 
[sic] officer, if Lord Beresford has not really the efficient command of the Portugueze 
army’.43 
It quickly became clear that Beresford was certainly not in efficient command. 
News arrived in late January 1827 that he was ‘ill with a large party at Lisbon, and to 
say the truth if he speaks of the Portuguese army openly at Lisbon as he has done in 
his letters to me, I am not surprised at his being unpopular’. Bathurst reckoned that he 
would ‘be soon deposed’.44 The following day, confirmation arrived of that fact: ‘the 
Portuguese government have refused to give the command to Lord Beresford. […] I 
confess I am not surprised at their refusals if he has abused their army openly as much 
as he did to me, more particularly if the army deserve it, as is probably the case’.45 
Wellington was even more critical: 
I think this is to be attributed to himself. He has very foolishly made himself a 
partizan [sic] in Portuguese politicks, and has pushed his objects with a 
perseverance and anxiety quite extraordinary in a man of his good sense and 
talents. Then the moment this country consented to give its aid, Lord Beresford 
was thrown overboard instead of being strengthened, as he would have been 
by that measure if his objects had been at all consistent with the views of this 
country, or with reason.46 
This marked the defeat of Wellington’s hopes of reforming the Portuguese 
army into an efficient force. He reported to Liverpool that he could not comment on 
the news, ‘as however sensible of the evil consequence which will attend this entire 
disappointment of our hopes of restoring the Portuguese army to some state of 
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efficiency, I am not prepared to suggest any remedy’.47 As Collins has argued, ‘[g]iven 
the centrality of disaffected officers to the revolts of 1820 and given Wellington’s 
experience in India, Wellington naturally focused on the primacy of the army as a 
governing institution’.48 The Duke had relied on Beresford to transform the army into 
a reliable means of bolstering stability in the country. He was convinced that the army 
could not be relied on to reform itself, and would remain a tool for political 
manoeuvring between the factions of Portuguese politics. However, Wellington also 
believed that Britain could not get entangled further. The Duke might not have had the 
reputation as an advocate of non-intervention, but he was a pragmatist and consistently 
worked towards to the same ends as Canning, although with less flair and flamboyant 
delivery. The Duke wrote to Bathurst voicing his approval that Clinton had refused 
the command of the Portuguese army after it was offered to him following Beresford 
stepping down. ‘It will not answer for us to become, or appear to be, principals in what 
is now doing in Portugal’. Though there was the possibility of escalation and eventual 
war with Spain, in which case ‘it may, and probably will, be necessary for us to 
become, and at all events we shall become, principals, and we must arrange our force, 
command, operations, etc., accordingly. But we must not do anything to accelerate 
that misfortune, or to give it the appearance of having ocurred [sic]’.49  
With Beresford’s departure from Portugal the question became one of what to 
do with the British force now there. After some delay in fully deploying it had 
succeeded with its immediate objects: ‘British intervention thus freed loyalist forces 
to act in the interior and provided a strong shield for the Lisbon region and a deterrent 
against further Miguelist mobilisation’.50 What was its role to be now? It was a 
difficult question. Liverpool told the Foreign Secretary how ‘our policy would be 
simple and intelligible’ if it was limited to just ‘the necessity of our continuance till 
Spain shall have carried into execution her promises’. He continued to Canning:  
We went to Portugal not for the purpose of interfering in the internal disputes 
of parties in that country, not to support liberty on one hand nor despotism on 
the other, not to maintain the charter (good as it may be), but because we were 
called upon by Portugal to enable Portugal to resist foreign aggression. 
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Remove then the foreign aggression, give the necessary satisfaction, and ought 
we not on our own principle to retire? 
But I look further and more particularly to what is most for our interest. 
If we do not limit our interference to the above objects, shall we not be 
necessarily, though unintentionally, involved in all the internal struggles which 
may take place in Portugal during our continuance in it, shall we not become 
decided partizans [sic] of the charter against those who may wish, as 
Portuguese, to destroy it, and shall we not be considered as keeping our army 
in Portugal for the sole purpose of maintaining it?  
There was no easy answer to this. Liverpool speculated between a choice of 
maintaining the force there during a ‘convulsion’ between Miguelists and 
Constitutionalists and ‘taking some decided part’, or pulling out once ‘satisfied as to 
the proceedings of Spain, declaring that the Portuguese must be left to themselves’ 
and no intervention would be allowed. The Prime Minister believed that ‘[i]f you were 
to canvass the opinion of the country I am satisfied it would be in favor of the latter 
course’. To withdraw could create difficulties though. ‘The overthrow of the charter 
and the restoration of absolute power in the hands of Don Miguel might be an eventual 
consequence’, but despite that, he urged that ‘[w]e must not, however, deceive 
ourselves. If we remain with our military force in Portugal, we remain there to support, 
influence and direct their government’.51 
Nevertheless, the British army did remain. In large part, this was due to 
circumstances in Britain as opposed to those in Portugal. The political manoeuvrings 
as Wellington and Canning tussled for the Premiership, along with the signature of the 
Treaty of London and the resulting Battle of Navarino, pushed Portugal down the 
agenda and the expeditionary force remained in place for the rest of the year.52 The 
next time it would enter Wellington’s purview would be as Prime Minister in 1828. 
By that time the military deployment had shifted in its nature but at heart it was still 
one of an unstable ally that was simply too strategically important to abandon to its 
fate. The dispatch of troops had done nothing to correct the fundamental problems that 
blighted the country. However, an alternative view is presented in the historiography. 
Temperley, as usual, was effusive in his praise: ‘The vigour of the action, like the 
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vigour of the speech by which he [Canning] justified it, positively electrified Europe. 
[…] Canning had made himself and England feared, because he directed a public 
opinion irresistible in England and powerful throughout Europe. It was now seen that 
he had not hesitated in this case, and would not hesitate again to support words and 
policies by vigorous and resolute action’.53 Hinde at least acknowledged that things 
were not quite so clear-cut and that there was an after story following the sending of 
the army: ‘[T]he internal stability of the new regime continued to be undermined by 
military plots, political dissensions between liberals and ultras and the unhelpful 
behaviour of the House of Braganza’. Hinde also acknowledges that the intervention 
was not a final act, noting that ‘almost literally until the day of his [Canning’s] death 
he was worrying over the potential danger that a disturbed and divided Portugal 
represented to the country that was bound to defend her against external attack’.54 
Wellington’s task would be to remove the soldiers there and try and establish a stable 
polity once and for all.  
By the time that Wellington entered office as Prime Minister in January 1828, 
Dom Miguel’s position had been transformed. From July 1827, Dom Pedro became 
willing to appoint Miguel regent, as long as the latter agreed to stick to the charter. In 
late February 1828 he officially took over as regent, and the situation appeared settled. 
This would prove an illusion though. Miguel’s seeming rehabilitation had led 
Wellington to order the removal of the British troops but when they began to depart it 
now seemed that the Regent would quickly act to seize control himself. Indeed, days 
after the first soldiers had left, Miguel had replaced the commanders of seven of the 
nine Lisbon garrisons with colonels personally loyal to him. 55 Ellenborough, the Lord 
Privy Seal, was not optimistic. He believed that the departure of the British soldiers 
‘will be the signal for violent reaction. Villa Real has no hopes’.56 
The question of whether to halt the removal of the British army in light of this 
became a live matter once again. Sir Frederick Lamb, the new ambassador to Portugal, 
wrote to the Duke complaining that ‘[i]f I had any discretionary power this would have 
been done differently and not a man should have gone from hence’ apart from those 
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needed for reinforcements elsewhere. He was of this opinion not because the numbers 
were not sufficient, ‘but that you may feel some awkwardness about encreasing [sic] 
it again’. If instead of reducing the force, it was augmented, this would serve ‘to put 
all notion of the possibility of resistance out of the question’. However, if the 
government were to ‘determine not to interfere, letting the affairs of this country take 
what course they will and only keeping your force here for a short time to let the 
present agitation subside and prevent the effects of panic’, Lamb believed that they 
should not keep an ambassador there as  ‘a mere cypher, but that you must recall him 
directly, making in this way your disapprobation of their course and the principle upon 
which your troops are still permitted to remain’.57 
The Cabinet was divided on what course to take. This was due to the difficult 
and contested legacy of Canning, most obvious over the Eastern Question as examined 
above, but also evident over Portugal. Ellenborough recorded the split within Cabinet, 
noting that while to begin with it seemed there was consensus to remove the army, this 
was shattered by the intervention of Huskisson who ‘endeavoured to persuade us to 
keep them there. He said we should do so for the protection of the Constitutionalists 
to whom we had promised our support, and for the security of British property. In fact 
he made an insidious attempt to obtain a continuance of Canning’s policy’. The result 
was ‘a skirmish’.58 Mrs Arbuthnot weighed in as well in her journal: ‘Every part of 
our foreign politics have certainly been bequeathed by Mr. Canning to his successor 
in the state of most complete dislocation possible. Portugal is now giving us plenty of 
trouble. Don Miguel has thrown off the mask at once’. She laid this firmly at the 
deceased Prime Minister’s door. ‘This comes of Mr. Canning’s interference & forcing 
a constitution upon Portugal which the people don’t like’.59  
Huskisson’s line that a withdrawal of troops would be a betrayal of Canning’s 
principles and past British foreign policy was as inaccurate as the criticisms of 
Ellenborough and Mrs Arbuthnot.60 Despite Canning’s rhetorical flourishes in the 
House of Commons, the initial intervention was clearly directed at the defence of 
Portugal from foreign invasion in the form of armed Portuguese deserters crossing the 
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border from Spain. The conversations at the time between the key ministers, Canning, 
Wellington and Liverpool, were concerned with ensuring this was not an intervention 
in favour of constitutionalism and that it should not be treated as such by foreign 
powers, as has been examined above.  
The Duke made this clear in a letter to Lamb. He stressed that ‘[t]he troops 
were sent out to protect Portugal against a foreign invasion, and with positive orders 
not to interfere in the domestick contest going on at the same time’. While it was the 
case that ‘incidentally their pressure has given protection to the constitutional party 
[there] is no reason why they should be left there. If the constitutional party are the 
strongest they don’t require our protection. If they are not, the other party must have 
the upper hand and it will not answer for us to involve this country in a contest to 
maintain the government in the hands of the constitutionalists’. This was a rational, 
pragmatic attitude that was typical of the Duke. He told Lamb that Britain certainly 
had ‘a right to remonstrate’ over Miguel not issuing a promised proclamation. They 
had even gone ‘farther than is consistent with strict rule in desiring that you should 
remonstrate respecting the formation of his ministry and advise him respecting the 
pardon of the rebels and the intention of his sister to come to Portugal’. In Wellington’s 
mind ‘[i]f matters go on quietly, if there should be no act of cruelty or violence, I 
confess I don’t see that we have any right to complain of Don Miguel preferring to 
employ one party in his service instead of another’. Only if there was ‘violence or 
cruelty’ would he consider withdrawing the British ambassador in protest.61 
This was a sound attitude, but it was not one likely to appeal to a public who 
had grown used to the rhetoric of Canning. Wellington’s and Lord Dudley’s approach 
was very much one of soft pressure at this point and avoiding any grandiose gestures. 
Dudley, ‘very civilly’, had written a dispatch for Metternich saying that it was ‘very 
desirable that the Emperor should understand that we think his credit, as well as our 
own, concerned in doing the utmost to hinder Don Miguel from violating his 
engagements’.62 In the Foreign Secretary’s mind, it was ‘[n]ot that the constitution is 
good for much in itself, but the immediate subversion of it by violence would be an 
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affront to us’.63 Coming from one of the nominal Canningites in Cabinet, it reflected 
an acknowledgement of the realities of the situation, and the reasons for intervention, 
though Dudley was always closer to the Duke than his other faction members. 
Nevertheless, even Huskisson did not speak up for Lamb and his more interventionist 
line in a Cabinet meeting. Instead, the forts were to be evacuated, and the ships 
withdrawn.64 
Lamb did not particularly lament the demise of the constitution – ‘I would not 
give one straw for it’. However, he had stronger opinions on the need to ensure an 
amnesty for past behaviour, something that Wellington had suggested many times 
when dealing with questions such as this. However, the ambassador lamented the lack 
of British influence: ‘Do not let us deceive ourselves. We do not stand well here, and 
the reason is plain, we have not gone fairly through with either party. This is the 
penalty of intermeddling’. This was a criticism that could often be levelled at 
Wellington’s foreign policy, especially as Prime Minister. In taking a middle line so 
often, and failing to back this up with a clear ideological appeal, the Duke fell between 
two stools and his policies failed. While this was most notably the case with Greece 
and the Russo-Turkish War, it was evident over Portugal as well. Lamb did not lay 
‘the end of every symptom of grace or favour between the two courts’ at Wellington’s 
door, however. He was of the opinion that the Duke ‘had no choice, that you could 
have taken no other and this I deplore’. This letter was the occasion of Lamb’s 
criticism of the doctrine of non-interference - ‘which has subsequently been slackened 
or tightened according to the temper and circumstances of the country’ – and the 
Finance Committee of the House of Commons which has been explored above.65  
In reply to this Wellington took the opportunity to expand on his views of 
interference in the affairs of Portugal: 
It is my opinion not only that we have no right to interfere (excepting in the 
limited manner above stated under the protocoles) but that the less we interfere 
in the internal affairs of Portugal the better for both parties. We are bound to 
defend Portugal against a foreign enemy and we have a right to give our advice 
in respect to the measures of foreign policy and possibly in respect to those 
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measures of internal policy which may in their consequences affect the 
tranquillity of the country and its political and military strength. The penalty 
of omitting to follow our advice must be that such omission puts it out of our 
power to fulfil the obligations of treaties. We have no right, nor, indeed, have 
we the means of using force, and my opinion is that we ought to confine our 
exertions strictly to the objects of keeping the country quiet, and in a state to 
enable us to assist efficaciously in its defence, if we should unfortunately be 
called upon to defend it.   
He continued to argue that ‘[a]ll the existing mischief has originated in our departure 
from the strict line above laid down, and the sooner we resume it the better’. 
Wellington was of the opinion, he told Lamb, that if ‘Lord Liverpool’s government 
had treated only with common kindness and attention the two countries which had 
been saved by us exclusively from the hands of the enemy [Spain and Portugal] they 
would have now been in a state of prosperity and useful allies to this country’. 
However, instead, with British support the New World had successfully rebelled 
against the two Iberian powers and their internal politics consequently thrown into 
confusion by the revolutions of 1820. As a result, Wellington believed that ‘[w]e must 
not aggravate these evils to those countries, to ourselves and to the world by making 
war upon them, nor must we force little questions (into which we have no right to enter 
excepting to give amicable advice) into importance, and thus place ourselves under 
the necessity of adopting an extreme course or of doing nothing after making a noise’. 
This displayed a certain misremembering of history, and Wellington’s role in British 
policy earlier in the decade. However, his conclusion that ‘in the existing situation of 
the world that breach [with Portugal] is not unattended by advantages’ certainly did 
ring true.66 
Two factors altered the question of Portugal for the Government. The first was 
the departure of the Canningites in May 1828. While they had argued for a 
continuation of the expedition to bolster the constitutionalists while in the Cabinet, the 
realities of the situation had meant they acquiesced in the eventual withdrawal. Outside 
of office though, they were free to take a more public line, released from the 
responsibilities of the course they advocated. However, the assumption of the throne 
by Miguel in June was more important.67 This was not unexpected. As Lamb’s 
accreditation was to Miguel as Regent, were he to crown himself then the British 
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ambassador should withdraw.68 Lamb had not done himself credit regardless though 
– his ‘position had become one of acute embarrassment’.69 At the end of May, he had 
written to the Duke attacking the Government’s policy and a few days later launched 
an even more scathing criticism.70 He told Wellington: 
What I have wanted is a clear and consistent line. Was it to be non-
interference? In that case your ambassadors and your naval force were to be 
taken away as soon as Miguel entered upon a course which you could not 
support. 
The penalty of doing this was that this country should become a dependency 
of Spain. 
That which you throw down you cannot prevent another from picking up. 
This, however, was to enter into the balance of interests to be struck at home. 
I have been ready to forward your views whatever they might be, but have 
never been able to make out what they were. 
In the ambassador’s mind, British ‘non-interference here has never been other than a 
deception’. Certainly, Lamb’s actions were of a very involved type; he admitted to the 
Duke that ‘[a]t this moment, I save the principal opponents of Miguel from his 
clutches. Can there be a more positive interference?’ For him, it was ridiculous to stick 
to the line of non-interference once ‘an affair is begun’ – likening it to ‘the conduct of 
a surgeon who suspends his help when the limb is off, leaving the arteries bleeding’. 
He told Wellington that his ‘only quarrel with the government is for not having known 
its own mind and made its non-interference (if non-interference it was to be) a real 
instead of a mock one’. 71 Given the splits and divisions in the Government, that 
essentially paralysed decision making for the first five months of its life and have been 
explored above, it was unsurprising that this was the case, but this was nevertheless a 
remarkable attack from a British ambassador on the Prime Minister and his policy.  
While Lamb was, to a certain degree, right about the unsuitability of half-
measures when intervening in the affairs of other states, he did rather miss the point 
of Wellington’s policies, and of Britain’s situation. As Collins has argued, the Duke 
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‘wanted stability and a conservative constitutional polity, but failed to overcome long-
standing internal problems of command and control in the Portuguese army, while the 
absence of financial leverage over the Portuguese authorities summed up the limits of 
British power’.  Lamb might well want a more determined line, but that was not 
consistent with the Duke’s long-term aims, nor even Canning’s, rhetoric aside. With 
‘middle-class fiscal stinginess and anti-militarism, and […] politicians’ pessimism 
about what interventions might achieve’, the ambassador set an unrealistic bar on 
Britain’s role in Portugal.72  
Given that Portugal was in the possession of Miguel, despite Britain’s 
acknowledgement of Maria and Pedro, Wellington was of the opinion that Lamb 
should be recalled. In part, this was because he thought ‘one of the defects of Sir 
F.Lambe’s [sic] dispatches is that there is a total absence of facts and information in 
any of them’.73 However, this was not the least of the complaints. Ellenborough 
described how Lamb had ‘written as intemperately as ever’ when Portugal was 
discussed in Cabinet late in June.74 A couple of days later he wrote that ‘[t]he Duke 
was desirous of recalling Lamb for his offensive letters’, though the majority of the 
Cabinet were not with him on it. Nevertheless, Wellington ‘was very earnest for 
Lamb’s recall, and said we should find him quite unbearable, and counteracting us in 
every way. That no public servant he ever knew had written half so offensively as 
Lamb, and all others had been severely reprimanded for it’.75 Writing to Lord 
Aberdeen, the new Foreign Secretary, the Duke said that: 
It is quite obvious that from the commencement of his embassy Sir Frederick 
Lamb has taken an erroneous view of the relative situation of this country and 
Portugal.  
We are not the protectors of Portugal. Portugal is not a dependency of this 
country either de jure, or de facto, or in principle, by any construction of our 
treaty or in practice.76 
Wellington and Aberdeen were not known for their cordial relations during 
this administration with their ambassadors – we have seen their distrust of Heytesbury 
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and Sir Stratford Canning and their strained relationship with Lord Stuart de Rothesay 
in Paris. Nevertheless, there was little to compare to the gulf that existed in policy 
aims and analysis of the situation in Portugal between Lamb and the ministers. In the 
end, this problem was solved by Lamb’s resignation and return to Britain.77 
Dom Miguel’s assumption of the throne ended the uncertainty over Portugal. 
Wellington wrote in a memorandum that the British Government should notify Dom 
Pedro of ‘the absolute hopelessness of the success of any contest in favour of the 
constitution […] This is obvious not only from the result of the recent contest, but 
from all its circumstances’. The Prime Minister was convinced that the ‘Emperor Don 
Pedro must see that a contest on his part, to recover possession of Portugal for himself 
or his daughter, and to re-establish in that country the constitution, would be hopeless. 
He has not the means even of conquering the Banda Oriental. How can he find them 
to reconquer the kingdom of Portugal?’ Given that, Wellington’s advice was that 
Pedro ‘should come to an arrangement with his brother’. That would ‘provide best for 
his own security and peace, for the peace of Portugal, and for the happiness of the 
house of Braganza’. This could be achieved by the marriage of Donna Maria to Dom 
Miguel. Britain would not consider, or allow, ‘any farther dismemberment of the 
Portuguese monarchy’ though. The separation of Brazil and Portugal was ‘final’.78 
In a broad form, this memorandum outlined British policy towards Miguel for 
the rest of Wellington’s Government. The withdrawal of the ambassador was further 
emphasised by the removal of the naval squadron that had been stationed at Lisbon. 
Wellington told Lord Aberdeen that ‘it will not answer to allow His Majesty’s subjects 
to continue to reside in a country in a state of revolution in which they think their 
residence is not quite safe, and to reckon upon the constant presence of our squadron, 
not only to give them protection but to carry them off at any moment’. This statement 
was a far cry from Palmerston’s later invocation of ‘Pax Romana’ – the ships would 
remain in the Tagus and Douro for five days after the receipt of their orders, and after 
that, any British subjects remaining would be left to their own devices.79 Short of a 
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direct attack on the sovereignty of Portugal, still a red line for Britain, Wellington 
would maintain this detached stance as much as he could.80 
The factions in Portugal were less willing to leave the British government out 
of the thick of affairs. The Brazilian representatives tried to insist they not only 
represented Pedro, Emperor of Brazil but also Pedro, King of Portugal though it was 
‘quite inconsistent with diplomatick rule’.81 More troubling was the possibility of 
Pedro’s and Maria’s supporters using Britain as a staging point for an armed invasion 
of Portugal or its overseas territories. In August Itabayana, the Brazilian Envoy 
Extraordinary tried to seek permission to send stores and provisions duty-free on a 
Brazilian frigate, only for it to be revealed that they included gunpowder and muskets 
destined for Madeira.82 Wellington told Aberdeen that they could only be embarked 
with assurances that they were not bound for there. Should Britain ‘impose this 
condition, we must state the reason, viz., that till Don Pedro has declared his own 
intentions, we do not intend to allow his subjects, or the subjects of his daughter, to 
carry on war from England against Portugal’.83 This would form their consistent line. 
It was imperilled though by a new development – the arrival of Portuguese 
refugees, many of them constitutional soldiers who had fled Miguel’s clampdowns, 
and of German emigrants bound for Brazil, or mercenaries in another term. The British 
system of allowing any person to seek refuge in Britain for any reason complicated 
matters. The Government certainly did not want the skeleton of an army to be allowed 
on their shores. Wellington told Aberdeen that ‘we cannot allow foreign troops to 
remain in England, that all individuals are welcome, but nothing in the shape of troops 
can remain, and as individuals they must conduct themselves peaceably and obey the 
laws’. He instructed the Foreign Secretary that the Marquis de Palmella, a leading 
supporter of Maria and Pedro’s representative for her in London, should be informed 
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that ‘we cannot allow His Majesty’s dominions to be made the seat of the cabinet, the 
government, the arsenal and harbour by which war is to be carried on in the name but 
without the knowledge or consent of Don Pedro against Portugal’.84 How to marry the 
policy of asylum for individuals when they came as a whole was not an easy one, 
however, and the matter was sent off to the King’s Advocate.85  
The situation was not aided by the behaviour of Palmella and Itabayana. 
Wellington complained at the end of August that ‘[n]o diplomatick agents at this or 
any other court would venture to conduct themselves as the Portuguese and Brazilian 
agents conduct themselves towards the government of this country. We shall never be 
on good terms with them till we shall convince them that they cannot so conduct 
themselves with impunity, and in saying this I do it of a people with whom I am well 
acquainted’.86 A few days later, Wellington asked Aberdeen to ‘speak very seriously 
to Monsieur de Itabayana and the Marquis de Palmella respecting their conduct. The 
King will not allow a foreign minister to give him an assurance that arms are not to be 
sent to a particular place, and afterwards that they should be sent to that place’.87 
Despite all of this though, the Prime Minister was unwilling to budge on assisting 
Maria’s cause. Taking a pragmatic view of the situation, he was of the view that there 
needed to be a marriage between Maria and Miguel to settle the dispute. That would 
be the only way to restore peace in Portugal, and finally, end the intriguing on British 
soil for good.88 Like so many of Wellington’s policies, to do this would not necessarily 
a popular. John Wilson Croker wrote to the Duke urging him that ‘[s]omething should 
be done to set the press right on the subject of our policy towards Portugal. […] When 
the newspapers are allowed to go all the same way and to repeat the same story without 
contradiction, the best and wisest course of policy cannot fail to be damaged in public 
opinion’.89 Wellington would have done well to heed Croker’s advice as the following 
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year would show when Portugal became an avenue of attack in Parliament with those 
opposing the administration. Instead, he just criticised the two diplomats for doing it 
themselves. Ellenborough recorded that Wellington ‘is very angry with Itabayana and 
Palmella for newspapering, as he calls it, and will hold no communication with them 
except officially’.90 
Mid-September, a new factor came into play when Donna Maria herself 
arrived in Britain.91 Wellington advised George IV that it would ‘be most advisable 
that Your Majesty’s servants should not encourage the Queen of Portugal to remain in 
England’ – her arrival added complications to the Government’s position as they were 
required to receive her with the same ceremony that Miguel had when passing through 
earlier in the year.92 As the Duke said to Aberdeen, ‘[t]he arrival of this young Queen 
is the work of an intrigue, and is intended to give and will give us a good deal of 
trouble’. In the Prime Minister’s analysis, ‘the discussion will turn upon the degree of 
interference on our part in the framing, the bringing to Europe and the establishment 
in Portugal of the constitution’. The Duke did not rule out that the conflict in Portugal 
could take on an international aspect, as the Spanish interference in 1826 had, thanks 
to Miguel making a marriage alliance with Spain or France. Nevertheless, this 
emphasised the need to remain out of the dispute as much as possible and to stick 
closely to the principle of non-interference.93 As he wrote a few days later: ‘[i]t will 
not answer to allow these blackguards to do as they please with us’.94 
The poor behaviour of the Portuguese was compounded when the Marquis de 
Barbacena, who had been sent with Maria by Pedro, sought a British naval escort for 
an expedition to the island of Terceira in the Azores which was for the young Queen.95 
He wrote to the Duke requesting, in the name of his Queen, that ‘le convoi d’un 
bâtiment de guerre pour escorter d’Angleterre à une possession qui reste soumise à 
l’autorité légitime de sa Majesté très-fidèle, une partie des troupes loyales, qui se 
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trouvent à Plymouth, ce secours ne devant pas débarquer à Terceira dans les cas 
malheureux où cette isle aurait succombée à l’agression dont elle est menacée’.96  For 
Aberdeen, ‘[h]is proposal is even beyond most of the specimens of impudence we 
have had from his countrymen’.97 Wellington was rather blunt in his reply to 
Barbacena. He tersely told him that ‘[l]es Portugais qui se trouvent en Angleterre s’y 
trouvent en leur qualité d’individus. Nous ne connaissons pas de troupes portugaises 
dans ce pays-ci. S’il y en a, il faut qu’elles quittent le pays sans perte de temps’. He 
additionally repeated how the government could not allow a war to be waged from 
British soil between the two branches of the House of Braganza.98  
Wellington took an equally critical line towards Miguel’s conduct in Portugal. 
The Government had received numerous complaints about the treatment of British 
subjects. Moreover, if the Duke was not prepared to aid Maria’s supporters, he was 
equally determined to hold Miguel to account as well. For the Prime Minister, ‘no 
King of Portugal can justify the conduct of Don Miguel’s government or any King of 
England bear it’. He informed Aberdeen that should the British demands for the 
release of Britons imprisoned in breach of the treaties between the two countries and 
compensation for those acts not be met then the Consul General would be instructed 
to withdraw. Furthermore, the British Government would ‘insist upon reparation for 
these breaches of treaty and injuries’ and would be prepared to ‘seize the latter for 
ourselves’.99 A few days later Wellington reassured Aberdeen that to ‘[r]ely upon it 
that there is no man in England who knows so well as I do how to manage the 
Portuguese’. He continued with a very revealing statement about his attitude towards 
foreign policy: ‘I don’t care a pin about clamours, but I do about realities. We must 
not allow ourselves to be unjustly treated by any power’.100 A greater concern for 
‘clamours’ and the presentation of policy might well have served the Duke to achieve 
his aims. Miguel for his part did as little as possible to accommodate British protests. 
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These infractions by Miguel’s government aside, the biggest thorn in 
Wellington’s side remained the supporters of Maria. At the end of October arms were 
landed in Terceira, an act which drew the ire of the Duke.101 More concerning was the 
continuing presence of 4,000 Portuguese soldiers, rather too close to the naval base at 
Plymouth. They were being paid by the Portuguese and Brazilian representatives in 
London, and were accompanied by the officers on the spot. Wellington was concerned 
that they should not ‘allow officers and men to remain in the same place, and all events 
not in such as place as Plymouth where in one night they might do us much mischief’ 
– a moderate way of highlighting what could be a devastating blow to one of Britain’s 
most important naval arsenals. There were ‘very few [British] troops there [without] 
the means of reinforcing them. It is true that these Portuguese have no arms, but with 
money they can have arms when they please in this country without our being aware 
of it’.102 Wellington was understandably keen to see the Portuguese dispersed, a long 
way from the naval facilities at Plymouth, if possible. There was additionally a legal 
complication – the law officers having warned Peel of the danger of their sudden 
departure ‘as a military body on some expedition against some part of Portugal or its 
dependencies’.103 Though they were assured by Barbacena that ‘nothing of the kind 
would take place;- that they might talk about it, but that nothing would be attempted’, 
they were certain that they would hear from Miguel’s minister Monsieur d’Assera 
should anything be attempted.104 
These legal ambiguities mattered to Wellington and his administration. As has 
been seen concerning the Eastern Question, the Duke was consistently determined to 
stick closely to the letter of the law and confine his actions strictly to those required 
by treaties. For him, British negligence in regard to the Portuguese at Plymouth was a 
matter of grave importance. Indeed, it was more important than the actual dispute 
between the contending parties. The simultaneous actions of demanding reparations 
for actions against British subjects by Miguel’s Government, and actively opposing 
and frustrating the attempts of Maria’s supporters in Britain, while maintaining a firm 
legal and treaty position towards both merely ensured that in neither case was 
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Wellington advancing a solution in Portugal or cultivating potential allies. Indeed, 
Britain was creating problems not solving them. As Aberdeen put it: ‘It is a most 
extraordinary thing that the two powers in the whole world of whom we have most 
reason to complain for want of common respect are Portugal and Brazil; one of them 
actually created by us, and the other almost dependant [sic] upon us for existence’.105 
Wellington attributed this to ‘nothing but the system of laisser aller which has 
prevailed in England for the last twenty years and most particularly since the war, 
upon every subject excepting the encouragement given to insurrection whether at 
home or abroad’.106  
Wellington’s failure to take a side and his determination to stick to a legal 
viewpoint did nothing to dampen suspicions of Britain’s involvement amongst the 
Chancelleries of Europe. Wellington told Aberdeen how he did not ‘wonder that the 
French government suspect the Portuguese and Brazilian corps diplomatique in 
London, as I don’t believe that any people ever so conducted themselves, not that we 
are suspected as the measures which have taken to counteract these gentlemen are not 
known’. To have followed Croker’s advice to be more active in promoting the 
Government’s policy rather than just criticising Maria’s supporters’ own efforts would 
have been a useful prop for British policy. Instead the Duke asked Aberdeen to pass 
on letters and the substance of a conversation with Barbacena to Polignac ‘and assure 
him that we stand exactly on the ground in this question which we took when Lord 
Strangford was sent to [the] Brazils, and that every day’s information tends to prove 
to us that that is the right ground, and that there is nobody more anxious to avoid being 
committed in hostilities with Portugal than Don Pedro himself’.107 
After the rejection of Barbacena’s scheme of a naval escort to Terceira, the 
Portuguese and Brazilian diplomats in London pushed the Government to instead 
escort them to Brazil as colonists rather than have them broken up and dispersed across 
the country as Wellington wished.108 The Duke did not understand the need for a 
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convoy, however, pointing out to Aberdeen that he knew ‘of no war in which the 
Emperor of Brazil is engaged, although his servants stationed in England are doing 
everything in their power to excite one’.109 Nevertheless, in the end he came around 
to the idea. The prospect of just getting rid of them completely must have been too 
appealing a thought, and Wellington told Palmella that 
In consequence of your informing me that the Portuguese officers and troops 
now at Plymouth preferred to quit the country and to proceed to Rio Janeiro, 
rather than remove from Plymouth to the neighbouring towns and villages, as 
I had desired in the conversation which I had with you on the 20th instant, and 
as you have expressed a wish that the government should give these Portuguese 
a guarantee for their safety from attack on their passage, or send a vessel of 
war, to convey them, I have to inform you that His Majesty's servants will give 
orders that a convoy shall be prepared to escort the vessels which will carry 
these Portuguese troops according to the wish expressed by you.110 
Just when Wellington agreed to an escort, however, Palmella began to oppose 
the prospect. He wrote to the Prime Minister, ‘je crois devoir, Monsieur le Duc, vous 
prier de ne pas donner suite à l'intention que vous m'annoncez, et qui me paraît dans 
le cas actuel présenter plus d'inconvénients que d'avantages’. Instead of an escort, 
Palmella believed that ‘[u]ne simple assurance verbale de la part du gouvernement 
britannique me semblerait suffisante pour les mettre à l’abri de tout danger dans le cas 
dont il s’agit’. He told the Duke that ‘j'avoue que plus j'y pense et plus il me semble 
qu'elle serait interprétée, ou comme un signe défiance de la part du gouvernement 
brittanique, ou comme une preuve de l'expulsion forcée des Portugais qui avaient 
cherché un asile dans ce pays’.111 Of course, this was in part what the Duke wished to 
do – to demonstrate that the actions of the Portuguese were not supported by the British 
Government and to finally be rid of what was a distinctly irritating problem.  
Wellington pointed out as much to Palmella, referencing Barbacena’s request 
for a convoy for an expedition. Given the large number of soldiers assembled at 
Plymouth, ever increasing as it was, they had to leave or disperse. As it was ‘[t]heir 
presence at Plymouth can be consider[ed] as […] one of two grounds only: that these 
troops, as placed at Plymouth with transports in the harbour, were in a menacing 
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position in relation to Portugal, or the dominions or the colonies of Portugal; or that 
they were actually intended to attack Portugal or her dominions or colonies from His 
Majesty’s port and arsenal of Plymouth’. Wellington pointed out the discrepancy of 
the legal position of the soldiers thus gathered, having been assured by Itabayana that 
they were not in the service of Don Pedro, but instead directed by Palmella himself – 
‘I am certain that there is no person excepting that individual who can blame His 
Majesty’s government for what has occurred’. He continued with the difference 
between the offer of a guarantee of safe passage and that of convoy. But there was 
more than ‘a difference of principle’ between the two, but also a ‘difference in fact’:  
When the King’s servants grant a convoy they have it in their power to 
prescribe the course and the proceedings of the vessels placed under its charge, 
and they are responsible for their safety. When they give a guarantee for the 
safety of vessels navigating the Atlantick whose course and proceedings are 
ordered by others, the latter may direct those vessels to pursue such course as 
they please, while His Majesty’s servants would be responsible for the 
consequences not only of those directions but for those of the conduct of the 
Portuguese government in consequence of the course taken.112 
There was only one course amongst these that Wellington’s Government could allow. 
Indeed, Peel and Aberdeen further ordered the Admiral at Plymouth to prevent the 
Portuguese ‘giving us the slip’, by preventing the sailing of the transports.113   
Finding this course of action a dead end, Palmella changed tack. Assuring 
Aberdeen that ‘he honestly indented to send them all to Brazil, when he saw 
[Wellington]’, circumstances on Terceira meant that some of the Portuguese ‘were 
desirous of going’ there. ‘He added that he did not wish even to send them, or have 
anything to do with them, but merely to know if these individuals who chose to go 
upon their own account would be interrupted’. Palmella’s professions of innocence 
ring rather hollow given all the previous actions and duplicity of Maria’s supporters 
within Britain. Aberdeen informed him that Terceira was a place that the British 
Government was determined ‘not to permit to be fed by supplies sent from this 
country. That individuals, bona fide, might of course go to Terceira, or to any part of 
Portugal at their pleasure’, but soldiers, even disarmed, was a different case. The same 
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would apply to the German mercenaries also gathered at Plymouth. To this, Palmella 
‘made some remonstrances, but I told him we should take care to act according to the 
law of the land, and according to the duties imposed upon us by our neutrality’.114 
Wellington was frank when he wrote to Palmella. He was not ‘deceived as to [the 
expedition’s] real intentions’. He reminded the diplomat that ‘above a month has now 
elapsed since I desired in the name of His Majesty’s government that the Portuguese 
officers and troops should be removed from Plymouth, and I again announce to you 
that His Majesty’s government have taken measures to prevent these troops from 
proceeding in a hostile character from England to any part of the dominions or colonies 
of Portugal, which measures they do not intend to advise His Majesty to 
countermand’.115 
In the end, the soldiers did embark to leave, but it was to Terceira. They left 
Plymouth on 6 January 1829, unarmed, but with weapons dispatched separately. Ten 
days later they were met off the island by Captain Walpole of H.M.S. Ranger, who 
prevented them disembarking at Porto Praya. This was achieved with the use of force 
though, and one Portuguese was killed in the gunfire. Consequently, they were forced 
back into a French port.116 
This incident would mark the culmination of the Government’s ineffectual 
handling of the matter of the Portuguese refugees, proving the lengths that they would 
go to, to ensure that Britain remained within the letter of the law and her treaties. When 
an explanation was demanded by Barbacena, Wellington gave him short shrift. In a 
memorandum, he argued that the Marquis ‘should be informed that His Majesty’s 
servants deny the right of the Emperor Don Pedro in any capacity […] to require 
answers to any questions put to His Majesty’s government respecting the measures 
which His Majesty’s government have adopted’. According to all the laws and 
customs of the land, ‘no person whatever, be their rank or dignity what they may, can 
assume any authority within His Majesty’s dominions, much less carry on war from 
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His Majesty’s ports or arsenals in His Majesty’s dominions without His Majesty’s 
consent and against His Majesty’s prohibition and His Majesty’s government will not 
allow his undoubted prerogative upon this subject’. Having stated to Palmella 
previously the grounds for preventing any expeditions, the Duke stressed that the 
Government ‘will follow the same course respecting any other similar expedition from 
this country’ as the one to Terceira. The Duke ended on a threatening note, saying that 
Barbacena should ensure he stops fermenting civil war in Portugal while in Britain: 
‘Such interference be it on the part of whom it may is inconsistent with the laws of 
nations and with the laws of England, a breach of His Majesty's royal prerogative, and 
in positive disobedience to His Majesty's command repeatedly conveyed to the 
Marquis de Barbacena, his colleagues and the Marquis de Palmela [sic].’117 
The Government would face repeated attacks over this incident in Parliament. 
Palmerston marked his emergence as a ‘thinking politician’ and one with a keen eye 
for foreign affairs, in an attack on Wellington and Aberdeen’s Portuguese policy in a 
speech in June 1829.118 In it he branded Miguel ‘this destroyer of constitutional 
freedom, this breaker of solemn oaths, this faithless usurper, this enslaver of this 
country, this trampler upon public law, this violator of private rights, this attempter on 
the life of a helpless and defenceless woman’. But despite that it was believed that ‘the 
Cabinet of England look upon his usurpation with no unfriendly eye’. Wellington’s 
adherence to non-intervention, not to mention his strict interpretation of treaties, had 
allowed Miguel to prevail.119 He returned to the charge the following year, noting that 
while in 1826 the freedom of Portugal had seemed to come from Britain, in 1829, the 
return of a conservative administration in France was believed to be caused by her as 
well. He asked, ‘[w]hence has arisen this great and sudden change in public opinion? 
Why is it, that England, who only three short years ago was hailed as the author of 
good, should now be branded as the instigator of evil?’ The reason was the foreign 
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policy failures of Wellington’s administration that had ‘lost our influence in Portugal, 
and have thrown her into the arms of Spain’ and overseen the destruction of 
‘Constitutional freedom in Portugal’.120 This was followed by an attempt to censure 
the Government in the House of Lords over Terceira a few days later.121 While these 
attacks were fended off, the latter being defeated 126-31, they nevertheless marked 
the ease with which British foreign policy could be attacked in these years. Maria 
could be painted as the good, liberal candidate that legalism and inaction had seen 
thrown over by the evil, reactionary Miguel. While bearing little relationship to the 
actual state of affairs, it was a useful avenue to criticise Wellington’s actions, and the 
painting of him as an abettor of reaction had a lasting impact, weakening him in the 
public eye when it came to the issue of Reform and in the historiography which has 
rarely moved beyond the caricature that was painted of him at this time.  
After the Terceira incident, the main question left over Portugal was no longer 
if, but when, to recognise Miguel’s government. As Aberdeen put it in July, ‘Portugal 
is satisfied or at least quiet, under Don Miguel, and we cannot therefore look for any 
alteration from within’.122 By September it was becoming clear that other states were 
already moving towards recognition.123 Given the concurrent crisis over the Treaty of 
Adrianople, Wellington carried over his criticisms of Russian conduct into the 
Portuguese question. France had been in discussion with Miguel’s agents to recognise 
his Government in return for the return of confiscated property and a general amnesty. 
However, Wellington took great exception to this, despite it almost being the same 
policy as he was recommending. In his opinion, if Miguel ‘agrees to an article with 
any sovereign, I don’t care with what sovereign, engaging to restore properties to his 
subjects to pardon his subjects, or to do any act or to refrain from doing any act in 
relation to his subject, he is no longer an independent sovereign’. Indeed, the Duke 
drew the direct comparison, how Miguel would be as much under another’s control as 
‘the Porte is in the hands of Russia respecting Servia [sic], Wallachia and 
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Moldavia’.124 This was quite a ridiculous assertion, and more flexibility could have 
achieved an earlier resolution to recognition in cooperation with other powers.  
Instead, Britain pursued a policy of inaction and delay. When word reached 
Aberdeen that the King of Naples was likely to recognise Don Miguel, the Foreign 
Secretary urged the Neopolitan envoy to ‘write to his court and recommend some 
delay in this affair’, which the diplomat had ‘no doubt will be complied with’. The 
Netherlands as well would follow the example of Britain or France. In Aberdeen’s 
opinion, ‘[w]e shall preserve our ascendancy in the affair by restraining them in this 
manner’.125  
While this ascendancy was of questionable value and utility, the policy of delay 
was certainly successful, and by the following year a resolution had still not been 
reached, though it was clearly inevitable now. The Duke was convinced that there was 
no other option and told Aberdeen about the ‘inexpediency of allowing matters to 
remain as they are and to allow the peace of Europe to be distracted by a few hundred 
starving Portuguese vagrants’. The peace of Europe was a higher priority than 
‘constitutional forms’.126 Miguel was still delaying on granting an amnesty though, 
now using the excuse of the impact of the French revolution when he wrote to 
Wellington in September 1830 to explain his position.127 When Aberdeen put forward 
the prospect of granting recognition in return for an amnesty, the exact policy that 
France had previously proposed, to Wellington’s ire, the Duke was unimpressed.128 
He told the Foreign Secretary tersely, ‘I confess that I have never understood what you 
meant by your intention to exact the amnesty from Don Miguel. How do you mean to 
exact it? […] Do you mean to menace? What will you menace? What menace will you 
carry into execution?’ Written shortly after Huskisson’s tragic death, and while 
Wellington was still in Liverpool, wider circumstances may explain his angry reaction, 
and one quite unrelated to Aberdeen’s proposal. Nevertheless, Wellington did raise 
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some points of more relevance. Tying British recognition to the amnesty would mean 
that ‘[t]here is not an individual who will return to Portugal under [it] who will not be 
under our protection’. The result would be ‘[i]nstead of one question we shall have 
twenty every day’.129 In his mind, to tie the two together would put the cart before the 
horse:  
A remedy will be applied to the existing evils only by the adoption of a wise 
system of government, one that will conciliate the affections of all the 
Portuguese, that will restore the prosperity of the country, insure its internal 
peace and obtain for it the esteem and respect of all foreign nations. The 
commencement of such a system must be a general amnesty; till that measure 
is adopted His Majesty cannot recognize the government of Don Miguel. The 
honour of the country, the desire to avoid to interfere in the internal concerns 
of Portugal and the wish to see that country happy and respectable dictate this 
decision.130 
It was this course that Wellington advised Miguel to follow in his reply to his 
letter. He told him that ‘Portugal can never be considered in a state of tranquillity or 
safety as long as such a large proportion of its men of property, talent and activity are 
ill-treated, greatly dissatisfied and consequently in a state of hostility against the 
government and its head and daily intentions’. Once they were brought back into the 
fold then peaceful relations between Britain and Portugal would follow to the mutual 
interest of both.131 
This was where the state of affairs stood when Wellington’s government fell 
in November. Early on, in 1826, the Duke had identified the need for a stable military 
situation in the country and set out proposals for how this could be achieved to help 
ensure there would be no deterioration into civil war. By the time he was Prime 
Minister though, Portugal had become another annoyance and another diplomatic 
matter where drift, delay and embarrassment were to become the norm. As with the 
Eastern Question, Wellington stuck closely to legalistic interpretations. He clung 
closely to non-interference, arguably taking it far beyond its utility. Like on so many 
other occasions throughout these years, the Duke’s disdain for principles and 
ideologies meant that there was no effective presentation of the Government’s policies 
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to the public, and they were merely an avenue of attack for her opponents, rather than 
a shield for her defenders. This meant that when the situation in Portugal was 
fundamentally altered with Pedro’s return to Europe, Palmerston was able to paint it 
as a struggle of liberalism against reaction to great personal success, but at the cost, 
minimal to him, of tarring Wellington and Aberdeen as reactionaries in the process. 
They had failed to move with the times and acknowledge the importance of public 
opinion and the need to bring it with you, a crucial distinction that Canning had begun 
to drift towards and Palmerston would take up with full force upon succeeding 
Aberdeen to the Foreign Office.  
 
French Invasion of Algiers  
If ineffectual protest and a deterioration of the British position had marked 
British diplomacy in the Near East, not to mention Portugal, then the same 
characteristics would become evident again over the French invasion of Algiers. 
Nominally a vassal of the Ottoman Sultan, the Bey of Algiers had long overseen piracy 
of the Barbary corsairs in the Mediterranean alongside the Beys of Tunis and Tripoli. 
With the largest merchant fleet in the world, Britain was deeply concerned by the 
piracy that plagued the region. Indeed, she had mounted two punitive expeditions 
herself against Algiers: the first in 1816 under Lord Exmouth and a second in 1824.132 
Neither these nor the expeditions attempted by other powers had removed the central 
problem though – the corsairs would just regroup and strike again from somewhere 
else.  
France had a long list of complaints against the Bey of Algiers that even went 
beyond the question of piracy: from the issue of payments for ‘concessions’, trading 
outposts on the North African coasts, to the legacy of Napoleonic debts and the literal 
assault of the French consul by the Bey with the handle of his fly-swisher. Though the 
administrations of Villèle and Martignac contemplated retaliation, circumstances in 
Spain and Greece meant that French forces were tied up elsewhere. Polignac, however, 
had different plans, especially as at the same time as he entered office, news had 
reached Paris that a parley ship had been fired on eighty times while leaving Algiers. 
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133 However, these merely provided the context and nominal excuse for the French 
invasion of 1830. As Sauvigny has argued, it was a ‘policy of prestige, looking less to 
augmenting the material powers of France than to re-enforcing her moral position 
before Europe and that of the monarchy before the nation’.134  
The fact that the decision of Polignac to invade was based, in large part, on 
domestic factors would form an important part of the British Government’s opposition 
to the move. Initially, it seemed that France would act in conjunction with Mehemet 
Ali. In late January 1830, the French began to test the water to gauge reactions to it. 
Wellington pointed out to Laval, the French ambassador to London, that ‘Europe had 
long suffered the inconvenience, and even indignity, resulting from the conduct of 
these regencies, rather than the disadvantage of allowing any power to conquer and 
settle them with a view to its own advantage, or indeed, any change’. However, the 
prospect of cooperation with the Pasha of Egypt was such that the Duke ‘could not but 
view this scheme as one tending to establish in the regencies on the coast of Africa a 
French system of goverment [sic] instead of a Turkish one’. Furthermore, ‘he was 
quite convinced that it would be so viewed in this country and by every man of 
unbiassed [sic] judgement in Europe and this would not be deemed a very desireable 
[sic] mode of getting rid of piracy’.135  
Although France backed out of a joint expedition with Mehemet Ali in favour 
of one composed entirely of its forces, Wellington was once more proved wrong in his 
assessment of the European reaction. The other major powers were quite content to 
see France undertake an invasion.136 This did not moderate the Duke though. In a letter 
to Aberdeen, he argued that ‘the Prince de Polignac seems to have made a strange 
mistake in thinking that we can allow France to seek safety from domestick troubles 
in foreign conquests, even on the coast of Africa’. He went so far as to state that 
‘[n]either Buonaparte, nor the Directory, behaved worse than the French government 
have in this case’. Continuing the parallel, Wellington pointed out that the ‘French 
government are quite mistaken in supposing that any of the quarrels between 
Buonaparte and Europe were to be attributed to their fears of revolutionary principles. 
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They were apprehensive of his conquests and they therefore leagued against him’. In 
his mind, Polignac had to realise that ‘even if we were so disposed this country would 
not allow us to consent to France making conquests on the coast of Africa’.137 
Consent is what Britain did. There was much bluster and complaint emanating 
from Whitehall. Laval complained to Aberdeen of the treatment of his government, 
saying ‘[h]e knew they were in a situation to do nothing with impunity which could 
displease us, but that we might depend upon it they were more afraid of their own 
people than they were even of us, and that they never dare present themselves to their 
publick in an unbecoming and unsuitable manner’.138 Yet this achieved nothing. 
Aberdeen’s attempts to secure a written promise that the French presence in Algiers 
would be temporary drew blanks despite early optimism ‘it appears likely that we shall 
receive all the satisfaction we can possibly require upon the subject of the 
expedition’.139 Polignac ‘adroitly evaded the question by suggesting that England 
could be satisfied by the general assurances furnished to all the powers. To give a 
special assurance to one of the powers would cause the expedition to lose its character 
of international interest which it was intended to preserve’.140 This focus on receiving 
a written promise from France was typical of Wellington’s foreign policy during his 
Government. While it would have been a more concrete statement than just the verbal 
assurances, it still guaranteed nothing. Despite the scale of the Duke’s objections to 
the expedition, Britain’s diplomacy was ineffectual. Never was the red line set out, 
with the effective menace of the Royal Navy behind it – the one force capable of 
actually stopping the invasion for certain.  
Instead, Wellington was forced to admit that Britain was constrained by the 
course he had taken. Though Parliament had been assured that France would give the 
wanted promises, the Duke conceded that ‘I don’t think that we can go to war because 
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we have a verbal explanation instead of one in writing’.141 In a memorandum he 
explained:  
The first notion of the cabinet when the demand was made of an official 
explanation was that if that explanation should not be satisfactory the French 
expedition should be prevented. 
It is quite obvious that that intention cannot be carried into execution. 
Moreover, this course of proceeding leads to war, not upon the case itself, upon 
which after all war may not be necessary, but upon matters of communication 
which, however important they would become as a point of honor if pushed 
farther, it is desireable [sic] to not bring to that extremity.142 
Wellington’s diplomacy had succeeded neither in getting assurances of the temporary 
nature of the expedition nor did it stop it taking place at all, despite the strategic 
implications for British naval power in the Mediterranean. The result of this situation 
was that France was allowed to dispatch a force of 103 warships, 350 transports, 
27,000 sailors and 37,000 soldiers across the Mediterranean to land in North Africa 
on 14 June. By 5 July 1830, the French flag was flying over Algiers and France would 
remain in occupation there for a further 132 years.143 The other result was that Charles 
X and the Bourbons definitively lost the sympathy of Wellington. So when revolution 
swept over France in July 1830, sweeping away with it the world of European 
diplomacy that Wellington had formed such a large part of over the previous sixteen 
years, Britain did not exert herself to save it. 
Both Portugal and the French expedition marked failures for Wellington’s 
foreign policy. In the former case, Wellington pursued a pragmatic policy but one that 
was without any appeal to the wider public, leaving his flank open to attack from 
parliamentary enemies. Thus, instead of celebrating avoiding a costly and long-term 
entanglement in Portuguese affairs, inaction was the hallmark of the Government’s 
course of action. The Algiers affair was even more damaging for Britain, if not for 
Wellington’s administration. The tight adherence to a legalistic interpretation left 
Polignac free to issue empty promises only to present Britain with a fait accompli. If 
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revolution overtook events before the Duke could face Parliament, this would be of 





Wellington might not have had the impact of Lord Castlereagh or the flair of 
George Canning when it came to foreign policy. This circumstance does not make him 
any less important for historians to study. This thesis has broken new ground by 
establishing Wellington as a central figure in the framing and conduct of British 
foreign policy from 1814-30. Even when he was not directly responsible for foreign 
policy, his influence was palpable. Quite simply, Britain’s diplomacy over these years 
cannot be understood without reference to the Duke. From his time in Europe as a 
statesman of the first rank, through his friendship with Castlereagh and his rivalry with 
Canning, to his Premiership, Wellington was at the heart of affairs. He influenced the 
crafting of British foreign policy in a positive manner at times, such as his important 
part in the second Bourbon restoration, and in a negative one, as when he engaged in 
a drawn out rearguard action over the independence of Spanish America. His influence 
was profound.  
More than anything, Wellington’s attitudes were shaped by his time on the 
continent between 1814-18. Though he had previously had some experience with 
diplomacy, in India, Ireland and during the Peninsular War, this tended to be in the 
context of his military career, and from a relatively junior position. Instead, 
Wellington’s formative diplomatic experiences came in middle age between 1814-18. 
By the time that the war drew to a close, Wellington had accumulated a great amount 
of prestige and built up during the final years of the war a close working relationship 
with the ministers back in London. These factors combined meant that they decided 
to use the Duke to effect in the diplomatic arena, first as ambassador to Paris, and then 
as plenipotentiary to the Congress of Vienna.  
The year between the conclusion of hostilities in 1814 and Napoleon’s escape 
and Wellington’s return to the field in 1815 set the pattern for much of what followed. 
The Duke established a solid working relationship with Lord Castlereagh. The two 
shared a common outlook and their experiences together stood them in good stead. As 
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Charles Webster has argued, out of all of the politicians and envoys in British service, 
‘only Wellington, whose services as a diplomatist were invaluable to him, had in any 
way a policy of his own’.1 The Duke never sought to impose his own preferences on 
Castlereagh, or increase his influence at the Foreign Secretary’s expense. As a result, 
he was a trusted confidant and important sounding board for policies, even before they 
had reached the Prime Minister’s ear.2  This situation would continue once Wellington 
entered the Cabinet in 1819.3 Only in Castlereagh’s final days, as the toll of high office 
finally began to have its effect mentally and physically, would their relationship 
deteriorate from the friendly state it had been in for years.4  
The strength of their ‘special relationship’ in foreign affairs lay in their shared 
experiences of personal diplomacy on the Continent together, and this fact would 
figure as an important part of Wellington’s career. He would always prefer a quieter, 
more private, method of dealing with diplomatic problems. Never was he inclined to 
unleash a public broadside on other states in the manner Canning would, and he took 
great exception to the publication of dispatches.5 Foreign policy was not to be 
conducted in the public arena – that meant inviting misunderstandings and tensions 
unnecessarily. When there were differences with the Continental powers, as there were 
bound to be, their visibility should be reduced as much as possible. If this did not 
happen, as was the case with some of Canning’s policies, and with the conduct of 
Britain’s allies at the Congresses of Troppau and Verona, Wellington was deeply 
unimpressed. Speaking of the latter two occasions, Wellington told Metternich how 
he did not ‘pretend that upon either occasion the allies were bound to abandon their 
object to please the councils of this country’ but that instead ‘it would have been wise 
to conduct these transactions in such manner as that at least it might not be apparent 
to the world that we were separated from the allies’.6 
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Despite his preference for dealing with problems in a personal manner, 
Wellington was never an advocate of congresses or conferences. On this he shared an 
equal aversion as Canning, though the Duke has never received the praise that the 
Foreign Minister has been accorded for his views on this head. When a conference 
was proposed in 1824 on the matter of the Spanish Colonies in America, Wellington 
and Canning were as one on the need to reject the invitation. Where they differed was 
about ‘the whole tone & temper of Mr. Canning’s intended note’.7 Likewise, 
Wellington was a consistent advocate of non-intervention. He might never have put 
forward his views with the fluency of Castlereagh’s State Paper of 5 May 1820 or with 
the rhetorical flourish of Canning that ‘[w]e go to plant the standard of England on the 
well-known heights of Lisbon. Where that standard is planted, foreign dominion shall 
not come’. 8 Nevertheless, the Duke put his weight behind both. In the former case, 
Castlereagh’s State Paper was accompanied by a memorandum of Wellington’s and 
in the latter he was giving a speech in the Lords supporting Canning’s policy 
simultaneously with the Foreign Secretary’s.9 Despite this, however, the Duke always 
firmly believed in pursuing consensus on important problems. Aware of the suspicion 
that Britain could be held in on the Continent, he believed in the need to work with 
European partners, not against them, if British diplomacy was to be at its most 
effective. This was the course he advocated in 1825 over the tensions in the Near East, 
to take one example.10 
There is one aspect of Wellington’s diplomatic career that arose out of the 
circumstances of 1814-18 and would have a deep influence on his later conduct: his 
sense of his own exceptionalism. While he was undoubtedly a major and prestigious 
figure, his sense of his own importance and ability to direct events could work against 
him. As Commander-in-Chief of the Army of Occupation, the Duke certainly did have 
a preeminent position in European diplomacy. But this was fleeting. After his return 
to Britain he was no longer a European statesman to the same degree. The result was 
that time and time again, he would find that his own sense of the weight his voice 
carried would be out of sync with reality. No longer was he ‘l'homme nécessaire’, as 
                                                 
7 21 Jan. 1824, Journal of Mrs Arbuthnot, vol. I, p. 283. 
8 Castlereagh’s State Paper, 5 May 1820, in Foundations of British Foreign, pp. 48-63; 
Hansard, HC Debate, 12 Dec. 1826, vol. 16, cc. 350-69. See also Hinde, George Canning, pp. 421-2. 
9 Memorandum on difficulties of military intervention in Spain, Wellington, 16 Apr. 1820, 
WP1/644/7 (also in WND, vol. I, pp. 116-21); Hansard, HL Deb, 12 Dec. 1826, vol. 16, cc. 347-8. 
10 22 Nov. 1825, Journal of Mrs Arbuthnot, vol. I, p. 424. 
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Webster described him, as he was while encamped in Cambrai with 150,000 European 
soldiers under his command.11 Nevertheless, his position was still an exceptional one, 
even if not to the extent he believed it. He would continue to have the ear of major 
figures throughout his life and he was never simply a purely British statesman. 
Wellington, the Prince of Waterloo in the Netherlands, the Duke of Ciudad Rodrigo 
in Spain, Duke of Vitoria in Portugal and Field-Marshal, Marshal-General or Captain-
General in the armies of eight different states was not someone to be easily 
pigeonholed. The debt of gratitude he felt for these honours, and the memories of 
service under Europe collectively as Commander-in-Chief, left him with some sense 
of obligation towards other monarchs. Thus, in 1826 when on his mission to St 
Petersburg, Wellington went beyond what might have been prudent as a British 
diplomat, but what was in line with the previous frankness, openness, and willingness 
to offer advice regardless of whether he supported the underlying policy or not.12 
Wellington’s willingness to offer advice on the military aspects of intervention in 
Spain in 1822 has drawn criticism from historians, but as has been seen, was in line 
with his broader career and outlook.13 
These connections were, on occasion, turned to account in favour of British 
policy. This was most clearly the case during Wellington’s time in Cabinet alongside 
Castlereagh. Their shared outlook and understanding of each other’s tactics and 
strengths meant that the Foreign Secretary was willing to draw on the Duke’s 
connections. Wellington could then serve as a back room conduit, one able to push the 
British position in a frank and private way that would have been inappropriate for 
formal correspondence. Furthermore, he could act as an additional source of 
information for the Government, especially on military matters.14 Wellington then was 
not a typical diplomat for Britain, and certainly has been open to attack for some of 
this. But it should always be remembered that, if he was frank with foreign statesmen 
                                                 
11 Webster, Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, p.77-8. 
12 See above p. 152 and Memorandum, Wellington to Nesselrode, 11 March 1826, Wellington 
Mss., WP1/853/7 (also published in WND, vol. III, pp. 164-6). In many ways this also reflected the 
ambiguities of Wellington’s domestic political situation for much of this period. 
13 See above p. 111-3. 
14 See above p. 77. For an example of Wellington’s informal efforts at explaining the British 
position see Wellington to Pozzo di Borgo, 18 May 1819, Wellington Mss., WP1/626/4 (also in WND, 
vol. I, pp. 65-7); for military intelligence see Wellington to Castlereagh, 4 Apr. 1819, enclosing a letter 





when it would have better to been coy, it was on the very basis of his solid trustworthy 
nature that Wellington had first achieved his eminent status in Europe. Military 
prestige was not enough on its own.  
Wellington found that himself when he became Prime Minister. There were 
early hopes that his mere presence would reassure the Ottomans and help avert war, 
but these would prove unfounded.15 The same was the case for many of the Duke’s 
own expectations. He proved unable to surmount the difficulties left to him, such as 
the Finance Committee or Canning’s flawed Treaty of London. Overwhelmed by the 
situation facing him, Wellington almost retreated into bitterness and suspicion, 
looking for enemies at home and abroad. British ambassadors felt his ire, in the form 
of Lamb in Portugal and Heytesbury in Russia, and the Lievens falling out with the 
Duke left a permanent sour note over relations with the Tsar. Long after he should 
have been able to deal with Canning’s legacy, he was still complaining about the 
former Prime Minister. On top of all of this, the Duke also got into problems of his 
own making. A strict adherence to France and devotion to a strict legalist outlook left 
the diplomacy of the British Government rigid and liable to be outmanoeuvred by 
others. Thus France was able to dispatch troops to the Morea and later to launch her 
expedition to Algiers, and Portugal would remain a constant thorn in Wellington’s 
side, with the refugees in Plymouth causing them some embarrassment.  
By taking a pragmatic line in diplomatic problems and steering a middle course 
through the troubled waters of the late 1820s, Wellington did himself a disservice. His 
disdain for principles left his policy unsupported by the ideological props that were 
becoming increasingly crucial in a dynamic age.16 The lack of strategic planning on 
his part undermined the ability of Britain to reach resolutions on the issues confronting 
them. Thus, when Wellington’s Government fell, the two main problems of his tenure, 
Greece and Portugal, were left unresolved. It would be Palmerston who took the credit 
on both, much as he would over Belgium, despite Wellington laying the groundwork. 
The French Revolution of 1830 was one of the supreme ironies of Wellington’s 
diplomatic career from 1814-30. It marked the end of the European settlement as the 
Duke knew it. The eruption of ideological fervour in Europe and Britain meant that 
                                                 
15 See above pp. 173-4 and 19 Feb. 1828, Journal of Mrs Arbuthnot, vol. II, p. 163.  
16 Muir, Wellington, vol. II, p.365. 
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Wellington’s policy of conducting diplomacy quietly, out of the public eye, was no 
longer viable. The Great Reform Act would compound this fact, and it would be Lord 
Palmerston who stepped up to the new challenges and methods needed. Yet, for all of 
that, Wellington’s handling of the French Revolution was potentially his crowning 
achievement. It marked the one time that he truly took the reins, using his considerable 
knowledge and skill to steer Britain and Europe out of a very dangerous situation, that 
could easily have ended in war. No other issue had seen such clearheaded analysis and 
determination. Within days, Wellington was convinced of the need to acknowledge 
the overthrow of the Bourbons. Though ‘[t]here are some bitter pills to swallow’, he 
wrote to Aberdeen, ‘the cockade; the apparently verbal, but in fact real and essential 
alterations of the charter; the act of placing it under the sauvegarde of the national 
guard; the line assumed by Lafayette. However, the best chance of peace is to swallow 
them all’. He saw clearly, that if Britain did not quarrel with the French then ‘they 
must set these matters to rights or quarrel among themselves or quarrel with us. Any 
one of these would be better for us and for the world than that we should at this moment 
quarrel with them’. Having been constrained by treaties, committees, cabinets and 
allies, the Revolution was finally an issue on which Wellington was free of them. In 
his mind, there was ‘nothing more clear than that what has occurred is at most a case 
for deliberation’. He also noted with some satisfaction that he believed ‘that there is 
not a power in Europe who will not be relieved from a load of anxiety when it will be 
known that we have recognized the new government’.17 On this he was right, and the 
other powers followed the British lead, though Russia with a lot less willingness and 
a lot more bluster and military preparation than any other power.18 One cannot help 
but wonder how the foreign policy of his Government might have proceeded had 
Wellington pursued all the problems confronting him with the same vigour and 
decision.  
Ultimately, he did not, and his reputation has suffered as a result. When 
Wellington died, he was buried as a great military hero and a non-partisan figure. Thus 
was buried his political role and his diplomatic one. As one of his biographers has 
argued, to just focus on the military aspect of his career was ‘at best a partial view of 
Wellington’s career which seriously distorted the story of his life’. However, while 
                                                 
17 Wellington to Aberdeen, 12 Aug. 1830, Wellington Mss., WP1/1137/33.  
18 Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, p. 670. 
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Muir has stated that ‘any examination of Wellington’s life shows that his political and 
military careers were closely intertwined and that one cannot be properly understood 
without the other’, this does not go far enough. 19 This thesis has re-established 
Wellington as a major political and diplomatic figure in his own right by giving this 
part of his career the full attention it deserves. Without an appreciation of the Duke’s 
deep involvement in Britain’s foreign policy, neither he nor the diplomacy of this 
period can be understood.  
There is far more work still to do both on Wellington and British foreign policy 
in the early-nineteenth century. While 1830 marked a clear dividing line in his 
diplomatic career, the Duke continued to have an influence in different forms. His 
tenure as Foreign Secretary and his role in Peel’s second government need further 
consideration. His efforts in the latter to increase British defences against France is a 
notable change from his earlier adherence to France and his quick acceptance of the 
July Monarchy. As his Parliamentary role took on greater prominence as well, so his 
speaking on foreign policy there needs to receive more consideration. However, the 
need for further work is not limited to Wellington. The fact that this is the first work 
to examine Peel’s involvement in foreign policy before his 1841-6 administration is 
telling of the scholarly neglect of this area. Lords Aberdeen, Ellenborough and 
Bathurst are all influential figures who have not had their impact sufficiently studied. 
All these statesmen were people whose formative political experiences were in the 
French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, yet this fact has never received any 
attention. It is the author’s hope that this will be corrected in future research in the way 
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